Doing The Right Thing (and Figuring Out What That Is)

Political Versus Epidemiological Correctness

In the March issue of the journal, the Joint SHEA and APIC Task Force indicates that the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America (SHEA) and the Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology (APIC) support the use of active detection and isolation (ADI) for controlling nosocomial infections due to methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus (VRE) “in appropriate circumstances, as recommended in previously published guidelines”1(p250) (those published by SHEA and the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee [HICPAC]), but that SHEA and APIC oppose the use of legislation for mandating any infection control approach, including this one as tried in 2006 in Illinois and Maryland.

Both supporters and opponents of controlling MRSA and VRE with ADI probably will agree that legislation is not the optimal way to control nosocomial infections in general, but this position statement undoubtedly will please the latter more than it does the former because the SHEA/APIC Task Force argues that ADI is not ready for routine use throughout all healthcare facilities, directly opposing the position of the original SHEA guideline. As an author of that SHEA guideline, I would like to comment. First, the new position seems politically correct (since most infection control professionals have not yet bothered using ADI to control MRSA and VRE), but many of the planks of the SHEA/APIC Task Force position statement are misleading.

Impact of Contact and Droplet Precautions on the Incidence of Hospital-Acquired Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus Infection

Objective.

To evaluate the efficacy of contact and droplet precautions in reducing the incidence of hospital-acquired methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infections.

Design.

Before-after study.

Setting.

A 439-bed, university-affiliated community hospital.

Methods.

To identify inpatients infected or colonized with MRSA, we conducted surveillance of S. aureus isolates recovered from clinical culture and processed by the hospital's clinical microbiology laboratory. We then reviewed patient records for all individuals from whom MRSA was recovered. The rates of hospital-acquired MRSA infection were tabulated for each area where patients received nursing care. After a baseline period, contact and droplet precautions were implemented in all intensive care units (ICUs). Reductions in the incidence of hospital-acquired MRSA infection in ICUs led to the implementation of contact precautions in non-ICU patient care areas (hereafter, “non-ICU areas”), as well. Droplet precautions were discontinued. An analysis comparing the rates of hospital-acquired MRSA infection during different intervention periods was performed.

Results.

The combined baseline rate of hospital-acquired MRSA infection was 10.0 infections per 1,000 patient-days in the medical ICU (MICU) and surgical ICU (SICU) and 0.7 infections per 1,000 patient-days in other ICUs. Following the implementation of contact and droplet precautions, combined rates of hospital-acquired MRSA infection in the MICU and SICU decreased to 4.3 infections per 1,000 patient-days (95% confidence interval [CI], 0.17-0.97; P = .03). There was no significant change in hospital-acquired MRSA infection rates in other ICUs. After the discontinuation of droplet precautions, the combined rate in the MICU and SICU decreased further to 2.5 infections per 1,000 patient-days. This finding was not significant (P = .43). In the non-ICU areas that had a high incidence of hospital-acquired MRSA infection, the rate prior to implementation of contact precautions was 1.3 infections per 1,000 patient-days. After the implementation of contact precautions, the rate in these areas decreased to 0.9 infections per 1,000 patient-days (95% CI, 0.47-0.94; P = .02).

Conclusion.

The implementation of contact precautions significantly decreased the rate of hospital-acquired MRSA infection, and discontinuation of droplet precautions in the ICUs led to a further reduction. Additional studies evaluating specific infection control strategies are needed.

The role of healthcare personnel in the maintenance and spread of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus

Healthcare workers may acquire methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) from patients, both hospital and home environments, other healthcare workers, family and public acquaintances, and pets. There is a consensus of case reports and series which now strongly support the role for MRSA-carrying healthcare personnel to serve as a reservoir and as a vehicle of spread within healthcare settings. Carriage may occur at a number of body sites and for short, intermediate, and long terms. A number of approaches have been taken to interrupt the linkage of staff-patient spread, but most emphasis has been placed on handwashing and the treatment of staff MRSA carriers. The importance of healthcare workers in transmission has been viewed with varying degrees of interest, and several logistical problems have arisen when healthcare worker screening is brought to the forefront. There is now considerable support for the screening and treatment of healthcare workers, but it is suggested that the intensity of any such approach must consider available resources, the nature of the outbreak, and the strength of epidemiological associations. The task of assessing healthcare personnel carriage in any context should be shaped with due regard to national and international guidelines, should be honed and practiced according to local needs and experience, and must be patient-oriented.

Controlling a multicenter outbreak involving the New York/Japan methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus clone

OBJECTIVE

To describe the control of an outbreak of infection and colonization with the New York/Japan methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) clone in multiple healthcare facilities, and to demonstrate the importance of making an MRSA management policy involving molecular typing of MRSA into a statewide public health responsibility.

SETTING

A range of healthcare facilities, including 2 metropolitan teaching hospitals and a regional hospital, as well as several community hospitals and long-term care facilities in a nonmetropolitan healthcare region.

INTERVENTIONS

A comprehensive, statewide MRSA epidemiological investigation and management policy.

RESULTS

In May 2005, there were 3 isolates referred to the Western Australian Gram-Positive Bacteria Typing and Research Unit that were identified as the New York/Japan MRSA clone, a pandemic MRSA clone with the ability to spread and replace existing clones in a region. Subsequent investigation identified 28 additional cases of infection and/or colonization dating from 2002 onward, including 1 involving a colonized healthcare worker (HCW) who had previously been hospitalized overseas. Of the 31 isolates detected, 25 were linked epidemiologically and via molecular typing to the isolate recovered from the colonized HCW. Four isolates appeared to have been introduced separately from overseas. Although the isolate from the single remaining case patient was genetically indistinct from the isolates that spread within Western Australia, no specific epidemiological link could be established. The application of standard outbreak management strategies reduced further spread.

CONCLUSIONS

The elimination of the New/York Japan MRSA clone in a healthcare region demonstrates the importance of incorporating MRSA management policy into statewide public health programs. The mainstays of such programs should include a comprehensive and effective outbreak identification and management policy (including pre-employment screening of HCWs, where applicable) and MRSA clone identification by multilocus sequence typing.