Confabulation, delusion, and anosognosia: motivational factors and false claims

Fetal alcohol spectrum disorder and confabulation in psycholegal settings: A beginner's guide for criminal justice, forensic mental health, and legal interviewers

Fetal alcohol spectrum disorders (FASD) are neurodevelopmental/neurobehavioral conditions caused by prenatal alcohol exposure (PAE). Impairments caused by PAE contribute to the over-representation of individuals with FASD in the United States juvenile and adult criminal justice systems. These same impairments can equally impact on individuals with FASD who are witnesses to or victims of crime who also have to navigate the complexities of the criminal justice system. Difficulties include increased susceptibility to confabulation throughout the legal process that, in turn, can contribute to increased rates of poor outcomes including false confessions and wrongful convictions. Individuals with FASD are particularity at risk of confabulation when they are subjected to tactics, such as stressful and anxiety-provoking situations, threats, and leading, suggestive, or coercive questioning. Many professionals in the forensic context are unfamiliar with FASD or related confabulation risk and may unintentionally utilize tactics that intensify impacts of pre-existing impairment. This article serves as a beginner's guide for professionals working in criminal justice settings by (a) providing research-based overviews of FASD and confabulation, (b) describing how FASD may lead to confabulation, and (c) suggesting ways that professionals can modify protocols when interacting with individuals with FASD. Suggestions in this article hold the potential to decrease the risk of confabulation in the criminal justice system and decrease problematic outcomes, such as false confessions and wrongful convictions among individuals with FASD.

Conspiratorial Thinking During COVID-19: The Roles of Paranoia, Delusion-Proneness, and Intolerance of Uncertainty

The COVID-19 global pandemic has left many feeling a sense of profound uncertainty about their world, safety, and livelihood. Sources espousing misinformation and conspiracy theories frequently offer information that can help make sense of this uncertainty. Individuals high in intolerance of uncertainty (IU) may be particularly impacted by the impoverished epistemic environment and may thus be more drawn to conspiratorial thinking (CT). In the present work, we show across 2 studies (N = 519) that COVID-19-specific CT is associated with higher levels of IU as well as delusion-proneness, and paranoia. Furthermore, delusion-proneness and paranoia explained the relationship between IU and CT and emerged as independent partial correlates of CT even when controlling for other facets of schizotypy. In contrast, anxiety did not explain the relationship between IU and CT. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of individual differences in IU, delusion-proneness and paranoia in the development of CT in the context of the acute uncertainty of a global crisis, in which conspiracy theories are more prevalent and salient. Informational intervention designs may benefit from leveraging the body of work demonstrating the efficacy of targeting IU to incite meaningful changes in thinking.

Reduplicative paramnesia for places: A comprehensive review of the literature and a new case report

Reduplicative paramnesia for places (i.e., the delusional belief that a place has been duplicated or exists in two different locations) is a rare disorder observed in neurological patients. We review the existing literature on the topic, highlighting commonalities and differences among the 51 cases published since the first report in 1903. Our results highlight the combination of multiple factors in the pathogenesis of this monothematic spatial delusion. From a neurological perspective, a crucial role is played by damage to the right frontal and temporal lobe. Deficits of non-verbal memory and executive functions, along with topographical disorientation, appear to be the most common (but, not systematic) cognitive impairments. The clinical picture of the disorder is further complicated by often overlooked psychological and motivational factors. Consequently, the precise neuro-cognitive substrate of this disorder is yet to be described in detail. We stress the need for a more detailed and systematic approach exploiting neurological, neuroimaging, neuropsychological and psychopathological methods. To guide future investigations, we provide clinical- and research-oriented recommendations. Finally, we illustrate the interplay of all above-mentioned factors with a new case report.

Can We Ameliorate Psychotic Symptoms by Improving Implicit Self-Esteem? A Proof-of-Concept Experience Sampling Study of an Evaluative Classical Conditioning Intervention

There is a need to develop novel interventions for psychosis, targeted at specific psychological mechanisms. We used a classical conditioning paradigm to a) modify implicit self-esteem and b) examine subsequent effects on subclinical psychotic symptoms measured by the Experience Sampling Methodology. This study is a proof-of-concept pilot investigation conducted with 28 students with high paranoia levels, assessing variations in their self-esteem, paranoid beliefs, and subclinical psychotic symptoms daily. After 2 days, participants were randomized to receive either a positive conditioning task (repeatedly pairing self-relevant words with an image of a smiling face) or a neutral conditioning task (repeatedly pairing self-relevant words with random smiling, angry, or neutral faces). After the intervention, the positive conditioning participants showed significantly higher levels of implicit self-esteem and lower subclinical psychotic symptoms than the control condition participants. This study demonstrated that implicit self-esteem can be increased by using a classical conditioning task.

A Causal Theory of Mnemonic Confabulation

This paper attempts to answer the question of what defines mnemonic confabulation vis-à-vis genuine memory. The two extant accounts of mnemonic confabulation as “false memory” and as ill-grounded memory are shown to be problematic, for they cannot account for the possibility of veridical confabulation, ill-grounded memory, and well-grounded confabulation. This paper argues that the defining characteristic of mnemonic confabulation is that it lacks the appropriate causal history. In the confabulation case, there is no proper counterfactual dependence of the state of seeming to remember on the corresponding past representation.

The epistemic innocence of motivated delusions

Delusions are defined as irrational beliefs that compromise good functioning. However, in the empirical literature, delusions have been found to have some psychological benefits. One proposal is that some delusions defuse negative emotions and protect one from low self-esteem by allowing motivational influences on belief formation. In this paper I focus on delusions that have been construed as playing a defensive function (motivated delusions) and argue that some of their psychological benefits can convert into epistemic ones. Notwithstanding their epistemic costs, motivated delusions also have potential epistemic benefits for agents who have faced adversities, undergone physical or psychological trauma, or are subject to negative emotions and low self-esteem. To account for the epistemic status of motivated delusions, costly and beneficial at the same time, I introduce the notion of epistemic innocence. A delusion is epistemically innocent when adopting it delivers a significant epistemic benefit, and the benefit could not be attained if the delusion were not adopted. The analysis leads to a novel account of the status of delusions by inviting a reflection on the relationship between psychological and epistemic benefits.

The neural basis of optimism and pessimism

Our survival and wellness require a balance between optimism and pessimism. Undue pessimism makes life miserable; however, excessive optimism can lead to dangerously risky behaviors. A review and synthesis of the literature on the neurophysiology subserving these two worldviews suggests that optimism and pessimism are differentially associated with the two cerebral hemispheres. High self-esteem, a cheerful attitude that tends to look at the positive aspects of a given situation, as well as an optimistic belief in a bright future are associated with physiological activity in the left-hemisphere (LH). In contrast, a gloomy viewpoint, an inclination to focus on the negative part and exaggerate its significance, low self-esteem as well as a pessimistic view on what the future holds are interlinked with neurophysiological processes in the right-hemisphere (RH). This hemispheric asymmetry in mediating optimistic and pessimistic outlooks is rooted in several biological and functional differences between the two hemispheres. The RH mediation of a watchful and inhibitive mode weaves a sense of insecurity that generates and supports pessimistic thought patterns. Conversely, the LH mediation of an active mode and the positive feedback it receives through its motor dexterity breed a sense of confidence in one's ability to manage life's challenges, and optimism about the future.

Confabulation and delusion: a common monitoring framework

Confabulations and delusions both involve the production of false claims. Although they may have different types of content, they share several characteristics. For example, they are often held with considerable conviction and are resistant to counter evidence, they may be acted upon, and they may be accompanied by a lack of concern about the false claim or its implications. Confabulations and delusions may initially arise from failures in different systems (e.g., mnemonic vs. perceptual or affective). However, their shared characteristics raise the possibility that the monitoring deficits involved might be the same, resulting in failure to reject the confabulatory or delusional ideas. In this paper we will focus on the nature of these common monitoring deficits. Critically, we argue that monitoring in confabulation and delusion involves both unconscious and conscious processes. We propose that an unconscious process is responsible for tagging suspect content which needs to be checked for veracity by a separate set of conscious evaluative processes. Failure of these monitoring processes would allow ideas which ought to be checked and rejected to instead be uncritically accepted: This would result in the production of confabulations or delusions. Importantly, inclusion of both unconscious and conscious monitoring stages allows the model to account for both "endorsement" and "explanation" delusions, and both "primary" and "secondary" confabulations. Our hope is that this model may provide a theoretical framework to guide empirical investigation of the commonalities and differences between the conditions.

Hypnotic illusions and clinical delusions: hypnosis as a research method

INTRODUCTION

Hypnosis is not only intrinsically interesting, but it can be used instrumentally as a powerful tool to investigate phenomena outside its immediate domain. In focusing on instrumental hypnosis research, we first sketch the many contributions of hypnosis across a range of areas in experimental psychopathology. In particular, we summarise the historical and more recent uses of hypnosis to create and explore clinically relevant, temporary delusions.

METHODS

We then describe in detail the steps that hypnosis researchers take in constructing a hypnotic paradigm to map the features and processes shared by clinical and hypnotic delusions, as well as their impact on information processing (including autobiographical memory). We illustrate with hypnotic versions of mirrored-self misidentification, somatoparaphrenia, alien control, and identity delusions.

RESULTS

Finding indicate that hypnotic analogues can produce compelling delusions with features that are strikingly similar to their clinical counterparts. These similarities encompass phenomenological features of delusions, delusional resistance to challenge, and autobiographical memory during delusions.

CONCLUSIONS

We recognise important methodological issues and limitations of such hypnotic analogues, including: indexing response (behaviour vs. experience), alternative explanations (e.g., social compliance), the need for converging data, the need for close and continuing dialogue between the clinic and the laboratory, and generalisability of the findings.

The misidentification syndromes as mindreading disorders

The patient with Capgras' syndrome claims that people very familiar to him have been replaced by impostors. I argue that this disorder is due to the destruction of a representation that the patient has of the mind of the familiar person. This creates the appearance of a familiar body and face, but without the familiar personality, beliefs, and thoughts. The posterior site of damage in Capgras' is often reported to be the temporoparietal junction, an area that has a role in the mindreading system, a connected system of cortical areas that allow us to attribute mental states to others. Just as the Capgras' patient claims that that man is not his father, the patient with asomatognosia claims that his arm is not really his. A similar account applies here, in that a nearby brain area, the supramarginal gyrus, is damaged. This area works in concert with the temporoparietal junction and other areas to produce a large representation of a mind inside a body situated in an environment. Damage to the mind-representing part of this system (coupled with damage to executive processes in the prefrontal lobes) causes Capgras' syndrome, whereas damage to the body-representing part of this system (also coupled with executive damage) causes asomatognosia.

Delusion and confabulation: mistakes of perceiving, remembering and believing

This paper adopts an inclusive approach to the relationship between delusion and confabulation, according to which some symptoms might qualify as both delusional and confabulatory. Our initial focus is on the cardinal signs of delusions: incomprehensibility, incorrigibility, and subjective conviction. Setting aside post hoc (or secondary) confabulations-plausible rationalisations that might be generated by nonpathological belief formation processes-we focus on spontaneous memory-based confabulations which, we suggest, conform to the characterisation of delusions. After considering current accounts of the role of experience in delusion formation, we propose that spontaneous confabulations are located at (or towards) the "received" end of a "received-reflective" spectrum of delusions: the spontaneous confabulator simply receives and endorses as genuine the content of an apparent-yet implausible-memory experience. Underlying both spontaneous confabulations and other received delusions, we propose, is an inability to inhibit the prepotent tendency to upload and maintain experiential content (mnemonic or perceptual) into belief.