Integration of Two Skeptical Emotion Theories: Dimensional Appraisal Theory and Russell's Psychological Construction Theory

Basic Emotions or Constructed Emotions: Insights From Taking an Evolutionary Perspective

The ongoing debate between basic emotion theories (BETs) and the theory of constructed emotion (TCE) hampers progress in the field of emotion research. Providing a new perspective, here we aim to bring the theories closer together by dissecting them according to Tinbergen's four questions to clarify a focus on their evolutionary basis. On the basis of our review of the literature, we conclude that whereas BETs focus on the evolution question of Tinbergen, the TCE is more concerned with the causation of emotion. On the survival value of emotions both theories largely agree: to provide the best reaction in specific situations. Evidence is converging on the evolutionary history of emotions but is still limited for both theories-research within both frameworks focuses heavily on the causation. We conclude that BETs and the TCE explain two different phenomena: emotion and feeling. Therefore, they seem irreconcilable but possibly supplementary for explaining and investigating the evolution of emotion-especially considering their similar answer to the question of survival value. Last, this article further highlights the importance of carefully describing what aspect of emotion is being discussed or studied. Only then can evidence be interpreted to converge toward explaining emotion.

Varieties of instrumental theories of emotional action: commentary on "a perceptual control theory of emotional action"

Eder proposes a theory of action causation based on Powers' control theory and Hommel's theory of event coding in which emotional feelings play a crucial role. After presenting a rough description of Eder's theory in which I try to spell out the various steps in the control cycle, I compare his theory to my own goal-directed theory. The two theories converge in that they (a) rely on a control cycle in which different states are compared and (b) emphasise the instrumental or goal-directed nature of emotional actions. Points of divergence include the content of the representations involved in the control cycle and the meaning and role of feelings.

Commentary: Connecting Müller's Philosophical Position-Taking Theory of Emotional Feelings to Mechanistic Emotion Theories in Psychology

Müller proposes a position-taking theory to account for the manifest image of emotional feelings as “feelings towards”. He reduces the process of position-taking to goal-based construal, which is akin to the stimulus-goal comparison process central in appraisal theories. Although this reduction can account for the heat of emotional feelings and the intuition that non-linguistic organisms can also have feelings, it may fail to keep the position-taking aspect on board. Moreover, the image of emotional feelings as active position-takings may itself be questioned and replaced with a passive image. I end by acknowledging that a passive image is still compatible with an active underlying mechanism as is the case in appraisal theories but even more so in the goal-directed theory.

The CODA Model: A Review and Skeptical Extension of the Constructionist Model of Emotional Episodes Induced by Music

This paper discusses contemporary advancements in the affective sciences (described together as skeptical theories) that can inform the music-emotion literature. Key concepts in these theories are outlined, highlighting their points of agreement and disagreement. This summary shows the importance of appraisal within the emotion process, provides a greater emphasis upon goal-directed accounts of (emotion) behavior, and a need to move away from discrete emotion “folk” concepts and toward the study of an emotional episode and its components. Consequently, three contemporary music emotion theories (BRECVEMA, Multifactorial Process Approach, and a Constructionist Account) are examined through a skeptical lens. This critique highlights the over-reliance upon categorization and a lack of acknowledgment of appraisal processes, specifically goal-directed appraisal, in examining how individual experiences of music emerge in different contexts. Based on this critique of current music-emotion models, we present our skeptically informed CODA model - Constructivistly-Organised Dimensional-Appraisal model. This model addresses skeptical limitations of existing theories, reinstates the role of goal-directed appraisal as central to what makes music relevant and meaningful to an individual in different contexts and brings together different theoretical frameworks into a single model. From the development of the CODA model, several hypotheses are proposed and applied to musical contexts. These hypotheses address theoretical issues such as acknowledging individual and contextual differences in emotional intensity and valence, as well as differentiating between induced and perceived emotions, and utilitarian and aesthetic emotions. We conclude with a sections of recommendations for future research. Altogether, this theoretical critique and proposed model points toward a positive future direction for music-emotion science. One where researchers can take forward testable predictions about what makes music relevant and meaningful to an individual.

Old Wine in New Bags—Suri and Gross's Connectionist Theory of Emotion is Another Type of Network Theory

Suri and Gross's 2022 connectionist emotion theory can be considered as one version of a family of theories known as network theories of emotion. It presents similarities and differences with older versions of network theories. Like previous network theories and several other traditional emotion theories, however, the connectionist theory remains a reactive theory. The class of reactive theories can be meaningfully contrasted with a class of instrumental theories of which the goal-directed theory is a representative example. Although the latter theory does not deny the existence of emotion networks in memory, it does not grant them many causal powers, thereby seriously restricting their explanatory territory. Future research efforts may help disambiguate between both classes of theories.

What is an Emotion? A Connectionist Perspective

Researchers often disagree as to whether emotions are largely consistent across people and over time, or whether they are variable. They also disagree as to whether emotions are initiated by appraisals, or whether they may be initiated in diverse ways. We draw upon Parallel-Distributed-Processing to offer an algorithmic account in which features of an emotion instance are bi-directionally connected to each other via conjunction units. We propose that such indirect connections may be innate as well as learned. These ideas lead to the development of the Interactive Activation and Competition framework for Emotion (IAC-E) which allows us to specify when emotions are consistent and when they are variable, as well as when they are appraisal-led and when they are input-agnostic.

The Psychological Construction of Emotion – A Non-Essentialist Philosophy of Science

Advocates for the psychological construction of emotion view themselves as articulating a non-essentialist alternative to basic emotion theory's essentialist notion of affect programs. Psychological constructionists have also argued that holding essentialist assumptions about emotions engenders misconceptions about the psychological constructionist viewpoint. If so, it is important to understand what psychological constructionists mean by “essentialism” and “non-essentialism.” To advance the debate, I take a deeper dive into non-essentialism, comparing the non-essentialist views of the early empiricists with those of the psychological constructionists, focusing on the theories of James Russell and Lisa Barrett. Using Lakatos’ notion of scientific research programs, I also describe how Russell's and Barrett's views have evolved into different and potentially competing research programs under the psychological constructionist banner.

Tasks for a theoretical psychology of emotion

In the first part of the article, the central role of theory in emotion psychology is underscored and reasons are given why more theoretical psychology of emotion is needed. In the second part, nine tasks for the theoretical psychology of emotion are defined, by refining and extending three of the general tasks of theoretical psychology proposed 70 years ago by Sigmund Koch [Theoretical psychology, 1950: An overview. Psychological Review, 58(4), 295. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0055768]. The nine tasks are: (1) Analysis, rational reconstruction and critique of existing emotion theories. (2) Comparison of different theories. (3) Systematization and integration of theories. (4) Reconstruction of the development of theories over time. (5) Analysis, reconstruction and critique of theory-data and data-theory inferences. (6) Analysis, reconstruction and critique of the complete set of arguments for and against specific emotion-theoretic assumption and whole theories. (7) Analysis, reconstruction and critique of measurement theories for emotions. (8) Development of new emotion theories and theories of emotion measurement. (9) Information about theoretical and methodological developments of interest to emotion psychology in other subdisciplines of psychology and in neighbouring sciences, and export of theories and methods to other disciplines.

Does playing a video game really result in improvements in psychological well-being in the era of COVID-19?

This study examines the structural relationships between the perceived value dimensions of quality, emotional, price, and social, positive and negative emotions, psychological well-being, and loyalty in the video game context along with the moderating role of the perceived severity of COVID-19. This study collected data from 258 video game consumers in the United States via three waves of surveys. The findings of structural equation modeling revealed significant associations among the perceived value dimensions, emotions, psychological well-being, and loyalty. In addition, the moderating role of the perceived severity of COVID-19 showed that the impact of video game consumers' positive emotions on psychological well-being would be weaker with a high level of perception of the severity of COVID-19. Based on the empirical results, this research proposes theoretical (i.e., extension of the cognitive appraisal theory in a digital environment, and integration of the cognitive appraisal theory with the two-factor theory of motivation) and practical implications (i.e., how to increase levels of users’ psychological well-being and loyalty via video games) for the video game industry during and after the era of COVID-19.

Algorithmic bias in social research: A meta-analysis

Both the natural and the social sciences are currently facing a deep "reproducibility crisis". Two important factors in this crisis have been the selective reporting of results and methodological problems. In this article, we examine a fusion of these two factors. More specifically, we demonstrate that the uncritical import of Boolean optimization algorithms from electrical engineering into some areas of the social sciences in the late 1980s has induced algorithmic bias on a considerable scale over the last quarter century. Potentially affected are all studies that have used a method nowadays known as Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). Drawing on replication material for 215 peer-reviewed QCA articles from across 109 high-profile management, political science and sociology journals, we estimate the extent this problem has assumed in empirical work. Our results suggest that one in three studies is affected, one in ten severely so. More generally, our article cautions scientists against letting methods and algorithms travel too easily across disparate disciplines without sufficient prior evaluation of their suitability for the context in hand.

A neurocognitive model of perceptual decision-making on emotional signals

Humans make various kinds of decisions about which emotions they perceive from others. Although it might seem like a split-second phenomenon, deliberating over which emotions we perceive unfolds across several stages of decisional processing. Neurocognitive models of general perception postulate that our brain first extracts sensory information about the world then integrates these data into a percept and lastly interprets it. The aim of the present study was to build an evidence-based neurocognitive model of perceptual decision-making on others' emotions. We conducted a series of meta-analyses of neuroimaging data spanning 30 years on the explicit evaluations of others' emotional expressions. We find that emotion perception is rather an umbrella term for various perception paradigms, each with distinct neural structures that underline task-related cognitive demands. Furthermore, the left amygdala was responsive across all classes of decisional paradigms, regardless of task-related demands. Based on these observations, we propose a neurocognitive model that outlines the information flow in the brain needed for a successful evaluation of and decisions on other individuals' emotions. HIGHLIGHTS: Emotion classification involves heterogeneous perception and decision-making tasks Decision-making processes on emotions rarely covered by existing emotions theories We propose an evidence-based neuro-cognitive model of decision-making on emotions Bilateral brain processes for nonverbal decisions, left brain processes for verbal decisions Left amygdala involved in any kind of decision on emotions.

Toward an Integrative Psychometric Model of Emotions

Emotions are part and parcel of the human condition, but their nature is debated. Three broad classes of theories about the nature of emotions can be distinguished: affect-program theories, constructionist theories, and appraisal theories. Integrating these broad classes of theories into a unifying theory is challenging. An integrative psychometric model of emotions can inform such a theory because psychometric models are intertwined with theoretical perspectives about constructs. To identify an integrative psychometric model, we delineate properties of emotions stated by emotion theories and investigate whether psychometric models account for these properties. Specifically, an integrative psychometric model of emotions should allow (a) identifying distinct emotions (central in affect-program theories), (b) between- and within-person variations of emotions (central in constructionist theories), and (c) causal relationships between emotion components (central in appraisal theories). Evidence suggests that the popular reflective and formative latent variable models-in which emotions are conceptualized as unobservable causes or consequences of emotion components-cannot account for all properties. Conversely, a psychometric network model-in which emotions are conceptualized as systems of causally interacting emotion components-accounts for all properties. The psychometric network model thus constitutes an integrative psychometric model of emotions, facilitating progress toward a unifying theory.

Reappraising Reappraisal

What psychological mechanisms enable people to reappraise a situation to change its emotional impact? We propose that reappraisal works by shifting appraisal outcomes—abstract representations of how a situational construal compares to goals—either by changing the construal ( reconstrual) or by changing the goal set ( repurposing). Instances of reappraisal can therefore be characterized as change vectors in appraisal dimensional space. Affordances for reappraisal arise from the range of mental models that could explain a situation ( construal malleability) and the range of goals that the situation could serve ( goal set malleability). This framework helps to expand our conception of reappraisal, assess and classify different instances of reappraisal, predict their relative effectiveness, understand their brain mechanisms, and relate them to individual differences.

The role of stimulus-driven versus goal-directed processes in fight and flight tendencies measured with motor evoked potentials induced by Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation

This study examines two contrasting explanations for early tendencies to fight and flee. According to a stimulus-driven explanation, goal-incompatible stimuli that are easy/difficult to control lead to the tendency to fight/flee. According to a goal-directed explanation, on the other hand, the tendency to fight/flee occurs when the expected utility of fighting/fleeing is the highest. Participants did a computer task in which they were confronted with goal-incompatible stimuli that were (a) easy to control and fighting had the highest expected utility, (b) easy to control and fleeing had the highest expected utility, and (c) difficult to control and fleeing and fighting had zero expected utility. After participants were trained to use one hand to fight and another hand to flee, they either had to choose a response or merely observe the stimuli. During the observation trials, single-pulse Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) was applied to the primary motor cortex 450 ms post-stimulus onset and motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) were measured from the hand muscles. Results showed that participants chose to fight/flee when the expected utility of fighting/fleeing was the highest, and that they responded late when the expected utility of both responses was low. They also showed larger MEPs for the right/left hand when the expected utility of fighting/fleeing was the highest. This result can be interpreted as support for the goal-directed account, but only if it is assumed that we were unable to override the presumed natural mapping between hand (right/left) and response (fight/flight).

The time course of emotion recognition in speech and music

The auditory gating paradigm was adopted to study how much acoustic information is needed to recognize emotions from speech prosody and music performances. In Study 1, brief utterances conveying ten emotions were segmented into temporally fine-grained gates and presented to listeners, whereas Study 2 instead used musically expressed emotions. Emotion recognition accuracy increased with increasing gate duration and generally stabilized after a certain duration, with different trajectories for different emotions. Above-chance accuracy was observed for ≤100 ms stimuli for anger, happiness, neutral, and sadness, and for ≤250 ms stimuli for most other emotions, for both speech and music. This suggests that emotion recognition is a fast process that allows discrimination of several emotions based on low-level physical characteristics. The emotion identification points, which reflect the amount of information required for stable recognition, were shortest for anger and happiness for both speech and music, but recognition took longer to stabilize for music vs speech. This, in turn, suggests that acoustic cues that develop over time also play a role for emotion inferences (especially for music). Finally, acoustic cue patterns were positively correlated between speech and music, suggesting a shared acoustic code for expressing emotions.