A mega-analysis of memory reports from eight peer-reviewed false memory implantation studies

Judges and lawyers' beliefs in repression and dissociative amnesia may imperil justice: further guidance required

This article examines continuing misunderstanding about memory function especially for trauma, across three UK samples (N = 717). Delayed allegations of child sexual and physical abuse are prevalent in Western legal systems and often rely upon uncorroborated memory testimony to prove guilt. U.K. legal professionals and jurors typically assess the reliability of such memory recall via common sense, yet decades of scientific research show common sense beliefs often conflict with science. Recent international surveys show controversial notions of repression and accurate memory recovery remain strongly endorsed. In historical cases, these notions may lead to wrongful convictions. The current study surveyed the U.K. public, lawyers, and mental health professionals' beliefs about repression, dissociative amnesia and false memories. Study findings give unique data on judges' and barristers' beliefs. Overall, the study findings reinforce international scientists' concerns of a science - knowledge-gap. Repression was strongly endorsed by lay, legal and clinical participants (> 78%) as was dissociative amnesia (> 87%). Moreover, suboptimal professional legal education and juror guidance may increase misunderstanding. Correcting beliefs about memory function, and extending the contribution of memory science in the courtroom remains an important quest for cognitive scientists.

Open science practices in the false memory literature

In response to the replication crisis in psychology, the scientific community has advocated open science practices to promote transparency and reproducibility. Although existing reviews indicate inconsistent and generally low adoption of open science in psychology, a current-day, detailed analysis is lacking. Recognising the significant impact of false memory research in legal contexts, we conducted a preregistered systematic review to assess the integration of open science practices within this field, analysing 388 publications from 2015 to 2023 (including 15 replications and 3 meta-analyses). Our findings indicated a significant yet varied adoption of open science practices. Most studies (86.86%) adhered to at least one measure, with publication accessibility being the most consistently adopted practice at 73.97%. While data sharing demonstrated the most substantial growth, reaching about 75% by 2023, preregistration and analysis script sharing lagged, with 20-25% adoption in 2023. This review highlights a promising trend towards enhanced research quality, transparency, and reproducibility in false memory research. However, the inconsistent implementation of open science practices may still challenge the verification, replication, and interpretation of research findings. Our study underscores the need for a comprehensive adoption of open science to improve research reliability and validity substantially, fostering trust and credibility in psychology.

[Trauma and memory-A contribution to the current debate in law and psychotherapy]

The recall of memories of past events, experiences and emotions is a complex process. When experiencing traumatic events, as is the case with sexual violence, a host of additional complexities and difficulties arise. This becomes especially important in court cases which rely mostly or exclusively on the testimony of the victim, where the problem of the fallibility of memory takes center stage. Some research studies emphasize the possibility of inducing, altering or suppressing memories, especially in the context of psychotherapy. This has led to the unfortunate reality that the testimony of victims who have undergone psychotherapy is often considered to be unreliable. This in turn can lead to the impression that a decision has to be made between treatment of the adverse effects of traumatic events and maximizing the chances for a conviction of the perpetrator in court. This article introduces some central concepts of our current understanding of memory and gives an overview of the relevant scientific literature and debate. Following this, it examines the dilemma as it pertains to the different groups of all involved parties (i.e., victims, members of the judiciary and psychotherapists). Lastly, it proposes a framework of how to approach a solution to this problem by focusing on research in critical areas, expansion of therapy guidelines and documentation procedures as well as communication of these efforts to all parties involved.

Unringing the bell: Successful debriefing following a rich false memory study

In rich false memory studies, familial informants often provide information to support researchers in planting vivid memories of events that never occurred. The goal of the current study was to assess how effectively we can retract these false memories via debriefing - i.e., to what extent can we put participants back the way we found them? We aimed to establish (1) what proportion of participants would retain a false memory or false belief following debriefing, and (2) whether richer, more detailed memories would be more difficult to retract. Participants (N = 123) completed a false memory implantation protocol as part of a replication of the "Lost in the Mall" study (Loftus & Pickrell, Psychiatric Annals, 25, 720-725, 1995). By the end of the protocol, 14% of participants self-reported a memory for the fabricated event, and a further 52% believed it had happened. Participants were then fully debriefed, and memory and belief for the false event were assessed again. In a follow-up assessment 3 days post-debriefing, the false memory rate had dropped to 6% and false belief rates also fell precipitously to 7%. Moreover, virtually all persistent false memories were found to be nonbelieved memories, where participants no longer accepted that the fabricated event had occurred. Richer, more detailed memories were more resistant to correction, but were still mostly retracted. This study provides evidence that participants can be "dehoaxed", and even very convincing false memories can be retracted.

False memories in forensic psychology: do cognition and brain activity tell the same story?

One of the most important problems in forensic psychology is the impossibility of reliably discriminating between true and false memories when the only prosecution evidence comes from the memory of a witness or a victim. Unfortunately, both children and adults can be persuaded that they have been victims of past criminal acts, usually of a sexual nature. In adults, suggestion often occurs in the context of suggestive therapies based on the belief that traumatic events are repressed, while children come to believe and report events that never occurred as a result of repeated suggestive questioning. Cognitive Researchers have designed false memory paradigms (i.e., misinformation effect, Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm, event implantation paradigm) to first form false memories and then determine whether it is possible to reliably differentiate between false and true memories. In the present study, we review the contribution of cognitive research to the formation of false memories and the neuropsychological approaches aimed to discriminate between true and false memories. Based on these results, we analyze the applicability of the cognitive and neuropsychological evidence to the forensic setting.

Repressed Memories (of Sexual Abuse Against Minors) and Statutes of Limitations in Europe: Status Quo and Possible Alternatives

One of the most heated debates in psychological science concerns the concept of repressed memory. We discuss how the debate on repressed memories continues to surface in legal settings, sometimes even to suggest avenues of legal reform. In the past years, several European countries have extended or abolished the statute of limitations for the prosecution of sexual crimes. Such statutes force legal actions (e.g., prosecution of sexual abuse) to be applied within a certain period of time. One of the reasons for the changes in statutes of limitations concerns the idea of repressed memory. We argue that from a psychological standpoint, these law reforms can be detrimental, particularly when they are done to endorse unfounded psychological theories. The validity of testimonies is compromised many years after the alleged facts, and abolishing the statute of limitations increases the chance that even more (false) recovered memories of abuse might enter the courtroom. We propose solutions to these changes such as establishing an independent expert committee evaluating claims of sexual abuse.

When is memory more reliable? Scientific findings, theories, and myths

The question of whether human memory is reliable generated extensive research. Memory is open to reconstruction and false retrieval of unpresented information or unexperienced events. These can create problems in judgments and decisions that rely on memory accuracy. In the case of eyewitness testimony, these problems can result in injustice. Then again, memory is also reliable enough. Information acquisition, processing, and retrieval capacity of our memory made it possible to survive the course of evolution. Our memory also makes it possible to continue our daily lives, most of the time without major problems. In the present review, we suggest that the right question to ask may not be whether memory is reliable, but rather to ask when and under what circumstances memory is more reliable. The review's educational aim is to identify the conditions under which memory is more versus less reliable, and its theoretical aim is to discuss memory reliability. We reviewed the literature on situational, emotional, social, and individual difference variables that affect memory reliability, identified the conditions under which memory is more versus less reliable, summarized these outcomes as easy-to-reach items, and discussed them in the light of major theories. Our discussion also touched upon the differentiation of societal myths about the reliability of memory from scientific findings, since believing in memory myths can also affect the reliability of memory. Awareness of the specific circumstances under which memory is more reliable can lead to the consideration of how much memory can be trusted under those specific circumstances.

Recovered memories of trauma as a special (or not so special) form of involuntary autobiographical memories

Recovered memories of trauma are memories of traumatic events experienced generally during childhood, but of which the persons were unaware until they retrieved it. Legal decisions are sometimes based on such recovered memories, the validity of which is often questioned. Yet, people can recover genuine traumatic memories of childhood abuse. In this paper, we present and further discuss the idea that recovered traumatic memories can be interpreted in the context of the autobiographical memory framework. Specifically, we argue that recovered memories may be accessed after exposure to incidental cues that initiate unexpected spontaneous memory retrieval. Thus, we relate the recovered memory phenomenon to involuntary autobiographical memories and argue that it is an example of highly stressful, emotionally negative, and intense involuntary memories that were yet never recalled. This novel, evidence-based perspective leads us to reconsider the examination of the validity of eyewitness testimony as a continuum ranging from the least valid form (i.e., memories recovered in highly suggestive context facilitating its factitious reconstruction) to the most valid form (i.e., memories that were triggered by cues without any person's voluntary engagement), and this in relation with how internal (e.g., age and internal cue) or external (e.g., suggestion in therapy, suggestion during investigative interview, and contextual cue) factors may influence memory retrieval. Finally, we propose several recommendations for experts that may be useful in assessing the validity of a testimony based on recovered memories.

External and internal influences yield similar memory effects: the role of deception and suggestion

In legal cases, testimonies can become contaminated because of an amalgam of external and internal influences on memory. It is well-established that external influences (e.g., suggestive interviews) can hurt memory. However, less focus has been placed on the impact of internal influences (e.g., lying) on memory. In the current review, we show that the available evidence suggests that both external and internal influences exert similar effects on memory. That is, we review studies showing that suggesting non-occurrences and suggesting non-experiences can lead to omission errors and false memories, respectively. Likewise, these memory effects are also observed when focusing on internal influences. That is, false denials, feigning amnesia and fabrication have been shown to affect memory in terms of forgetting (i.e., omissions) and false memories (i.e., commissions). Also, we show that both external and internal influences can lead to changes in the belief that an event occurred. We argue that in legal cases, triers of fact should concentrate on whether both types of influences might have affected testimonial accuracy in witnesses, victims, and suspects.

Doctored photographs create false memories of spectacular childhood events. a replication of Wade et al. (2002) with a Scandinavian twist

ABSTRACTCan exposure to a doctored photograph of a plausible yet fictitious childhood event create false memories in adults? Twenty years ago, (Wade, K. A., Garry, M., Don Read, J., & Lindsay, D. S. (2002). A picture is worth a thousand lies: Using false photographs to create false childhood memories. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9(3), 597-603) found that half of the participants reported false beliefs or memories after multiple interview sessions about a doctored photograph of themselves as children on a fictitious hot air balloon ride. In this replication, which rigorously recreated the method and procedure of Wade et al. (2002), participants were interviewed over three interview sessions using free recall and imagery techniques about three true and one fictitious childhood event photos. The balloon ride was modified to a culturally appropriate target event - a Viking ship ride - to ensure that the doctored photograph was functionally equivalent. The results showed almost identical patterns in the two studies: 40% (n = 8) of the participants reported partial or clear false beliefs or memories compared with 50% (n = 10) in the original study. The participants who reported false memories reported detailed and coherent memory narratives of the Viking ship ride not depicted in the doctored photograph. Our study successfully replicating the results of Wade et al. (2002), suggest that memories can relatively easily be implanted, regardless of cultural setting.

Lost in the mall again: a preregistered replication and extension of Loftus & Pickrell (1995)

The seminal Lost in the Mall study has been enormously influential in psychology and is still cited in legal cases. The current study directly replicated this paper, addressing methodological weaknesses including increasing the sample size fivefold and preregistering detailed analysis plans. Participants (N = 123) completed a survey and two interviews where they discussed real and fabricated childhood events, based on information provided by an older relative. We replicated the findings of the original study, coding 35% of participants as reporting a false memory for getting lost in a mall in childhood (compared to 25% in the original study). In an extension, we found that participants self-reported high rates of memories and beliefs for the fabricated event. Mock jurors were also highly likely to believe the fabricated event had occurred and that the participant was truly remembering the event, supporting the conclusions of the original study.

Factors affecting the forced confabulation effect: a meta-analysis of laboratory studies

During police investigations, interviewees are sometimes forced to confabulate a response to questions for which they don't know the answer. In this registered report, we conducted a three-level meta-analysis to examine whether forcing people to confabulate an answer to these questions can lead to false memories for the confabulated details and/or events (i.e., forced confabulation effect). Results showed that forced confabulation indeed led to the production of false memories. Qualitative reviews of studies suggested that the forced confabulation effect is enhanced after receiving confirmatory feedback. Moreover, we found evidence that longer delays between the forced confabulation phase and the final memory task are necessary to observe the forced confabulation effect for entire events. However, caution is needed when interpreting the forced confabulation effect. Specifically, our moderator analyses revealed that voluntarily produced confabulation led to more false memories than forced confabulation. Also, our exploratory analysis indicated that the forced confabulation effect was mainly observed in within-subject designs. Taken together, our meta-analysis supports the notion that forcing participants to confabulate can lead them to later report such confabulations as part of the truth. Nonetheless, caution is warranted because this effect might be due to the introduction of misinformation through asking unanswerable questions.

Associations between the misinformation effect, trauma exposure and symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder and depression

This research aimed to conduct an initial investigation into the relationships between the "misinformation effect" and trauma exposure, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression. Study 1 was a pilot study developing an online misinformation paradigm that could assess the influence of emotion and arousal on memory distortions. Participants (n = 162, M_age = 39.90; SD = 10.90) were recruited through TurkPrime. In Study 2 community members (n = 116, M_age = 28.96; SD = 10.33) completed this misinformation paradigm and measures of trauma exposure, PTSD, and depression. Study 1 found memory for central details was better for high-arousal than low-arousal and neutral-arousal images. Peripheral memory appeared worse for negative and neutral images than positive images. Study 2 found that, when controlling for age and gender, PTSD symptoms significantly predicted proportion of correct responses on control items. However, there was no evidence to indicate that trauma exposure, PTSD symptoms nor depression symptoms, were associated with proportion of correct responses on misled items. Valence and arousal did not influence these associations. These findings have important implications in clinical and legal contexts where individuals with a history of trauma, or who are experiencing symptoms of PTSD or depression, are often required to recall emotionally-laden events. There is a surprising dearth of research into the misinformation effect in clinical populations and further research is required.

How do participants feel about the ethics of rich false memory studies?

ABSTRACTDeception is often a necessity in rich false memory studies, but is this deception acceptable to participants? In the current study, we followed up with 175 participants who had taken part in a replication of the Lost in the Mall childhood false memory study (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995), as either a research subject or a familial informant. We found that both participants and informants were generally very positive about their experience, did not regret taking part and found the deceptive methods acceptable. Importantly, the vast majority reported that they would still have taken part had they known the true objectives from the beginning. Participants also reported learning something interesting about memory and enjoying the nostalgia and family discussions that were prompted by the study. We would encourage other researchers to assess the ethical implications of false memory research paradigms and to incorporate the valuable feedback from participants and informants.

The importance of the smallest effect size of interest in expert witness testimony on alcohol and memory

Memory experts are sometimes asked to evaluate the validity of accounts of witnesses, victims, or suspects. In some of these cases, they are asked what effect alcohol has on the validity of such accounts. In this article, we offer a guide on what expert witnesses can reliably say about how alcohol affects memory. We do so by resorting to effect sizes from previous studies and meta-analytic work, and address this novel question: Are these effect sizes meaningful in legal cases? More specifically, we argue that any determination of whether individual studies about alcohol and memory are practically relevant for legal cases, scientists must focus on the smallest effect size of interest. We make the case that a decrease or increase of only 1 detail, especially an incorrect detail, should be regarded as the smallest effect size of interest in this line of research. In line with this idea, we show that effect sizes in the alcohol and memory literature are often larger than this smallest effect size of interest. This finding is important because it implies that alcohol often exerts a practically relevant and meaningful detrimental effect on the reporting of both correct and incorrect details, which in turn negatively affects the validity of witness testimony.

Early Childhood Memories Are not Repressed: Either They Were Never Formed or Were Quickly Forgotten

Early childhood events are rarely remembered in adulthood. In fact, memory for these early experiences declines during childhood itself. This holds regardless of whether these memories of autobiographical experiences are traumatic or mundane, everyday experiences. Indeed, what people tend to remember from their childhoods involves relatively innocuous experiences, ones often devoid of emotion. In this article, I provide an overview of the types of memories adults recall from their childhoods and the ages at which these memories are believed to have been formed. Along the way, I provide a brief exegesis of the neurobiological and cognitive underpinnings of early memory development. I will show that changes and growth in neural interconnectivity as well as the development of various cognitive structures (e.g., the inception of the cognitive self) help propel the emergence of a mature autobiographical memory system, one that can and does serve as a reconstructive base for remembering events that occur in later childhood and adulthood. During the course of this review, I detail the nature of early memories, their fragility, and the adaptive consequences of forgetting and supplanting these memories with newer, more age-appropriate experiences throughout childhood.

Investigating false memories among "winners" and "losers" in the prisoner's dilemma

ABSTRACTMany legal cases hinge on evaluating the veracity of two versions of events ("he said, she said"). Expert witnesses are often called upon to testify on the malleability of memory, most often testifying for the defence. This may lead to the theoretically unfounded assumption that it is only victims who are vulnerable to distorted memories of a crime. Inspired by this question, we conducted a series of five experiments in which 2010 participants played a novel version of the Prisoner's Dilemma. Participants could either betray their partner in the game ("winners") or be betrayed by their partner ("losers"). We exposed participants to misinformation concerning the other player's statements to assess whether winners and losers may be differentially susceptible to false memories of the event in question. Across our experiments, including where real financial rewards were at stake, we found that winners were just as susceptible as losers to memory distortion. We highlight the need to consider the possibility of faulty memory affecting all parties to in legal cases, though further research is needed beyond this highly artificial paradigm.

False remembering in real life: James Ost's contributions to memory psychology

This special issue honours James Ost's (1973-2019) contributions to our understanding of false and distorted remembering. In our editorial, we introduce some of James' distinctive research themes including the experiences of people who retract "recovered" memories, social (e.g., co-witness and interviewer influence) and personality influences on false remembering, the nature of false remembering itself (e.g., different types of false memories; false memories vs. false beliefs), public understanding of (false) memory, and a historical link to the work of Frederic Bartlett. We illustrate these themes through a number of key publications. The unifying thread behind James' work is his core interest in false/distorted remembering in real-life (typically high-stake) situations, in line with his engagement with the British False Memory Society and his role as an expert witness in court trials. The articles included in this special issue elaborate on the research themes to which James devoted his career and his curiosity.

A court ruled case on therapy-induced false memories

We report on a unique Italian criminal case in which a court ruled that a therapist implanted false memories of abuse in a young girl. Using therapeutic excerpts, we show that the therapist used a multitude of problematic interventions that are all linked to false memory creation. Specifically, an analysis of the therapeutic excerpts showed that across many sessions, the therapist asked highly suggestive questions to the girl, implying that she was abused by her father. In addition, the girl underwent EMDR techniques that have been associated with memory undermining effects. Our analyses showed that although before treatment the girl did not have any recollection of being abused by her father, she gradually started to remember the abuse and identified the father as her abuser during the therapeutic sessions. Our case report clearly shows the danger of suggestive pressure in a therapeutic context causing patients to form false memories of abuse and supports the need to prevent the therapeutic practice of suggestive techniques.

Cybernetic Hive Minds: A Review

Insect swarms and migratory birds are known to exhibit something known as a hive mind, collective consciousness, and herd mentality, among others. This has inspired a whole new stream of robotics known as swarm intelligence, where small-sized robots perform tasks in coordination. The social media and smartphone revolution have helped people collectively work together and organize in their day-to-day jobs or activism. This revolution has also led to the massive spread of disinformation amplified during the COVID-19 pandemic by alt-right Neo Nazi Cults like QAnon and their counterparts from across the globe, causing increases in the spread of infection and deaths. This paper presents the case for a theoretical cybernetic hive mind to explain how existing cults like QAnon weaponize group think and carry out crimes using social media-based alternate reality games. We also showcase a framework on how cybernetic hive minds have come into existence and how the hive mind might evolve in the future. We also discuss the implications of these hive minds for the future of free will and how different malfeasant entities have utilized these technologies to cause problems and inflict harm by various forms of cyber-crimes and predict how these crimes can evolve in the future.

Implanting false autobiographical memories for repeated events

Research to date has exclusively focused on the implantation of false memories for single events. The current experiment is the first proof of concept that false memories can be implanted for repeated autobiographical experiences using an adapted false memory implantation paradigm. We predicted that false memory implantation approaches for repeated events would generate fewer false memories compared to the classic implantation method for single events. We assigned students to one of three implantation conditions in our study: Standard, Repeated, and Gradual. Participants underwent three interview sessions with a 1-week interval between sessions. In the Standard condition, we exposed participants to a single-event implantation method in all three interviews. In the Repeated condition, participants underwent a repeated-event implantation method in the three interviews. The Gradual condition also consisted of a repeated-event implantation method, however, in the first interview alone, we suggested to participants that they had experienced the false narrative once. Surprisingly, within our sample, false memories rates in the Standard condition were not higher compared to the Repeated and Gradual conditions. Although sometimes debated, our results imply that false memories for repeated events can be implanted in lab conditions, likely with the same ease as false memories for single events.

Externalizing autobiographical memories in the digital age

People externalize their autobiographical memories by creating representations that exist outside of their minds. Externalizations often serve personal and social functions, consistent with theorized functions of autobiographical memory. With new digital technologies, people are documenting more memories than ever and are sharing them with larger audiences. However, these technologies do not change the core cognitive processes involved in autobiographical memory, but instead present novel situations that affect how these processes are deployed. Smartphones allow events to be recorded as they unfold, thus directing attention and sometimes impairing memory. Social media increase the frequency of reviewing and sharing records which reactivate memories, potentially strengthening or updating them. Overall, externalization in the digital age changes what people attend to and remember about their own experiences.

Is the study of memory unduly preoccupied with its sins?

A broad functional approach is taken to the analysis of human memory. The overall importance of episodic memory, the capacity to remember specific events, is illustrated by the devastating effect that loss of this aspect of memory has on the capacity to cope in the case of densely amnesic patients. Recent applied research has however focussed heavily on factors compromising the reliability of eyewitness testimony in the forensic field and on the creation of false memories. While acknowledging the progress made on this issue, it presents two dangers. The first is practical, the danger of generalising too readily from laboratory-influenced simulations that differ in important ways from the context to which they are applied. This suggests a need for fewer but more realistically representative studies. The second is a broad theoretical issue, that of extending the findings from this important but limited applied area, within which precise detail may be crucial, to the whole of memory, consequently failing to appreciate its many strengths.

Misremembering Brexit: partisan bias and individual predictors of false memories for fake news stories among Brexit voters

Exposure to fake news stories can result in false memories for the events portrayed, and this effect can be enhanced if the stories conform to the reader's ideological position. We exposed 1299 UK residents to fabricated news stories about Brexit. 44% of participants reported a false memory for at least one fabricated story, with a higher rate of false memories for stories that reflected poorly on the opposing side. This effect of ideological congruency was somewhat greater among participants who were exposed to a threat to their social identity as a Leave or Remain supporter; however, this moderating effect was only statistically significant in exploratory analyses using a more conservative definition of false memory. Participants with higher cognitive ability and analytical reasoning scores were less susceptible to false memories. Individuals with better knowledge about Brexit showed better discrimination between true and false stories, while self-reported engagement with the Brexit debate was associated with an increased tendency to "remember" any story, regardless of its truth. These results implicate a combination of social and individual factors in the development of false memories from fake news, and suggest that exposure to social identity threats may enhance the polarising effects of fake news.

Resisting misinformation via discrepancy detection: effects of an unaware suspicion cue

Previous studies have shown that contaminating effects of misinformation can be reduced by consciously raising the awareness of eyewitnesses to the discrepancy between the misinformation and the original information (e.g., Tousignant, J. P., Hall, D., & Loftus, E. F. [1986]. Discrepancy detection and vulnerability misleading postevent information. Memory & Cognition, 14(4), 329-338. doi:10.3758/BF03202511). We tested whether similar effects could be obtained without conscious awareness, by drawing on the metaphor "something smells fishy" linking fishy smells and suspicion (Lee, S. W. S., & Schwarz, N. [2012]. Bidirectionality, mediation, and moderation of metaphorical effects: The embodiment of social suspicion and fishy smells. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 103(5), 737-749. doi:10.1037/a0029708). In a pilot study, we established the replicability and generality of previous findings concerning this metaphorical link. We then examined the effects of the smell-suspicion link on susceptibility to misleading post-event information using the misinformation paradigm. Here, the "something smells fishy" metaphor was used to invoke suspicion and increase discrepancy detection. Forty-eight hours after viewing an event, participants received misinformation in a room sprayed with either a fishy or a neutral smell. As expected, unaware exposure to the fishy smell (compared to the neutral smell) increased discrepancy detection (measured indirectly) and resistance to the contaminating effects of misinformation, eliminating misinformation interference and lowering suggestibility on the final test.

Replicating autobiographical memory research using social media: a case study

The durability of memories for personally experienced events and the effectiveness of naturalistically generated cues of those events were investigated via a case study using Timehop to re-present information from Facebook, Twitter, and the iPhone photograph archive from the past six years to generate autobiographical memories. Replicating prior longitudinal self-studies of remembering, recency predicted successful recall of specific events. Prior research showing images to be more evocative of autobiographical remembering than text was also replicated here. Results also supported claims that direct retrieval is a common mode of remembering. Somewhat surprisingly, retrieval of autobiographical memories had little influence on ongoing affect, cognition, and behaviour. This is suggested as "proof of concept" that social media data allows for modern replication of diary-type studies and expansion beyond typical participant pools. The interrelated functions of social media for remembering and of autobiographical remembering to social media can also be explored with this method.

Rich false memories of autobiographical events can be reversed

False memories of autobiographical events can create enormous problems in forensic settings (e.g., false accusations). While multiple studies succeeded in inducing false memories in interview settings, we present research trying to reverse this effect (and thereby reduce the potential damage) by means of two ecologically valid strategies. We first successfully implanted false memories for two plausible autobiographical events (suggested by the students' parents, alongside two true events). Over three repeated interviews, participants developed false memories (measured by state-of-the-art coding) of the suggested events under minimally suggestive conditions (27%) and even more so using massive suggestion (56%). We then used two techniques to reduce false memory endorsement, source sensitization (alerting interviewees to possible external sources of the memories, e.g., family narratives) and false memory sensitization (raising the possibility of false memories being inadvertently created in memory interviews, delivered by a new interviewer). This reversed the false memory build-up over the first three interviews, returning false memory rates in both suggestion conditions to the baseline levels of the first interview (i.e., to ∼15% and ∼25%, respectively). By comparison, true event memories were endorsed at a higher level overall and less affected by either the repeated interviews or the sensitization techniques. In a 1-y follow-up (after the original interviews and debriefing), false memory rates further dropped to 5%, and participants overwhelmingly rejected the false events. One strong practical implication is that false memories can be substantially reduced by easy-to-implement techniques without causing collateral damage to true memories.

Belief in Unconscious Repressed Memory Persists

On the basis of converging research, we concluded that the controversial topic of unconscious blockage of psychological trauma (i.e., repressed memory) remains very much alive in clinical, legal, and academic contexts. In his commentary, Brewin (this issue, p. 443) conducted a cocitation analysis and concluded that scholars do not adhere to the concept of unconscious repression. Furthermore, he argued that previous survey research did not specifically assess unconscious repression. Here, we present critical evidence that runs counter to his claims. First, we inspected his cocitation analysis and found that some scholars support notions that are closely related to unconscious repression. Furthermore, we conducted another analysis on the basis of articles' similarity. Again, we found examples of scholars specifically endorsing unconscious repressed memories. Second, as opposed to what Brewin reports, recent survey research now exists that bears directly on people's beliefs regarding unconscious repression. This work reveals that large percentages of people (e.g., students and eye-movement desensitization and reprocessing [EMDR] clinicians) endorse the concept of unconscious repressed memories. The belief in unconscious repressed memory can continue to contribute to harmful consequences in clinical, legal, and academic domains (e.g., false accusations of abuse).

Induction of false beliefs and false memories in laboratory studies-A systematic review

Psychological interventions often use guided discovery and other techniques for diagnostic exploration and intervention planning. This way, memories may arise in the person, which may be true or false. False memories of earlier events can be harmful and result in real suffering, similar to actual traumatic memories. Based on cognitive psychological and psycho-traumatological findings, there is pronounced dissent in the academic disciplines regarding the conceptualization, relevance and research of false memories. This review contributes to the basic question of how often false beliefs and false memories may be induced within the frame of different interactional techniques. A systematic review has been conducted of 59 articles from (quasi-)experimental studies and two qualitative sources from 30 data bases. Three main methods of memory induction provide the basis for reporting: imagination inflation, false feedback, and memory implantation. Due to the conceptual and methodological diversity of the studies, the results appear to be heterogeneous. Free and guided imagery, as well as suggestive statements, could induce false beliefs or false memories in, on average, 20%-50% of the participants who underwent experimental manipulation concerning false past events. A false belief induction may occur after dream interpretation or hypnosis in more than 50% of participants. Personalized suggestion is more effective in inducing memory than the general plausibility of the suggested events. Further research questions are which therapeutic actions seem appropriate in cases of harmful false memories. This depends not only on whether there are veridical elements in the false memory but also on the quality and meaning of the memory for the person's life and ability to cope with burdens.

Hazy memories in the courtroom: A review of alcohol and other drug effects on false memory and suggestibility

Alcohol and other psychoactive drugs are oftentimes implicated in legal cases. A pertinent question herein is whether such substances might adversely affect testimonies of victims, eyewitnesses, or suspects by propelling the formation of false memory and increasing susceptibility to suggestion. In the current review, we amassed all available evidence on the effects of intoxication on false memory formation and suggestibility, including the substances alcohol, benzodiazepines, cannabis, stimulants, hallucinogens, and antipsychotics. Our review indicated that alcohol and cannabis under certain conditions increased the susceptibility to false memories and/or suggestion with effect sizes ranging from medium to large. When intoxicated during an event, alcohol is most likely to increase this susceptibility at high intoxication levels or after a delay, whereas cannabis exerts detrimental effects during acute intoxication but not necessarily once sober. For other substances, ecologically valid research separating different memory phases is needed. Overall, differences between substances regarding false memory effects exist, suggesting that a nuanced approach is needed when dealing with intoxicated individuals in a legal context.

How deception and believability feedback affect recall

While research suggests that telling lies can distort memory for the truth, the effects of receiving feedback about the believability about one's lies are not known. We hypothesised that participants who exaggerated the number of stolen items (vs. told the truth) in a mock insurance claim and then received feedback that their statement was believable (vs. not believable) would incorporate this lie into memory. In a two-phase between-subjects design, participants saw images of an office pre- and post-theft and were randomly assigned to report the number of stolen items accurately (truth-tellers) or exaggerate (liars). They were then randomly assigned to receive feedback that their statement was believable or not. Approximately two weeks later, participants' recall of the theft was measured. Liars and truth-tellers recalled a similar number of stolen items, but liars had less accurate recall for exactly which items were stolen. Liars (vs. truth-tellers) also made more omission errors. The majority of participants who fabricated additional stolen items (65.7%) incorporated one or more of these (false) items into their memory. Results suggest that source monitoring errors may lead fabricated details to be incorporated into memory. Although no effects of believability feedback were observed, recommendations for future researchers are discussed.

Teaching psychology students to change (or correct) controversial beliefs about memory works

Therapists, judges, law enforcement, and students often believe in the existence of automatic and unconscious repression. Such a belief can be perilous as it might lead therapists to suggestively search for repressed memories leading to false memories. Recovering therapy-induced false memories of criminal acts can have serious consequences. Here, we tested whether erroneous beliefs in repressed memories can be corrected. Surveying two cohorts of Forensic and Legal Psychology Master's students, we examined whether education about the science of (eyewitness) memory can correct erroneous beliefs in repressed memories. Students assessed memory statements before taking a course on eyewitness memory, six weeks after the course exam, and 18 or 6 months later, respectively (Ns = 33-74 per cohort and measurement). As expected, students in both cohorts on average initially strongly agreed with the statement that memories of traumatic events can be unconsciously blocked, but strongly disagreed with the statement after the course. Belief-corrections also persisted after the longer delay. These findings show that educating people about the science of (eyewitness) memory can be effective in correcting false and controversial memory beliefs in general and the existence of repressed memories in specific.

What do people really think of when they claim to believe in repressed memory? Methodological middle ground and applied issues

What do people really think of when they say they believe in repressed traumatic memory? In two studies (N_{Study 1}= 3158; N_{Study 2}= 305) using an integrative method taking into account recent methodological discussions, we found that, in total, 2458 participants (71% of the two combined samples) reported that they believed in repressed memory. In Study 1, based on separate questions on the whole group, we found 71% of agreement with the concept of repression, 74% with the concept of unconscious repression, and 54% with the concept of deliberate memory suppression. Participants with no memory of childhood abuse endorsed unconscious and deliberate mechanisms less than those with such memories. In Study 2, the order in which the items were presented was not associated with the beliefs in the different statements. Overall, our results show that people see repression as an unconscious mechanism. We suggest the use of within-subject designs and/or follow-up questions to determine how people understand the concept of repression. Such adherence to this controversial concept can have adverse implications in the clinical and legal arenas.

What science tells us about false and repressed memories

What does science tell us about memory phenomena such as false and repressed memories? This issue is highly pressing as incorrect knowledge about these memory phenomena might contribute to egregious effects in the courtroom such as false accusations of abuse. In the current article, we provide a succinct review of the scientific nature of false and repressed memories. We demonstrate that research has shown that about 30% of tested subjects formed false memories of autobiographical experiences. Furthermore, this empirical work has also revealed that such false memories can even be implanted for negative events and events that allegedly occurred repeatedly. Concerning the controversial topic of repressed memories, we show that plausible alternative explanations exist for why people claim to have forgotten traumatic experiences; explanations that do not require special memory mechanisms such as the unconscious blockage of traumatic memories. Finally, we demonstrate that people continue to believe that unconscious repression of traumatic incidents can exist. Disseminating scientifically articulated knowledge on the functioning of memory to contexts such as the courtroom is necessary as to prevent the occurrence of false accusations and miscarriages of justice.

Correcting eyewitness suggestibility: does explanatory role predict resistance to correction?

Many studies have documented that exposure to post event misinformation can lead eyewitnesses to misremember witnessing events they did not see and do so with high confidence. The goal of the present study was to investigate whether reporting of suggested misinformation can be reversed following a correction, and if so, whether misinformation would be more resistant to correction when it serves an explanatory function than when it does not. In two experiments participants witnessed an event, were exposed to a blatantly false suggestion(s) and one week later received a correction followed by a test of their memory for the witnessed event. We found evidence for both the persistence of misinformation following a correction (E1) and the complete reversibility of misinformation effects following a highly salient correction (E2). Although false reporting of the misinformation doubled when it served an explanatory function relative to when it did not (E1 and E2), in both experiments we found no evidence that resistance to correction varied as a function of the misinformation's explanatory role. Our findings suggest that, with a salient correction provided by a credible source, people are capable of updating their knowledge with new information that reverses what they previously thought.

Laypeople's beliefs about memory: disentangling the effects of age and time

Cognitive scientists have firmly established that memory is vulnerable to decay and distortion. Yet laypeople - who may be required to evaluate memory evidence as jurors - have shown less awareness of memory fallibility. Although we might expect laypeople's knowledge of memory to have improved over time, research has yet to explore this issue while accounting for possible age-related changes. We administered a modified version of the Beliefs about Memory Survey (BAMS) to a community sample, investigating patterns of beliefs relating to memory permanence, repression of traumatic memories, and memory reconstruction. Older participants were more likely than younger participants to believe that traumatic memories can be repressed, while younger participants were more likely than their older counterparts to believe that memory is permanent, but also that memory is malleable. We assessed whether these beliefs were stable over time, by comparing our data to a sample of data collected 25 years earlier. Although contemporary beliefs about the repression of traumatic memories and memory reconstruction were more aligned with expert opinion than those of 25 years ago, beliefs about memory permanence were not. These findings highlight the need for continued education about memory and its shortcomings. We discuss ways of improving decisions about memory evidence.

Do False Memories Look Real? Evidence That People Struggle to Identify Rich False Memories of Committing Crime and Other Emotional Events

Two studies examined whether people could identify rich false memories. Each participant in both studies was presented with two videos, one of a person recalling a true emotional memory, and one of the same person recalling a false memory. These videos were filmed during a study which involved implanting rich false memories (Shaw and Porter, 2015). The false memories in the videos either involved committing a crime (assault, or assault with a weapon) or other highly emotional events (animal attack, or losing a large sum of money) during adolescence. In study 1, participants (n = 124) were no better than chance at accurately classifying false memories (61.29% accurate), or false memories of committing crime (53.33% accurate). In study 2, participants (n = 82) were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, where they only had access to the (i) audio account of the memory with no video, (ii) video account with no audio, or (iii) the full audio-visual accounts. False memories were classified correctly by 32.14% of the audio-only group, 45.45% of the video-only group, and 53.13% of the audio-visual group. This research provides evidence that naïve judges are not able to reliably identify false memories of emotional or criminal events, or differentiate true from false memories. These findings are likely to be of particular interest to those working in legal and criminal justice settings.

Regaining Consensus on the Reliability of Memory

In the last 20 years, the consensus about memory being essentially reliable has been neglected in favor of an emphasis on the malleability and unreliability of memory and on the public’s supposed unawareness of this. Three claims in particular have underpinned this popular perspective: that the confidence people have in their memory is weakly related to its accuracy, that false memories of fictitious childhood events can be easily implanted, and that the public wrongly sees memory as being like a video camera. New research has clarified that all three claims rest on shaky foundations, suggesting there is no reason to abandon the old consensus about memory being malleable but essentially reliable.

The Return of the Repressed: The Persistent and Problematic Claims of Long-Forgotten Trauma

Can purely psychological trauma lead to a complete blockage of autobiographical memories? This long-standing question about the existence of repressed memories has been at the heart of one of the most heated debates in modern psychology. These so-called memory wars originated in the 1990s, and many scholars have assumed that they are over. We demonstrate that this assumption is incorrect and that the controversial issue of repressed memories is alive and well and may even be on the rise. We review converging research and data from legal cases indicating that the topic of repressed memories remains active in clinical, legal, and academic settings. We show that the belief in repressed memories occurs on a nontrivial scale (58%) and appears to have increased among clinical psychologists since the 1990s. We also demonstrate that the scientifically controversial concept of dissociative amnesia, which we argue is a substitute term for memory repression, has gained in popularity. Finally, we review work on the adverse side effects of certain psychotherapeutic techniques, some of which may be linked to the recovery of repressed memories. The memory wars have not vanished. They have continued to endure and contribute to potentially damaging consequences in clinical, legal, and academic contexts.

Reports of recovered memories of childhood abuse in therapy in France

Recovered memories of abuse in therapy are especially controversial if the clients were not aware they were abused before therapy. In the past, such memory recovery has led to legal action, as well as a debate about whether such memories might be repressed, forgotten, or false memories. More than two decades after the height of the controversy, it is unclear to what degree such memories are still recovered today, and to what extent it occurs in France. In our French survey of 1312 participants (M_age = 33; 53% female), 551 reported having done therapy at some point. Of that 551, 33 (6%) indicated they had recovered memories of abuse in therapy that they did not know about before therapy. Sexual abuse was the most commonly reported type that was recovered in therapy (79%). As in past research, discussing the possibility of repressed memories with therapists was associated with reports of recovered memories of abuse. Surprisingly, memory recovery occurred just as much in behavioural and cognitive therapies as it did in therapies focused on trauma. We found recovered memories in a proportion of clients who began therapy recently. Recovered memories in therapy appears to be an ongoing concern in France.