Theory of Mind Through the Ages: Older and Middle-Aged Adults Exhibit More Errors Than Do Younger Adults on a Continuous False Belief Task

A further study of the psychometric qualities of the Strange Stories-Revised across the three stages of aging

INTRODUCTION

Happé's Strange Stories task was developed in 1994 to assess theory of mind, the ability to infer mental states in oneself and others. Since then, it has undergone revisions, translations, and adaptations. A modified version of the task, the Strange Stories-Revised (SS-R), previously showed satisfactory qualities in a study aiming at identifying psychometrically acceptable social cognitive measures.

OBJECTIVE

The current study expands upon the psychometric evaluation study by examining the qualities of a short version of the SS-R in a sample of healthy adult subjects.

METHODS

One hundred and eighteen healthy adults completed the task along with neurocognitive measures. Mean scores of the long and short versions were compared. Associations between ToM as measured by performance on this abbreviated version of the SS-R, and potential confounders were explored. Internal consistency, dimensionality of the short version, and performance comparisons across three stages of aging (18-34; 35-59; 60-85 years old) were investigated, and standard measurement error was calculated to improve precision and data interpretation.

RESULTS

Reliability coefficients were comparable in the short and long versions. Principal component analysis showed that a one-factor structure best fits the data. Significant differences were observed in ToM performance across the three age groups, indicating a decline with time that was also captured by the long version, starting during midlife and increasing in significance with age.

CONCLUSION

The short version of the SS-R is a promising measure that can be profitably used in time-limited settings to assess theory of mind.

Hot and cool executive function and theory of mind in children with and without specific learning disorders

Executive function (EF) in specific learning disorders (SLD) has been investigated using mainly cool EF tasks, whilst less is known about hot EF and theory of mind (ToM) in this population. The aim of this study was to examine group differences in hot and cool EF and ToM in school-aged children with SLD relative to typically developing peers. It also attempted to investigate whether EF measures are significant predictors of ToM in SLD and typical development. Cross-sectional data were collected from 135 school-aged children with and without SLD (8-10 years old), tested on measures of cool & hot EF and ToM. Significant group differences were observed in EFs inhibition (p= .04), working memory (p= .04) and delay of gratification (p < .001), as well as ToM mental state/emotion recognition (p = .019). Inhibition and planning contributed to 22% of the explained variance of ToM mental state/emotion recognition, but not false belief overall. Results suggest that cool EF may be a crucial predictor of ToM in children with and without SLD. Finally, stepwise logistic regression analysis identified specific hot EF and ToM measures contributing to group differentiation, specifically delay of gratification (odds ratio=.995, 95% CI [.993-.998]) and mental state/emotion recognition (odds ratio= .89, 95% CI [.796-.995]). This study contributes to our understanding of cognitive deficits and socio-cognitive impairment in children with SLD, which hold promise for informing interventions aimed at addressing these cognitive challenges.

Testing theory of mind in large language models and humans

At the core of what defines us as humans is the concept of theory of mind: the ability to track other people's mental states. The recent development of large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT has led to intense debate about the possibility that these models exhibit behaviour that is indistinguishable from human behaviour in theory of mind tasks. Here we compare human and LLM performance on a comprehensive battery of measurements that aim to measure different theory of mind abilities, from understanding false beliefs to interpreting indirect requests and recognizing irony and faux pas. We tested two families of LLMs (GPT and LLaMA2) repeatedly against these measures and compared their performance with those from a sample of 1,907 human participants. Across the battery of theory of mind tests, we found that GPT-4 models performed at, or even sometimes above, human levels at identifying indirect requests, false beliefs and misdirection, but struggled with detecting faux pas. Faux pas, however, was the only test where LLaMA2 outperformed humans. Follow-up manipulations of the belief likelihood revealed that the superiority of LLaMA2 was illusory, possibly reflecting a bias towards attributing ignorance. By contrast, the poor performance of GPT originated from a hyperconservative approach towards committing to conclusions rather than from a genuine failure of inference. These findings not only demonstrate that LLMs exhibit behaviour that is consistent with the outputs of mentalistic inference in humans but also highlight the importance of systematic testing to ensure a non-superficial comparison between human and artificial intelligences.

The modulation effect of cognition on mentalization in late-life depression: a study of gaze perception-a potential screening tool for high-risk group of late-life depression

Introduction

Impairment in mentalization is implicated in the development and maintenance of depression. Major depressive disorders showed significant impairment in social cognition and such impairment appears to be positively associated with the severity of depression. Self-referential gaze perception (SRGP), a measurement of mentalization, was predominantly measured in patients with psychosis but rarely examined in late-life depression (LLD).

Methods

To assess the effect of cognition on the interpretation bias of mentalization, 29 LLD patients and 29 healthy controls were asked to judge if various gaze directions were directed to self in SRGP.

Results

Patients with better cognition showed less unambiguous-SRGP bias than those with worse cognitive scores; this difference was not found in healthy controls. Global cognition and executive function contributed to the SRGP rate in patients.

Conclusion

The current study is the first study to explore the relationship between cognition and SRGP in the LLD population. Our study findings suggested that the cognitive function of LLD patients may contribute to the modulation of interpretation bias, which in turn underlie the role of SRGP bias. Greater SRGP bias in patients may reflect social cognition deterioration, impairing the social interaction and functioning of LLD patients. This highlights the need for early intervention and cognitive decline identification to facilitate better prognosis and treatment effectiveness; thus, further studies could navigate the potential of SRGP task as a screening tool for high-risk group of LLD likely to develop dementia.

TANGO: A reliable, open-source, browser-based task to assess individual differences in gaze understanding in 3 to 5-year-old children and adults

Traditional measures of social cognition used in developmental research often lack satisfactory psychometric properties and are not designed to capture variation between individuals. Here, we present the TANGO (Task for Assessing iNdividual differences in Gaze understanding-Open); a brief (approx. 5-10min), reliable, open-source task to quantify individual differences in the understanding of gaze cues. Localizing the attentional focus of an agent is crucial in inferring their mental states, building common ground, and thus, supporting cooperation. Our interactive browser-based task works across devices and enables in-person and remote testing. The implemented spatial layout allows for discrete and continuous measures of participants' click imprecision and is easily adaptable to different study requirements. Our task measures inter-individual differences in a child (N = 387) and an adult (N = 236) sample. Our two study versions and data collection modes yield comparable results that show substantial developmental gains: the older children are, the more accurately they locate the target. High internal consistency and test-retest reliability estimates underline that the captured variation is systematic. Associations with social-environmental factors and language skills speak to the validity of the task. This work shows a promising way forward in studying individual differences in social cognition and will help us explore the structure and development of our core social-cognitive processes in greater detail.

Adaptation across the Lifespan: Towards a Processual Evolutionary Explanation of Human Development

This paper argues that the project of a lifespan perspective in developmental psychology has not yet been systematically pursued. Overall, the number of age-specific papers far outweighs the number of lifespan approaches, and even approaches that focus on the lifespan as a whole are often restricted to adulthood. Further, there is a lack of approaches that examine cross-lifespan relationships. However, the lifespan perspective has brought with it a "processual turn" that suggests an examination of developmental regulatory processes that are either operative across the lifespan or develop across the lifespan. Accommodative adjustment of goals and evaluations in response to obstacles, loss, and threat is discussed as an example of such a process. Not only is it prototypical of efficacy and change of developmental regulation across the lifespan, but at the same time it makes clear that stability (e.g., of the self)-as a possible outcome of accommodation-is not an alternative to, but a variant of development. Explaining how accommodative adaptation changes, in turn, requires a broader perspective. For this purpose, an evolutionary approach to developmental psychology is proposed that not only views human development as a product of phylogenesis, but also applies the central concepts of the theory of evolution (adaptation and history) directly to ontogeny. The challenges, conditions, and limitations of such a theoretical application of adaptation to human development are discussed.

Examining whether adults with autism spectrum disorder encounter multiple problems in theory of mind: a study based on meta-analysis

Theory of mind (ToM) represents a complex ability, while persons with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) encounter difficulties in the processing of ToM. The present ToM-focused studies on adults with ASD report inconsistent results, possibly owing to the differences between tasks. For instance, different ToM-related tasks involve different cognitive abilities, but the development of these cognitive abilities is different among adults with ASD, thereby leading to different behaviors by the same individual with ASD in different tasks. Therefore, it is of vital significance to explore the potential reasons for inconsistencies in the existing studies based on the task classification perspective. Hence, this study primarily reviews the existing ToM tasks used in studies on adults with ASD; afterward, based on the forms and characteristics of the task, the current ToM tasks are classified into four categories-reading comprehension, perceptual scene comprehension, comprehensive scene comprehension , and self-other processing. Subsequently, a meta-analysis is undertaken to determine the difference in each ToM task category between the ASD group and the typically developing (TD) group. As a result, 110 research papers (including 3,205 adults with ASD and 3,675 TD adults) that fulfilled the stated criteria are examined in this study. The study findings suggest that adults with ASD demonstrate worse performance in terms of all four ToM task categories as compared to TD adults. Furthermore, compared with tasks of self-other processing and perceptual scene comprehension, adults with ASD perform worse in reading comprehension and comprehensive scene comprehension. This shows that the differences between tasks may exert a potential influence on the study results. Future studies should focus on different abilities involved in ToM processing and the choice of ToM tasks, in order to elucidate the critical problems of ToM in adults with ASD.

How robust are egocentric and altercentric interference effects in social cognition? a test with explicit and implicit versions of a continuous false belief task

It has been long assumed that meta-representational theory of mind (ToM) -our ability to ascribe mental states to ourselves and other people- emerges around age four as indicated in performance on explicit verbal false belief tasks. In contrast, newer studies assessing false belief understanding with implicit, non-verbal measures suggest that some form of ToM may be present even in infancy. But these studies now face replication issues, and it remains unclear whether they can provide robust evidence for implicit ToM. One line of research on implicit ToM, however, may remain promising: Studies that tap so-called altercentric biases. Such biases occur when agents in their judgments about the world are influenced (perform slower, more error-prone) in light of another agent's deviating perspective even if that perspective is completely irrelevant to the task; they thus can be seen as indicators of spontaneous and implicit ToM. Altercentric biases are the mirror images of egocentric biases (agents are influenced by their own perspective when evaluating another agent's deviating perspective). In three studies with adults, we aimed to tap both egocentric and altercentric interference effects within the same task format. We used the so-called Sandbox task, a false belief task with continuous locations. In Study 1, we tested an online adaptation of the Sandbox task, which we also used to explore potential cross-cultural differences in these biases. Studies 2 and 3 combined the Sandbox task with mouse-tracking measures. These studies revealed neither egocentric nor altercentric biases. These null results are discussed with regard to the question whether absence of evidence here may present evidence of absence of such spontaneous perspective-taking biases or merely false negatives.

The audience who knew too much: investigating the role of spontaneous theory of mind on the processing of dramatic irony scenes in film

As in real life, cinema viewers rely on spontaneous theory of mind (SToM) to interpret characters' mental states. Thus, analyzing cinematic structures offers a unique opportunity to examine ecologically valid sociocognitive processes. We conducted a proof-of-concept study (N = 42) to explore how SToM inferences impact film event comprehension in dramatic irony scenes, where knowledge divergence exists between the audience and characters. We hypothesized that spectators would focus more on characters' mental states in such false-belief inducing scenarios compared to scenarios without such disparity. We used six Harold Lloyd silent comedy clips in a narrative comprehension and spontaneous mental state attribution study with a between-subject (Knowledge Manipulation: Installation vs. Control) and within-subject (Phase: Context vs. Exploitation) comparisons. We provided critical information unknown to the characters only to the Installation group and withheld it from the Control group. By comparing differences in participants' descriptions of the clips during the Context phase (varying across groups) and Exploitation phase (same across groups), we evaluated viewers' processing of the same scenes based on their false- or true-belief representations. Our findings indicate that the Installation group used more cognitive mental state words during the Exploitation phase relative to the Context phase, suggesting that exposure to undisclosed critical information enhances the frequency of spontaneous epistemic state inferences and integration into event models of the exploitation. This research advances neurocinematics by highlighting spontaneous sociocognitive processes in event perception and comprehension and provides a novel dramatic irony film corpus and measures for future moment-to-moment SToM processing studies across cognitive-behavioral, physiological, and neural levels.

Younger adults are more prosocial than older adults in economic decision making results from the give and take game

The present study was designed to investigate the disadvantageous and advantageous inequity aversion of young and older adults in situations which allowed them to maximize or minimize payoff inequalities. Given the very limited evidence regarding an actual age-related effect on inequity aversion, the purpose of this study was to examine this question using an economic game, "the Give-and-Take Game", which is able to circumvent certain limitations of the Ultimatum Game, to evaluate inequity aversion (i.e., a same behaviour which can be induced by opposite motivations: prosocial vs. pro-self vs. altruistic orientations). In the "Give-and-Take Game", a sum of money was randomly distributed between the participant and a dummy player. These distributions created monetary inequalities, advantageous either for the participant (to examine advantageous inequity aversion) or for the other player (to examine disadvantageous inequity aversion). Different response options were proposed to the participants to either maximize or minimize payoff inequalities between the players. This procedure not only allowed to differentiate individual's profiles with more prosocial vs. pro-self vs. altruistic orientations, but also to examine age-related effects on these profiles. The results showed that older adults showed a more important pro-self orientation compared to their younger counterparts. They more frequently selected the options which maximized their own payoffs and were less averse to advantageous inequity compared to young adults. In contrast, young adults showed a similar level of advantageous and disadvantageous inequity aversion. Older adults focused on the economic and competitive dimension of the game, which may have motivated them to maximize their own payoffs. Conversely, young adults took into account the social dimension of the game, focusing on a fair monetary distribution.

Socio-demographic and political predictors of Theory of Mind in adulthood

Individual differences in Theory of Mind (ToM)-the ability to understand the mental states of others-are theorised to be predicted by socio-demographic and political factors. However, inconsistent findings on the relationships between various socio-demographic predictors and ToM, as well as a paucity of research on political predictors of ToM, have left a gap in the literature. Using a recently validated self-report measure of ToM in a large sample (N = 4202) we investigated the unique contributions of age, sex, socio-economic status, and political beliefs to ToM in adults. Except for age, all variables were correlated with ToM, but when accounting for the variance of other predictors in statistical analyses, political beliefs was no longer associated with ToM. Dominance analysis revealed that participant sex was the most important predictor of ToM. These findings help to address theoretical discrepancies in the existing literature and inform future methods and directions in social cognition research.

Age differences in social-cognitive abilities across the stages of adulthood and path model investigation of adult social cognition

Accumulating evidence points toward an association between older age and performance decrements in social cognition (SC). We explored age-related variations in four components of SC: emotion recognition, theory of mind, social judgment, and blame attributions. A total of 120 adults divided into three stages (18-34 years, 35-59 years, 60-85 years) completed a battery of SC. Between and within age-group differences in SC were investigated. Path analyses were used to identify relationships among the components. Emotion recognition and theory of mind showed differences beginning either in midlife, or after. Blame attributions and social judgment did not show a significant difference. However, social judgment varied significantly within groups. Path models revealed a relationship between emotion recognition and theory of mind. Findings highlight age-related differences in some components and a link between two components. Strategies promoting social functioning in aging might help to maintain or improve these abilities over time.

Aging Is Associated With Multidirectional Changes in Social Cognition: Findings From an Adult Life-Span Sample Ranging From 18 to 101 Years

OBJECTIVES

Normal adult aging is associated with changes in social cognition. Although 4 social cognitive domains have been identified (social perception, theory of mind [ToM], affective empathy, and social behavior), no study has tested all 4 domains concurrently in a life-span sample, limiting understanding of the relative magnitude of age-related changes across domains. This study addresses this gap by providing the first assessment of all 4 social cognitive domains in an adult life-span sample.

METHODS

Three hundred and seventy-two participants ranging from 18 to 101 years of age took part in this study. Participants completed a testing battery that assessed social perception, ToM, affective empathy, and social behavior, as well as broader cognitive function and well-being.

RESULTS

The results showed that adult aging is associated with multidirectional changes in social cognitive abilities, with ToM and social perception showing nonlinear decline across much of the life-span, and affective empathy and social behavior showing improvement. Age remained a significant predictor of all 4 social cognitive domains, even after accounting for broader cognitive function. Weak associations emerged between some of the social cognitive abilities and and indices of broader well-being.

DISCUSSION

These findings provide novel and important evidence that normative aging is associated with both gains and losses in social cognition that occur at distinct points of the adult life-span, and that are at least partially independent of general age-related cognitive decline.

What is theory of mind? A psychometric study of theory of mind and intelligence

Theory of mind (ToM) is an essential ability for social competence and communication, and it is necessary for understanding behaviors that differ from our own (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Recent research suggests that tasks designed to measure ToM do not adequately capture a single ToM ability (Warnell & Redcay, 2019; Quesque & Rossetti, 2020) and, instead, might be related to tasks of general cognitive ability (Coyle, Elpers, Gonzalez, Freeman, & Baggio, 2018). This hinders the interpretation of experimental findings and puts into question the validity of the ToM construct. The current study is the first psychometric assessment of the structure of ToM to date. Comparing ToM to crystallized intelligence (Gc) and fluid intelligence (Gf), the study aims to (a) understand whether ToM should be considered a monolithic ability and (b) explore whether tasks of ToM adequately assess ToM, above and beyond general cognitive ability. For this, confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs), exploratory factor analysis (EFA), and exploratory network analysis (NMA) were conducted. The results of the models largely point to the same conclusion: while ToM tasks are not merely assessing cognitive ability, they are not purely assessing a single ToM construct either. Importantly, these findings align with recent theoretical accounts proposing that ToM should not be considered a monolithic construct (Quesque & Rossetti, 2020; Schaafsma, Pfaff, Spunt, & Adolphs, 2015, Devaine, Hollard, & Daunizeau, 2014), and should instead be explored and measured as multiple domains.

No signs of automatic perspective-taking or its modulation by joint attention in toddlers using an object retrieval task

It is currently debated whether simple forms of social perspective-taking that are in place by late infancy are performed automatically. We conducted two experiments (N = 124) to test whether 3-year-olds show automatic perspective-taking during object searches, and whether automatic perspective-taking is facilitated by joint attention. Children were asked to retrieve an object immediately after it was moved from one (L1) to another (L2) location within a container, e.g. a sandbox. In Experiment 1, a between-subjects design was used, with children being randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions: one in which child and other jointly attended to the object in L1 (joint attention condition); one in which the other was present but unengaged with the child when the object was placed in L1 (other present condition) and a baseline condition in which only the child was present (no other condition). Automatic perspective-taking should manifest in biased searches toward L1 in the other present and joint attention conditions, but not in the no other condition. No automatic perspective-taking was observed in either experiment, regardless of whether the other person left and remained absent (Experiment 1) or returned after the object was relocated (Experiment 2). The findings contribute to a growing body of empirical data that questions the existence of automatic perspective-taking.

Cognitive and Affective Theory of Mind across Adulthood

BACKGROUND

Theory of mind (ToM) is a fundamental aspect of social cognition. Previous studies on age-related changes in mentalizing processes have provided conflicting results. This study aims to investigate the age-related changes in the cognitive and affective components of ToM throughout adulthood.

METHODS

Two hundred and thirty-eight healthy participants divided into five age groups (18-40 years old; 41-50 years old; 51-60 years old; 61-70 years; 71-80 years old) underwent tasks assessing the cognitive (ToM Picture Sequencing Task, TMPS, and the Advanced Test of ToM, ATT) and affective (Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task, RMET, and the Emotion Attribution Task, EAT) components of ToM, in both verbal and nonverbal modality.

RESULTS

Regarding affective ToM, both the youngest- and middle-old adult groups (61 to 80 years) performed worse than the young and youngest-middle adult groups (18 to 50 years) in the RMET, but no significant differences were found in the EAT. Regarding cognitive ToM, the middle-old adult group (71 to 80 years) performed worse than the young adult group (18 to 40 years) only in the TMPS, but no significant differences were found in the ATT.

CONCLUSION

Rather than a general decline in ToM, our results provide evidence regarding selective changes in ToM in older adults, further confirming the dissociation of cognitive and affective ToM.

Exploring the Relationship Between Loneliness and Social Cognition in Older Age

Abstract. Understanding others is a key component of successful social interactions, and declines in social abilities during later life can lead to social isolation and loneliness. We investigated the relationship between different subcomponents of social cognition and loneliness in a large sample of older adults. We tested perspective-taking and mentalizing skills, alongside self-reported loneliness and social functioning. The results revealed that both loneliness and age correlated significantly with older adults' ability to resist egocentric interference when taking others' perspectives. However, mediation models showed that the effect of loneliness on egocentric tendencies was eliminated when age was accounted for. Therefore, loneliness relates to egocentrism only because egocentric tendencies increase with age, and people experience increasing levels of loneliness and feelings of social isolation with increasing age. Mentalizing and interference from others' perspectives were not influenced by loneliness or age.

Spelling out some unaddressed conceptual and methodological challenges in empirical lifespan research

The importance of taking a lifespan approach to describe and understand human development has long been acknowledged (e.g., Baltes, 1987). Nevertheless, theoretical or empirical research that actually encompasses the entire lifespan, that is, from early childhood to old age, is rare. This is not surprising given the challenges such an approach entails. Many of these challenges (e.g., establishing measurement invariance between age groups) have been addressed in the previous literature, but others have not yet been sufficiently considered. The main purpose of this article is to present several examples of such largely unaddressed conceptual and methodological challenges and reflect upon possible ways to address them. We discuss the usefulness of a lifespan approach and the generalization of the challenges to other research comparing different groups, such as gender, culture, or species.

Exploring the Relationship Between Deficits in Social Cognition and Neurodegenerative Dementia: A Systematic Review

Background

Neurodegenerative diseases might affect social cognition in various ways depending on their components (theory of mind, emotional processing, attribution bias, and social perception) and the subtype of dementia they cause. This review aims to explore this difference in cognitive function among individuals with different aetiologies of dementia.

Methods

The following databases were explored: MEDLINE via PubMed, Cochrane Library, Lilacs, Web of Science, and PsycINFO. We selected studies examining social cognition in individuals with neurodegenerative diseases in which dementia was the primary symptom that was studied. The neurodegenerative diseases included Alzheimer's disease, Lewy body disease and frontotemporal lobar degeneration. The search yielded 2,803 articles.

Results

One hundred twenty-two articles were included in the present review. The summarised results indicate that people with neurodegenerative diseases indeed have deficits in social cognitive performance. Both in populations with Alzheimer's disease and in populations with frontotemporal dementia, we found that emotional processing was strongly affected. However, although theory of mind impairment could also be observed in the initial stages of frontotemporal dementia, in Alzheimer's disease it was only appreciated when performing highly complex task or in advanced stages of the disease.

Conclusions

Each type of dementia has a differential profile of social cognition deterioration. This review could provide a useful reference for clinicians to improve detection and diagnosis, which would undoubtedly guarantee better interventions.

Systematic Review Registration

https://www.crd.york.ac.uk/prospero/display_record.php?ID=CRD42020152562, PROSPERO, identifier: CRD42020152562.

Anxiety symptoms and theory of mind in older and younger adults: curvilinearity moderated by age group

OBJECTIVES

Theory of mind (ToM), the ability to reason about mental states, declines in later life. While anxiety symptoms may predict ToM abilities, the nature of associations requires more elucidation. Further, it is unknown whether age group moderates associational patterns. We examined associations between anxiety symptoms (linear and curvilinear) and cognitive ToM (C-ToM) and affective ToM (A-ToM); and moderation by age group (older vs. younger adults).

METHODS

In a sample of healthy younger (n = 90, M_age = 20.17 years) and older adults (n = 87, M_age = 71.52), we used hierarchical regressions with polynomial and interaction terms to assess the association between anxiety symptoms and ToM in younger and older adults.

RESULTS

Anxiety symptoms were associated with C-ToM but not A-ToM. Age group interacted linearly with anxiety (β = -1.64, p = .02), and with anxiety's quadratic polynomial (β = .84, p = .04). The inverted-U shaped association in younger adults (highest C-ToM at moderate anxiety) contrasted with older adults' linear decline in C-ToM with increasing anxiety.

CONCLUSION

We highlight the importance of anxiety symptoms for predicting ToM, and clarify that associations vary by age. Elucidating associations may be critical to developing interventions that improve social wellbeing.

Theory of mind performance in depression: A meta-analysis

BACKGROUND

Theory of mind (ToM) is a social-cognitive skill that involves the ability to understand the thoughts and feelings of others. Evidence is mixed regarding the extent of ToM ability in individuals with depression.

METHODS

We conducted a meta-analysis of 43 studies to investigate the strength of the association between ToM and depression.

RESULTS

Results indicated significant, small- to moderate impairment in ToM with a medium overall effect size (g = -0.398) in individuals with depression. Moderator analyses compared effect sizes across groups for the following variables: ToM content, process, and sample type. Additionally, meta-regression analyses tested age and gender as continuous moderators.

LIMITATIONS

The cross-sectional nature of included studies limits this meta-analysis from clarifying temporal or bidirectional relations.

CONCLUSIONS

We discuss findings in the context of the extant developmental, cognitive, social, and clinical literatures. We also suggest several possible explanations for these findings and offer implications for intervention.

Changes in Pronoun Use a Decade before Clinical Diagnosis of Alzheimer’s Dementia. Linguistic Contexts Suggest Problems in Perspective-Taking

The use of pronouns has been shown to change pathologically in the early phases of Alzheimer’s Dementia (AD). So far, the findings have been of a quantitative nature. Little is known, however, about the developmental path of the change, its onset, the domains in which it initially occurs, and if and how it spreads to other linguistic domains. The present study investigates pronoun use in six speakers of German a decade before they were clinically diagnosed with AD (LAD) and six biographically matched healthy controls (CTR). The data originate from monologic spoken language elicited by semi-spontaneous biographical interviews. Investigation of nine pronoun types revealed group differences in the use of three pronoun types: D-pronouns—a specific pronoun type of German for reference to persons and objects; the impersonal pronoun man ‘one’, and the propositional pronoun das ‘this/that’. Investigation of the linguistic contexts in which these three pronoun types were used revealed a correlation with declines in elaborative and evaluative information; that is, information the hearer would benefit from in creating an informed model of the discourse. We, therefore, hypothesize that the early changes in language use due to AD point to problems in perspective-taking, specifically in taking the hearer’s perspective.

Sources of Cognitive Conflict and Their Relevance to Theory-of-Mind Proficiency in Healthy Aging: A Preregistered Study

Age-related decline in theory of mind (ToM) may be due to waning executive control, which is necessary for resolving conflict when reasoning about other individuals' mental states. We assessed how older (n = 50) and younger (n = 50) adults were affected by three theoretically relevant sources of conflict within ToM: competing self-other perspectives, competing cued locations, and outcome knowledge. We examined which best accounted for age-related difficulty with ToM. Our data show unexpected similarity between age groups when people are representing a belief incongruent with their own. Individual differences in attention and response speed best explained the degree of conflict experienced through incompatible self-other perspectives. However, older adults were disproportionately affected by managing conflict between cued locations. Age and spatial working memory were most relevant for predicting the magnitude of conflict elicited by conflicting cued locations. We suggest that previous studies may have underestimated older adults' ToM proficiency by including unnecessary conflict in ToM tasks.

Long-Term Profiles of Bullying Victims and Aggressors: A Retrospective Study

Bullying is a widespread and worrying phenomenon, related to many different personal, behavioral, and social variables which can modulate it and its outcomes, also in the long term. These relationships are usually studied in children and adolescents, but less often in adults who have suffered or perpetrated bullying in the past. The present work explored the long-term characteristics of bullying victims and aggressors using a retrospective design. A sample of 138 adults of different ages completed an on-line protocol that included measures of bullying and victimization, substance use, sensitivity to reward and punishment, social skills, antisocial behavior, emotional regulation strategies, depression, anxiety, stress, self-esteem, and risk of suicide. The sample was divided into three groups (victims, aggressors, and controls) based on their responses to bullying-related questions. A set of Multiple Analyses of Variance with group as a fixed factor was carried out for each dependent variable. Victims and aggressors did not significantly differ in their self-reported substance consumption. Victims showed higher global depression, anxiety and stress in the past than aggressors (M = 34.66, SD = 11.74; aggressors: M = 19.70, SD = 16.53), higher emotional lack of control (M = 23.97, SD = 10.62; controls: M = 17.11, SD = 7.95) and rejection (M = 21.72, SD = 7.24; controls: M = 16.33, SD = 5.67), lower self-esteem (M = 27.72, SD = 6.70; controls: M = 31.60, SD = 6.60), and a larger frequency of suicidal thoughts (in the past) than controls. Aggressors showed higher sensitivity to reward (M = 12.03, SD = 3.66; controls: M = 8.42, SD = 3.92), larger communicational and relational skills (M = 22.10, SD = 7.20; controls: M = 17.96, SD = 7.16), and lower emotional sensitivity (M = 14.80, SD = 4.10; controls: M = 16.76, SD = 2.21). Accordingly, the logistic regression analysis identified sensitivity to reward and low psychological adjustment as the main predictors of the aggressor and victim profiles, respectively. The present results are discussed considering the extant literature on bullying and may help to improve prevention programs for this relevant social scourge.

Poorer Theory of Mind in Amnestic Mild Cognitive Impairment Is Associated with Decreased Functional Connectivity in the Default Mode Network

BACKGROUND

Older adults living with amnestic mild cognitive impairment (aMCI) not only demonstrate impairments in Theory of Mind (ToM), relative to adults with non-amnestic MCI (naMCI), but are also at a higher risk of developing dementia.

OBJECTIVE

Our primary objective was to ascertain whether default mode network (DMN) functional connectivity was differentially associated with ToM abilities between MCI subgroups.

METHODS

Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we investigated alterations in resting-state functional connectivity within the brain's DMN in a sample of 43 older adults with aMCI (n = 19) and naMCI (n = 24), previously reported to demonstrate poorer ToM abilities.

RESULTS

Compared to naMCI, the aMCI subgroup revealed a significant association between poorer ToM performance and reduced functional connectivity between the bilateral temporal pole (TempP) and the left lateral temporal cortex (LTC) (LTC_L-TempP_L: b = -0.06, t(33) = -3.53, p = 0.02; LTC_L-TempP_R: b = -0.07,t(33) = -3.20, p = 0.03); between the right TempP and the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) (b = -0.04, t(33) = -3.02, p = 0.03) and between the left and right TempP (b = -0.05, t(33) = -3.26, p = 0.03). In the naMCI subgroup, the opposite relationship was present between the bilateral TempP and the left LTC (Combined correlation: r = -0.47, p = 0.02), however, not between the right TempP and the dMPFC (r = -0.14, p = 0.51) or the left and right TempP (r = -0.31, p = 0.14).

CONCLUSION

Our findings suggest that alterations in functional connectivity within the DMN involving temporal and frontal lobe regions are associated with ToM deficits in aMCI.

Age Differences in the Subcomponents of Executive Functioning

OBJECTIVES

Across the life span, deficits in executive functioning (EF) are associated with poor behavioral control and failure to achieve goals. Though EF is often discussed as one broad construct, a prominent model of EF suggests that it is composed of three subdomains: inhibition, set shifting, and updating. These subdomains are seen in both younger (YA) and older adults (OA), with performance deficits across subdomains in OA. Therefore, our goal was to investigate whether subdomains of EF might be differentially affected by age, and how these differences may relate to broader global age differences in EF.

METHODS

To assess these age differences, we conducted a meta-analysis at multiple levels, including task level, subdomain level, and of global EF. Based on previous work, we hypothesized that there would be overall differences in EF in OA.

RESULTS

Using 1,268 effect sizes from 401 articles, we found overall differences in EF with age. Results suggested that differences in performance are not uniform, such that variability in age effects emerged at the task level, and updating was not as affected by age as other subdomains.

DISCUSSION

These findings advance our understanding of age differences in EF, and stand to inform early detection of EF decline.

Does interference between self and other perspectives in theory of mind tasks reflect a common underlying process? Evidence from individual differences in theory of mind and inhibitory control

Theory of mind (ToM), the ability to understand that other agents have different beliefs, desires, and knowledge than oneself, has been extensively researched. Theory of mind tasks involve participants dealing with interference between their self-perspective and another agent’s perspective, and this interference has been related to executive function, particularly to inhibitory control. This study assessed whether there are individual differences in self–other interference, and whether these effects are due to individual differences in executive function. A total of 142 participants completed two ToM (the director task and a Level 1 visual perspective-taking task), which both involve self–other interference, and a battery of inhibitory control tasks. The relationships between the tasks were examined using path analysis. Results showed that the self–other interference effects of the two ToM tasks were dissociable, with individual differences in performance on the ToM tasks being unrelated and performance in each predicted by different inhibitory control tasks. We suggest that self–other differences are part of the nature of ToM tasks, but self–other interference is not a unitary construct. Instead, self–other differences result in interference effects in various ways and at different stages of processing, and these effects may not be a major limiting step for adults’ performance on typical ToM tasks. Further work is needed to assess other factors that may limit adults’ ToM performance and hence explain individual differences in social ability.

Executive Functions do not Underlie Performance on the Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT) in Healthy Younger and Older Adults

OBJECTIVE

Current measures of social cognition have shown inconsistent findings regarding the effects of executive function (EF) abilities on social cognitive performance in older adults. The psychometric properties of the different social cognition tests may underlie the disproportional overlap with EF abilities. Our aim was to examine the relationship between social cognition and EF abilities using the Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT; Baksh, R.A., Abrahams, S., Auyeung, B., & MacPherson, S.E. (2018). The Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT): Examining the effects of age on a new measure of theory of mind and social norm understanding. PloS One, 13(4), e0195818.), a test assessing four different aspects of social cognition: cognitive theory of mind (ToM), affective ToM, interpersonal understanding of social norms, and intrapersonal understanding of social norms.

METHOD

We administered the ESCoT, EF measures of inhibition, set shifting, updating, and a measure of processing speed to 30 younger and 31 older adults. We also administered the Visual Perspective Taking task (VPT) as a ToM test thought to be reliant on EF abilities.

RESULTS

Better performance on cognitive ToM was significantly associated with younger age and slower processing speed. Better performance on affective ToM and ESCoT total score was associated with being younger and female. Better performance on interpersonal understanding of social norms was associated with being younger. EF abilities did not predict performance on any subtest of the ESCoT. In contrast, on the VPT, the relationship between age group and performance was fully or partially mediated by processing speed and updating.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings show that the ESCoT is a valuable measure of different aspects of social cognition and, unlike many established tests of social cognition, performance is not predicted by EF abilities.

Theory of mind across lifespan from ages 16 to 81 years

PURPOSE

Impaired theory of mind (ToM) is a neurobehavioral phenotype of epilepsy. Given that the age transitions affect cognitive development and decline, it is important to refine ToM across the lifespan. This study evaluated ToM in healthy subjects, taking into account education, gender, and other functions, aiming to clarify its specificity and relationships to major demographic and cognitive domains.

METHODS

A hundred and seventy subjects from ages 16 to 81 years (68 men) who received five to 17 years of schooling were evaluated using a Faux Pas Task (FPT) that is solved at the end of childhood and is highly sensitive to brain damage and tests for language, memory, praxis, visual perception, initiative, attention, shifting, and planning. Factor analysis, analysis of variance, and correlation and regression analyses were used to assess the data.

RESULTS

The analysis yielded six factors: Beliefs, Delusions, and Facts, which express the understanding of mental states and contextual details; Matching-Learning, Executive, and Working Memory. On this basis, six composite scores (CSs) were computed. Age and schooling showed significant effects on the Matching-Learning, Executive, and Working Memory CSs. The FPT raw scores and CSs were unrelated to age or schooling, while females showed better performance than males. The Beliefs CS and FPT scores were predicted by the Executive, Working Memory, Delusions, and Facts CSs and gender.

CONCLUSIONS

Theory of mind is a specific cognitive domain independent of age and formal education, but related to gender. Working memory, executive functions, and reality examination support some ToM processes. These findings may provide reference points against which impairment can be assessed. This article is part of the Special Issue "Epilepsy and social cognition across the lifespan".

Impact of Aging on Empathy: Review of Psychological and Neural Mechanisms

Empathy in aging is a key capacity because it affects the quality of older adults' relationships and reduced levels are associated with greater loneliness. Many older adults also find themselves in the role of a caregiver to a loved one, and thus empathy is critical for the success of the caregiver-patient relationship. Furthermore, older adults are motivated to make strong emotional connections with others, as highlighted in the socioemotional selectivity theory. Consequently, reductions in empathy could negatively impact their goals. However, there is growing evidence that older adults experience at least some changes in empathy, depending on the domain. Specifically, the state of the research is that older adults have lower cognitive empathy (i.e., the ability to understand others' thoughts and feelings) than younger adults, but similar and in some cases even higher levels of emotional empathy (i.e., the ability to feel emotions that are similar to others' or feel compassion for them). A small number of studies have examined the neural mechanisms for age-related differences in empathy and have found reduced activity in a key brain area associated with cognitive empathy. However, more research is needed to further characterize how brain changes impact empathy with age, especially in the emotional domain of empathy. In this review, we discuss the current state of the research on age-related differences in the psychological and neural bases of empathy, with a specific comparison of the cognitive versus emotional components. Finally, we highlight new directions for research in this area and examine the implications of age-related differences in empathy for older adults.

The unreliability of egocentric bias across self-other and memory-belief distinctions in the Sandbox Task

Humans are often considered egocentric creatures, particularly (and ironically) when we are supposed to take another person's perspective over our own (i.e. when we use our theory of mind). We investigated the underlying causes of this phenomenon. We gave young adult participants a false belief task (Sandbox Task) in which objects were first hidden at one location by a protagonist and then moved to a second location within the same space but in the protagonist's absence. Participants were asked to indicate either where the protagonist remembered the item to be (reasoning about another's memory), believed it to be (reasoning about another's false belief), or where the protagonist would look for it (action prediction of another based on false belief). The distance away from Location A (the original one) towards Location B (the new location) was our measure of egocentric bias. We found no evidence that egocentric bias varied according to reasoning type, and no evidence that participants actually were more biased when reasoning about another person than when simply recalling the first location from memory. We conclude that the Sandbox Task paradigm may not be sensitive enough to draw out consistent effects related to mental state reasoning in young adults.

Egocentric bias across mental and non-mental representations in the Sandbox Task

In the Sandbox Task, participants indicate where a protagonist who has a false belief about the location of an object will look for that object in a trough filled with a substrate that conceals the hidden object's location. Previous findings that participants tend to indicate a location closer to where they themselves know the object to be located have been interpreted as evidence of egocentric bias when attributing mental states to others. We tested the assumption that such biases occur as a result of reasoning about mental states specifically. We found that participants showed more egocentric bias when reasoning from a protagonist's false belief than from their own memory, but found equivalent levels of bias when they were asked to indicate where a false film would depict the object as when they were asked about a protagonist's false belief. Our findings suggest that that egocentric biases found in adult false belief tasks are more likely due to a general difficulty with reasoning about false representations than a specialised difficulty with reasoning about false mental states.

The role of social attention in older adults’ ability to interpret naturalistic social scenes

Age-related differences on theory of mind (ToM) tasks are well established. However, the literature has been criticised for predominantly relying on tasks with poor ecological validity, and consequently it remains unclear whether these age differences extend to tasks with greater realism. In addition, we currently have a limited understanding of the factors that may contribute to age-related declines in ToM. To address these issues, we conducted two studies that assessed age differences in ToM using multimodal social scene stimuli. Study 1 also examined eye movements to assess whether biases in visual attention may be related to age-related difficulties in ToM, and Study 2 included an assessment of social attention (as indexed by biological motion perception) and working memory to assess whether these capacities may explain age difficulties in ToM. In both studies, the results showed that older adults performed worse than their younger counterparts on the ToM tasks, indicating that age-related difficulties in ToM extend to measures that more closely represent everyday social interactions. The eye-tracking data in Study 1 showed that older adults gazed less at the faces of protagonists in the social scenes compared with younger adults; however, these visual biases were not associated with ToM ability. Study 2 showed that older age was associated with a reduced ability to detect biological motion cues, and this mediated age-related variance in ToM ability. These findings are discussed in relation to competing theoretical frameworks of ageing that predict either improvements or declines in ToM with age.

People Searching for Meaning in Their Lives Find Literature More Engaging

Why are some people interested in complex literature and others not? This study experimentally investigated this question by assessing what cognitive traits moderated responses to literary and less-literary fictional vignettes. Specifically, participants were exposed to two variants of a celebrated literary text, one altered so as to remove overtly literary elements. A moderation analysis was performed on responses with respect to three variables: need for cognition (NC); meaning in life (measured in two subscales, search for meaning [SM] and presence of meaning [PM]); and intentionality/mentalizing ability (IM). Results showed that SM moderated interpretive response to the textual variation, such that those with increasing scores on the SM scale were increasingly more likely to rate the literary vignettes as worthy of appreciation. This result, in turn, gave grounds for a second study that investigated the role played by cloze values in identifying a text as “literary.” The latter study showed that the literary and less-literary vignettes exhibited significant differences in cloze values. Taken together, these studies suggest that differences in responsiveness to literary materials may well be driven by preexisting cognitive factors.

Does altercentric interference rely on mentalizing?: Results from two level-1 perspective-taking tasks

Considerable debate has focused on whether adults possess an implicit system for representing others' mental states. Some argue that people automatically represent the perspective of others using evidence from altercentric interference-cases in which another agent's perspective affects the speed with which one can report one's own perspective. Others have argued that altercentric interference is not always specific to social stimuli and thus may represent a simpler process such as submentalizing. To distinguish between these positions, Study 1 developed a novel measure of altercentric interference-a "sandbox" measure-that allowed us to more sensitively assess altercentric interference across social and non-social conditions. We replicated previous findings showing that participants experience both egocentric and altercentric interference, but we found that these effects emerge equally in social and non-social conditions. To further test whether altercentric interference emerges in social perspective-taking situations, Study 2 conducted a conceptual replication of a study which used a novel "goggle" paradigm to assess whether individuals implicitly represent others' perspectives. Although we failed to find evidence of altercentric interference in response times, participants' accuracy reflected the possibility of interference from others' perspectives. We argue that these findings provide support for the idea that altercentric interference in response to social stimuli (an avatar) is driven by perspective-taking mechanisms, while such interference in response to non-social stimuli (an arrow) is driven by attention-cuing mechanisms.

False-belief reasoning from 3 to 92 years of age

False-belief reasoning, defined as the ability to reason about another person’s beliefs and appreciate that beliefs can differ from reality, is an important aspect of perspective taking. We tested 266 individuals, at various ages ranging from 3 to 92 years, on a continuous measure of false-belief reasoning (the Sandbox task). All age groups had difficulty suppressing their own knowledge when estimating what a naïve person knew. After controlling for task-specific memory, our results showed similar false-belief reasoning abilities across the preschool years and from older childhood to younger adulthood, followed by a small reduction in this ability from younger to older adulthood. These results highlight the relative similarity in false-belief reasoning abilities at different developmental periods across the lifespan.

Testing the validity of a continuous false belief task in 3- to 7-year-old children

In two studies, we examined young children's performance on the paper-and-pencil version of the Sandbox task, a continuous measure of false belief, and its relations with other false belief and inhibition tasks. In Study 1, 96 children aged 3 to 7years completed three false belief tasks (Sandbox, Unexpected Contents, and Appearance/Reality) and two inhibition tasks (Head-Shoulders-Knees-Toes and Grass/Snow). Results revealed that false belief bias-a measure of egocentrism-on the Sandbox task correlated with age but not with the Unexpected Contents or Appearance/Reality task or with measures of inhibition after controlling for age. In Study 2, 90 3- to 7-year-olds completed five false belief tasks (Sandbox, Unexpected Contents, Appearance/Reality, Change of Location, and a second-order false belief task), two inhibition tasks (Simon Says and Grass/Snow), and a receptive vocabulary task (Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test). Results showed that false belief bias on the Sandbox task correlated negatively with age and with the Change of Location task but not with the other false belief or inhibition tasks after controlling for age and receptive vocabulary. The Sandbox task shows promise as an age-sensitive measure of false belief performance during early childhood and shows convergent and discriminant validity.

Non-linearities in Theory-of-Mind Development

Research on Theory-of-Mind (ToM) has mainly focused on ages of core ToM development. This article follows a quantitative approach focusing on the level of ToM understanding on a measurement scale, the ToM Storybooks, in 324 typically developing children between 3 and 11 years of age. It deals with the eventual occurrence of developmental non-linearities in ToM functioning, using smoothing techniques, dynamic growth model building and additional indicators, namely moving skewness, moving growth rate changes and moving variability. The ToM sum-scores showed an overall developmental trend that leveled off toward the age of 10 years. Within this overall trend two non-linearities in the group-based change pattern were found: a plateau at the age of around 56 months and a dip at the age of 72–78 months. These temporary regressions in ToM sum-score were accompanied by a decrease in growth rate and variability, and a change in skewness of the ToM data, all suggesting a developmental shift in ToM understanding. The temporary decreases also occurred in the different ToM sub-scores and most clearly so in the core ToM component of beliefs. It was also found that girls had an earlier growth spurt than boys and that the underlying developmental path was more salient in girls than in boys. The consequences of these findings are discussed from various theoretical points of view, with an emphasis on a dynamic systems interpretation of the underlying developmental paths.

A Mind-Reader Does Not Always Have Deontological Moral Judgments and Prosocial Behavior: A Developmental Perspective

The rationalistic theories of morality emphasize that reasoning plays an important role in moral judgments and prosocial behavior. Theory of mind as a reasoning ability in the mental domain has been considered a facilitator of moral development. The present study examined whether theory of mind was consistently positively associated with morality from middle childhood to late adulthood. Two hundred and four participants, including 48 elementary school children, 45 adolescents, 62 younger adults, and 49 older adults, completed theory of mind, moral judgment and prosocial behavior tasks. Theory of mind was measured with strange stories that tapped into an understanding of lies, white lies, double bluffs, irony, and persuasion. Moral judgments were measured with variants of the trolley dilemma. Prosocial behavior was measured through participants' performance in an interactive situation in which a helping request was made. The results indicated specific rather than similar developmental trajectories of theory of mind, moral judgments, and prosocial behavior. There was a quadratic trend in theory of mind, a combination of quadratic and cubic trends in deontological moral judgments and a linear decline in helping behavior. It is thus suggested that theory of mind may not be associated with morality in an unchanging way during development. Further results indicated that theory of mind and deontological moral judgments were negatively correlated for children, adolescents, and older adults but positively correlated for younger adults. Theory of mind and helping behavior were positively correlated for children but negatively correlated for adolescents. However, the relationships disappeared in adulthood. In sum, the present study reveals that theory of mind may be a nice tool for its facilitation of deontological moral judgments and prosocial behavior, but it may also be a nasty tool for its blocking of deontological moral judgments and prosocial behavior. Moreover, theory of mind may be a permanent tool for moral judgment development but a temporary tool for prosocial behavior development. Thus, the present study enriches the rationalistic theories of morality from a developmental perspective. Different relationships between theory of mind and morality from middle childhood to late adulthood are discussed.

Development of a Veterinary Surgical Checklist

We describe a new surgical checklist for veterinary cardiologists based on the literature and the application of human factors design. The checklist was developed and iterated with subject-matter experts and was implemented for 4 months, during which use of the checklist was monitored, feedback was gathered, and a final survey was distributed to assess subjective experiences. Although developed for the cardiology team, the checklist also affected the anesthesia team by requiring information and responses to be transmitted across teams. Interviews, subjective reports, and observations pointed to the fact that the checklist engendered communication, particularly by requiring the thoughts and expectations of team members to be stated explicitly.