Sensing the body, representing the body: Evidence from a neurologically based delusion of body ownership

Diametrical modulation of tactile and visual perceptual thresholds during the rubber hand illusion: a predictive coding account

During the rubber hand illusion (RHI), the synchronous stroking of the participants' concealed hand and a visible rubber hand induces a conflict among visuo-tactile inputs, leading healthy subjects to perceive the illusion of being touched on the rubber hand, as if it were part of their body. The predictive coding theory suggests that the RHI emerges to settle the conflict, attenuating somatosensory inputs in favour of visual ones, which "capture" tactile sensations. Here, we employed the psychophysical measure of perceptual threshold to measure a behavioural correlate of the somatosensory and visual modulations, to better understand the mechanisms underpinning the illusion. Before and after the RHI, participants underwent a tactile (Experiment 1) and a visual (Experiment 2) task, wherein they had to detect stimuli slightly above the perceptual threshold. According to the predictive coding framework, we found a significant decrease of tactile detection (i.e. increased tactile perceptual threshold) and a significant increase of visual detection (i.e.  decreased visual perceptual threshold), suggesting a diametrical modulation of somatosensory and visual perceptual processes. These findings provide evidence of how our system plastically adapts to uncertainty, attributing different weights to sensory inputs to restore a coherent representation of the own body.

From embodying tool to embodying alien limb: sensory-motor modulation of personal and extrapersonal space

Years ago, it was demonstrated (e.g., Rizzolatti et al. in Handbook of neuropsychology, Elsevier Science, Amsterdam, 2000) that the brain does not encode the space around us in a homogeneous way, but through neural circuits that map the space relative to the distance that objects of interest have from the body. In monkeys, relatively discrete neural systems, characterized by neurons with specific neurophysiological responses, seem to be dedicated either to represent the space that can be reached by the hand (near/peripersonal space) or to the distant space (far/extrapersonal space). It was also shown that the encoding of spaces has dynamic aspects because they can be remapped by the use of tools that trigger different actions (e.g., Iriki et al. 1998). In this latter case, the effect of the tool depends on the modulation of personal space, that is the space of our body. In this paper, I will review and discuss selected research, which demonstrated that also in humans: 1 spaces are encoded in a dynamic way; 2 encoding can be modulated by the use of tool that the system comes to consider as parts of the own body; 3 body representations are not fixed, but they are fragile and subject to change to the point that we can incorporate not only the tools necessary for action, but even limbs belonging to other people. What embodiment of tools and of alien limb tell us about body representations is then briefly discussed.

Self-other distinction modulates the social softness illusion

The social softness illusion (i.e., the tendency to perceive another person's skin as softer than our own) is thought to promote the sharing of social-emotional experiences because of the rewarding properties of receiving and giving social affective touch. Here we investigated whether the ability to distinguish someone else's body from our own modulates the social softness illusion. In particular, we tested whether the spatial perspective taken by the participants and seeing or not the touched arms could alter this illusion. Pairs of female participants were assigned the roles of either the giver (i.e., delivering the touches) or the receiver (i.e., being touched). We manipulated the location of the touch (palm or forearm), the spatial perspective of the receiver's body with respect to the giver's body (egocentric or allocentric perspective), and the vision of the touched body part (the giver could either see both her own and the receiver's body part, or she was blindfolded). Consistently with previous findings, the skin of another person was perceived as softer than the own one. Additionally, the illusion was present for both the forearm and the palm, and it was stronger in allocentric compared to the egocentric perspective (i.e., when the self-other distinction was clearer). These findings show that the mechanisms underpinning the ability to represent another person's body as distinct from our own modulates the social softness illusion, and thus support the role of the social softness illusion in fostering social relationships.

Repeated Exposure to Illusory Sense of Body Ownership and Agency Over a Moving Virtual Body Improves Executive Functioning and Increases Prefrontal Cortex Activity in the Elderly

We previously showed that the illusory sense of ownership and agency over a moving body in immersive virtual reality (displayed in a first-person perspective) can trigger subjective and physiological reactions on the real subject’s body and, therefore, an acute improvement of cognitive functions after a single session of high-intensity intermittent exercise performed exclusively by one’s own virtual body, similar to what happens when we actually do physical activity. As well as confirming previous results, here, we aimed at finding in the elderly an increased improvement after a longer virtual training with similar characteristics. Forty-two healthy older subjects (28 females, average age = 71.71 years) completed a parallel-group randomized controlled trial (RCT; UMIN000039843, umin.ac.jp) including an adapted version of the virtual training previously used: while sitting, participants observed the virtual body in a first-person perspective (1PP) or a third-person perspective (3PP) performing 20 min of virtual high-intensity intermittent exercise (vHIE; the avatar switched between fast and slow walking every 2 min). This was repeated twice a week for 6 weeks. During the vHIE, we measured the heart rate and administered questionnaires to evaluate illusory body ownership and agency. Before the beginning of the intervention, immediately after the first session of vHIE, and at the end of the entire intervention, we evaluated the cognitive performance at the Stroop task with online recording of the hemodynamic activity over the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. While we confirm previous results regarding the virtual illusion and its physiological effects, we did not find significant cognitive or neural improvement immediately after the first vHIE session. As a novelty, in the 1PP group only, we detected a significant decrease in the response time of the Stroop task in the post-intervention assessment compared to its baseline; coherently, we found an increased activation on left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (lDLPFC) after the entire intervention. While the current results strengthen the impact of the virtual full-body illusion and its physiological consequences on the elderly as well, they might have stronger and more established body representations. Perhaps, a longer and increased exposure to those illusions is necessary to initiate the cascade of events that culminates to an improved cognitive performance.

Self-consciousness impairments in schizophrenia with and without first rank symptoms using the moving rubber hand illusion

INTRODUCTION

The moving rubber hand illusion allows the evaluation both the sense of body ownership and agency using visuo-motor stimulations.

METHODS

We used the moving rubber hand illusion in anatomic congruence with explicit measures to compare active asynchronous and passive synchronous movements in patients diagnosed with schizophrenia with first rank symptoms (FRS) (n = 31) versus without FRS (n = 25).

RESULTS

Patients with FRS are characterized by a lack of agency in active asynchronous condition. The two groups had no sense of ownership in synchronous passive condition. Using a multivariate regression model, we found an association between agency and body ownership measures in the active asynchronous condition in two groups (OR: 1.825, p < 0.001). In the passive condition, this association was only present in the group with first rank symptoms (OR: 2.04, p < 0.001).

CONCLUSION

Temporal proximity and sensorimotor information are essential in the understanding of self-consciousness disorders in schizophrenia.

Using Body Ownership to Modulate the Motor System in Stroke Patients

Recent findings suggest that body ownership can activate the motor system in the absence of movement execution. Here, we investigated whether such a process promotes motor recovery in stroke patients. A group of patients with left-hemisphere damage (N = 12) and chronic motor deficits completed an immersive virtual reality training (three sessions of 15 min each week for 11 weeks). Patients sat still and either experienced (first-person perspective) or did not experience (third-person perspective) illusory ownership over the body of a standing virtual avatar. After the training, in which the avatar walked around a virtual environment, only patients who experienced the illusion improved gait and balance. We argue that representing the virtual body as their own allowed patients to access motor functioning and promoted motor recovery. This procedure might be integrated with rehabilitative approaches centered on motor execution. These findings also have an impact on the knowledge of the motor system in general.

Awareness of voluntary action, rather than body ownership, improves motor control

Awareness of the body is essential for accurate motor control. However, how this awareness influences motor control is poorly understood. The awareness of the body includes awareness of visible body parts as one’s own (sense of body ownership) and awareness of voluntary actions over that visible body part (sense of agency). Here, I show that sense of agency over a visible hand improves the initiation of movement, regardless of sense of body ownership. The present study combined the moving rubber hand illusion, which allows experimental manipulation of agency and body ownership, and the finger-tracking paradigm, which allows behavioral quantification of motor control by the ability to coordinate eye with hand movements. This eye–hand coordination requires awareness of the hand to track the hand with the eye. I found that eye–hand coordination is improved when participants experience a sense of agency over a tracked artificial hand, regardless of their sense of body ownership. This improvement was selective for the initiation, but not maintenance, of eye–hand coordination. These results reveal that the prospective experience of explicit sense of agency improves motor control, suggesting that artificial manipulation of prospective agency may be beneficial to rehabilitation and sports training techniques.

Explicit and Implicit Own's Body and Space Perception in Painful Musculoskeletal Disorders and Rheumatic Diseases: A Systematic Scoping Review

Background: Pain and body perception are essentially two subjective mutually influencing experiences. However, in the field of musculoskeletal disorders and rheumatic diseases we lack of a comprehensive knowledge about the relationship between body perception dysfunctions and pain or disability. We systematically mapped the literature published about the topics of: (a) somatoperception; (b) body ownership; and (c) perception of space, analysing the relationship with pain and disability. The results were organized around the two main topics of the assessment and treatment of perceptual dysfunctions.

Methods: This scoping review followed the six-stage methodology suggested by Arksey and O'Malley. Ten electronic databases and grey literature were systematically searched. The PRISMA Extension for Scoping Reviews was used for reporting results. Two reviewers with different background, independently performed study screening and selection, and one author performed data extraction, that was checked by a second reviewer.

Results: Thirty-seven studies fulfilled the eligibility criteria. The majority of studies (68%) concerned the assessment methodology, and the remaining 32% investigated the effects of therapeutic interventions. Research designs, methodologies adopted, and settings varied considerably across studies. Evidence of distorted body experience were found mainly for explicit somatoperception, especially in studies adopting self-administered questionnaire and subjective measures, highlighting in some cases the presence of sub-groups with different perceptual features. Almost half of the intervention studies (42%) provided therapeutic approaches combining more than one perceptual task, or sensory-motor tasks together with perceptual strategies, thus it was difficult to estimate the relative effectiveness of each single therapeutic component.

Conclusions: To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to systematically map and summarize this research area in the field of musculoskeletal disorders and rheumatic diseases. Although methodological limitations limit the validity of the evidence obtained, some strategies of assessment tested and therapeutic strategies proposed represent useful starting points for future research. This review highlights preliminary evidence, strengths, and limitations of the literature published about the research questions, identifying key points that remain opened to be addressed, and make suggestions for future research studies. Body representation, as well as pain perception and treatment, can be better understood if an enlarged perspective including body and space perception is considered.

Visual appearance of the virtual hand affects embodiment in the virtual hand illusion

Body ownership (the feeling that one’s body belongs to oneself) is commonly studied with Rubber hand illusion (RHI) paradigm that allows inducing a temporary illusory feeling of ownership of a life-sized rubber hand. However, it remains unclear whether illusory ownership of the fake hand relies on the same mechanisms as ownership of one’s own real hand. Here, we directly compared ownership of the own hand (OH) and fake hand (FH) in the same set of conditions within immersive virtual reality. We obtained behavioral (proprioceptive drift) and subjective (questionnaire) measures of ownership and disownership for virtual OH, FH and object (Obj) that were located congruently or incongruently with the participant’s real hand and were stimulated synchronously or asynchronously with the real hand. Both OH and FH (but not Obj) were embodied after synchronous stimulation in both locations. Crucially, subjective ownership of the OH was stronger than of the FH in congruent location after synchronous stimulation. It was also present after asynchronous stimulation, being stronger when the virtual OH was subjectively more similar to the real hand. The results suggest that the detailed appearance of the body might act as an additional component in the construction of body ownership.

Shared neurocognitive mechanisms of attenuating self-touch and illusory self-touch

Despite the fact that any successful achievement of willed actions necessarily entails the sense of body ownership (the feeling of owning the moving body parts), it is still unclear how this happens. To address this issue at both behavioral and neural levels, we capitalized on sensory attenuation (SA) phenomenon (a self-generated stimulus is perceived as less intense than an identical externally generated stimulus). We compared the intensity of somatosensory stimuli produced by one's own intended movements and by movements of an embodied fake hand. Then, we investigated if in these two conditions SA was equally affected by interfering with the activity of the supplementary motor area (SMA; known to be related to motor intention and SA) using single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation. We showed that ownership of the fake hand triggered attenuation of somatosensory stimuli generated by its movements that were comparable to the attenuation of self-generated stimuli. Furthermore, disrupting the SMA eliminated the SA effect regardless of whether it was triggered by actual participant's movements or by illusory ownership. Our findings suggest that SA triggered by body ownership relies, at least in part, on the activation of the same brain structures as SA triggered by motor-related signals.

Relationships Between Personality Features and the Rubber Hand Illusion: An Exploratory Study

The rubber hand illusion paradigm allows investigating human body ownership by inducing an illusion of owning a life-sized fake hand. Despite the wide consensus on the fact that integration of multisensory signals is the main interpretative framework of the rubber hand illusion, increasing amount of data show that additional factors might contribute to the emergence of the illusion and, in turn, explain the strong inter-individual differences of the illusory patterns. Here, we explored whether and how personality features contribute to the emergence of the illusion by administering to healthy participants the rubber hand illusion paradigm along with two well-known personality tests, i.e., the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) and the Rorschach test. Results showed that two Rorschach domains (i.e., "Perception and Thinking Problems" and "Self and Other Representation") were positively correlated with the illusory mislocalization of the own left hand toward the fake hand. Further analyses suggested that while the tendency to perceive unconventionally is related to mislocalizing the own hand toward the fake hand, the association of the RHI index and other personality features measured by the Rorschach remain uncertain. However, our findings in general suggest that personality features might have a role in the emergence of the rubber hand illusion. This, in turn, could explain the high inter-individual variability of the illusory effects.

Hand blink reflex in virtual reality: The role of vision and proprioception in modulating defensive responses

Our research focused on the role of vision and proprioception in modulating a defensive reflex (hand blink reflex, HBR) whose magnitude is enhanced when the threatened hand is inside the peripersonal space of the face. We capitalized on virtual reality, which allows dissociating vision and proprioception by presenting a virtual limb in congruent/incongruent positions with respect to the participants' limb. In experiment 1, participants placed their own stimulated hand in far/near positions with respect to their face (postural manipulation task), while observing a virtual empty scenario. Vision was not informative, but the HBR was significantly enhanced in near compared with far position, suggesting that proprioception is sufficient for the HBR modulation to occur. In experiment 2, participants did not perform the postural manipulation but they (passively) observed the avatar's virtual limb performing it. Proprioceptive signals were not informative, but the HBR was significantly enhanced when the observed virtual limb was near to the face, suggesting that visual information plays a role in modulating the HBR. In experiment 3, both participants and avatar performed the postural manipulation, either congruently (both of them far/near) or incongruently (one of them far, the other near). The HBR modulation was present only in congruent conditions. In incongruent conditions, the conflict between vision and proprioception confounded the system, abolishing the difference between far and near positions. Taken together, these findings promote the view that observing a virtual limb modulates the HBR, providing also new evidence on the role of vision and proprioception in modulating this subcortical reflex.

The Role of Body-Related Afferent Signals in Human Sense of Agency

At present, most of the neurocognitive models of human sense of agency (ie, "this action is due to my own will") have been traditionally rooted in a variety of internal efferent signals arising within the motor system. However, recent neuroscientific evidence has suggested that also the body-related afferent signals that subserve body ownership (ie, "this body is mine") might have a key role in this process. Accordingly, in the present review paper, we briefly examined the literature investigating how and to what extent body ownership contributes to building up human motor consciousness. Evidence suggests that, if required by the context, body ownership per se can act on agency attribution (ie, independently from efferent signals). Hence, a unitary and coherent subjective experience of willed actions (ie, "this willed action is being realized by my own body") requires both awareness of being an agent and of owning the body.

'See Me, Feel Me': Prismatic Adaptation of an Alien Limb Ameliorates Spatial Neglect in a Patient Affected by Pathological Embodiment

Pathological embodiment (E+) is a specific contralesional delusion of body ownership, observed following brain damage, in which patients embody someone else's arm and its movements within their own body schema whenever the contralesional 'alien' arm is presented in a body-congruent position (i.e., 1st person perspective and aligned with the patient's shoulder). This disorder is often associated with spatial neglect, a neurological syndrome in which patients are unaware of stimuli presented in the contralesional (often the left) space. Capitalizing on previous evidence demonstrating that prismatic adaptation of the ipsilesional arm to right-deviating prisms is effective in ameliorating neglect symptoms, here we investigated whether such amelioration also occurs in E+ patients with neglect when prismatic training is performed by the 'alien' embodied arm. Four left neglect patients (one with and three without pathological embodiment) underwent visuomotor prismatic training performed by an 'alien' arm. Specifically, while patients were wearing prismatic goggles shifting the visual field rightward, a co-experimenter's left arm presented in a body-congruent perspective was repeatedly moved toward visual targets by another examiner. In a control condition, the co-experimenter's arm was moved toward the targets from a body-incongruent position (i.e., 3rd person perspective). Neglect symptoms were assessed before and after training through paper-and-pencil tasks. In the E+ patient, neglect improved significantly more in 1st than in 3rd person perspective training, suggesting that prismatic adaptation of the 'alien' embodied arm is effective in modulating spatial representation. Conversely, for control E- patients (not embodying the 'alien' arm), we observed more limited improvements following training. These findings indicate that the 'alien' embodied arm is so deeply embedded in the patient body and motor schema that adaptation to prismatic lenses can affect multiple processing stages, from low level sensory-motor correspondences, to higher level body, motor and spatial maps, similarly as it occurs in normal subjects and neglect patients without pathological embodiment.

Body ownership increases the interference between observed and executed movements

When we successfully achieve willed actions, the feeling that our moving body parts belong to the self (i.e., body ownership) is barely required. However, how and to what extent the awareness of our own body contributes to the neurocognitive processes subserving actions is still debated. Here we capitalized on immersive virtual reality in order to examine whether and how body ownership influences motor performance (and, secondly, if it modulates the feeling of voluntariness). Healthy participants saw a virtual body either from a first or a third person perspective. In both conditions, they had to draw continuously straight vertical lines while seeing the virtual arm doing the same action (i.e., drawing lines) or deviating from them (i.e., drawing ellipses). Results showed that when there was a mismatch between the intended and the seen movements (i.e., participants had to draw lines but the avatar drew ellipses), motor performance was strongly "attracted" towards the seen (rather than the performed) movement when the avatar's body part was perceived as own (i.e., first person perspective). In support of previous studies, here we provide direct behavioral evidence that the feeling of body ownership modulates the interference of seen movements to the performed movements.

Defending the Body Without Sensing the Body Position: Physiological Evidence in a Brain-Damaged Patient With a Proprioceptive Deficit

The ability to know where our body parts are located in space (proprioception) is fundamental for both successfully interacting with the external world and monitoring potential threats. In this case-control study, we investigated whether the absence of proprioceptive signals may affect physiological defensive responses. To this aim, a right brain-damaged patient with a left upper-limb proprioceptive deficit (P+ patient) and age-matched healthy controls, underwent the recording of the Hand-Blink Reflex (HBR). This defensive response, elicited by electrical stimulation of the median nerve and recorded from the orbicularis oculi, is modulated by the hand position: it is enhanced when the threatened hand is near to the face, inside the defensive peripersonal-space (DPPS). According to the classical neuropsychological perspective, we used P+ patient as a model to investigate the role of proprioception in HBR modulation, by manipulating the congruity/incongruity between the intended and actual positions of the stimulated hand. P+ patient, with his eyes closed, had to voluntarily place his left hand either far from or near to his face and to relieve the arm's weight over a supporting device. Then, in congruent conditions, the hand was stimulated in the actual (intended) position. In incongruent conditions, the patient's hand was moved by the examiner from the intended to the opposite (not-intended) position and then stimulated. We observed an inverse response pattern between congruent and incongruent conditions. In congruent conditions, P+ patient showed an HBR enhancement in near compared to far position, comparable to that found in healthy controls. This suggests that, even in absence of proprioceptive and visual information, the HBR modulation was still present. Conversely, in incongruent conditions, P+ patient showed a greater HBR magnitude for far position (when the hand was actually far, but the patient intended it to be near) than for near position (when the hand was actually near, but the patient intended it to be far). This result suggests that proprioceptive signals are not necessary for HBR modulation to occur. It relies more on the intended than on the actual position of the hand. The role of motor intention and planning in shaping the DPPS is discussed.

Losing my hand. Body ownership attenuation after virtual lesion of the primary motor cortex

A fundamental component of the self-awareness is the sensation that we are acting with our own body. Thus, a coherent sense of self implies the existence of a tight link between the sense of body ownership and the motor system. Here, we investigated this issue by taking advantage of a well-known experimental manipulation of body ownership, i.e., the rubber hand illusion (RHI), during which the subjects perceive a fake hand as part of their own body. To test the effect of the motor system down-regulation on the RHI susceptibility, we designed a sham-controlled study, where the primary motor cortex (M1) excitability was modulated by off-line low-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS). After rTMS (real or sham), subjects underwent the RHI either on the right hand, contralateral to the inhibited hemisphere (Experiment 1), or on the left hand, ipsilateral to the inhibited hemisphere (Experiment 2). Only in Experiment 1, the procedure strengthened the illusory experience, as proved by a significant increase, in rTMS compared to Sham, of both subjective (Embodiment/Disembodiment Questionnaires) and objective (Proprioceptive Drift) RHI measures. This evidence demonstrates that, when the M1 activity is down-regulated, the sense of body ownership is attenuated and the subjects become more prone to incorporate an alien body part. This, in turn, supports the existence of a mutual interaction between the sense of body ownership and the motor system, shedding new light on the construction of a coherent sense of self as an acting body.

Entrainment beyond embodiment

Mutual adaptive timing (MAT), the capacity to adapt one's timing to the timing of a partner, is a form of interpersonal entrainment necessary to play music in ensemble. To this respect, two questions can be advanced. First, whether MAT can be seen also in non-musician populations. This might imply interesting theoretical consequences with respect to the hypothesis of an innate inter-subjective musicality. Second, whether subject's MAT can be influenced by the position of the partner's body. This might imply that MAT modulation is guided by changes in the feeling of body ownership and agency, which in turn would affect subject's cortico-spinal excitability patterns. In order to test these hypotheses, we employed an alternate joint finger tapping task (which can be easily carried out without being expert performers), while single-pulse TMS was delivered on M1. This experimental design allowed us to test MAT in non-musicians and to study cortico-spinal excitability patterns while manipulating partners' body position. Ownership and agency were tested by ad hoc questionnaires. We first found that MAT was present also in a non-musicians population and was not affected by the position of the partner, thus pointing to the universality of such a joint proto-musical competence. Moreover, cortico-spinal excitability was similar when the subject tapped alone ('solo condition') and when the subject tapped with the partner in a position congruent with the subject's body (the 'egocentric condition'). On the contrary, when the subject tapped with the partner placed in front of him (the 'allocentric' condition') cortico-spinal excitability was higher with respect to the solo and egocentric conditions. These results show that, despite the fact that the partner was present both in the egocentric and in the allocentric position, only the allocentric condition was treated as a social ensemble. Interestingly, in the egocentric condition the partner's body seemed to be treated as the subject's 'own' body. The subjective feeling of ownership and agency were coherent with the physiological data.

On the relation between body ownership and sense of agency: A link at the level of sensory-related signals

The relation between sense of body ownership and sense of agency is still highly debated. Here we investigated in a large sample of healthy participants the associations between several implicit and explicit indexes of the two senses. Specifically, we examined the correlations between proprioceptive shift (implicit measure) and questionnaire on the subjective experience of ownership (explicit measure) within the rubber hand illusion paradigm (body ownership), and intentional binding (implicit measure), attenuation of the intensity of auditory outcomes of actions (implicit measure) and questionnaire on the subjective experience of authorship (explicit measure) within the Libet's clock paradigm (sense of agency). Our results showed that proprioceptive shift was positively correlated with the attenuation of auditory outcomes. No significant correlations were found between the explicit measures of the two senses. We argue that the individual spatiotemporal constraints subserving the integration of sensory-related signals (implicit signature) would be common to both senses, whereas their subjective experience (explicit signature) would rely on additional processes specific for any given sense.

"As long as that is my hand, that willed action is mine": Timing of agency triggered by body ownership

We investigated whether agency triggered by body ownership shares similar temporal constraints with agency induced by actual movements. We compared agency over the movements of the own hand, a fake hand and an embodied fake hand when they pressed a button delivering a stimulus to the participant's body after 500, 1000 or 2000 ms. In the first two delays, the movement of the embodied fake hand was misattributed to the participant's own will and the stimulus intensity was attenuated, as it happened when the own hand delivered the stimulus. With the longest delay, the movement of the embodied fake hand was neither misattributed to the participant's will nor the stimulus intensity was attenuated, as it happened when the fake non-embodied hand delivered the stimulus. By showing that illusory and veridical agency arise under similar temporal constraints, we further demonstrated that body ownership per se acts upon agency attribution.

Decreased motor cortex excitability mirrors own hand disembodiment during the rubber hand illusion

During the rubber hand illusion (RHI), subjects experience an artificial hand as part of their own body, while the real hand is subject to a sort of 'disembodiment'. Can this altered belief about the body also affect physiological mechanisms involved in body-ownership, such as motor control? Here we ask whether the excitability of the motor pathways to the real (disembodied) hand are affected by the illusion. Our results show that the amplitude of the motor-evoked potentials recorded from the real hand is significantly reduced, with respect to baseline, when subjects in the synchronous (but not in the asynchronous) condition experience the fake hand as their own. This finding contributes to the theoretical understanding of the relationship between body-ownership and motor system, and provides the first physiological evidence that a significant drop in motor excitability in M1 hand circuits accompanies the disembodiment of the real hand during the RHI experience.

DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.14972.001

The feeling of body ownership — that the various parts of your body are all part of you — is something that we typically take for granted. However, brain damage can disrupt this sensation and leave individuals convinced that an arm or a leg is no longer their own. Even in healthy people, the ‘rubber hand illusion’ can temporarily produce a similar phenomenon. Individuals watch a lifelike rubber hand being touched while their own hand – which is hidden from view – is touched at the same time. This creates the feeling that the artificial hand has become part of their body, while their real hand is left in a ‘disembodied’ state.

How does the brain generate this illusory sense of ownership and accompanying sense of disembodiment? A person’s ability to move their body is thought to contribute to their feeling of body ownership. Therefore, della Gatta, Garbarini et al. asked whether the brain’s ability to move the real hand changes during the rubber hand illusion.

In the experiments, the region of the brain that controls hand movement was artificially stimulated in a number of volunteers. When an individual had been primed by the rubber hand illusion to perceive a fake hand as part of their own body, their brain was temporarily less able to activate the muscles of their real hand. This is as if the brain no longer considered the real hand as part of the body. Thus, the altered sense of body ownership experienced during the rubber hand illusion is not a bizarre fantasy, but corresponds to a physiological reaction that accompanies changes in brain activity.

The next step is to further define and quantify the relationship between the sense of body ownership and the control of body movement. Specifically, how does activity in the brain areas that control movement contribute to the sense of body ownership? And how do these brain regions communicate with one another to generate a sense of self?

DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.14972.002