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Chakraborty S, Agarwal I, Chakraborty S. Replicator-mutator dynamics of the rock-paper-scissors game: Learning through mistakes. Phys Rev E 2024; 109:034404. [PMID: 38632809 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.109.034404] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/19/2023] [Accepted: 02/06/2024] [Indexed: 04/19/2024]
Abstract
We generalize the Bush-Mosteller learning, the Roth-Erev learning, and the social learning to include mistakes, such that the nonlinear replicator-mutator equation with either additive or multiplicative mutation is generated in an asymptotic limit. Subsequently, we exhaustively investigate the ubiquitous rock-paper-scissors game for some analytically tractable motifs of mutation pattern for which the replicator-mutator flow is seen to exhibit rich dynamics that include limit cycles and chaotic orbits. The main result of this paper is that in both symmetric and asymmetric game interactions, mistakes can sometimes help the players learn; in fact, mistakes can even control chaos to lead to rational Nash-equilibrium outcomes. Furthermore, we report a hitherto-unknown Hamiltonian structure of the replicator-mutator equation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Suman Chakraborty
- Department of Physics, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh 208016, India
| | - Ishita Agarwal
- Department of Physics, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh 208016, India
| | - Sagar Chakraborty
- Department of Physics, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh 208016, India
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2
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LaPorte P, Nowak MA. A geometric process of evolutionary game dynamics. J R Soc Interface 2023; 20:20230460. [PMID: 38016638 PMCID: PMC10684345 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2023.0460] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/06/2023] [Accepted: 11/02/2023] [Indexed: 11/30/2023] Open
Abstract
Many evolutionary processes occur in phenotype spaces which are continuous. It is therefore of interest to explore how selection operates in continuous spaces. One approach is adaptive dynamics, which assumes that mutants are local. Here we study a different process which also allows non-local mutants. We assume that a resident population is challenged by an invader who uses a strategy chosen from a random distribution on the space of all strategies. We study the repeated donation game of direct reciprocity. We consider reactive strategies given by two probabilities, denoting respectively the probability to cooperate after the co-player has cooperated or defected. The strategy space is the unit square. We derive analytic formulae for the stationary distribution of evolutionary dynamics and for the average cooperation rate as function of the cost-to-benefit ratio. For positive reactive strategies, we prove that cooperation is more abundant than defection if the area of the cooperative region is greater than 1/2 which is equivalent to benefit, b, divided by cost, c, exceeding [Formula: see text]. We introduce the concept of strategies that are stable with probability one. We also study an extended process and discuss other games.
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Affiliation(s)
- Philip LaPorte
- Department of Mathematics, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA
| | - Martin A. Nowak
- Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
- Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
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3
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LaPorte P, Hilbe C, Nowak MA. Adaptive dynamics of memory-one strategies in the repeated donation game. PLoS Comput Biol 2023; 19:e1010987. [PMID: 37384811 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010987] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/02/2023] [Accepted: 06/13/2023] [Indexed: 07/01/2023] Open
Abstract
Human interactions can take the form of social dilemmas: collectively, people fare best if all cooperate but each individual is tempted to free ride. Social dilemmas can be resolved when individuals interact repeatedly. Repetition allows them to adopt reciprocal strategies which incentivize cooperation. The most basic model for direct reciprocity is the repeated donation game, a variant of the prisoner's dilemma. Two players interact over many rounds; in each round they decide whether to cooperate or to defect. Strategies take into account the history of the play. Memory-one strategies depend only on the previous round. Even though they are among the most elementary strategies of direct reciprocity, their evolutionary dynamics has been difficult to study analytically. As a result, much previous work has relied on simulations. Here, we derive and analyze their adaptive dynamics. We show that the four-dimensional space of memory-one strategies has an invariant three-dimensional subspace, generated by the memory-one counting strategies. Counting strategies record how many players cooperated in the previous round, without considering who cooperated. We give a partial characterization of adaptive dynamics for memory-one strategies and a full characterization for memory-one counting strategies.
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Affiliation(s)
- Philip LaPorte
- Department of Mathematics, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California, United States of America
| | - Christian Hilbe
- Max Planck Research Group 'Dynamics of Social Behavior', Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, Germany
| | - Martin A Nowak
- Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachussetts, United States of America
- Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachussetts, United States of America
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4
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Coggan H, Page KM. The role of evolutionary game theory in spatial and non-spatial models of the survival of cooperation in cancer: a review. JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY, INTERFACE 2022; 19:20220346. [PMID: 35975562 PMCID: PMC9382458 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2022.0346] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/15/2022]
Abstract
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is a branch of mathematics which considers populations of individuals interacting with each other to receive pay-offs. An individual’s pay-off is dependent on the strategy of its opponent(s) as well as on its own, and the higher its pay-off, the higher its reproductive fitness. Its offspring generally inherit its interaction strategy, subject to random mutation. Over time, the composition of the population shifts as different strategies spread or are driven extinct. In the last 25 years there has been a flood of interest in applying EGT to cancer modelling, with the aim of explaining how cancerous mutations spread through healthy tissue and how intercellular cooperation persists in tumour-cell populations. This review traces this body of work from theoretical analyses of well-mixed infinite populations through to more realistic spatial models of the development of cooperation between epithelial cells. We also consider work in which EGT has been used to make experimental predictions about the evolution of cancer, and discuss work that remains to be done before EGT can make large-scale contributions to clinical treatment and patient outcomes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Helena Coggan
- Department of Mathematics, University College London, London, UK
| | - Karen M Page
- Department of Mathematics, University College London, London, UK
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5
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Massing JC, Gross T. Generalized Structural Kinetic Modeling: A Survey and Guide. Front Mol Biosci 2022; 9:825052. [PMID: 35573734 PMCID: PMC9098827 DOI: 10.3389/fmolb.2022.825052] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/29/2021] [Accepted: 03/29/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Many current challenges involve understanding the complex dynamical interplay between the constituents of systems. Typically, the number of such constituents is high, but only limited data sources on them are available. Conventional dynamical models of complex systems are rarely mathematically tractable and their numerical exploration suffers both from computational and data limitations. Here we review generalized modeling, an alternative approach for formulating dynamical models to gain insights into dynamics and bifurcations of uncertain systems. We argue that this approach deals elegantly with the uncertainties that exist in real world data and enables analytical insight or highly efficient numerical investigation. We provide a survey of recent successes of generalized modeling and a guide to the application of this modeling approach in future studies such as complex integrative ecological models.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jana C. Massing
- Helmholtz Institute for Functional Marine Biodiversity at the University of Oldenburg (HIFMB), Oldenburg, Germany
- Helmholtz Centre for Marine and Polar Research, Alfred-Wegener-Institute, Bremerhaven, Germany
- Institute for Chemistry and Biology of the Marine Environment (ICBM), Carl-von-Ossietzky University, Oldenburg, Germany
- *Correspondence: Jana C. Massing,
| | - Thilo Gross
- Helmholtz Institute for Functional Marine Biodiversity at the University of Oldenburg (HIFMB), Oldenburg, Germany
- Helmholtz Centre for Marine and Polar Research, Alfred-Wegener-Institute, Bremerhaven, Germany
- Institute for Chemistry and Biology of the Marine Environment (ICBM), Carl-von-Ossietzky University, Oldenburg, Germany
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6
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Hauert C, Doebeli M. Spatial social dilemmas promote diversity. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2021; 118:e2105252118. [PMID: 34649992 PMCID: PMC8594579 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2105252118] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 07/19/2021] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Cooperative investments in social dilemmas can spontaneously diversify into stably coexisting high and low contributors in well-mixed populations. Here we extend the analysis to emerging diversity in (spatially) structured populations. Using pair approximation, we derive analytical expressions for the invasion fitness of rare mutants in structured populations, which then yields a spatial adaptive dynamics framework. This allows us to predict changes arising from population structures in terms of existence and location of singular strategies, as well as their convergence and evolutionary stability as compared to well-mixed populations. Based on spatial adaptive dynamics and extensive individual-based simulations, we find that spatial structure has significant and varied impacts on evolutionary diversification in continuous social dilemmas. More specifically, spatial adaptive dynamics suggests that spontaneous diversification through evolutionary branching is suppressed, but simulations show that spatial dimensions offer new modes of diversification that are driven by an interplay of finite-size mutations and population structures. Even though spatial adaptive dynamics is unable to capture these new modes, they can still be understood based on an invasion analysis. In particular, population structures alter invasion fitness and can open up new regions in trait space where mutants can invade, but that may not be accessible to small mutational steps. Instead, stochastically appearing larger mutations or sequences of smaller mutations in a particular direction are required to bridge regions of unfavorable traits. The net effect is that spatial structure tends to promote diversification, especially when selection is strong.
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Affiliation(s)
- Christoph Hauert
- Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2, Canada;
- Department of Zoology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada
| | - Michael Doebeli
- Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2, Canada
- Department of Zoology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada
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7
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Abstract
Cooperation in social dilemmas plays a pivotal role in the formation of systems at all levels of complexity, from replicating molecules to multi-cellular organisms to human and animal societies. In spite of its ubiquity, the origin and stability of cooperation pose an evolutionary conundrum, since cooperation, though beneficial to others, is costly to the individual cooperator. Thus natural selection would be expected to favor selfish behavior in which individuals reap the benefits of cooperation without bearing the costs of cooperating themselves. Many proximate mechanisms have been proposed to account for the origin and maintenance of cooperation, including kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, and evolution in structured populations. Despite the apparent diversity of these approaches they all share a unified underlying logic: namely, each mechanism results in assortative interactions in which individuals using the same strategy interact with a higher probability than they would at random. Here we study the evolution of cooperation in both discrete strategy and continuous strategy social dilemmas with assortative interactions. For the sake of tractability, assortativity is modeled by an individual interacting with another of the same type with probability r and interacting with a random individual in the population with probability 1−r, where r is a parameter that characterizes the degree of assortativity in the system. For discrete strategy social dilemmas we use both a generalization of replicator dynamics and individual-based simulations to elucidate the donation, snowdrift, and sculling games with assortative interactions, and determine the analogs of Hamilton’s rule, which govern the evolution of cooperation in these games. For continuous strategy social dilemmas we employ both a generalization of deterministic adaptive dynamics and individual-based simulations to study the donation, snowdrift, and tragedy of the commons games, and determine the effect of assortativity on the emergence and stability of cooperation.
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8
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de Jager M, van de Koppel J, Weerman EJ, Weissing FJ. Patterning in Mussel Beds Explained by the Interplay of Multi-Level Selection and Spatial Self-Organization. Front Ecol Evol 2020. [DOI: 10.3389/fevo.2020.00007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
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9
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Allen B, Sample C, Jencks R, Withers J, Steinhagen P, Brizuela L, Kolodny J, Parke D, Lippner G, Dementieva YA. Transient amplifiers of selection and reducers of fixation for death-Birth updating on graphs. PLoS Comput Biol 2020; 16:e1007529. [PMID: 31951612 PMCID: PMC6968840 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1007529] [Citation(s) in RCA: 23] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/01/2019] [Accepted: 10/30/2019] [Indexed: 11/30/2022] Open
Abstract
The spatial structure of an evolving population affects the balance of natural selection versus genetic drift. Some structures amplify selection, increasing the role that fitness differences play in determining which mutations become fixed. Other structures suppress selection, reducing the effect of fitness differences and increasing the role of random chance. This phenomenon can be modeled by representing spatial structure as a graph, with individuals occupying vertices. Births and deaths occur stochastically, according to a specified update rule. We study death-Birth updating: An individual is chosen to die and then its neighbors compete to reproduce into the vacant spot. Previous numerical experiments suggested that amplifiers of selection for this process are either rare or nonexistent. We introduce a perturbative method for this problem for weak selection regime, meaning that mutations have small fitness effects. We show that fixation probability under weak selection can be calculated in terms of the coalescence times of random walks. This result leads naturally to a new definition of effective population size. Using this and other methods, we uncover the first known examples of transient amplifiers of selection (graphs that amplify selection for a particular range of fitness values) for the death-Birth process. We also exhibit new families of “reducers of fixation”, which decrease the fixation probability of all mutations, whether beneficial or deleterious. Natural selection is often thought of as “survival of the fittest”, but random chance plays a significant role in which mutations persist and which are eliminated. The balance of selection versus randomness is affected by spatial structure—how individuals are arranged within their habitat. Some structures amplify the effects of selection, so that only the fittest mutations are likely to persist. Others suppress the effects of selection, making the survival of genes primarily a matter of random chance. We study this question using a mathematical model called the “death-Birth process”. Previous studies have found that spatial structure rarely, if ever, amplifies selection for this process. Here we report that spatial structure can indeed amplify selection, at least for mutations with small fitness effects. We also identify structures that reduce the spread of any new mutation, whether beneficial or deleterious. Our work introduces new mathematical techniques for assessing how population structure affects natural selection.
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Affiliation(s)
- Benjamin Allen
- Department of Mathematics, Emmanuel College, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
- * E-mail:
| | - Christine Sample
- Department of Mathematics, Emmanuel College, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
| | - Robert Jencks
- Department of Mathematics, Emmanuel College, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
| | - James Withers
- Department of Mathematics, Emmanuel College, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
| | - Patricia Steinhagen
- Department of Mathematics, Emmanuel College, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
| | - Lori Brizuela
- Department of Mathematics, Emmanuel College, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
| | - Joshua Kolodny
- Department of Mathematics, Emmanuel College, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
| | - Darren Parke
- Department of Mathematics, Emmanuel College, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
| | - Gabor Lippner
- Department of Mathematics, Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
| | - Yulia A. Dementieva
- Department of Mathematics, Emmanuel College, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
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10
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Hajihashemi M, Aghababaei Samani K. Fixation time in evolutionary graphs: A mean-field approach. Phys Rev E 2019; 99:042304. [PMID: 31108590 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.99.042304] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/13/2018] [Indexed: 06/09/2023]
Abstract
Using an analytical method we calculate average conditional fixation time of mutants in a general graph-structured population of two types of species. The method is based on Markov chains and uses a mean-field approximation to calculate the corresponding transition matrix. Analytical results are compared with the results of simulation of the Moran process on a number of network structures.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mahdi Hajihashemi
- Department of Physics, Isfahan University of Technology, Isfahan 84156-83111, Iran
| | - Keivan Aghababaei Samani
- Department of Physics, Isfahan University of Technology, Isfahan 84156-83111, Iran
- International Institute for Applied System Analysis (IIASA), Schlossolatz 1, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria
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11
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Park HJ, Gokhale CS. Ecological feedback on diffusion dynamics. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2019; 6:181273. [PMID: 30891264 PMCID: PMC6408370 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.181273] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/01/2018] [Accepted: 01/09/2019] [Indexed: 06/09/2023]
Abstract
Spatial patterns are ubiquitous across different scales of organization in ecological systems. Animal coat pattern, spatial organization of insect colonies and vegetation in arid areas are prominent examples from such diverse ecologies. Typically, pattern formation has been described by reaction-diffusion equations, which consider individuals dispersing between subpopulations of a global pool. This framework applied to public goods game nicely showed the endurance of populations via diffusion and generation of spatial patterns. However, how the spatial characteristics, such as diffusion, are related to the eco-evolutionary process as well as the nature of the feedback from evolution to ecology and vice versa, has been so far neglected. We present a thorough analysis of the ecologically driven evolutionary dynamics in a spatially extended version of ecological public goods games. Furthermore, we show how these evolutionary dynamics feed back into shaping the ecology, thus together determining the fate of the system.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hye Jin Park
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August Thienemann Street 2, 24306 Plön, Germany
| | - Chaitanya S. Gokhale
- Research Group for Theoretical Models of Eco-evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August Thienemann Street 2, 24306 Plön, Germany
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12
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Allen B, McAvoy A. A mathematical formalism for natural selection with arbitrary spatial and genetic structure. J Math Biol 2018; 78:1147-1210. [PMID: 30430219 DOI: 10.1007/s00285-018-1305-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/11/2018] [Revised: 10/29/2018] [Indexed: 12/22/2022]
Abstract
We define a general class of models representing natural selection between two alleles. The population size and spatial structure are arbitrary, but fixed. Genetics can be haploid, diploid, or otherwise; reproduction can be asexual or sexual. Biological events (e.g. births, deaths, mating, dispersal) depend in arbitrary fashion on the current population state. Our formalism is based on the idea of genetic sites. Each genetic site resides at a particular locus and houses a single allele. Each individual contains a number of sites equal to its ploidy (one for haploids, two for diploids, etc.). Selection occurs via replacement events, in which alleles in some sites are replaced by copies of others. Replacement events depend stochastically on the population state, leading to a Markov chain representation of natural selection. Within this formalism, we define reproductive value, fitness, neutral drift, and fixation probability, and prove relationships among them. We identify four criteria for evaluating which allele is selected and show that these become equivalent in the limit of low mutation. We then formalize the method of weak selection. The power of our formalism is illustrated with applications to evolutionary games on graphs and to selection in a haplodiploid population.
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Affiliation(s)
- Benjamin Allen
- Department of Mathematics, Emmanuel College, Boston, MA, 02115, USA. .,Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA.
| | - Alex McAvoy
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA
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13
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Giaimo S, Arranz J, Traulsen A. Invasion and effective size of graph-structured populations. PLoS Comput Biol 2018; 14:e1006559. [PMID: 30419017 PMCID: PMC6258371 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006559] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/07/2018] [Revised: 11/26/2018] [Accepted: 10/09/2018] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
Population structure can strongly affect evolutionary dynamics. The most general way to describe population structures are graphs. An important observable on evolutionary graphs is the probability that a novel mutation spreads through the entire population. But what drives this spread of a mutation towards fixation? Here, we propose a novel way to understand the forces driving fixation by borrowing techniques from evolutionary demography to quantify the invasion fitness and the effective population size for different graphs. Our method is very general and even applies to weighted graphs with node dependent fitness. However, we focus on analytical results for undirected graphs with node independent fitness. The method will allow to conceptually integrate evolutionary graph theory with theoretical genetics of structured populations. Evolving populations, companies, social circles are networks in which genes, resources and ideas circulate. Imagine a useful novelty is introduced in the network: a favorable mutation, a new product concept or a smart idea. Will this novelty be retained and propagated through the network or rather lost? Using tools originally devised for demographic research, we model the dynamics of the very initial spread of a useful novelty in a network. The network structure has a strong impact on these dynamics by affecting the effective network size through random effects. This effective network size, which correlates with the probability that a novelty spreads and is different from the actual size (i.e. number of nodes), varies with network structure. The effective size can even become independent of the actual network size and thus remain very small even for huge networks.
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Affiliation(s)
- Stefano Giaimo
- Evolutionary Theory Department, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, Germany
- * E-mail:
| | - Jordi Arranz
- Evolutionary Theory Department, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, Germany
| | - Arne Traulsen
- Evolutionary Theory Department, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, Germany
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14
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Spatial heterogeneity and evolution of fecundity-affecting traits. J Theor Biol 2018; 454:190-204. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.06.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/15/2018] [Revised: 06/01/2018] [Accepted: 06/04/2018] [Indexed: 11/23/2022]
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15
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Abstract
Cooperation in collective action dilemmas usually breaks down in the absence of additional incentive mechanisms. This tragedy can be escaped if cooperators have the possibility to invest in reward funds that are shared exclusively among cooperators (prosocial rewarding). Yet, the presence of defectors who do not contribute to the public good but do reward themselves (antisocial rewarding) deters cooperation in the absence of additional countermeasures. A recent simulation study suggests that spatial structure is sufficient to prevent antisocial rewarding from deterring cooperation. Here we reinvestigate this issue assuming mixed strategies and weak selection on a game-theoretic model of social interactions, which we also validate using individual-based simulations. We show that increasing reward funds facilitates the maintenance of prosocial rewarding but prevents its invasion, and that spatial structure can sometimes select against the evolution of prosocial rewarding. Our results suggest that, even in spatially structured populations, additional mechanisms are required to prevent antisocial rewarding from deterring cooperation in public goods dilemmas.
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Affiliation(s)
- Miguel Dos Santos
- Department of Zoology, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom.
| | - Jorge Peña
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, Germany
- GEOMAR Helmholtz Centre for Ocean Research Kiel, Kiel, Germany
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16
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Molina C, Earn DJD. On selection in finite populations. J Math Biol 2017; 76:645-678. [PMID: 28664222 DOI: 10.1007/s00285-017-1151-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/13/2016] [Revised: 05/25/2017] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
Abstract
Two major forces shaping evolution are drift and selection. The standard models of neutral drift-the Wright-Fisher (WF) and Moran processes-can be extended to include selection. However, these standard models are not always applicable in practice, and-even without selection-many other drift models make very different predictions. For example, "generalised Wright-Fisher" models (so-called because their first two conditional moments agree with those of the WF process) can yield wildly different absorption times from WF. Additionally, evolutionary stability in finite populations depends only on fixation probabilities, which can be evaluated under less restrictive assumptions than those required to estimate fixation times or more complex population-genetic quantities. We therefore distill the notion of a selection process into a broad class of finite-population, mutationless models of drift and selection (including the WF and Moran processes). We characterize when selection favours fixation of one strategy over another, for any selection process, which allows us to derive finite-population conditions for evolutionary stability independent of the selection process. In applications, the precise details of the selection process are seldom known, yet by exploiting these new theoretical results it is now possible to make rigorously justifiable inferences about fixation of traits.
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Affiliation(s)
- Chai Molina
- Department of Mathematics and Statistics, McMaster University, 1280 Main Street West, Hamilton, ON, L8S 4K1, Canada.
| | - David J D Earn
- Department of Mathematics and Statistics, McMaster University, 1280 Main Street West, Hamilton, ON, L8S 4K1, Canada
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17
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Débarre F. Fidelity of parent-offspring transmission and the evolution of social behavior in structured populations. J Theor Biol 2017; 420:26-35. [PMID: 28254478 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.02.027] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/21/2016] [Revised: 02/13/2017] [Accepted: 02/20/2017] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
The theoretical investigation of how spatial structure affects the evolution of social behavior has mostly been done under the assumption that parent-offspring strategy transmission is perfect, i.e., for genetically transmitted traits, that mutation is very weak or absent. Here, we investigate the evolution of social behavior in structured populations under arbitrary mutation probabilities. We consider populations of fixed size N, structured such that in the absence of selection, all individuals have the same probability of reproducing or dying (neutral reproductive values are the all same). Two types of individuals, A and B, corresponding to two types of social behavior, are competing; the fidelity of strategy transmission from parent to offspring is tuned by a parameter μ. Social interactions have a direct effect on individual fecundities. Under the assumption of small phenotypic differences (implying weak selection), we provide a formula for the expected frequency of type A individuals in the population, and deduce conditions for the long-term success of one strategy against another. We then illustrate our results with three common life-cycles (Wright-Fisher, Moran Birth-Death and Moran Death-Birth), and specific population structures (graph-structured populations). Qualitatively, we find that some life-cycles (Moran Birth-Death, Wright-Fisher) prevent the evolution of altruistic behavior, confirming previous results obtained with perfect strategy transmission. We also show that computing the expected frequency of altruists on a regular graph may require knowing more than just the graph's size and degree.
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Affiliation(s)
- F Débarre
- Centre Interdisciplinaire de Recherche en Biologie (CIRB), Collège de France, CNRS UMR 7241 - Inserm U1050, 11, Place Marcelin Berthelot, 75231 Paris Cedex 05, France.
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18
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Kurokawa S, Ihara Y. Evolution of group-wise cooperation: Is direct reciprocity insufficient? J Theor Biol 2017; 415:20-31. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.12.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/24/2016] [Revised: 09/26/2016] [Accepted: 12/05/2016] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
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19
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20
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Assortment and the evolution of cooperation in a Moran process with exponential fitness. J Theor Biol 2016; 409:38-46. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.08.026] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/13/2016] [Revised: 07/01/2016] [Accepted: 08/16/2016] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
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21
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De Leenheer P, Mohapatra A, Ohms HA, Lytle DA, Cushing JM. The puzzle of partial migration: Adaptive dynamics and evolutionary game theory perspectives. J Theor Biol 2016; 412:172-185. [PMID: 27810395 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.10.011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/15/2016] [Revised: 10/17/2016] [Accepted: 10/25/2016] [Indexed: 01/18/2023]
Abstract
We consider the phenomenon of partial migration which is exhibited by populations in which some individuals migrate between habitats during their lifetime, but others do not. First, using an adaptive dynamics approach, we show that partial migration can be explained on the basis of negative density dependence in the per capita fertilities alone, provided that this density dependence is attenuated for increasing abundances of the subtypes that make up the population. We present an exact formula for the optimal proportion of migrants which is expressed in terms of the vital rates of migrant and non-migrant subtypes only. We show that this allocation strategy is both an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) as well as a convergence stable strategy (CSS). To establish the former, we generalize the classical notion of an ESS because it is based on invasion exponents obtained from linearization arguments, which fail to capture the stabilizing effects of the nonlinear density dependence. These results clarify precisely when the notion of a "weak ESS", as proposed in Lundberg (2013) for a related model, is a genuine ESS. Secondly, we use an evolutionary game theory approach, and confirm, once again, that partial migration can be attributed to negative density dependence alone. In this context, the result holds even when density dependence is not attenuated. In this case, the optimal allocation strategy towards migrants is the same as the ESS stemming from the analysis based on the adaptive dynamics. The key feature of the population models considered here is that they are monotone dynamical systems, which enables a rather comprehensive mathematical analysis.
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Affiliation(s)
- Patrick De Leenheer
- Department of Mathematics, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR 97330, USA; Department of Integrative Biology, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR 97330, USA
| | - Anushaya Mohapatra
- Department of Mathematics, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR 97330, USA
| | - Haley A Ohms
- Department of Integrative Biology, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR 97330, USA
| | - David A Lytle
- Department of Integrative Biology, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR 97330, USA
| | - J M Cushing
- Department of Mathematics, University of Arizona, Tuscon, AZ 85721, USA
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22
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Zhang Y, Liu A, Sun C. Impact of migration on the multi-strategy selection in finite group-structured populations. Sci Rep 2016; 6:35114. [PMID: 27767074 PMCID: PMC5073348 DOI: 10.1038/srep35114] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/08/2016] [Accepted: 09/23/2016] [Indexed: 12/14/2022] Open
Abstract
For large quantities of spatial models, the multi-strategy selection under weak selection is the sum of two competition terms: the pairwise competition and the competition of multiple strategies with equal frequency. Two parameters σ1 and σ2 quantify the dependence of the multi-strategy selection on these two terms, respectively. Unlike previous studies, we here do not require large populations for calculating σ1 and σ2, and perform the first quantitative analysis of the effect of migration on them in group-structured populations of any finite sizes. The Moran and the Wright-Fisher process have the following common findings. Compared with well-mixed populations, migration causes σ1 to change with the mutation probability from a decreasing curve to an inverted U-shaped curve and maintains the increase of σ2. Migration (probability and range) leads to a significant change of σ1 but a negligible one of σ2. The way that migration changes σ1 is qualitatively similar to its influence on the single parameter characterizing the two-strategy selection. The Moran process is more effective in increasing σ1 for most migration probabilities and the Wright-Fisher process is always more effective in increasing σ2. Finally, our findings are used to study the evolution of cooperation under direct reciprocity.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yanling Zhang
- School of Automation and Electrical Engineering, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing 100083, China
| | - Aizhi Liu
- School of Automation and Electrical Engineering, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing 100083, China
| | - Changyin Sun
- School of Automation, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China
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23
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Abstract
Spatial structure greatly affects the evolution of cooperation. While in two-player games the condition for cooperation to evolve depends on a single structure coefficient, in multiplayer games the condition might depend on several structure coefficients, making it difficult to compare different population structures. We propose a solution to this issue by introducing two simple ways of ordering population structures: the containment order and the volume order. If population structure is greater than population structure in the containment or the volume order, then can be considered a stronger promoter of cooperation. We provide conditions for establishing the containment order, give general results on the volume order, and illustrate our theory by comparing different models of spatial games and associated update rules. Our results hold for a large class of population structures and can be easily applied to specific cases once the structure coefficients have been calculated or estimated.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jorge Peña
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Straße 2, Plön 24306, Germany
| | - Bin Wu
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Straße 2, Plön 24306, Germany
| | - Arne Traulsen
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Straße 2, Plön 24306, Germany
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24
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van Veelen M, Allen B, Hoffman M, Simon B, Veller C. Hamilton's rule. J Theor Biol 2016; 414:176-230. [PMID: 27569292 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.08.019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 23] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/09/2015] [Revised: 07/20/2016] [Accepted: 08/13/2016] [Indexed: 10/21/2022]
Abstract
This paper reviews and addresses a variety of issues relating to inclusive fitness. The main question is: are there limits to the generality of inclusive fitness, and if so, what are the perimeters of the domain within which inclusive fitness works? This question is addressed using two well-known tools from evolutionary theory: the replicator dynamics, and adaptive dynamics. Both are combined with population structure. How generally Hamilton's rule applies depends on how costs and benefits are defined. We therefore consider costs and benefits following from Karlin and Matessi's (1983) "counterfactual method", and costs and benefits as defined by the "regression method" (Gardner et al., 2011). With the latter definition of costs and benefits, Hamilton's rule always indicates the direction of selection correctly, and with the former it does not. How these two definitions can meaningfully be interpreted is also discussed. We also consider cases where the qualitative claim that relatedness fosters cooperation holds, even if Hamilton's rule as a quantitative prediction does not. We furthermore find out what the relation is between Hamilton's rule and Fisher's Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection. We also consider cancellation effects - which is the most important deepening of our understanding of when altruism is selected for. Finally we also explore the remarkable (im)possibilities for empirical testing with either definition of costs and benefits in Hamilton's rule.
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Affiliation(s)
- Matthijs van Veelen
- Department of Economics and Business, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands; Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
| | - Benjamin Allen
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA; Department of Mathematics, Emmanuel College, MA 02115, USA; Center for Mathematical Sciences and Applications, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
| | - Moshe Hoffman
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA; Rady School of Management, UC San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093, USA; Department of Computer Science and Engineering, UC San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093, USA
| | - Burton Simon
- Department of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences, University of Colorado Denver, Denver, CO 80202, USA
| | - Carl Veller
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA; Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
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25
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Simon B, Pilosov M. Group-level events are catalysts in the evolution of cooperation. J Theor Biol 2016; 410:125-136. [PMID: 27544418 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.08.021] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/10/2015] [Revised: 08/08/2016] [Accepted: 08/15/2016] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
Group-level events, like fission and extinction, catalyze the evolution of cooperation in group-structured populations by creating new paths from uncooperative population states to more cooperative states. Group-level events allow cooperation to thrive under unfavorable conditions such as low intra-group assortment and moderate rates of migration, and can greatly speed up the evolution of cooperation when conditions are more favorable. The time-dependent effects of fission and extinction events are studied and illustrated here using a PDE model of a group-structured population based loosely on populations of hunter-gatherer tribes. By solving the PDE numerically we can compare models with and without group-level events, and explicitly calculate quantities associated with dynamics, like how long it takes a small population of cooperators to become a majority, as well as equilibrium population densities.
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Affiliation(s)
- Burton Simon
- Department of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences, University of Colorado Denver, United States.
| | - Michael Pilosov
- Department of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences, University of Colorado Denver, United States.
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26
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Evolutionary Games of Multiplayer Cooperation on Graphs. PLoS Comput Biol 2016; 12:e1005059. [PMID: 27513946 PMCID: PMC4981334 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005059] [Citation(s) in RCA: 35] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/21/2016] [Accepted: 07/12/2016] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
There has been much interest in studying evolutionary games in structured populations, often modeled as graphs. However, most analytical results so far have only been obtained for two-player or linear games, while the study of more complex multiplayer games has been usually tackled by computer simulations. Here we investigate evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs updated with a Moran death-Birth process. For cycles, we obtain an exact analytical condition for cooperation to be favored by natural selection, given in terms of the payoffs of the game and a set of structure coefficients. For regular graphs of degree three and larger, we estimate this condition using a combination of pair approximation and diffusion approximation. For a large class of cooperation games, our approximations suggest that graph-structured populations are stronger promoters of cooperation than populations lacking spatial structure. Computer simulations validate our analytical approximations for random regular graphs and cycles, but show systematic differences for graphs with many loops such as lattices. In particular, our simulation results show that these kinds of graphs can even lead to more stringent conditions for the evolution of cooperation than well-mixed populations. Overall, we provide evidence suggesting that the complexity arising from many-player interactions and spatial structure can be captured by pair approximation in the case of random graphs, but that it need to be handled with care for graphs with high clustering. Cooperation can be defined as the act of providing fitness benefits to other individuals, often at a personal cost. When interactions occur mainly with neighbors, assortment of strategies can favor cooperation but local competition can undermine it. Previous research has shown that a single coefficient can capture this trade-off when cooperative interactions take place between two players. More complicated, but also more realistic, models of cooperative interactions involving multiple players instead require several such coefficients, making it difficult to assess the effects of population structure. Here, we obtain analytical approximations for the coefficients of multiplayer games in graph-structured populations. Computer simulations show that, for particular instances of multiplayer games, these approximate coefficients predict the condition for cooperation to be promoted in random graphs well, but fail to do so in graphs with more structure, such as lattices. Our work extends and generalizes established results on the evolution of cooperation on graphs, but also highlights the importance of explicitly taking into account higher-order statistical associations in order to assess the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in spatially structured populations.
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27
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Iyer S, Killingback T. Evolutionary dynamics of a smoothed war of attrition game. J Theor Biol 2016; 396:25-41. [PMID: 26903203 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.02.014] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/17/2014] [Revised: 02/06/2016] [Accepted: 02/10/2016] [Indexed: 10/22/2022]
Abstract
In evolutionary game theory the War of Attrition game is intended to model animal contests which are decided by non-aggressive behavior, such as the length of time that a participant will persist in the contest. The classical War of Attrition game assumes that no errors are made in the implementation of an animal׳s strategy. However, it is inevitable in reality that such errors must sometimes occur. Here we introduce an extension of the classical War of Attrition game which includes the effect of errors in the implementation of an individual׳s strategy. This extension of the classical game has the important feature that the payoff is continuous, and as a consequence admits evolutionary behavior that is fundamentally different from that possible in the original game. We study the evolutionary dynamics of this new game in well-mixed populations both analytically using adaptive dynamics and through individual-based simulations, and show that there are a variety of possible outcomes, including simple monomorphic or dimorphic configurations which are evolutionarily stable and cannot occur in the classical War of Attrition game. In addition, we study the evolutionary dynamics of this extended game in a variety of spatially and socially structured populations, as represented by different complex network topologies, and show that similar outcomes can also occur in these situations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Swami Iyer
- Computer Science Department, University of Massachusetts, Boston, MA 02125, USA.
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28
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Débarre F, Otto SP. Evolutionary dynamics of a quantitative trait in a finite asexual population. Theor Popul Biol 2016; 108:75-88. [PMID: 26772818 DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2015.12.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 25] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/12/2015] [Revised: 12/03/2015] [Accepted: 12/15/2015] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
In finite populations, mutation limitation and genetic drift can hinder evolutionary diversification. We consider the evolution of a quantitative trait in an asexual population whose size can vary and depends explicitly on the trait. Previous work showed that evolutionary branching is certain ("deterministic branching") above a threshold population size, but uncertain ("stochastic branching") below it. Using the stationary distribution of the population's trait variance, we identify three qualitatively different sub-domains of "stochastic branching" and illustrate our results using a model of social evolution. We find that in very small populations, branching will almost never be observed; in intermediate populations, branching is intermittent, arising and disappearing over time; in larger populations, finally, branching is expected to occur and persist for substantial periods of time. Our study provides a clearer picture of the ecological conditions that facilitate the appearance and persistence of novel evolutionary lineages in the face of genetic drift.
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Affiliation(s)
- Florence Débarre
- Department of Zoology and Biodiversity Research Centre, University of British Columbia, 6270 University Boulevard, Vancouver, B.C., V6T 1Z4, Canada; Centre Interdisciplinaire de Recherche en Biologie (CIRB), Collège de France, CNRS UMR 7241 - Inserm U1050, 11 place Marcelin Berthelot, 75231 Paris Cedex 05, France.
| | - Sarah P Otto
- Department of Zoology and Biodiversity Research Centre, University of British Columbia, 6270 University Boulevard, Vancouver, B.C., V6T 1Z4, Canada.
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29
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Tekwa EW, Gonzalez A, Loreau M. Local densities connect spatial ecology to game, multilevel selection and inclusive fitness theories of cooperation. J Theor Biol 2015; 380:414-25. [PMID: 26100180 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.06.016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/16/2014] [Revised: 05/23/2015] [Accepted: 06/09/2015] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
Abstract
Cooperation plays a crucial role in many aspects of biology. We use the spatial ecological metrics of local densities to measure and model cooperative interactions. While local densities can be found as technical details in current theories, we aim to establish them as central to an approach that describes spatial effects in the evolution of cooperation. A resulting local interaction model neatly partitions various spatial and non-spatial selection mechanisms. Furthermore, local densities are shown to be fundamental for important metrics of game theory, multilevel selection theory and inclusive fitness theory. The corresponding metrics include structure coefficients, spatial variance, contextual covariance, relatedness, and inbreeding coefficient or F-statistics. Local densities serve as the basis of an emergent spatial theory that draws from and brings unity to multiple theories of cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Edward W Tekwa
- Department of Biology, McGill University, 1205 Avenue Docteur Penfield, Montreal, Que., Canada H3A 1B1.
| | - Andrew Gonzalez
- Department of Biology, McGill University, 1205 Avenue Docteur Penfield, Montreal, Que., Canada H3A 1B1.
| | - Michel Loreau
- Centre for Biodiversity Theory and Modelling, Station d'Ecologie Expérimentale du CNRS, 09200 Moulis, France.
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30
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Social evolution and genetic interactions in the short and long term. Theor Popul Biol 2015; 103:2-26. [PMID: 26003630 DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2015.05.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 46] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/14/2014] [Revised: 03/31/2015] [Accepted: 05/04/2015] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
The evolution of social traits remains one of the most fascinating and feisty topics in evolutionary biology even after half a century of theoretical research. W.D. Hamilton shaped much of the field initially with his 1964 papers that laid out the foundation for understanding the effect of genetic relatedness on the evolution of social behavior. Early theoretical investigations revealed two critical assumptions required for Hamilton's rule to hold in dynamical models: weak selection and additive genetic interactions. However, only recently have analytical approaches from population genetics and evolutionary game theory developed sufficiently so that social evolution can be studied under the joint action of selection, mutation, and genetic drift. We review how these approaches suggest two timescales for evolution under weak mutation: (i) a short-term timescale where evolution occurs between a finite set of alleles, and (ii) a long-term timescale where a continuum of alleles are possible and populations evolve continuously from one monomorphic trait to another. We show how Hamilton's rule emerges from the short-term analysis under additivity and how non-additive genetic interactions can be accounted for more generally. This short-term approach reproduces, synthesizes, and generalizes many previous results including the one-third law from evolutionary game theory and risk dominance from economic game theory. Using the long-term approach, we illustrate how trait evolution can be described with a diffusion equation that is a stochastic analogue of the canonical equation of adaptive dynamics. Peaks in the stationary distribution of the diffusion capture classic notions of convergence stability from evolutionary game theory and generally depend on the additive genetic interactions inherent in Hamilton's rule. Surprisingly, the peaks of the long-term stationary distribution can predict the effects of simple kinds of non-additive interactions. Additionally, the peaks capture both weak and strong effects of social payoffs in a manner difficult to replicate with the short-term approach. Together, the results from the short and long-term approaches suggest both how Hamilton's insight may be robust in unexpected ways and how current analytical approaches can expand our understanding of social evolution far beyond Hamilton's original work.
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31
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Allen B, Nowak MA. Games among relatives revisited. J Theor Biol 2015; 378:103-16. [PMID: 25953388 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.04.031] [Citation(s) in RCA: 34] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/03/2014] [Revised: 03/09/2015] [Accepted: 04/22/2015] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
We present a simple model for the evolution of social behavior in family-structured, finite sized populations. Interactions are represented as evolutionary games describing frequency-dependent selection. Individuals interact more frequently with siblings than with members of the general population, as quantified by an assortment parameter r, which can be interpreted as "relatedness". Other models, mostly of spatially structured populations, have shown that assortment can promote the evolution of cooperation by facilitating interaction between cooperators, but this effect depends on the details of the evolutionary process. For our model, we find that sibling assortment promotes cooperation in stringent social dilemmas such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, but not necessarily in other situations. These results are obtained through straightforward calculations of changes in gene frequency. We also analyze our model using inclusive fitness. We find that the quantity of inclusive fitness does not exist for general games. For special games, where inclusive fitness exists, it provides less information than the straightforward analysis.
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Affiliation(s)
- Benjamin Allen
- Department of Mathematics, Emmanuel College, Boston, MA 02115, United States; Center for Mathematical Sciences and Applications, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, United States; Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, United States.
| | - Martin A Nowak
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, United States; Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, United States; Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, United States
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32
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Older partner selection promotes the prevalence of cooperation in evolutionary games. J Theor Biol 2014; 359:171-83. [PMID: 24956329 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.06.013] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/28/2014] [Revised: 06/05/2014] [Accepted: 06/10/2014] [Indexed: 11/21/2022]
Abstract
Evolutionary games typically come with the interplays between evolution of individual strategy and adaptation to network structure. How these dynamics in the co-evolution promote (or obstruct) the cooperation is regarded as an important topic in social, economic, and biological fields. Combining spatial selection with partner choice, the focus of this paper is to identify which neighbour should be selected as a role to imitate during the process of co-evolution. Age, an internal attribute and kind of local piece of information regarding the survivability of the agent, is a significant consideration for the selection strategy. The analysis and simulations presented, demonstrate that older partner selection for strategy imitation could foster the evolution of cooperation. The younger partner selection, however, may decrease the level of cooperation. Our model highlights the importance of agent׳s age on the promotion of cooperation in evolutionary games, both efficiently and effectively.
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33
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Zhang Y, Fu F, Wu T, Xie G, Wang L. A tale of two contribution mechanisms for nonlinear public goods. Sci Rep 2014; 3:2021. [PMID: 23779102 PMCID: PMC3685828 DOI: 10.1038/srep02021] [Citation(s) in RCA: 35] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/05/2013] [Accepted: 05/31/2013] [Indexed: 11/09/2022] Open
Abstract
Amounts of empirical evidence, ranging from microbial cooperation to collective hunting, suggests public goods produced often nonlinearly depend on the total amount of contribution. The implication of such nonlinear public goods for the evolution of cooperation is not well understood. There is also little attention paid to the divisibility nature of individual contribution amount, divisible vs. non-divisible ones. The corresponding strategy space in the former is described by a continuous investment while in the latter by a continuous probability to contribute all or nothing. Here, we use adaptive dynamics in finite populations to quantify and compare the roles nonlinearity of public-goods production plays in cooperation between these two contribution mechanisms. Although under both contribution mechanisms the population can converge into a coexistence equilibrium with an intermediate cooperation level, the branching phenomenon only occurs in the divisible contribution mechanism. The results shed insight into understanding observed individual difference in cooperative behavior.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yanling Zhang
- Center for Systems and Control, State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China.
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34
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Abstract
Until recently, inclusive fitness has been widely accepted as a general method to explain the evolution of social behavior. Affirming and expanding earlier criticism, we demonstrate that inclusive fitness is instead a limited concept, which exists only for a small subset of evolutionary processes. Inclusive fitness assumes that personal fitness is the sum of additive components caused by individual actions. This assumption does not hold for the majority of evolutionary processes or scenarios. To sidestep this limitation, inclusive fitness theorists have proposed a method using linear regression. On the basis of this method, it is claimed that inclusive fitness theory (i) predicts the direction of allele frequency changes, (ii) reveals the reasons for these changes, (iii) is as general as natural selection, and (iv) provides a universal design principle for evolution. In this paper we evaluate these claims, and show that all of them are unfounded. If the objective is to analyze whether mutations that modify social behavior are favored or opposed by natural selection, then no aspect of inclusive fitness theory is needed.
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35
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Van Cleve J, Lehmann L. Stochastic stability and the evolution of coordination in spatially structured populations. Theor Popul Biol 2013; 89:75-87. [DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2013.08.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/14/2013] [Revised: 08/08/2013] [Accepted: 08/16/2013] [Indexed: 10/26/2022]
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36
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Allen B, Nowak MA. Evolutionary shift dynamics on a cycle. J Theor Biol 2012; 311:28-39. [PMID: 22814475 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.07.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/22/2011] [Revised: 06/26/2012] [Accepted: 07/06/2012] [Indexed: 01/06/2023]
Abstract
We present a new model of evolutionary dynamics in one-dimensional space. Individuals are arranged on a cycle. When a new offspring is born, another individual dies and the rest shift around the cycle to make room. This rule, which is inspired by spatial evolution in somatic tissue and microbial colonies, has the remarkable property that, in the limit of large population size, evolution acts to maximize the payoff of the whole population. Therefore, social dilemmas, in which some individuals benefit at the expense of others, are resolved. We demonstrate this principle for both discrete and continuous games. We also discuss extensions of our model to other one-dimensional spatial configurations. We conclude that shift dynamics in one dimension is an unusually strong promoter of cooperative behavior.
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Affiliation(s)
- Benjamin Allen
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
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