Emotions as Viewed by Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience: An Exercise in Consilience

Freud's 1926 conjecture is confirmed: evidence from the dorsal periaqueductal gray in mice that human psychological defense against internal instinctual threat evolved from animal motor defense against external predatory threat

In 1926, Freud famously conjectured that the human ego defense of repression against an internal instinctual threat evolved from the animal motor defense of flight from an external predatory threat. Studies over the past 50 years mainly in rodents have investigated the neurobiology of the fight-or-flight reflex to external threats, which activates the emergency alarm system in the dorsal periaqueductal gray (dPAG), the malfunction of which appears likely in panic and post-traumatic stress disorders, but perhaps also in some "non-emergent" conditions like social anxiety and "hysterical" conversion disorder. Computational neuroscience studies in mice by Reis and colleagues have revealed unprecedented insights into the dPAG-related neural mechanisms underlying these evolutionarily honed emergency vertebrate defensive functions (e.g., explore, risk assessment, escape, freeze). A psychoanalytic interpretation of the Reis studies demonstrates that Freud's 1926 conjecture is confirmed, and that internal instinctual threats alone can also set off the dPAG emergency alarm system, which is regulated by 5-HT1A and CRF-1 receptors. Consistent with current psychoanalytic and neurobiologic theories of panic, several other of the primitive components of the dPAG alarm system may also have relevance for understanding of the unconscious determinants of impaired object relationships (e.g., avoidance distance). These dPAG findings reveal (1) a process of "evolution in situ," whereby a more sophisticated dPAG ego defense is seen evolving out of a more primitive dPAG motor defense, (2) a dPAG location for the phylogenetically ancient kernel of Freud's Ego and Id, and (3) a Conscious Id theory that has been conclusively invalidated.

Drive theory, redux: a history and reconsideration of the drives

A large and significant portion of contemporary psychoanalytic theory has given up on the drives. The shift toward object relations in the 1940s and 50s, the scepticism about metapsychology in the latter half of the twentieth century, and a general confusion about the coherence of Freud's drive theory have all contributed to their slow decline in prominence. There are legitimate criticisms of the drives that deserve attention but the drives themselves require a careful examination before any successful defence of their place in the metapsychology may be mounted. The current paper provides an account of the drives informed by the intellectual history of German and English thought related to the drives and instincts as they came to Freud. This history allows us to clearly distinguish between "drive" (or Trieb) and its conceptual neighbour "instinct" (or Instinkt).

Psychosis, symbol, affectivity 2: another perspective on the treatment of psychotic disorder

This is the second of two papers concerning our study into an integrated approach to psychotic disorders conducted at the University Psychiatry Unit of Palermo's Polyclinic over approximately 15 years; this paper concentrates on the clinical phenomena. The study aimed to find the best possible treatment and to improve the prognosis of this patient group. We have explored the efficacy of a range of psycho-therapeutic (cognitive-behavioural, systemic-relational, psychodynamic, group and others), psycho-pharmaceutical, psychiatric rehabilitative and psycho-educational treatments, with a hermeneutic approach instead of a systematic one. The study's conclusions, described in the paper, are that all psychotic functions start with a nuclear psychic issue connected to emotional development. We describe how the most significant symptoms of acute psychotic manifestations (delusions and misperceptions) make use of an encrypted psychological meaning that can be decoded through the patient's symbolic language. This language is a key element in diagnosis and in the choice of treatment. The paper describes how we revised our understanding of psychosis from being a brain disease to being a process aimed at the rearrangement of psychic functioning. Our significant results are described.

In search of the 'self': Holistic rehabilitation in restoring cognition and recovering the 'self' following traumatic brain injury: A case report

BACKGROUND

Following mild-moderate traumatic brain injury (TBI), an individual experiences a range of emotional changes. It is often difficult for the patient to reconcile with their post-injury persona, and the memory of pre-injury personhood is particularly painful. Insight into one's cognitive deficits subsequent to injury can lead to an existential crisis and a sense of loss, including loss of self.

OBJECTIVE

Restoration of cognitive functions and reconciliation with loss of pre-traumatic personhood employing a holistic method of neuropsychological rehabilitation in a patient suffering from TBI.

METHODS

Ms. K.S, a 25-year-old female, presented with emotional disturbances following TBI. She reported both retrograde and anterograde amnesia. A multidimensional holistic rehabilitation was planned. Treatment addressed cognitive deficits through the basic functions approach. Cognitive behavioural methods for emotional regulation like diary writing helped reduce irritability and anger outbursts. Use of social media created new modes of memory activation and interactions. Compensatory strategies were used to recover lost skills, music-based attention training helped foster an individualised approach to the sense of one's body and self.

RESULTS

As a result of these differing strategies, changes were reflected in neuro-psychological tests, depression score and the patient's self-evaluation. This helped generate a coherent self-narrative.

CONCLUSION

Treatment challenges in such cases are increased due to patient's actual deficits caused by neuronal/biochemical changes. Innovative and multi-pronged rehabilitation strategies which involve everyday activities provided an answer to some of these problems. This method of rehabilitation may provide an optimistic context for future research.

Neuroscience and Imagination: the Relevance of Susanne Langer’s Work to Psychoanalytic Theory

This paper presents the work of philosopher Susanne Langer and argues that her conceptualization of the human mind can provide psychoanalysts with a unique framework with which to theoretically combine interpretive and biological approaches to their work. Langer's earlier work in the philosophy of symbols directs her investigation into the biological sciences along the lines of sentience and imagination, which in turn become the cornerstones of her theory of mind. Langer's understanding of the continuing transformation of affect into language is a decisive contribution yet to be built upon by others.

On Dreams and Motivation: Comparison of Freud's and Hobson's Views

The merits of Freudian dream theory continue to be debated and both supporters and critics appeal to empirical evidence to support their respective positions. What receives much less attention is the theoretical coherency of either Freudian dream theory or alternative perspectives. This paper examines Freudian dream theory and J. Allan Hobson's alternative position by addressing the role of motivation in dreams. This paper first discusses motivation in Freudian theory and its relation to dreams and disguise-censorship. The role of motivation in Hobson's theory is then considered. Hobson's claim that dream plot and content selection is random and based on design error and functional imbalance is then discussed in relation to the protoconsciousness theory proposal that dreams serve an adaptive function. While there are apparent inconsistencies in Hobson's position, his appeal to emotions and instincts provides a preliminary platform for understanding the role of motivation in dreams that is consonant with the Freudian position.

The Neuropsychoanalytic Approach: Using Neuroscience as the Basic Science of Psychoanalysis

Neuroscience was the basic science behind Freud's psychoanalytic theory and technique. He worked as a neurologist for 20 years before being aware that a new approach to understand complex diseases, namely the hysterias, was needed. Solms coined the term neuropsychoanalysis to affirm that neuroscience still belongs in psychoanalysis. The neuropsychoanalytic field has continued Freud's original ideas as stated in 1895. Developments in psychoanalysis that have been created or revised by the neuropsychoanalysis movement include pain/relatedness/opioids, drive, structural model, dreams, cathexis, and dynamic unconscious. Neuroscience has contributed to the development of new psychoanalytic theory, such as Bazan's (2011) description of anxiety driven by unconscious intentions or “phantoms.” Results of adopting the “dual aspect monism” approach of idiographic psychoanalytic clinical observation combined with nomothetic investigation of related human phenomena include clarification and revision of theory, restoration of the scientific base of psychoanalysis, and improvement of clinical treatments. By imbricating psychoanalytic thinking with neuroscience, psychoanalysts are also positioned to make contributions to neuroscience research. Freud's original Project for a Scientific Psychology/Psychology for Neurologists can be carried forward in a way that moves psychoanalysis into the twenty-first century as a core contemporary science (Kandel, 1999). Neuroscience as the basic science of psychoanalysis both improves the field, and enhances its scientific and cultural status.

Freud's "Project": The Mind-Brain Connection Revisited

Freud's "Project for a Scientific Psychology" (1895) reflected his attempt to explain psychic phenomena in neurobiological terms. The recent discovery of the neuron motivated him to embark on this endeavor. His basic hypothesis was that neurons were vehicles for the conduction of "currents" or "excitations," and that they were connected to one another. Using this model, Freud attempted to describe a number of mental phenomena, including: consciousness, perception, affect, self, cognition, dreaming, memory, and symptom formation. However, he was unable to complete his exploration of these mental processes because he lacked the information and technology that became available over the following century. Subsequent discoveries, including fMRIs, PET scans, EEGs, synapses, neural networks, genetic factors, neurotransmitters, and discrete brain circuits facilitated a significant expansion of our knowledge of mind-brain phenomena. As a result, effective pharmacological treatments have been developed for schizophrenia, mood and anxiety disorders. Moreover, changes in brain function can be measured that reflect successful pharmacologic and psychotherapeutic treatment. Despite these advances, there remain limitations in our understanding of the relationship between mind and brain functions. More than a century after Freud began the "Project," the neurobiology underlying the phenomena of consciousness, unconsciousness, qualities of subjective feelings, thoughts, and memories is still not fully understood. Can we expect to reach a more comprehensive integration of mind and its neurobiological substrate a century from now? The purpose of this article is to update our knowledge of the neurobiology associated with the specific mental functions that Freud examined in the "Project," and to pose questions concerning mind-brain phenomena that will hopefully be answered in the future.

Can anthropomorphic analyses of separation cries in other animals inform us about the emotional nature of social loss in humans? Comment on Blumberg and Sokoloff (2001)

M. S. Blumberg and G. Sokoloff's (2001) critical analysis has raised doubt whether emotional feelings can be studied in nonhuman animals, and they have reaffirmed the inappropriateness of anthropomorphic reasoning in animal research. They argue that the ultrasonic distress calls of infant rats may be little more than acoustic by-products of bodily adjustments to physiological stressors. This author argues that comparable vocalizations in other species do index separation distress. Considering that there may be deep homologies in the neural systems that govern such emotional processes in many mammalian species, anthropomorphic-zoomorphic reasoning may be a viable cross-species research strategy as long as it is limited to neuroscientific contexts that lead to testable predictions in humans and other animals.