Failure of hypothesis evaluation as a factor in delusional belief

A meta-cognitive Wisconsin Card Sorting Test in people with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder: Self-assessment of sorting performance

People with serious mental illness have challenged self-awareness, including momentary monitoring of performance. A core feature of this challenge is in the domain of using external information to guide behavior, an ability that is measured very well by certain problem-solving tasks such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) . We used a modified WCST to examine correct sorts and accuracy decisions regarding the correctness of sort. Participants with schizophrenia (n = 99) or bipolar disorder (n = 76) sorted 64 cards and then made judgments regarding correctness of each sort prior to feedback. Time series analyses examined the course of correct sorts and correct accuracy decisions by examining the momentary correlation and lagged correlation on the next sort. People with schizophrenia had fewer correct sorts, fewer categories, and fewer correct accuracy decisions (all p<.001). Positive response biases were seen in both groups. After an incorrect sort or accuracy decision, the groups were equally likely to be incorrect on the next sort or accuracy decision. Following correct accuracy decisions, participants with bipolar disorder were significantly (p=.003) more likely to produce a correct sort or accuracy decision. These data are consistent with previous studies implicating failures to consider external feedback for decision making. Interventions aimed at increasing consideration of external information during decision making have been developed and interventions targeting use of feedback during cognitive test performance are in development.

Everything in its right place: a case report of reduplicative paramnesia with therapeutic and theoretical considerations

Introductions: Reduplicative paramnesia (RP) is a rare and poorly understood phenomenon in which a person believes the place they are in has been replicated and exists in two places at once. There is minimal extant theoretical work addressing possible cognitive mechanisms subtending RP.Method: We present a new case of RP and discuss the therapeutic and theoretical implications of this case for the management and understanding of this phenomenon. Using the hypothetico-deductive approach to a neuropsychological case, we examine the phenomenon in the light of one and two-factor approaches to understanding the genesis of delusions.Results: The individual discussed in this case showed some evidence of relatively efficient incorporation of new evidence (belief updating) despite concurrently maintaining a delusional belief system.Conclusion: This case raises novel challenges for the two-factor account of neurological delusions.

Koro: a socially-transmitted delusional belief

INTRODUCTION

Koro is a delusion whereby a man believes his penis is shrinking into his abdomen and this may result in his death. This socially-transmitted non-neuropsychological delusional belief occurs (in epidemic form) in South-East and South Asia. We investigated whether the two-factor theory of delusion could be applied to epidemic Koro.

METHODS

We scrutinised the literature on epidemic Koro to isolate features relevant to the two questions that must be answered to provide a two-factor account: What could initially prompt the Koro delusional hypothesis? Why is this hypothesis adopted as a belief?

RESULTS

We concluded that the Koro hypothesis is usually prompted by the surprising observation of actual penis shrinkage-but only if the man has access to background beliefs about Koro. Whether the hypothesis is then adopted as a belief will depend on individual factors such as prior belief in the Koro concept or limited formal education and sociocultural factors such as deference to culture, to media, or to rumours spread by word of mouth. Social transmission can influence how the first factor works and how the second factor works.

CONCLUSION

The two-factor theory of delusion can be applied to a socially-transmitted delusion that occurs in epidemic form.

Delusions of love and passion in the behavioral variant of frontotemporal dementia

Erotomania (de Clérambault's syndrome) refers to the delusional belief that another person, usually socially unreachable, is in love with the holder of the delusion. The occurrence of erotomania in Frontotemporal Dementia has rarely been reported. We present the unique case of a 59-year-old woman with a strong family history of early-onset dementia in whom erotomania was the initial manifestation that led to a diagnosis of definite Behavioral Variant of Frontotemporal Dementia with a pathogenic missense mutation in the MAPT gene. Based on this case, we propose a hypothetical model for developing erotomania in patients with FTD.

Cotard delusion, emotional experience and depersonalisation

INTRODUCTION

Cotard delusion-the delusional belief "I am dead"-is named after the French psychiatrist who first described it: Jules Cotard. Ramachandran and Blakeslee proposed that the idea "I am dead" comes to mind when a neuropathological condition has resulted in complete abolition of emotional responsivity to the world. The idea would arise as a putative explanation: if "I am dead" were true, there would be no emotional responsivity to the world.

METHODS

We scrutinised the literature on people who expressed the delusional belief "I am dead", looking for data on whether such patients are reported as entirely lacking in emotional responsivity.

RESULTS

In numerous cases, patients with Cotard delusion are described as experiencing emotions including anxiety, fear, guilt, distress, euphoria and worry.

CONCLUSIONS

We conclude that complete absence of emotional responsivity cannot be what prompts the delusional idea that one is dead. We propose that, in at least some cases, the idea "I am dead" comes to mind in response to symptoms of depersonalisation or derealisation, often present in cases of Cotard delusion, and give examples of Cotard patients with abnormalities in various neural areas that could be responsible for the presence of such symptoms.

'An experience of meaning': A 20-year prospective analysis of delusional realities in schizophrenia and affective psychoses

Delusions are transdiagnostic and heterogeneous phenomena with varying degrees of intensity, stability, and dimensional attributes where the boundaries between everyday beliefs and delusional beliefs can be experienced as clearly demarcated, fuzzy, or indistinguishable. This highlights the difficulty in defining delusional realities. All individuals in the current study were evaluated at index and at least one of six subsequential follow-ups over 20 years in the Chicago Longitudinal Study. We assessed 16 distinct delusions categorized as thought or thematic delusions. We also examined the probability of recurrence and the relationships between delusions and hallucinations, depression, anxiety, and negative symptoms. The sample consisted of 262 individuals with schizophrenia vs. affective psychosis. Thought delusions were significantly different between groups at all follow-up evaluations except the 20-year timepoint. Thematic delusions were more common than thought delusions and show a significant decreasing pattern. In general, delusional content varied over time. Referential, persecutory, and thought dissemination delusions show the highest probability of recurrence. Hallucinations were the strongest indicator for thought, thematic, and overall delusions. The formation and maintenance of delusions were conceptualized as a multimodal construct consisting of sensory, perceptual, emotional, social, and somatic embodiment of an "experience of meanings". Given the significant associations between delusions and hallucinations, future work incorporating participatory research is needed to better define and align subjective and objective perspectives. Our research also points to the need for future clinical interventions that specifically evaluate and target the coexistence and entanglement of delusions and hallucinations.

Everything is connected: Inference and attractors in delusions

Delusions are, by popular definition, false beliefs that are held with certainty and resistant to contradictory evidence. They seem at odds with the notion that the brain at least approximates Bayesian inference. This is especially the case in schizophrenia, a disorder thought to relate to decreased - rather than increased - certainty in the brain's model of the world. We use an active inference Markov decision process model (a Bayes-optimal decision-making agent) to perform a simple task involving social and non-social inferences. We show that even moderate changes in some model parameters - decreasing confidence in sensory input and increasing confidence in states implied by its own (especially habitual) actions - can lead to delusions as defined above. Incorporating affect in the model increases delusions, specifically in the social domain. The model also reproduces some classic psychological effects, including choice-induced preference change, and an optimism bias in inferences about oneself. A key observation is that no change in a single parameter is both necessary and sufficient for delusions; rather, delusions arise due to conditional dependencies that create 'basins of attraction' which trap Bayesian beliefs. Simulating the effects of antidopaminergic antipsychotics - by reducing the model's confidence in its actions - demonstrates that the model can escape from these attractors, through this synthetic pharmacotherapy.

What is Capgras delusion?

INTRODUCTION

Capgras delusion is sometimes defined as believing that close relatives have been replaced by strangers. But such replacement beliefs also occur in response to encountering an acquaintance, or the voice of a familiar person, or a pet, or some personal possession. All five scenarios involve believing something familiar has been replaced by something unfamiliar.

METHODS

We evaluate the proposal that these five kinds of delusional belief should count as subtypes of the same delusion.

RESULTS

Personally familiar stimuli activate the sympathetic nervous system (SNS) much more strongly than unfamiliar stimuli. In Capgras delusion, this difference is absent, prompting the delusional idea that a familiar person is actually a stranger. We suggest this absence of an effect of familiarity on SNS response will occur in all five scenarios and will prompt the idea that the familiar has been replaced by the unfamiliar.

CONCLUSIONS

We propose that: (a) all five scenarios be referred to as subtypes of Capgras delusion; (b) in all five, ideas about replacement are prompted by weakness of SNS responses to familiar stimuli; (c) this is insufficient to generate delusion. For a delusional idea to become a belief, a second factor (impaired hypothesis evaluation) must also be present.

Modelling delusions as temporally-evolving beliefs

Introduction: Delusions demand an explanation in terms of their neural, psychological, and sociological mechanisms. We must bridge these levels of explanation in order to understand and ultimately treat delusions. To this end, debates continue as to the number of contributing factors, how those factors interact, and their underlying computational mechanisms.Methods: One popular family of models suggests that two separate insults are necessary, a problem with perception and an independent problem with belief. In particular, new work proposes that the belief problem entails a bias against disconfirmatory evidence - yielding the characteristic fixity of delusions. Here, we evaluate that claim, as well as explanations of delusions more broadly.Results: We suggest that such a bias may not explain enough of the variance in belief updating in delusional participants, and, more fundamentally, it might rule out specific accounts of delusions, since, such a bias might prevent them from forming in the first place, under particular assumptions about cognitive architectures.Conclusion: We suggest conceptualising delusions as an evolving uncertainty driven negotiation between beliefs and evidence, in which initial formation is fuelled by unexpected uncertainty, but, once formed, the delusion engenders new expectations about uncertainty that tune down updating but also facilitate the elastic assimilation of contradictory evidence.