Inventing a new death and making it believable

No Detectable Electroencephalographic Activity After Clinical Declaration of Death Among Tibetan Buddhist Meditators in Apparent Tukdam, a Putative Postmortem Meditation State

Recent EEG studies on the early postmortem interval that suggest the persistence of electrophysiological coherence and connectivity in the brain of animals and humans reinforce the need for further investigation of the relationship between the brain's activity and the dying process. Neuroscience is now in a position to empirically evaluate the extended process of dying and, more specifically, to investigate the possibility of brain activity following the cessation of cardiac and respiratory function. Under the direction of the Center for Healthy Minds at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, research was conducted in India on a postmortem meditative state cultivated by some Tibetan Buddhist practitioners in which decomposition is putatively delayed. For all healthy baseline (HB) and postmortem (PM) subjects presented here, we collected resting state electroencephalographic data, mismatch negativity (MMN), and auditory brainstem response (ABR). In this study, we present HB data to demonstrate the feasibility of a sparse electrode EEG configuration to capture well-defined ERP waveforms from living subjects under very challenging field conditions. While living subjects displayed well-defined MMN and ABR responses, no recognizable EEG waveforms were discernable in any of the tukdam cases.

Organs and organisations: Situating ethics in organ donation after circulatory death in the UK

Controlled organ donation after circulatory death (DCD) has recently been revived in the UK, as part of attempts to increase organ donation rates. The re-introduction of DCD has subsequently become the focus of bioethical controversy, since it necessitates intervening in the care of dying patients to obtain quality donor organs. Transplant policy responses to these concerns have generated new legal and ethical guidelines to address uncertainties around DCD, producing claims that the UK has overcome' the ethical challenge of DCD. In contrast, by drawing on Lynch's call to 'respecify' ethics, this paper argues that ethics in DCD cannot be reduced to abstract directives for practice, but, instead, are composed and dealt with as an organisational problem. To do this, I utilise data from an ethnographic study examining the production of the 'minority ethnic organ donor' within UK organ donation settings; in particular, the data pertains to a case hospital which was in the process of developing a DCD programme during the period of fieldwork. Findings show that the ethics of DCD are encountered as practical sets of problems, constructed in relation to particular institutional locales. I describe how these issues are worked-around by creating conditions to make DCD organisationally possible, and through the animation of standard procedures into acceptable forms of practice. I argue that ethics in DCD go far beyond normative bioethical principles, to encompass concerns around: the reputation of hospital Trusts, public perceptions of organ donation, the welfare of potential donor families, and challenges to the work of health professionals caring for dying patients. The paper enriches understanding of ethics in science and medicine by showing how ethics are assembled and negotiated as a practical-organisational concern, and calls for further examination of how DCD gets constructed as a potential problem and is made to happen in practice.

Brain death and true patient care

The "brain death" standard as a criterion of death is closely associated with the need for transplantable organs from heart-beating donors. Are all of these potential donors really dead, or does the documented evidence of patients destined for organ harvesting who improve, or even recover to live normal lives, call into question the premise underlying "brain death"? The aim of this paper is to re-examine the notion of "brain death," especially its clinical test-criteria, in light of a broad framework, including medical knowledge in the field of neuro-intensive care and the traditional ethics of the medical profession. I will argue that both the empirical medical evidence and the ethics of the doctor-patient relationship point to an alternative approach toward the severely comatose patient (potential brain-dead donor). Lay Summary: Though legally accepted and widely practiced, the "brain death" standard for the determination of death has remained a controversial issue, especially in view of the occurrence of "chronic brain death" survivors. This paper critically re-evaluates the clinical test-criteria for "brain death," taking into account what is known about the neuro-critical care of severe brain injury. The medical evidence, together with the understanding of the moral role of the physician toward the patient present before him or her, indicate that an alternative approach should be offered to the deeply comatose patient.

A survey of American neurologists about brain death: understanding the conceptual basis and diagnostic tests for brain death

Background

Neurologists often diagnose brain death (BD) and explain BD to families in the intensive care unit. This study was designed to determine whether neurologists agree with the standard concept of death (irreversible loss of integrative unity of the organism) and understand the state of the brain when BD is diagnosed.

Methods

A previously validated survey was mailed to a random sample of 500 board-certified neurologists in the United States. Main outcomes were: responses indicating the concept of death that BD fulfills and the empirical state of the brain that would rule out BD.

Results

After the second mailing, 218 (44%) surveys were returned. Few (n = 52, 27%; 95% confidence interval (CI), 21%, 34%) responded that BD is death because the organism has lost integrative unity. The most common justification was a higher brain concept (n = 93, 48%; 95% CI, 41%, 55%), suggesting that irreversible loss of consciousness is death. Contrary to the recent President's Council on Bioethics, few (n = 22, 12%; 95% CI, 8%, 17%) responded that the irreversible lack of vital work of an organism is a concept of death that the BD criterion may satisfy. Many responded that certain brain functions remaining are not compatible with a diagnosis of BD, including EEG activity, evoked potential activity, and hypothalamic neuroendocrine function. Many also responded that brain blood flow and lack of brainstem destruction are not compatible with a diagnosis of BD.

Conclusions

American neurologists do not have a consistent rationale for accepting BD as death, nor a clear understanding of diagnostic tests for BD.

A survey to determine the understanding of the conceptual basis and diagnostic tests used for brain death by neurosurgeons in Canada

OBJECTIVE

To determine the understanding of the conceptual basis and diagnostic tests used for brain death (BD) by neurosurgeons in Canada.

METHODS

Between February and June 2006, a previously developed survey was mailed to every neurosurgeon in Canada.

RESULTS

Of 223 surveys mailed, 147 (66%) were returned; of these, 128 (87%) were completed and analyzed. When asked to choose a conceptual reason to explain why BD is equivalent to death, 50 (39%) chose a higher brain concept, 50 (39%) chose a prognosis concept, and 33 (26%) chose a loss of integration of the organism concept. More than half of respondents answered that BD is not compatible with electroencephalographic activity or brainstem evoked potential activity. More than one-third of respondents answered that some cerebral blood flow or a brainstem with minimal microscopic damage was not compatible with BD. Of the 90 respondents who answered that they were comfortable diagnosing BD because the conceptual basis of BD makes it equivalent to death of the patient, in their own words, 14 (16%) used a loss of integration concept, 20 (22%) used a prognosis concept, 25 (28%) used a higher brain concept, and 39 (43%) did not articulate a concept. When asked, "Are brain death and cardiac death the same state (i.e., are both death of the patient)?," 57 (45%) answered "No."

CONCLUSION

Within the neurosurgical community, a stand-alone concept of BD does not exist. There is also significant variability in the understanding of the tests that are compatible with the criterion of BD.

Brain Death and Organ Procurement

Patients with severe brain injuries (as can result from trauma, subarachnoid hemorrhage, or brain tumor) are monitored closely by nursing staff. It's often the nurse who first recognizes clinical signs of decompensation and begins the process of determining whether the patient is a potential organ donor. When a person is declared brain dead, it's the nurse who maintains hemodynamic stability so that donor organs remain viable. It's therefore crucial for nurses to know how brain death is determined in adults and how potential organ donors are identified, and to know the major physiologic changes that occur upon brain death, as well as essential nursing interventions.

Discretionary death: conditions, dilemmas, and normative regulation

The author examines a major shift in the conceptualization and practices relating to death and dying in Western and other societies with advanced medicine. This shift is the result of socio-technical and cultural developments characterized by but not limited to the routine widespread application of life support technologies in the hospital together with notions of increased patient rights. It has resulted in a class of end-of-life situations, which the author defines as "discretionary death." The concept of discretionary death underscores the role of contextual and discretionary factors in end-of-life decision-making. The author identifies and discusses the necessary and complex process of norm formation that informs and regulates end-of-life medical practice and establishes societal consensus across society with respect to legitimizing "discretionary death."