Distributions of observed death tolls govern sensitivity to human fatalities

Loss aversion, the endowment effect, and gain-loss framing shape preferences for noninstrumental information

We often talk about interacting with information as we would with a physical good (e.g., "consuming content") and describe our attachment to personal beliefs in the same way as our attachment to personal belongings (e.g., "holding on to" or "letting go of" our beliefs). But do we in fact value information the way we do objects? The valuation of money and material goods has been extensively researched, but surprisingly few insights from this literature have been applied to the study of information valuation. This paper demonstrates that two fundamental features of how we value money and material goods embodied in Prospect Theory-loss aversion and different risk preferences for gains versus losses-also hold true for information, even when it has no material value. Study 1 establishes loss aversion for noninstrumental information by showing that people are less likely to choose a gamble when the same outcome is framed as a loss (rather than gain) of information. Study 2 shows that people exhibit the endowment effect for noninstrumental information, and so value information more, simply by virtue of "owning" it. Study 3 provides a conceptual replication of the classic "Asian Disease" gain-loss pattern of risk preferences, but with facts instead of human lives, thereby also documenting a gain-loss framing effect for noninstrumental information. These findings represent a critical step in building a theoretical analogy between information and objects, and provide a useful perspective on why we often resist changing (or losing) our beliefs.

The effects of embodying wildlife in virtual reality on conservation behaviors

Efforts to mitigate environmental threats are often inversely related to the magnitude of casualty, human or otherwise. This “compassion fade” can be explained, in part, by differential processing of large- versus small-scale threats: it is difficult to form empathic connections with unfamiliar masses versus singular victims. Despite robust findings, little is known about how non-human casualty is processed, and what strategies override this bias. Across four experiments, we show how embodying threatened megafauna-Loggerhead sea turtles (Caretta Caretta)-using virtual reality can offset and reverse compassion fade. After observing compassion fade during exposure to non-human casualty in virtual reality (Study 1; N = 60), we then tested a custom virtual reality simulation designed to facilitate body transfer with a threatened Loggerhead sea turtle (Study 2; N = 98). Afterwards, a field experiment (Study 3; N = 90) testing the simulation with varied number of victims showed body transfer offset compassion fade. Lastly, a fourth study (N = 25) found that charitable giving among users embodying threatened wildlife was highest when exposed to one versus several victims, though this effect was reversed if victims were of a different species. The findings demonstrate how animal embodiment in virtual reality alters processing of environmental threats and non-human casualty, thereby influencing conservation outcomes.

The More Who Die, the Less We Care: Evidence from Natural Language Analysis of Online News Articles and Social Media Posts

Considerable amount of laboratory and survey-based research finds that people show disproportional compassionate and affective response to the scope of human mortality risk. According to research on "psychic numbing," it is often the case that the more who die, the less we care. In the present article, we examine the extent of this phenomenon in verbal behavior, using large corpora of natural language to quantify the affective reactions to loss of life. We analyze valence, arousal, and specific emotional content of over 100,000 mentions of death in news articles and social media posts, and find that language shows an increase in valence (i.e., decreased negative affect) and a decrease in arousal when describing mortality of larger numbers of people. These patterns are most clearly reflected in specific emotions of joy and (in a reverse fashion) of fear and anger. Our results showcase a novel methodology for studying affective decision making, and highlight the robustness and real-world relevance of psychic numbing. They also offer new insights regarding the psychological underpinnings of psychic numbing, as well as possible interventions for reducing psychic numbing and overcoming social and psychological barriers to action in the face of the world's most serious threats.

Losing my loss aversion: The effects of current and past environment on the relative sensitivity to losses and gains

It is often assumed that most people are loss averse, placing more weight on losses than commensurate gains; however, some research identifies variability in loss sensitivity that reflects features of the environment. We examined this plasticity in loss sensitivity by manipulating the size and distribution of possible outcomes in a set of mixed gambles, and assessing individual stability in loss sensitivity. In each of two sessions, participants made accept-reject decisions for 64 mixed-outcome gambles. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions defined by the relative range of losses and gains (wider range of losses vs. wider range of gains), and the currency-units at stake (‘pennies’ vs. ‘pounds’). Participants showed modest but non-trivial consistency in their sensitivity to losses; though loss sensitivity also varied substantially with our manipulations. When possible gains had greater range than possible losses, most participants were loss averse; however, when possible losses had the greater range, reverse loss aversion was the norm (i.e., more weight on gains than losses). This is consistent with decision-by-sampling theory, whereby an outcome’s rank within a consideration-set determines its value, but can also be explained by the gamble’s expected-value rank within the decision-set, or by adapting aspirations to the decision-environment. Loss aversion was also reduced in the second session of decisions when the stakes had been higher in the previous session. This illustrates the influence of prior context on current sensitivity to losses, and suggests a role for idiosyncratic experiences in the development of individual differences in loss sensitivity.

The Psychophysics of Terror Attack Casualty Counts

In communicating the risk that terror attacks pose to the public, government agencies and other organizations must understand which characteristics of an attack contribute to the public's perception of its severity. An attack's casualty count is one of the most commonly used metrics of a terror attack's severity, yet it is unclear whether the public responds to information about casualty count when forming affective and cognitive reactions to terror attacks. This study sought to characterize the "psychophysical function" relating terror attack casualty counts to the severity of the affective and cognitive reactions they elicit. We recruited n = 684 Mechanical Turk participants to read a realistic vignette depicting either a biological or radiological terror attack, whose death toll ranged from 20 to 50,000, and rated their levels of fear and anger along with the attack's severity. Even when controlling for the perceived plausibility of the scenarios, participants' severity ratings of each attack were logarithmic with respect to casualty count, while ratings of fear and anger did not significantly depend on casualty count. These results were consistent across attack weapon (biological vs. radiological) and time horizon of the casualties (same-day or anticipated to occur over several years). These results complement past work on life loss valuation and highlight a potential bifurcation between the public's affective and cognitive evaluations of terror attacks.

Decision contamination in the wild: Sequential dependencies in online review ratings

Current judgments are systematically biased by prior judgments. Such biases occur in ways that seem to reflect the cognitive system's ability to adapt to statistical regularities within the environment. These cognitive sequential dependencies have primarily been evaluated in carefully controlled laboratory experiments. In this study, we used these well-known laboratory findings to guide our analysis of two datasets, consisting of over 2.2 million business review ratings from Yelp and 4.2 million movie and television review ratings from Amazon. We explored how within-reviewer ratings are influenced by previous ratings. Our findings suggest a contrast effect: Current ratings are systematically biased away from prior ratings, and the magnitude of this bias decays over several reviews. This work is couched within a broader program that aims to use well-established laboratory findings to guide our understanding of patterns in naturally occurring and large-scale behavioral data.

Numerical magnitude evaluation as a foundation for decision making

The evaluation of magnitudes serves as a foundation not only for numerical and mathematical cognition, but also for decision making. Recent theoretical developments and empirical studies have linked numerical magnitude evaluation to a wide variety of core phenomena in decision making and challenge the idea that preferences are driven by an innate, universal, and stable sense of number or value.

Searching Choices: Quantifying Decision-Making Processes Using Search Engine Data

When making a decision, humans consider two types of information: information they have acquired through their prior experience of the world, and further information they gather to support the decision in question. Here, we present evidence that data from search engines such as Google can help us model both sources of information. We show that statistics from search engines on the frequency of content on the Internet can help us estimate the statistical structure of prior experience; and, specifically, we outline how such statistics can inform psychological theories concerning the valuation of human lives, or choices involving delayed outcomes. Turning to information gathering, we show that search query data might help measure human information gathering, and it may predict subsequent decisions. Such data enable us to compare information gathered across nations, where analyses suggest, for example, a greater focus on the future in countries with a higher per capita GDP. We conclude that search engine data constitute a valuable new resource for cognitive scientists, offering a fascinating new tool for understanding the human decision-making process.

Concepts for communication about risk in dementia care: A review of the literature

Communication about risk is central to decisions in dementia care. This review synthesises research on risk concepts and communication in dementia. Twelve bibliographic databases and one online search engine were searched up to February 2016. Reference lists of two related literature reviews were used. Thirty-four articles were identified that focused on risk concepts; two articles related to risk communication. Concepts were often socially constructed, and perceptions may differ from actual adverse outcomes. Perceptions of risk and thresholds of risk-tolerance varied between individuals with dementia, carers and professionals. Individuals with dementia were found to behave differently from controls when making decisions involving risk information in experimental settings. Cognitive impairment was also associated with lower health numeracy. These findings highlight the importance of communication between stakeholders when making decisions and of presenting information in an appropriate way to support informed and positive risk taking. Research is required on risk communication in dementia.

Using big data to predict collective behavior in the real world

Recent studies provide convincing evidence that data on online information gathering, alongside massive real-world datasets, can give new insights into real-world collective decision making and can even anticipate future actions. We argue that Bentley et al.'s timely account should consider the full breadth, and, above all, the predictive power of big data.

Do Student Evaluations of University Reflect Inaccurate Beliefs or Actual Experience? A Relative Rank Model

It was shown that student satisfaction ratings are influenced by context in ways that have important theoretical and practical implications. Using questions from the UK's National Student Survey, the study examined whether and how students' expressed satisfaction with issues such as feedback promptness and instructor enthusiasm depends on the context of comparison (such as possibly inaccurate beliefs about the feedback promptness or enthusiasm experienced at other universities) that is evoked. Experiment 1 found strong effects of experimentally provided comparison context—for example, satisfaction with a given feedback time depended on the time's relative position within a context. Experiment 2 used a novel distribution-elicitation methodology to determine the prior beliefs of individual students about what happens in universities other than their own. It found that these beliefs vary widely and that students' satisfaction was predicted by how they believed their experience ranked within the distribution of others' experiences. A third study found that relative judgement principles also predicted students' intention to complain. An extended model was developed to show that purely rank-based principles of judgement can account for findings previously attributed to range effects. It was concluded that satisfaction ratings and quality of provision are different quantities, particularly when the implicit context of comparison includes beliefs about provision at other universities. Quality and satisfaction should be assessed separately, with objective measures (such as actual times to feedback), rather than subjective ratings (such as satisfaction with feedback promptness), being used to measure quality wherever practicable. © 2014 The Authors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Characterizing the time-perspective of nations with search engine query data

Vast quantities of data on human behavior are being created by our everyday internet usage. Building upon a recent study by Preis, Moat, Stanley, and Bishop (2012), we used search engine query data to construct measures of the time-perspective of nations, and tested these measures against per-capita gross domestic product (GDP). The results indicate that nations with higher per-capita GDP are more focused on the future and less on the past, and that when these nations do focus on the past, it is more likely to be the distant past. These results demonstrate the viability of using nation-level data to build psychological constructs.

Lifespan and aggregate size variables in specifications of mortality or survivorship

A specification of mortality or survivorship provides respective explicit details about mortality's or survivorship's relationships with one or more other variables (e.g., age, sex, etc.). Previous studies have discovered and analyzed diverse specifications of mortality or survivorship; these discoveries and analyses suggest that additional specifications of mortality or survivorship have yet to be discovered and analyzed. In consistency with previous research, multivariable limited powered polynomials regression analyses of mortality and survivorship of selected humans (Swedes, 1760-2008) and selected insects (caged medflies) show age-specific, historical-time-specific, environmental-context-specific, and sex-specific mortality and survivorship. These analyses also present discoveries of hitherto unknown lifespan-specific, contemporary-aggregate-size-specific, and lifespan-aggregate-size-specific mortality and survivorship. The results of this investigation and results of previous research help identify variables for inclusion in regression models of mortality or survivorship. Moreover, these results and results of previous research strengthen the suggestion that additional specifications of mortality or survivorship have yet to be discovered and analyzed, and they also suggest that specifications of mortality and survivorship indicate corresponding specifications of frailty and vitality. Furthermore, the present analyses reveal the usefulness of a multivariable limited powered polynomials regression model-building approach. This article shows that much has yet to be learned about specifications of mortality or survivorship of diverse kinds of individuals in diverse times and places.

Books average previous decade of economic misery

For the 20^th century since the Depression, we find a strong correlation between a ‘literary misery index’ derived from English language books and a moving average of the previous decade of the annual U.S. economic misery index, which is the sum of inflation and unemployment rates. We find a peak in the goodness of fit at 11 years for the moving average. The fit between the two misery indices holds when using different techniques to measure the literary misery index, and this fit is significantly better than other possible correlations with different emotion indices. To check the robustness of the results, we also analysed books written in German language and obtained very similar correlations with the German economic misery index. The results suggest that millions of books published every year average the authors' shared economic experiences over the past decade.

The risks we dread: a social circle account

What makes some risks dreadful? We propose that people are particularly sensitive to threats that could kill the number of people that is similar to the size of a typical human social circle. Although there is some variability in reported sizes of social circles, active contact rarely seems to be maintained with more than about 100 people. The loss of this immediate social group may have had survival consequences in the past and still causes great distress to people today. Therefore we hypothesize that risks that threaten a much larger number of people (e.g., 1000) will not be dreaded more than those that threaten to kill "only" the number of people typical for social circles. We found support for this hypothesis in 9 experiments using different risk scenarios, measurements of fear, and samples from different countries. Fear of risks killing 100 people was higher than fear of risks killing 10 people, but there was no difference in fear of risks killing 100 or 1000 people (Experiments 1-4, 7-9). Also in support of the hypothesis, the median number of deaths that would cause maximum level of fear was 100 (Experiments 5 and 6). These results are not a consequence of lack of differentiation between the numbers 100 and 1000 (Experiments 7 and 8), and are different from the phenomenon of "psychophysical numbing" that occurs in the context of altruistic behavior towards members of other communities rather than in the context of threat to one's own community (Experiment 9). We discuss several possible explanations of these findings. Our results stress the importance of considering social environments when studying people's understanding of and reactions to risks.

How can group experience influence the cue priority? A re-examination of the ambiguity-ambivalence hypothesis

Since the discovery of the “framing effect” by Kahneman and Tversky, the sensitivity of the “framing effect” – its appearance and in some cases its disappearance – has long been an object of study. However there is little agreement as to the reasons for this sensitivity. The “ambiguity-ambivalence hypothesis” (Wang, 2008) aims to systematically explain the sensitivity of this effect by paying particular attention to people’s cue priority: it states that the framing effect occurs when verbal framing is used to compensate for the absence of higher prioritized decision cues. The main purpose of our study is to examine and develop this hypothesis by examining cue priority given differences in people’s “group experience.” The main result is that the framing effect is absent when the choice problem is presented in a group context that reflects the actual size of the group that the participant has had experience with. Thus, in order to understand the choices that people make in life and death decisions, it is important to incorporate the decision maker’s group experience explicitly into the ambiguity-ambivalence hypothesis.

How incidental values from the environment affect decisions about money, risk, and delay

How different are £0.50 and £1.50, “a small chance” and “a good chance,” or “three months” and “nine months”? Our studies show that people behave as if the differences between these values are altered by incidental everyday experiences. Preference for a £1.50 lottery rather than a £0.50 lottery was stronger among individuals exposed to intermediate supermarket prices than among those exposed to lower or higher prices. Preference for “a good chance” rather than “a small chance” of winning a lottery was stronger among participants who predicted intermediate probabilities of rain than among those who predicted lower or higher chances of rain. Preference for consumption in “three months” rather than “nine months” was stronger among participants who planned for an intermediate birthday than among participants who planned for a sooner or later birthday. These fluctuations directly challenge economic accounts that translate monies, risks, and delays into subjective equivalents with stable functions. The decision-by-sampling model—in which subjective values are rank positions constructed from comparisons with samples—predicts these effects and indicates a primary role for sampling in decision making.