The changing relationship between unemployment and total fertility

Fertility in a Pandemic: Evidence from California

The COVID-19 pandemic was accompanied by social and economic changes previously associated with fertility delay and reduction, sparking widespread discussion of a "baby bust" in the U.S. We examine fertility trends using restricted vital statistics data from California, a diverse population of 40 million contributing 12% of U.S. births. Using time series models that account for longer-run fertility trends, we observe modest, short-term reductions in births from mid 2020 through early 2021. Birth counts in subsequent months matched or even eased the pace of fertility decline since the 2008 recession and are unlikely a function of the pandemic alone. Responses to the pandemic were heterogeneous. Fertility declined markedly among the foreign-born population, largely driven by changes in net migration. Among the U.S.-born population, the short-term pandemic-attributable reductions were largest among older, highly educated people, suggesting mechanisms of fertility reduction disparately accessible to those with the most resources. We find no evidence of a strong population fertility response to the pandemic's accompanying employment shock, providing additional evidence of a growing divide between macroeconomic conditions and fertility patterns in the U.S.

Sustained and Universal Fertility Recuperation in Kazakhstan

The fertility rates of Kazakhstan have reversed to levels not seen for several decades. The striking fertility increase poses questions regarding the extent to which this new development is shared across socio-demographic groups and the nature of fertility recuperation. The current study employs UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey data and event-history modelling to analyse parity progressions to one, two, three, and four children. The results suggest a sustained fertility increase that is not merely associated with the recuperation of delayed first births, but a genuine increase across all birth orders. This pattern is evident for both main ethnicities in Kazakhstan and across educational groups. The gradual increase of higher-order births, especially among ethnic Kazakhs, indicates a reversed fertility transition and also that the previous fertility decline in the 1990s was not part of a general transition towards below-replacement fertility but rather a reflection of economic crisis after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Second Birth Fertility in Germany: Social Class, Gender, and the Role of Economic Uncertainty

Building on a thick strand of the literature on the determinants of higher-order births, this study uses a gender and class perspective to analyse second birth progression rates in Germany. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel from 1990 to 2020, individuals are classified based on their occupation into: upper service, lower service, skilled manual/higher-grade routine nonmanual, and semi-/unskilled manual/lower-grade routine nonmanual classes. Results highlight the "economic advantage" of men and women in service classes who experience strongly elevated second birth rates. Finally, we demonstrate that upward career mobility post-first birth is associated with higher second birth rates, particularly among men.

Evolving Fertility Goals and Behaviors in Current U.S. Childbearing Cohorts

In the post-Recession era, U.S. fertility rates have continued to fall. It is unclear if these declines are driven by shifts in fertility goals or growing difficulty in achieving goals. In this paper, we construct synthetic cohorts of men and women to examine both cross-cohort and within-cohort changes in fertility goals using multiple cycles of the National Survey of Family Growth. Although more recent cohorts exhibit lower achieved fertility at younger ages than earlier cohorts at the same age, intended parity remains around two children, and intentions to remain childless rarely exceed 15%. There is weak evidence of a growing fertility gap in the early 30s, suggesting more recent cohorts will need considerable childbearing in the 30s and early 40s to 'catch up' to earlier goals, yet low-parity women in their early 40s are decreasingly likely to have unfulfilled fertility desires or intentions to have children. Low-parity men in their early 40s, though, are increasingly likely to intend children. Declines in U.S. fertility thus seem to be largely driven not by changes in early-life fertility goals so much as either a decreasing likelihood of achieving earlier goals or, perhaps, shifts in the preferred timing of fertility that depress period measures.

Measuring the effect of employment uncertainty on fertility in low-fertility contexts: an overview of existing measures

Numerous studies aim to connect negative fertility desires and outcomes with employment conditions deemed to be uncertain. However, there is a lack of consensus about how to define, conceptualise, and measure employment uncertainty. This paper considers issues surrounding the conceptualisation of employment uncertainty. It then reviews existing measures of employment uncertainty in the context of fertility decisions. Finally, it raises considerations about their use. While some aspects of employment uncertainty are well studied, there are still gaps between theory and empirical evidence. Researchers should be aware of existing population heterogeneity, contextual factors, and model selection when considering their conceptualisation of employment uncertainty.

Influence of Obesity and Unemployment on Fertility Rates: A Multinational Analysis of 30 Countries from 1976 to 2014

Background: The rationale of a postulated decrease in fertility rate development is still being debated. Among the multiple influencing factors, socioeconomic variables and their complex influence are of particular interest. Methods: Data on socioeconomic and health variables from 1976−2014 of 30 countries within the OECD region were analysed for their respective influence on fertility rates by using mixed-effect regression models. Results: A significant negative influence of the increase in unemployment rate on the following year’s changes in fertility rate in Western (−0.00256; p < 0.001) as well as Eastern European (−0.0034; p < 0.001) countries was revealed. The effect of being overweight was significant for Western European (−0.00256; p < 0.001) countries only. When analysing the whole OECD region, an increase in unemployment retained its significant negative influence on the fertility rate (−0.0028; p < 0.001), while being overweight did not. Interestingly, divergent influences of time were revealed and fertility rates increased with time in Eastern Europe while they decreased in Western Europe. Conclusion: Importantly, a significant negative influence of increase in unemployment on the fertility rate was revealed—irrespective of the region and time analysed. Furthermore, an adverse effect of being overweight on the fertility rate in Western European countries was revealed. Interestingly, time was associated with a decreasing fertility rate in Western but not in Eastern Europe.

Theory and explanation in demography: The case of low fertility in Europe

In the 50th anniversary edition of Population Studies, John Hobcraft commented that demographers spend too little time trying to explain the phenomena they measure and describe. A quarter of a century on, this paper looks at the state of theory and explanation in contemporary demography. I ask how demographers have approached the task of explanation since Hobcraft's comment, grounding the discussion in the mainstream literature on low fertility in Europe. Using selected examples, I critically review macro- and micro-level approaches to explanation, highlighting some of the philosophical problems that each encounters. I argue that different conceptions of what demography is, and the explanatory language fertility researchers use, lead to differences in explanatory strategies that are rarely explicitly recognized. I also consider how critical theories challenge demographers to think in new ways. Despite the increasing attention paid to theory and explanation, I conclude that more engagement with the philosophy of social sciences is needed before fertility researchers can legitimately claim their studies do as much to explain and understand as to quantify and describe.

Beyond the Economic Gaze: Childbearing During and After Recessions in the Nordic Countries

During the 2010s, fertility rates fell across the Nordic region. The onset of these declines seems linked to the Great Recession of 2008-2009, but their continuation cannot easily be linked to subsequent economic change. The 1990s, too, brought episodes of economic crises to the Nordic region that were followed by different degrees of fertility decline. In this study, we provide an empirical overview of parity-, age- and education-specific fertility developments in the five Nordic countries in the wake of the economic recessions in 2008 and the early 1990s, respectively. We demonstrate a high degree of heterogeneity in fertility developments across countries after 1990, whereas after 2008, the trends are much more similar across the five countries. Likewise, the educational differences in birth hazards that characterized the developments after 1990 were much smaller in the initial years after 2008-2009. This reversal from heterogeneity to homogeneity in the fertility response to recessions calls for an expansion of theories on the cyclicality of fertility in relation to uncertainty and economic and social change. In our discussion, we consider the role of a set of factors that also incorporates the state, crisis management, and perceptions of economic and welfare uncertainty.

Labor market influences on Women's fertility decisions: Longitudinal evidence from Canada

While fertility theories suggest that insecure labor market experiences encourage women to postpone having children, few have examined whether job insecurity perceptions influence fertility in the North American context-an omission we address in the current study. Findings from event history analyses of a panel dataset of Canadian workers (Canadian Work, Stress and Health Study) reveal that perceived job insecurity is salient for women's first birth decisions but not subsequent births. Further subgroup analyses show that the association between perceived job insecurity and likelihood of a first birth is limited to college-educated women and those in low unemployment labor market regions. Among women with less than a college degree and those in high-unemployment regions, the likelihood of a first birth does not vary by respondents' perceptions of insecurity. Results suggest a more nuanced relationship between insecure work and women's childbearing decisions than predicted by traditional pro-cyclical accounts of the economy-fertility association.