Identity and Intergroup Leadership: Asymmetrical Political and National Identification in Response to Uncertainty

The Multiple-Matching Perspective on Value Versus Identity: Investigating How Political Ideology and Party Identity Contribute to Citizens' Support for Political Candidates

Past studies on how political value (i.e., ideology) and identity (i.e., party identity) predict support for candidates often fail to consider both the perspectives of citizens and candidates, introducing omitted variable problems. To address them, this paper introduces the multiple matching perspective, which considers how citizens' ideology and political identity are matched (i.e., moderated) by a candidate's ideology and party affiliation. Four studies using this approach reveal: 1. The effect of ideology match is large, robust, and consistent. 2. candidates' ideology plays more role than candidates' party identity except during the final stage of a presidential race. 3. Citizens' party identity can guide them to support a candidate based on the candidate's ideology (Republicans will support conservatives), but it is less so for the reverse of it (conservatives do not always support Republicans). Therefore, this approach helps theory-building in political psychology by uncovering novel effects of ideology and partisanship.

Mobilising Extremism in Times of Change: Analysing the UK's Far-Right Online Content During the Pandemic

The growing dissension towards the political handling of COVID-19, widespread job losses, backlash to extended lockdowns, and hesitancy surrounding the vaccine are propagating toxic far-right discourses in the UK. Moreover, the public is increasingly reliant on different social media platforms, including a growing number of participants on the far-right's fringe online networks, for all pandemic-related news and interactions. Therefore, with the proliferation of harmful far-right narratives and the public's reliance on these platforms for socialising, the pandemic environment is a breeding ground for radical ideologically-based mobilisation and social fragmentation. However, there remains a gap in understanding how these far-right online communities, during the pandemic, utilise societal insecurities to attract candidates, maintain viewership, and form a collective on social media platforms. The article aims to better understand online far-right mobilisation by examining, via a mixed-methodology qualitative content analysis and netnography, UK-centric content, narratives, and key political figures on the fringe platform, Gab. Through the dual-qualitative coding and analyses of 925 trending posts, the research outlines the platform's hate-filled media and the toxic nature of its communications. Moreover, the findings illustrate the far-right's online discursive dynamics, showcasing the dependence on Michael Hogg's uncertainty-identity mechanisms in the community's exploitation of societal insecurity. From these results, I propose a far-right mobilisation model termed Collective Anxiety, which illustrates that toxic communication is the foundation for the community's maintenance and recruitment. These observations set a precedent for hate-filled discourse on the platform and consequently have widespread policy implications that need addressing.

Not "My" crisis: Social identity and followers' crisis responses to COVID-19

Operationalizing social group identification as political partisanship, we examine followers' (i.e., US residents') affective experiences and behavioral responses during the initial COVID-19 outbreak in the United States (March to May 2020). In Study 1, we conducted content analyses on major news outlets' coverage of COVID-19 (N = 4319) to examine media polarization and how it plays a role in shaping followers' perceptions of the pandemic and leadership. News outlets trusted by Republicans portrayed US President Donald Trump as more effective, conveyed a stronger sense of certainty with less negative affective tone, and had a lower emphasis on COVID-19 prevention compared to outlets trusted by Democrats. We then conducted a field survey study (Study 2; N = 214) and found that Republicans perceived Trump as more effective, experienced higher positive affect, and engaged in less COVID-19 preventive behavior compared to Democrats. Using a longitudinal survey design in Study 3 (N = 251), we examined how emotional responses evolved in parallel with the pandemic and found further support for Study 2 findings. Collectively, our findings provide insight into the process of leadership from a social identity perspective during times of crisis, illustrating how social identity can inhibit mobilization of united efforts. The findings have implications for leadership of subgroup divides in different organizational and crisis contexts.

It is your fault: workplace consequences of anti-Asian stigma during COVID-19

Purpose

As COVID-19 cases rose in the US, so too did instances of discrimination against Asians. The current research seeks to understand and document discrimination toward Asians in the US specifically linked to the global pandemic (study 1). The authors test hypotheses based in social categorization and intergroup contact theories, demonstrating perceived pandemic blame is a mechanism for discrimination (study 2).

Design/methodology/approach

In study 1, the authors survey Asians living in the US regarding experiences and perceptions of COVID-19-related discrimination. In study 2, a two-time point survey examined whether participant perceptions of pandemic blame toward China predict discriminatory behavior toward Asians.

Findings

Study 1 demonstrated that 22.5% of US-residing Asians report personally encountering pandemic-related discrimination. Study 2 indicated that COVID-19 blame attributions toward China predicted anticipated hiring bias and increased physical distancing of Asians at work, associated with higher levels of US identification.

Research limitations/implications

The findings have theoretical implications for research on blame and stigmatization, as well as practical implications regarding bias mitigation.

Originality/value

The present studies advance understanding of event-based blame as a driver of prejudice and discrimination at work and suggest organizations attend to bias mitigation in conjunction with uncertainty reduction communications in challenging times.

Identification with the American South and Anti-Muslim Attitudes

The number of anti-Muslim hate groups in the U.S. nearly tripled between 2015 and 2016. In addition, the number of hate crimes committed against members of the religion jumped 67% in 2015 alone. Addressing the rise in anti-Muslim prejudice is critical. We examined (N = 406) the role of regional identification in predicting anti-Muslim attitudes. That is, identification with the American South, a more conservative and religious part of the country with a history of slavery and violent secession movements, predicted anti-Muslim attitudes. This relationship was mediated by conservation values. For Southerners who strongly identified with "the South", the endorsement of values related to a general resistance to change led to greater anti-Muslim attitudes. Anti-Muslim bias may lie in perceptions of threat: for strongly identified Southerners, the Muslim faith is viewed as a societal threat.

Self-uncertainty and group identification: A meta-analysis

A key prediction of uncertainty-identity theory is that under conditions of high self-uncertainty, people will identify more strongly with their group. This has been supported by numerous studies. To quantify this relationship, a meta-analysis was conducted on 35 studies from 30 papers ( N = 4,657). The relationship between self-uncertainty and group identification varied significantly as a function of how psychologically real the uncertainty was, as reflected in how uncertainty was operationalized and how the study was conducted. Self-uncertainty operationalized as social identity uncertainty had the strongest relationship with identification ( r = −.26, 6.8% variance accounted for), followed by indirect operationalization of self-uncertainty ( r = .23, 5.3% variance accounted for), and direct operationalization of self-uncertainty ( r = .14, 2.0% variance accounted for). The relationship did not differ between measured self-uncertainty ( r = −.13, 1.7% variance accounted for) and manipulated self-uncertainty ( r = .17, 2.9% variance accounted for). Implications and future directions are discussed.

The transformative and informative nature of elections: Representation, schism, and exit

In democratic elections, constituents may view unconventional or non-prototypical candidates as attempting to reshape their national identity in the wrong direction. When a non-prototypical candidate actually steps into a leadership role, the group's consensual view of their prototype may shift to position this new leader as prototypical. This process should be bound in member consensus, evidenced by the leader's successful election. The current work examines American Republicans (N = 297) and Democrats (N = 322) before and after the 2016 US election. We focus on Republicans' interpretations of their candidate Donald Trump's prototypicality and ability to bolster or subvert their party identity pre-election. Post-election, we examine changes to these processes, related in part to Republicans' homogenized view of Trump's prototypicality. In comparison, we examine these processes in the Democratic Party. Results suggest that whereas Democrats increased in their desire to leave their party, Republicans decreased in their desire to leave their party, an effect that is related to increasing perceptions of Trump's prototypicality and representation of the Republican Party. These findings have important implications for how the contexts of elections rapidly shape party identity through the election of leaders such as Trump.

Intergroup bias and perceived similarity: Effects of successes and failures on support for in- and outgroup political leaders

Drawing on the social identity theory of leadership and optimal distinctiveness theory, this research examined differences in perceived attitude similarity to in- and outgroup leaders among Liberals and Conservatives before and after the 2008 U.S. presidential election. We predicted Liberals and Conservatives alike would perceive their ingroup leaders (Obama or McCain) to be attitudinally similar to themselves before the election. After the election, however, Conservatives were expected to distance themselves from McCain and to accentuate similarity to Obama. Using a longitudinal design, analysis of American National Election Survey ( N = 742) data showed that Liberals and Conservatives viewed themselves to be similar to their respective ingroup leader and dissimilar to the outgroup leader. Consistent with expectations, Conservatives significantly accentuated perceived similarity with Obama following his electoral victory, and significantly distanced themselves from McCain following his loss. Liberals’ similarity with either candidate did not change from pre- to postelection. Implications for social identity in inter- and intragroup leadership contexts are discussed.

Collective symbolic coping with disease threat and othering: a case study of avian influenza

Much research studies how individuals cope with disease threat by blaming out-groups and protecting the in-group. The model of collective symbolic coping (CSC) describes four stages by which representations of a threatening event are elaborated in the mass media: awareness, divergence, convergence, and normalization. We used the CSC model to predict when symbolic in-group protection (othering) would occur in the case of the avian influenza (AI) outbreak. Two studies documented CSC stages and showed that othering occurred during the divergence stage, characterized by an uncertain symbolic environment. Study 1 analysed media coverage of AI over time, documenting CSC stages of awareness and divergence. In Study 2, a two-wave repeated cross-sectional survey was conducted just after the divergence stage and a year later. Othering was measured by the number of foreign countries erroneously ticked by participants as having human victims. Individual differences in germ aversion and social dominance orientation interacted to predict othering during the divergence stage but not a year later. Implications for research on CSC and symbolic in-group protection strategies resulting from disease threat are discussed.