Infants’ Brain Responses to Looming Danger: Degeneracy of Neural Connectivity Patterns

Looming Angry Faces: Preliminary Evidence of Differential Electrophysiological Dynamics for Filtered Stimuli via Low and High Spatial Frequencies

Looming motion interacts with threatening emotional cues in the initial stages of visual processing. However, the underlying neural networks are unclear. The current study investigated if the interactive effect of threat elicited by angry and looming faces is favoured by rapid, magnocellular neural pathways and if exogenous or endogenous attention influences such processing. Here, EEG/ERP techniques were used to explore the early ERP responses to moving emotional faces filtered for high spatial frequencies (HSF) and low spatial frequencies (LSF). Experiment 1 applied a passive-viewing paradigm, presenting filtered angry and neutral faces in static, approaching, or receding motions on a depth-cued background. In the second experiment, broadband faces (BSF) were included, and endogenous attention was directed to the expression of faces. Our main results showed that regardless of attentional control, P1 was enhanced by BSF angry faces, but neither HSF nor LSF faces drove the effect of facial expressions. Such findings indicate that looming motion and threatening expressions are integrated rapidly at the P1 level but that this processing relies neither on LSF nor on HSF information in isolation. The N170 was enhanced for BSF angry faces regardless of attention but was enhanced for LSF angry faces during passive viewing. These results suggest the involvement of a neural pathway reliant on LSF information at the N170 level. Taken together with previous reports from the literature, this may indicate the involvement of multiple parallel neural pathways during early visual processing of approaching emotional faces.

Improving the study of brain-behavior relationships by revisiting basic assumptions

Neuroimaging research has been at the forefront of concerns regarding the failure of experimental findings to replicate. In the study of brain-behavior relationships, past failures to find replicable and robust effects have been attributed to methodological shortcomings. Methodological rigor is important, but there are other overlooked possibilities: most published studies share three foundational assumptions, often implicitly, that may be faulty. In this paper, we consider the empirical evidence from human brain imaging and the study of non-human animals that calls each foundational assumption into question. We then consider the opportunities for a robust science of brain-behavior relationships that await if scientists ground their research efforts in revised assumptions supported by current empirical evidence.

Neural Aspects of Prospective Control through Resonating Taus in an Interceptive Timing Task

High-density electroencephalography from visual and motor cortices in addition to kinematic hand and target movement recordings were used to investigate τ-coupling between brain activity patterns and physical movements in an interceptive timing task. Twelve adult participants were presented with a target car moving towards a destination at three constant accelerations, and an effector dot was available to intercept the car at the destination with a swift movement of the finger. A τ-coupling analysis was used to investigate involvement of perception and action variables at both the ecological scale of behavior and neural scale. By introducing the concept of resonance, the underlying dynamics of interceptive actions were investigated. A variety of one- and two-scale τ-coupling analyses showed significant differences in distinguishing between slow, medium, and fast target speed when car motion and finger movement, VEP and MRP brain activity, VEP and car motion, and MRP and finger movement were involved. These results suggested that the temporal structure present at the ecological scale is reflected at the neural scale. The results further showed a strong effect of target speed, indicating that τ-coupling constants k and k_res increased with higher speeds of the moving target. It was concluded that τ-coupling can be considered a valuable tool when combining different types of variables at both the ecological and neural levels of analysis.

Context-sensitive computational mechanistic explanation in cognitive neuroscience

Mainstream cognitive neuroscience aims to build mechanistic explanations of behavior by mapping abilities described at the organismal level via the subpersonal level of computation onto specific brain networks. We provide an integrative review of these commitments and their mismatch with empirical research findings. Context-dependent neural tuning, neural reuse, degeneracy, plasticity, functional recovery, and the neural correlates of enculturated skills each show that there is a lack of stable mappings between organismal, computational, and neural levels of analysis. We furthermore highlight recent research suggesting that task context at the organismal level determines the dynamic parcellation of functional components at the neural level. Such instability prevents the establishment of specific computational descriptions of neural function, which remains a central goal of many brain mappers - including those who are sympathetic to the notion of many-to-many mappings between organismal and neural levels. This between-level instability presents a deep epistemological challenge and requires a reorientation of methodological and theoretical commitments within cognitive neuroscience. We demonstrate the need for change to brain mapping efforts in the face of instability if cognitive neuroscience is to maintain its central goal of constructing computational mechanistic explanations of behavior; we show that such explanations must be contextual at all levels.

Neurobiological tensegrity: The basis for understanding inter-individual variations in task performance?

Bernstein's (1996) levels of movement organization includes tonus, the muscular-contraction level that primes individual movement systems for (re)organizing coordination patterns. The hypothesis advanced is that the tonus architecture is a multi-fractal tensegrity system, deeply reliant on haptic perception for regulating movement of an individual actor in a specific environment. Further arguments have been proposed that the tensegrity-haptic system is implied in all neurobiological perception and -action. In this position statement we consider whether the musculoskeletal system can be conceptualized as a neurobiological tensegrity system, supporting each individual in co-adapting to many varied contexts of dynamic performance. Evidence for this position, revealed in investigations of judgments of object properties, perceived during manual hefting, is based on each participant's tensegrity. The implication is that the background organizational state of every individual is unique, given that no neurobiological architecture (musculo-skeletal components) is identical. The unique tensegrity of every organism is intimately related to individual differences, channeling individualized adaptations to constraints (task, environment, organismic), which change over different timescales. This neurobiological property assists transitions from one stable state of coordination to another which is needed in skill adaptation during performance. We conclude by discussing how tensegrity changes over time according to skill acquisition and learning.

Spinal reflexive movement follows general tau theory

Background

Tau theory explains how both intrinsically and perceptually guided movements are controlled by the brain. According to general tau theory, voluntary, self-paced human movements are controlled by coupling the tau of the movement (i.e., the rate of closure of the movement gap at its current closure rate) onto an intrinsically generated tau-guide (Lee in Ecol Psychol 10:221–250, 1998). To date there are no studies that have looked at involuntary movements, which are directly guided by innate patterns of neural energy generated at the level of the spinal cord or brain, and that can be explained by general tau theory. This study examines the guidance of an involuntary movement generated by the Patellar reflex in presence of a minimized gravitational field.

Results

The results showed that the Patellar reflexive movement is strongly coupled to an intrinsic tau-guide particularly when the limb is not moving in the direction of gravity.

Conclusion

These results suggest that the same principles of control underpin both voluntary and involuntary movements irrespective of whether they are generated in the brain or the spinal cord. Secondly, given that movements like the patellar reflex are visible from infancy, one might conclude that tau-guidance is an innate form of motor control, or neural blueprint, that has evolved over time.

Ecological Psychology and Enactivism: Perceptually-Guided Action vs. Sensation-Based Enaction

Ecological Psychology and Enactivism both challenge representationist cognitive science, but the two approaches have only begun to engage in dialogue. Further conceptual clarification is required in which differences are as important as common ground. This paper enters the dialogue by focusing on important differences. After a brief account of the parallel histories of Ecological Psychology and Enactivism, we cover incompatibility between them regarding their theories of sensation and perception. First, we show how and why in ecological theory perception is, crutially, not based on sensation. We elucidate this idea by examining the biological roots of work in the two fields, concentrating on Gibson and Varela and Maturana. We expound an ecological critique of any sensation based approach to perception by detailing two topics: classic retinal image theories and perception in single-celled organisms. The second main point emphasizes the importance of the idea of organism-environment mutuality and its difference from structural coupling of sensations and motor behavior. We point out how ecological-phenomenological methods of inquiry grow out of mutualism and compare Gibson's idea of visual kinesthesis to Merleau-Ponty's idea of the lived body. Third, we conclude that Ecological Psychology and varieties of Enactivism are laying down different paths to pursue related goals. Thus, convergence of Ecological Psychology and Enactivism is not possible given their conflicting assumptions, but cross-fertilization is possible and desirable.