Factors that influence the generation of autobiographical memory conjunction errors

The constructive nature of memories in insects: bumblebees as a case study

The view that human memory is constructive implies that recollections are not necessarily an accurate reproduction of past events. An approach to study this constructive nature of memory is by examining memory errors. In this regard, conjunction errors-i.e. incorrect recollection of new stimuli integrated by components from two previously studied stimuli-have attracted important attention in human memory research. Do animals other than humans make conjunction errors? To investigate this issue, a choice task in which training was not involved was used. Bees experienced two to-be-remembered stimuli. At the test, they were presented with four stimuli: one of the original items (i.e. old), an item made by combining two features of the original items (i.e. conjunction), an item containing a previously presented feature and a new one (i.e. feature), and an item integrated solely by new features (i.e. new). Bumblebees remembered the old items. Importantly, when making memory errors, bumblebees selected conjunction and feature lures more often than new items. These results indicate that bumblebees, like humans, spontaneously make memory conjunction errors and suggest that invertebrates' memories might also be constructive in nature. I suggest that focusing on memory errors is a solid avenue to investigate episodic (like) memory in animals.This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Episodic recombination and the role of time in mental travel

Mental time travel is often presented as a singular mechanism, but theoretical and empirical considerations suggest that it is composed of component processes. What are these components? Three hypotheses about the major components of mental time travel are commonly considered: (i) remembering and imagining might, respectively, rely on different processes, (ii) past- and future-directed forms of mental time travel might, respectively, rely on different processes, and (iii) the creation of episodic representations and the determination of their temporal orientation might, respectively, rely on different processes. Here, we flesh out the last of these proposals. First, we argue for 'representational continuism': the view that different forms of mental travel are continuous with regard to their core representational contents. Next, we propose an updated account of episodic recombination (the mechanism generating these episodic contents) and review evidence in its support. On this view, episodic recombination is a natural kind best viewed as a form of compositional computation. Finally, we argue that episodic recombination should be distinguished from mechanisms determining the temporal orientation of episodic representations. Thus, we suggest that mental travel is a singular capacity, while mental time travel has at least two major components: episodic representations and their temporal orientation. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Constructive Memory and Conscious Experience

Episodic memory relies on constructive processes that support simulating novel future events by flexibly recombining elements of past experiences, and that can also give rise to memory errors. In recent studies, we have developed methods to characterize the cognitive and neural processes that support conscious experiences linked to this process of episodic recombination, both when people simulate novel future events and commit recombination-related memory errors. In this Perspective, we summarize recent studies that illustrate these phenomena, and discuss broader implications for characterizing the basis of conscious experiences associated with constructive memory from a cognitive neuroscience perspective.

Reinstatement of item-specific contextual details during retrieval supports recombination-related false memories

Flexible retrieval mechanisms that allow us to infer relationships across events may also lead to memory errors or distortion when details of one event are misattributed to the related event. Here, we tested how making successful inferences alters representation of overlapping events, leading to false memories. Participants encoded overlapping associations ('AB' and 'BC'), each of which was superimposed on different indoor and outdoor scenes that were pre-exposed prior to associative learning. Participants were subsequently tested on both the directly learned pairs ('AB' and 'BC') and inferred relationships across pairs ('AC'). We predicted that when people make a correct inference, features associated with overlapping events may become integrated in memory. To test this hypothesis, participants completed a final detailed retrieval test, in which they had to recall the scene associated with initially learned 'AB' pairs (or 'BC' pairs). We found that the outcome of inference decisions impacted the degree to which neural patterns elicited during detailed 'AB' retrieval reflected reinstatement of the scene associated with the overlapping 'BC' event. After successful inference, neural patterns in the anterior hippocampus, posterior medial prefrontal cortex, and our content-reinstatement region (left inferior temporal gyrus) were more similar to the overlapping, yet incorrect 'BC' context relative to after unsuccessful inference. Further, greater hippocampal activity during inference was associated with greater reinstatement of the incorrect, overlapping context in our content-reinstatement region, which in turn tracked contextual misattributions during detailed retrieval. These results suggest recombining memories during successful inference can lead to misattribution of contextual details across related events, resulting in false memories.

The Truth Is Out There: Accuracy in Recall of Verifiable Real-World Events

How accurate is memory? Although people implicitly assume that their memories faithfully represent past events, the prevailing view in research is that memories are error prone and constructive. Yet little is known about the frequency of errors, particularly in memories for naturalistic experiences. Here, younger and older adults underwent complex real-world experiences that were nonetheless controlled and verifiable, freely recalling these experiences after days to years. As expected, memory quantity and the richness of episodic detail declined with increasing age and retention interval. Details that participants did recall, however, were highly accurate (93%–95%) across age and time. This level of accuracy far exceeded comparatively low estimations among memory scientists and other academics in a survey. These findings suggest that details freely recalled from one-time real-world experiences can retain high correspondence to the ground truth despite significant forgetting, with higher accuracy than expected given the emphasis on fallibility in the field of memory research.

An account of subjective probability judgment for joint events: Conjunctive and disjunctive

Probability judgment is a vital part of many aspects of everyday life. In the present paper, we present a new theory of the way in which individuals produce probability estimates for joint events: conjunctive and disjunctive. We propose that a majority of individuals produce conjunctive (disjunctive) estimates by making a quasi-random adjustment, positive or negative, from the less (more) likely component probability with the other component playing no obvious role. In two studies, we produce evidence supporting propositions that follow from our theory. First, the component probabilities do appear to play the distinct roles we propose in determining the joint event probabilities. Second, contrary to probability theory and other accounts of probability judgment, we show that the conjunctive-less likely probability difference is unrelated to the more likely disjunctive probability difference (in normative theory these quantities are identical). In conclusion, while violating the norms of probability judgment, we argue that estimates produced in the manner we propose will be close enough to the normative values especially given the changing nature of the external environment and the incomplete nature of available information.

Implicit Memory, Constructive Memory, and Imagining the Future: A Career Perspective

In this article I discuss some of the major questions, findings, and ideas that have driven my research program, which has examined various aspects of human memory using a combination of cognitive, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging approaches. I do so from a career perspective that describes important scientific influences that have shaped my approach to the study of memory and discusses considerations that led to choosing specific research paths. After acknowledging key early influences, I briefly summarize a few of the main takeaways from research on implicit memory during the 1980s and 1990s and then move on to consider more recent ideas and findings concerning constructive memory, future imagining, and mental simulation that have motivated my approach for the past 2 decades. A main unifying theme of this research is that memory can affect psychological functions in ways that go beyond the simple everyday understanding of memory as a means of revisiting past experiences.

Everyday false memories in older persons with depressive disorder

Generally we tend to think that memory in daily living is complete and accurate in healthy persons. However, current memory research has revealed inconspicuous memory faults. Rarely omissions and distortions of memory are researched with tasks resembling everyday life. We investigated healthy older control subjects (HC) and patients with depressive disorder (DD). Cognitive function was assessed with a comprehensive neuropsychological test battery and mood with the Montgomery-Asberg Depression Scale (MADRS). We assessed everyday veridical and distorted memories on showing participants original news and commercials. In most aspects of attention, executive functions, and memory, patients with DD performed worse than HC. Regarding memory content on viewing news or commercials the difference between patients with DD and HC was more pronounced for false memory content than for veridical memory content. Linear regression analysis showed the extent of false memory content being associated with mental flexibility as assessed with the Trail Making Test and mood as assessed with the MADRS for both information obtained on viewing news and commercials. Increase of false memories impedes overall accuracy of memory more than decrease of veridical memories in older persons with depressive disorder. Diminished executive functions and depressive mood partly explain these memory distortions.

Constructive episodic simulation, flexible recombination, and memory errors

According to Mahr & Csibra (M&C), the view that the constructive nature of episodic memory is related to its role in simulating future events has difficulty explaining why memory is often accurate. We hold this view, but disagree with their conclusion. Here we consider ideas and evidence regarding flexible recombination processes in episodic retrieval that accommodate both accuracy and distortion.

Nonprobative photos rapidly lead people to believe claims about their own (and other people's) pasts

Photos lead people to believe that both true and false events have happened to them, even when those photos provide no evidence that the events occurred. Research has shown that these nonprobative photos increase false beliefs when combined with misleading suggestions and repeated exposure to the photo or target event. We propose that photos exert similar effects without those factors, and test that proposition in five experiments. In Experiment 1, people saw the names of several animals and pretended to give food to or take food from each. Then people saw the animal names again, half with a photo of the animal and half alone, and decided whether they had an experience with each. The photos led people to believe they had experiences with the animals. Moreover, Experiments 2-5 provided evidence that photos exerted these effects by making it easier to bring related thoughts and images to mind-a feeling that people mistook as evidence of genuine experience. In each experiment, photos led people to believe positive claims about the past (but not negative claims), consistent with evidence that feelings of ease selectively increase positive judgments. Experiment 4 also showed that photos (like other manipulations of ease) bias people's judgments broadly, producing false beliefs about other people's pasts. Finally, in Experiment 5, photos exerted more powerful effects when they depicted unfamiliar animals, and thus could most help bring information to mind. These findings suggest that nonprobative photos can distort the past without other factors that encourage false beliefs, and that they operate by helping related thoughts and images come to mind.

Autobiographical memory conjunction errors in younger and older adults: Evidence for a role of inhibitory ability

Because of its reconstructive nature, autobiographical memory (AM) is subject to a range of distortions. One distortion involves the erroneous incorporation of features from one episodic memory into another, forming what are known as memory conjunction errors. Healthy aging has been associated with an enhanced susceptibility to conjunction errors for laboratory stimuli, yet it is unclear whether these findings translate to the autobiographical domain. We investigated the impact of aging on vulnerability to AM conjunction errors, and explored potential cognitive processes underlying the formation of these errors. An imagination recombination paradigm was used to elicit AM conjunction errors in young and older adults. Participants also completed a battery of neuropsychological tests targeting relational memory and inhibition ability. Consistent with findings using laboratory stimuli, older adults were more susceptible to AM conjunction errors than younger adults. However, older adults were not differentially vulnerable to the inflating effects of imagination. Individual variation in AM conjunction error vulnerability was attributable to inhibitory capacity. An inability to suppress the cumulative familiarity of individual AM details appears to contribute to the heightened formation of AM conjunction errors with age. (PsycINFO Database Record

Flexible retrieval: When true inferences produce false memories

Episodic memory involves flexible retrieval processes that allow us to link together distinct episodes, make novel inferences across overlapping events, and recombine elements of past experiences when imagining future events. However, the same flexible retrieval and recombination processes that underpin these adaptive functions may also leave memory prone to error or distortion, such as source misattributions in which details of one event are mistakenly attributed to another related event. To determine whether the same recombination-related retrieval mechanism supports both successful inference and source memory errors, we developed a modified version of an associative inference paradigm in which participants encoded everyday scenes comprised of people, objects, and other contextual details. These scenes contained overlapping elements (AB, BC) that could later be linked to support novel inferential retrieval regarding elements that had not appeared together previously (AC). Our critical experimental manipulation concerned whether contextual details were probed before or after the associative inference test, thereby allowing us to assess whether (a) false memories increased for successful versus unsuccessful inferences, and (b) any such effects were specific to after compared with before participants received the inference test. In each of 4 experiments that used variants of this paradigm, participants were more susceptible to false memories for contextual details after successful than unsuccessful inferential retrieval, but only when contextual details were probed after the associative inference test. These results suggest that the retrieval-mediated recombination mechanism that underlies associative inference also contributes to source misattributions that result from combining elements of distinct episodes. (PsycINFO Database Record

Are eyewitness accounts biased? Evaluating false memories for crimes involving in-group or out-group conflict

Eyewitness testimony has been shown to be unreliable and susceptible to false memories. Whether eyewitness memory errors are influenced by the victim's group membership (relative to both the eyewitness and perpetrator) is underexplored. The current study used complementary behavioral and neuroimaging approaches to test the hypothesis that intragroup conflict heightens participants' susceptibility to subsequent false memories. Healthy young adults witnessed and later answered questions about events in which the perpetrator and victim were either 1) identified as in-group members relative to each other and the eyewitness, 2) out-group members relative to the eyewitness, but not each other, or 3) out-group members relative to each other (Experiments 1a and 1b). When perpetrators and victims were in-group members (intragroup conflict), participants showed heightened false memory rates. Moreover, false memories increased upon crime realization. Neuroimaging data analysis revealed that salient (as compared to ambiguous) intragroup conflict elicited heightened activation in neural regions associated with resolving cognitive conflict (anterior cingulate cortex; ACC). Increased functional connectivity between the ACC and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex was associated with subsequent false memories (Experiment 2). Results suggest that the social salience of the intragroup conflict may have been associated with participants' increased susceptibility to false memories.

Remembering the past and imagining the future: Identifying and enhancing the contribution of episodic memory

Recent studies have shown that imagining or simulating future events relies on many of the same cognitive and neural processes as remembering past events. According to the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (Schacter and Addis, 2007), such overlap indicates that both remembered past and imagined future events rely heavily on episodic memory: future simulations are built on retrieved details of specific past experiences that are recombined into novel events. An alternative possibility is that commonalities between remembering and imagining reflect the influence of more general, non-episodic factors such as narrative style or communicative goals that shape the expression of both memory and imagination. We consider recent studies that distinguish the contributions of episodic and non-episodic processes in remembering the past and imagining the future by using an episodic specificity induction - brief training in recollecting the details of a past experience - and also extend this approach to the domains of problem solving and creative thinking. We conclude by suggesting that the specificity induction may target a process of scene construction that contributes to episodic memory as well as to imagination, problem solving, and creative thinking.