Naming guides how 12-month-old infants encode and remember objects

How labels shape visuocortical processing in infants

The current study examined the extent to which labels shape visuocortical processing during the first year of life during a brief (~6-min) associative learning task. Images of computer-generated artificial objects were paired with either individual-level (e.g., Jimmy, Boris) or category-level labels (e.g., Hitchel) while event-related potentials were recorded in response to the onset of the visual stimulus in 6- (n = 41), 9- (n = 27), and 12-month-old (n = 28) infants. Analyses examined experience-dependent visuocortical changes within and across trials, label conditions, and ages. Overall, results demonstrate that infants deploy greater visuocortical resources during the first half of associative learning trials and to stimuli paired with category-level relative to individual-level labels. Waveform morphologies also differed between stimuli paired with individual- and category-level labels and across the age groups, with more complex deflections and amplitude differences between label type at 9- and 12-month-olds, but not 6-month-old infants. The present results highlight the importance of associative learning during infancy and suggest that category- versus individual-level labels differentially direct infant attention and visuocortical processing.

Active control over exploration improves memory in toddlers

Across two experiments, we implemented a novel gaze-contingent eye-tracking paradigm to investigate the early emergence of memory benefits from active control over exploration and to examine how exploratory behaviours affect memory formation in early development. Toddlers (experiment 1: n = 36, 18-36 months; experiment 2: n = 41, 23-36 months) were either allowed to actively control their exploration (active condition) or presented with the same information that they could only passively observe (passive condition in experiment 1; yoked condition in experiment 2). They were then tested in a preferential-looking paradigm in which familiar versus novel stimuli were presented in pairs. Evidence from eye-movement patterns indicates that toddlers demonstrate improved recognition memory when given active control over learning. Toddlers' pace of learning (i.e. visitation rate) explains the recognition improvement in their active exploration. Their memory improvement is also related to individual differences in the systematicity of exploratory behaviour (i.e. sequence entropy). These findings suggest that toddlers exhibit more sophisticated exploratory strategies than previously believed, revealing the early emergence and development of their ability to adapt these strategies to enhance memory and therefore support learning.

Talking About the Absent and the Abstract: Referential Communication in Language and Gesture

Human language permits us to call to mind objects, events, and ideas that we cannot witness directly, either because they are absent or because they have no physical form (e.g., people we have not met, concepts like justice). What enables language to transmit such knowledge? We propose that a referential link between words, referents, and mental representations of those referents is key. This link enables us to form, access, and modify mental representations even when the referents themselves are absent ("absent reference"). In this review we consider the developmental and evolutionary origins of absent reference, integrating previously disparate literatures on absent reference in language and gesture in very young humans and gesture in nonhuman primates. We first evaluate when and how infants acquire absent reference during the process of language acquisition. With this as a foundation, we consider the evidence for absent reference in gesture in infants and in nonhuman primates. Finally, having woven these literatures together, we highlight new lines of research that promise to sharpen our understanding of the development of reference and its role in learning about the absent and the abstract.

The nature of label-induced categories: preverbal infants represent surface features and category symbols

Humans categorize objects not only based on perceptual features (e.g. red, rounded), but also function (e.g. used to transport people). Category membership can be communicated via labelling (e.g. 'apple', 'vehicle'). While it is well established that even preverbal infants rely on labels to learn categories, it remains unclear what is the nature of those categories: whether they simply contain sets of visual features diagnostic of category membership, or whether they additionally contain abstract category markers or symbols (e.g. linguistic in the form of category labels or non-linguistic). To address this question, we first used labelling to teach two novel object categories, each composed of unfamiliar visually unrelated objects, to adults and nine-month-olds. Then, we assessed categorization in an electroencephalography category-oddball task. Both adults and infants displayed stronger neural responses to the infrequent category, which, in the absence of visual features shared by all category members, indicates that the categories they set up contained feature-independent category markers. Well before language production starts, labels help infants to discover categories without relying on perceptual similarities across objects and build category representations with summary elements that may be critical for the development of abstract thought.

Introducing Mr. Three: Attention, Perception, and Meaning Selection in the Acquisition of Number and Color Words

Children learn their first number words gradually over the course of many months, which is surprising given their ability to discriminate small numerosities. One potential explanation for this is that children are sensitive to the numerical features of stimuli, but don't consider exact cardinality as a primary hypothesis for novel word meanings. To test this, we trained 144 children on a number word they hadn't yet learned, and contrasted this with a condition in which they were merely required to attend to number to identify the word's referent, without encoding number as its meaning. In the first condition, children were trained to find a "giraffe with three spots." In the second condition, children were instead trained to find "Mr. Three", which also named a giraffe with three spots. In both conditions, children had to attend to number to identify the target giraffe, but, because proper nouns refer to individuals rather than their properties, the second condition did not require children to encode number as the meaning of the expression. We found that children were significantly better at identifying the giraffe when it had been labeled with the proper noun than with the number word. This finding contrasted with a second experiment involving color words, in which children (n = 56) were equally successful with a proper noun ("Mr. Purple") and an adjective ("the giraffe with purple spots"). Together, these findings suggest that, for number, but not for color, children's difficulty acquiring new words cannot be solely attributed to problems with attention or perception, but instead may be due to difficulty selecting the correct meaning from their hypothesis space for learning unknown words.

Developmental origin of a language-cognition interface in infants: Gateway to advancing core knowledge?

Spelke's sweeping proposal requires greater precision in specifying the place of language in early cognition. We now know by 3 months of age, infants have already begun to forge a link between language and core cognition. This precocious link, which unfolds dynamically over development, may indeed offer an entry point for acquiring higher-order, abstract conceptual and representational capacities.

Causal Influence of Linguistic Learning on Perceptual and Conceptual Processing: A Brain-Constrained Deep Neural Network Study of Proper Names and Category Terms

Language influences cognitive and conceptual processing, but the mechanisms through which such causal effects are realized in the human brain remain unknown. Here, we use a brain-constrained deep neural network model of category formation and symbol learning and analyze the emergent model's internal mechanisms at the neural circuit level. In one set of simulations, the network was presented with similar patterns of neural activity indexing instances of objects and actions belonging to the same categories. Biologically realistic Hebbian learning led to the formation of instance-specific neurons distributed across multiple areas of the network, and, in addition, to cell assembly circuits of "shared" neurons responding to all category instances-the network correlates of conceptual categories. In two separate sets of simulations, the network learned the same patterns together with symbols for individual instances ["proper names" (PN)] or symbols related to classes of instances sharing common features ["category terms" (CT)]. Learning CT remarkably increased the number of shared neurons in the network, thereby making category representations more robust while reducing the number of neurons of instance-specific ones. In contrast, proper name learning prevented a substantial reduction of instance-specific neurons and blocked the overgrowth of category general cells. Representational similarity analysis further confirmed that the neural activity patterns of category instances became more similar to each other after category-term learning, relative to both learning with PN and without any symbols. These network-based mechanisms for concepts, PN, and CT explain why and how symbol learning changes object perception and memory, as revealed by experimental studies.

Local similarity and global variability characterize the semantic space of human languages

How does meaning vary across the world's languages? Scholars recognize the existence of substantial variability within specific domains, ranging from nature and color to kinship. The emergence of large language models enables a systems-level approach that directly characterizes this variability through comparison of word organization across semantic domains. Here, we show that meanings across languages manifest lower variability within semantic domains and greater variability between them, using models trained on both 1) large corpora of native language text comprising Wikipedia articles in 35 languages and also 2) Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) essays written by 38,500 speakers from the same native languages, which cluster into semantic domains. Concrete meanings vary less across languages than abstract meanings, but all vary with geographical, environmental, and cultural distance. By simultaneously examining local similarity and global difference, we harmonize these findings and provide a description of general principles that govern variability in semantic space across languages. In this way, the structure of a speaker's semantic space influences the comparisons cognitively salient to them, as shaped by their native language, and suggests that even successful bilingual communicators likely think with "semantic accents" driven by associations from their native language while writing English. These findings have dramatic implications for language education, cross-cultural communication, and literal translations, which are impossible not because the objects of reference are uncertain, but because associations, metaphors, and narratives interlink meanings in different, predictable ways from one language to another.

Longer looks for language: Novel labels lengthen fixation duration for 2-year-old children

The language infants hear guides their visual attention; infants look more to objects when they are labeled. However, it is unclear whether labels also change the way infants attend to and encode those objects-that is, whether hearing an object label changes infants' online visual processing of that object. Here, we examined this question in the context of novel word learning, asking whether nuanced measures of visual attention, specifically fixation durations, change when 2-year-olds hear a label for a novel object (e.g., "Look at the dax") compared with when they hear a non-labeling phrase (e.g., "Look at that"). Results confirmed that children visually process objects differently when they are labeled, using longer fixations to examine labeled objects versus unlabeled objects. Children also showed robust retention of these labels on a subsequent test trial, suggesting that these longer fixations accompanied successful word learning. Moreover, when children were presented with the same objects again in a silent re-exposure phase, children's fixations were again longer when looking at the previously labeled objects. Finally, fixation duration at first exposure and silent re-exposure were correlated, indicating a persistent effect of language on visual processing. These effects of hearing labels on visual attention point to the critical interactions involved in cross-modal learning and emphasize the benefits of looking beyond aggregate measures of attention to identify cognitive learning mechanisms during infancy.

Neurobiological mechanisms for language, symbols and concepts: Clues from brain-constrained deep neural networks

Neural networks are successfully used to imitate and model cognitive processes. However, to provide clues about the neurobiological mechanisms enabling human cognition, these models need to mimic the structure and function of real brains. Brain-constrained networks differ from classic neural networks by implementing brain similarities at different scales, ranging from the micro- and mesoscopic levels of neuronal function, local neuronal links and circuit interaction to large-scale anatomical structure and between-area connectivity. This review shows how brain-constrained neural networks can be applied to study in silico the formation of mechanisms for symbol and concept processing and to work towards neurobiological explanations of specifically human cognitive abilities. These include verbal working memory and learning of large vocabularies of symbols, semantic binding carried by specific areas of cortex, attention focusing and modulation driven by symbol type, and the acquisition of concrete and abstract concepts partly influenced by symbols. Neuronal assembly activity in the networks is analyzed to deliver putative mechanistic correlates of higher cognitive processes and to develop candidate explanations founded in established neurobiological principles.

A principled link between object naming and representation is available to infants by seven months of age

By their first birthdays, infants represent objects flexibly as a function of not only whether but how the objects are named. Applying the same name to a set of different objects from the same category supports object categorization, with infants encoding commonalities among objects at the expense of individuating details. In contrast, applying a distinct name to each object supports individuation, with infants encoding distinct features at the expense of categorical information. Here, we consider the development of this nuanced link between naming and representation in infants' first year. Infants at 12 months (Study 1; N = 55) and 7 months (Study 2; N = 96) participated in an online recognition memory task. All infants saw the same objects, but their recognition of these objects at test varied as a function of how they had been named. At both ages, infants successfully recognized objects that had been named with distinct labels but failed to recognize these objects when they had all been named with the same, consistent label. This new evidence demonstrates that a principled link between object naming and representation is available by 7 months, early enough to support infants as they begin mapping words to meaning.

Consequences of phonological variation for algorithmic word segmentation

Over the first year, infants begin to learn the words of their language. Previous work suggests that certain statistical regularities in speech could help infants segment the speech stream into words, thereby forming a proto-lexicon that could support learning of the eventual vocabulary. However, computational models of word segmentation have typically been tested using language input that is much less variable than actual speech is. We show that using actual, transcribed pronunciations rather than dictionary pronunciations of the same speech leads to worse segmentation performance across models. We also find that phonologically variable input poses serious problems for lexicon building, because even correctly segmented word forms exhibit a complex, many-to-many relationship with speakers' intended words. Many phonologically distinct word forms were actually the same intended word, and many identical transcriptions came from different intended words. The fact that previous models appear to have substantially overestimated the utility of simple statistical heuristics suggests a need to consider the formation of the lexicon in infancy differently.

Objects in a social world: Infants' object representational capacity limits are shaped by objects' social relevance

Several decades of research have revealed consistent signature limits on infants' ability to represent objects. However, these signature representational limits were established with methods that often removed objects from their most common context. In infants' everyday lives, objects are very often social artifacts: they are the targets of agents' goal-directed actions, communications, and beliefs, and may have social content or relevance themselves. In this chapter, we explore the relationship between infants' object representational capacity limits and their processing of the social world. We review evidence that the social content and context of objects can shift infants' object representational limits. We discuss how taking the social world into account can yield more robust and ecologically valid estimates of infants' early representational capacities.

Influence of language on perception and concept formation in a brain-constrained deep neural network model

A neurobiologically constrained model of semantic learning in the human brain was used to simulate the acquisition of concrete and abstract concepts, either with or without verbal labels. Concept acquisition and semantic learning were simulated using Hebbian learning mechanisms. We measured the network's category learning performance, defined as the extent to which it successfully (i) grouped partly overlapping perceptual instances into a single (abstract or concrete) conceptual representation, while (ii) still distinguishing representations for distinct concepts. Co-presence of linguistic labels with perceptual instances of a given concept generally improved the network's learning of categories, with a significantly larger beneficial effect for abstract than concrete concepts. These results offer a neurobiological explanation for causal effects of language structure on concept formation and on perceptuo-motor processing of instances of these concepts: supplying a verbal label during concept acquisition improves the cortical mechanisms by which experiences with objects and actions along with the learning of words lead to the formation of neuronal ensembles for specific concepts and meanings. Furthermore, the present results make a novel prediction, namely, that such 'Whorfian' effects should be modulated by the concreteness/abstractness of the semantic categories being acquired, with language labels supporting the learning of abstract concepts more than that of concrete ones. This article is part of the theme issue 'Concepts in interaction: social engagement and inner experiences'.

Visual object categorization in infancy

Categorization is the basis of thinking and reasoning. Through the analysis of infants’ gaze, we describe the trajectory through which visual object representations in infancy incrementally match categorical object representations as mapped onto adults’ visual cortex. Using a methodological approach that allows for a comparison of findings obtained with behavioral and brain measures in infants and adults, we identify the transition from visual exploration guided by perceptual salience to an organization of objects by categories, which begins with the animate–inanimate distinction in the first months of life and continues with a spurt of biologically relevant categories (human bodies, nonhuman bodies, nonhuman faces, small natural objects) through the second year of life.

Humans make sense of the world by organizing things into categories. When and how does this process begin? We investigated whether real-world object categories that spontaneously emerge in the first months of life match categorical representations of objects in the human visual cortex. Using eye tracking, we measured the differential looking time of 4-, 10-, and 19-mo-olds as they looked at pairs of pictures belonging to eight animate or inanimate categories (human/nonhuman, faces/bodies, real-world size big/small, natural/artificial). Taking infants’ looking times as a measure of similarity, for each age group, we defined a representational space where each object was defined in relation to others of the same or of a different category. This space was compared with hypothesis-based and functional MRI-based models of visual object categorization in the adults’ visual cortex. Analyses across different age groups showed that, as infants grow older, their looking behavior matches neural representations in ever-larger portions of the adult visual cortex, suggesting progressive recruitment and integration of more and more feature spaces distributed over the visual cortex. Moreover, the results characterize infants’ visual categorization as an incremental process with two milestones. Between 4 and 10 mo, visual exploration guided by saliency gives way to an organization according to the animate–inanimate distinction. Between 10 and 19 mo, a category spurt leads toward a mature organization. We propose that these changes underlie the coupling between seeing and thinking in the developing mind.

Sparse labels, no problems: Infant categorization under challenging conditions

Labeling promotes infants' object categorization even when labels are rare. By 2 years, infants engage in "semi-supervised learning" (SSL), integrating labeled and unlabeled exemplars to learn categories. However, everyday learning contexts pose substantial challenges for infants' SSL. Here, two studies (n = 74, 51% female, 62% non-Hispanic White, 18% multiracial, 8% Asian, 6% Black, M_age  = 27.3 months, collected 2018-2020) implemented a familiarization-novelty preference paradigm assessing 2-year-olds' SSL when (i) exemplars from the target category are interspersed with other objects (Study 1, d = .67) and (ii) multiple categories are learned simultaneously (Study 2, d = .74). The findings indicate 2-year-olds' SSL is robust enough to support object categorization despite substantial challenges posed by everyday learning contexts.

Acquiring verbal reference: The interplay of cognitive, linguistic, and general learning capacities

Verbal reference is the ability to use language to communicate about objects, events, or ideas, even if they are not witnessed directly, such as past events or faraway places. It rests on a three-way link between words, their referents, and mental representations of those referents. A foundational human capacity, verbal reference extends the communicative power of language beyond the here-and-now, enabling access to language-mediated learning and thus fueling cognitive development. In the current review, we consider how and when verbal reference develops. The existing literature suggests that verbal reference emerges around infants' first birthdays and becomes increasingly robust by their second. In discussing the powerful developmental advantages of acquiring verbal reference we propose that this achievement requires a dynamic interplay among infants' cognitive and language development, fueled by general learning capacities. We close by describing new research directions, aimed at advancing our understanding of how verbal reference emerges.

Twelve-month-olds disambiguate new words using mutual-exclusivity inferences

Representing objects in terms of their kinds enables inferences based on the long-term knowledge made available through kind concepts. For example, children readily use lexical knowledge linked to familiar kind concepts to disambiguate new words (e.g., "find the toma"): they exclude members of familiar kinds falling under familiar kind labels (e.g., a ball) as potential referents and link new labels to available unfamiliar objects (e.g., a funnel), a phenomenon dubbed as 'mutual exclusivity'. Younger infants' failure in mutual exclusivity tasks has been commonly interpreted as a limitation of early word-learning or inferential abilities. Here, we investigated an alternative explanation, according to which infants do not spontaneously represent familiar objects under kind concepts, hence lacking access to the information necessary for rejecting them as referents of novel labels. Building on findings about conceptual development and communication, we hypothesized that nonverbal communication could prompt infants to set up kind-based representations which, in turn, would promote mutual exclusivity inferences. This hypothesis was tested in a looking-while-listening task involving novel word disambiguation. Twelve-month-olds saw pairs of objects, one familiar and one unfamiliar, and heard familiar kind labels or novel words. Across two experiments providing a cross-lab replication in two different languages, infants successfully disambiguated novel words when the familiar object had been pointed at before labeling, but not when it had been highlighted in a non-communicative manner (Experiment 1) or not highlighted at all (Experiment 2). Nonverbal communication induced infants to recruit kind-based representations of familiar objects that they failed to recruit in its absence and that, once activated, supported mutual-exclusivity inferences. Developmental changes in children's appreciation of communicative contexts may modulate the expression of early inferential and word learning competences.

Nonverbal category knowledge limits the amount of information encoded in object representations: EEG evidence from 12-month-old infants

To what extent does language shape how we think about the world? Studies suggest that linguistic symbols expressing conceptual categories ('apple', 'squirrel') make us focus on categorical information (e.g. that you saw a squirrel) and disregard individual information (e.g. whether that squirrel had a long or short tail). Across two experiments with preverbal infants, we demonstrated that it is not language but nonverbal category knowledge that determines what information is packed into object representations. Twelve-month-olds (N = 48) participated in an electroencephalography (EEG) change-detection task involving objects undergoing a brief occlusion. When viewing objects from unfamiliar categories, infants detected both across- and within-category changes, as evidenced by their negative central wave (Nc) event-related potential. Conversely, when viewing objects from familiar categories, they did not respond to within-category changes, which indicates that nonverbal category knowledge interfered with the representation of individual surface features necessary to detect such changes. Furthermore, distinct patterns of γ and α oscillations between familiar and unfamiliar categories were evident before and during occlusion, suggesting that categorization had an influence on the format of recruited object representations. Thus, we show that nonverbal category knowledge has rapid and enduring effects on object representation and discuss their functional significance for generic knowledge acquisition in the absence of language.

Semantic priming supports infants' ability to learn names of unseen objects

Human language permits us to call to mind objects, events, and ideas that we cannot witness directly. This capacity rests upon abstract verbal reference: the appreciation that words are linked to mental representations that can be established, retrieved and modified, even when the entities to which a word refers is perceptually unavailable. Although establishing verbal reference is a pivotal achievement, questions concerning its developmental origins remain. To address this gap, we investigate infants’ ability to establish a representation of an object, hidden from view, from language input alone. In two experiments, 15-month-olds (N = 72) and 12-month-olds (N = 72) watch as an actor names three familiar, visible objects; she then provides a novel name for a fourth, hidden fully from infants’ view. In the Semantic Priming condition, the visible familiar objects all belong to the same semantic neighborhood (e.g., apple, banana, orange). In the No Priming condition, the objects are drawn from different semantic neighborhoods (e.g., apple, shoe, car). At test infants view two objects. If infants can use the naming information alone to identify the likely referent, then infants in the Semantic Priming, but not in the No Priming condition, will successfully infer the referent of the fourth (hidden) object. Brief summary of results here. Implications for the development of abstract verbal reference will be discussed.

How do the object-file and physical-reasoning systems interact? Evidence from priming effects with object arrays or novel labels

How do infants reason about simple physical events such as containment, tube, and support events? According to the two-system model, two cognitive systems, the object-file (OF) and physical-reasoning (PR) systems, work together to guide infants' responses to these events. When an event begins, the OF system sends categorical information about the objects and their arrangements to the PR system. This system then categorizes the event, assigns event roles to the objects, and taps the OF system for information about features previously identified as causally relevant for the event category selected. All of the categorical and featural information included in the event's representation is interpreted by the PR system's domain knowledge, which includes core principles such as persistence and gravity. The present research tested a novel prediction of the model: If the OF system could be primed to also send, at the beginning of an event, information about an as-yet-unidentified feature, the PR system would then interpret this information using its core principles, allowing infants to detect core violations involving the feature earlier than they normally would. We examined this prediction using two types of priming manipulations directed at the OF system, object arrays and novel labels. In six experiments, infants aged 7-13 months (N = 304) were tested using different event categories and as-yet-unidentified features (color in containment events, height in tube events, and proportional distribution in support events) as well as different tasks (violation-of-expectation and action tasks). In each case, infants who were effectively primed reasoned successfully about the as-yet-unidentified feature, sometimes as early as six months before they would typically do so. These converging results provide strong support for the two-system model and for the claim that uncovering how the OF and PR systems represent and exchange information is essential for understanding how infants respond to physical events.

Naming guides how 12-month-old infants encode and remember objects

A foundation of human cognition is the flexibility with which we can represent any object as either a unique individual (my dog Fred) or a member of an object category (dog, animal). This conceptual flexibility is supported by language; the way we name an object is instrumental to our construal of that object as an individual or a category member. Evidence from a new recognition memory task reveals that infants are sensitive to this principled link between naming and object representation by age 12 mo. During training, all infants (n = 77) viewed four distinct objects from the same object category, each introduced in conjunction with either the same novel noun (Consistent Name condition), a distinct novel noun for each object (Distinct Names condition), or the same sine-wave tone sequence (Consistent Tone condition). At test, infants saw each training object again, presented in silence along with a new object from the same category. Infants in the Consistent Name condition showed poor recognition memory at test, suggesting that consistently applied names focused them primarily on commonalities among the named objects at the expense of distinctions among them. Infants in the Distinct Names condition recognized three of the four objects, suggesting that applying distinct names enhanced infants' encoding of the distinctions among the objects. Infants in the control Consistent Tone condition recognized only the object they had most recently seen. Thus, even for infants just beginning to speak their first words, the way in which an object is named guides infants' encoding, representation, and memory for that object.