A study of intrafamilial transmission of smallpox

Repositioning potentials of smallpox vaccines and antiviral agents in monkeypox outbreak: A rapid review on comparative benefits and risks

Background and aims

There is a sought for vaccines and antiviral agents as countermeasures for the recent monkeypox outbreak. Here, we aimed to review and discuss the repurposing potentials of smallpox vaccines and drugs in monkeypox outbreaks based on their comparative benefits and risks. Therefore, we conducted this rapid review and discussed the repurposing potentials of smallpox vaccines and drugs in monkeypox infection.

Methods

Here, we searched Google Scholar and PubMed for relevant information and data. We found many articles that have suggested the use of smallpox vaccines and antiviral drugs in monkeypox outbreaks according to the study findings. We read the relevant articles to extract information.

Results

According to the available documents, we found two replication‐competent and one replication‐deficient vaccinia vaccines were effective against Orthopoxvirus. However, the healthcare authorities have authorized second‐generation live vaccina virus vaccines against Orthopoxvirus in many countries. Smallpox vaccine is almost 85% effective in preventing monkeypox infection as monkeypox virus, variola virus, and vaccinia virus are similar. The United States and Canada have approved a replication‐deficient third‐generation smallpox vaccine for the prevention of monkeypox infection. However, the widely used second‐generation smallpox vaccines contain a live virus and replicate it into the human cell. Therefore, there is a chance to cause virus‐induced complications among the vaccinated subjects. In those circumstances, the available Orthopoxvirus inhibitors might be a good choice for treating monkeypox infections as they showed similar efficacy in monkeypox infection in different animal model clinical trials. Also, the combined use of antiviral drugs and vaccinia immune globulin can enhance significant effectiveness in immunocompromised subjects.

Conclusion

Repurposing of these smallpox vaccines and antiviral agents might be weapons to fight monkeypox infection. Also, we recommend further investigations of smallpox vaccines and Orthopoxvirus inhibitors in a human model study to explore their exact role in human monkeypox infections.

Effect of Monkeypox Virus Preparation on the Lethality of the Intravenous Cynomolgus Macaque Model

For over two decades, researchers have sought to improve smallpox vaccines and also develop therapies to ensure protection against smallpox or smallpox-like disease. The 2022 human monkeypox pandemic is a reminder that these efforts should persist. Advancing such therapies have involved animal models primarily using surrogate viruses such as monkeypox virus. The intravenous monkeypox model in macaques produces a disease that is clinically similar to the lesional phase of fulminant human monkeypox or smallpox. Two criticisms of the model have been the unnatural route of virus administration and the high dose required to induce severe disease. Here, we purified monkeypox virus with the goal of lowering the challenge dose by removing cellular and viral contaminants within the inoculum. We found that there are advantages to using unpurified material for intravenous exposures.

Evidence for Residual Immunity to Smallpox After Vaccination and Implications for Re-emergence

INTRODUCTION

Smallpox has been eradicated but advances in synthetic biology have increased the risk of its re-emergence. Residual immunity in individuals who were previously vaccinated may mitigate the impact of an outbreak, but there is a high degree of uncertainty about the duration and degree of residual immunity. Both cell-mediated and humoral immunity are thought to be important but the exact mechanisms of protection are unclear. Guidelines usually suggest vaccine-induced immunity wanes to zero after 3-10 years post vaccination, whereas other estimates show long term immunity over decades.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

A systematic review of the literature was conducted to quantify the duration and extent of residual immunity to smallpox after vaccination.

RESULTS

Twenty-nine papers related to quantifying residual immunity to smallpox after vaccination were identified: neutralizing antibody levels were used as immune correlates of protection in 11/16 retrospective cross-sectional studies, 2/3 epidemiological studies, 6/7 prospective vaccine trials and 0/3 modeling studies. Duration of protection of >20 years was consistently shown in the 16 retrospective cross-sectional studies, while the lowest estimated duration of protection was 11.7 years among the modeling studies. Childhood vaccination conferred longer duration of protection than vaccination in adulthood, and multiple vaccinations did not appear to improve immunity.

CONCLUSIONS

Most studies suggest a longer duration of residual immunity (at least 20 years) than assumed in smallpox guidelines. Estimates from modeling studies were less but still greater than the 3-10 years suggested by the WHO Committee on International Quarantine or US CDC guidelines. These recommendations were probably based on observations and studies conducted while smallpox was endemic. The cut-off values for pre-existing antibody levels of >1:20 and >1:32 reported during the period of endemic smallpox circulation may not be relevant to the contemporary population, but have been used as a threshold for identifying people with residual immunity in post-eradication era studies. Of the total antibodies produced in response to smallpox vaccination, neutralizing antibodies have shown to contribute significantly to immunological memory. Although the mechanism of immunological memory and boosting is unclear, revaccination is likely to result in a more robust response. There is a need to improve the evidence base for estimates on residual immunity to better inform planning and preparedness for re-emergent smallpox.

Magnitude and diversity of immune response to vaccinia virus is dependent on route of administration

Historic observations suggest that survivors of smallpox maintained lifelong immunity and protection to subsequent infection compared to vaccinated individuals. Although protective immunity by vaccination using a related virus (vaccinia virus (VACV) strains) was the key for smallpox eradication, it does not uniformly provide long term, or lifelong protective immunity (Heiner et al., 1971). To determine differences in humoral immune responses, mice were inoculated with VACV either systemically, using intranasal inoculation (IN), or locally by an intradermal (ID) route. We hypothesized that sub-lethal IN infections may mimic systemic or naturally occurring infection and lead to an immunodominance reaction, in contrast to localized ID immunization. The results demonstrated systemic immunization through an IN route led to enhanced adaptive immunity to VACV-expressed protein targets both in magnitude and in diversity when compared to an ID route using a VACV protein microarray. In addition, cytokine responses, assessed using a Luminex® mouse cytokine multiplex kit, following IN infection was greater than that stemming from ID infection. Overall, the results suggest that the route of immunization (or infection) influences antibody responses. The greater magnitude and diversity of response in systemic infection provides indirect evidence for anecdotal observations made during the smallpox era that survivors maintain lifelong protection. These findings also suggest that systemic or disseminated host immune induction may result in a superior response, that may influence the magnitude of, as well as duration of protective responses.

Post-exposure prophylactic vaccine candidates for the treatment of human Risk Group 4 pathogen infections

Introduction: The development of therapeutics and vaccines to combat Risk Group 4 pathogens, which are associated with high case-fatality rates, is a high priority. Postexposure prophylactic vaccines have the potential to bridge classical therapeutic and vaccine applications, but little progress has been reported to date.Areas covered: This review provides an overview of postexposure prophylactic vaccine candidates against Risk Group 4 pathogens.Expert opinion: A few candidate postexposure prophylactic vaccines protect experimental animals infected with a few Risk Group 4 pathogens, such as filoviruses or hantaviruses, but the efficacy of candidate vaccines has not been similarly reported for most other high-consequence pathogens. A major drawback for the further development of existing candidates is the lack of understanding of their mechanisms of action, knowledge of which could help to identify focused paths forward in vaccine development and licensure. These drawbacks to further development ultimately slow progress toward postexposure prophylactic vaccine licensure.

Postexposure Effects of Vaccines on Infectious Diseases

We searched the PubMed database for clinical trials and observational human studies about postexposure vaccination effects, targeting infections with approved vaccines and vaccines licensed outside the United States against dengue, hepatitis E, malaria, and tick-borne encephalitis. Studies of animal models, serologic testing, and pipeline vaccines were excluded. Eligible studies were evaluated by definition of exposure; attempts to distinguish pre- and postexposure effects were rated on a scale of 1 to 4. We screened 4,518 articles and ultimately identified for this review 14 clinical trials and 31 observational studies spanning 7 of the 28 vaccine-preventable diseases. For secondary attack rate, the following medians were found for postexposure vaccination effectiveness: hepatitis A, 85% (interquartile range (IQR), 28; n = 5 sources); hepatitis B, 85% (IQR, 22; n = 5 sources); measles, 83% (IQR, 21; n = 8 sources); varicella, 67% (IQR: 48; n = 9 sources); smallpox, 45% (IQR, 39; n = 4 sources); and mumps, 38% (IQR, 7; n = 2 sources). For case fatality proportions resulting from rabies and smallpox, the median vaccine postexposure efficacies were 100% (IQR, 0; n = 6 sources) and 63% (IQR, 50; n = 8 sources), respectively. Many available vaccines can modify or preclude disease if administered after exposure. This postexposure effectiveness could be important to consider during vaccine trials and while developing new vaccines.

Modeling the Effect of Herd Immunity and Contagiousness in Mitigating a Smallpox Outbreak

The smallpox antiviral tecovirimat has recently been purchased by the U.S. Strategic National Stockpile. Given significant uncertainty regarding both the contagiousness of smallpox in a contemporary outbreak and the efficiency of a mass vaccination campaign, vaccine prophylaxis alone may be unable to control a smallpox outbreak following a bioterror attack. Here, we present the results of a compartmental epidemiological model that identifies conditions under which tecovirimat is required to curtail the epidemic by exploring how the interaction between contagiousness and prophylaxis coverage of the affected population affects the ability of the public health response to control a large-scale smallpox outbreak. Each parameter value in the model is based on published empirical data. We describe contagiousness parametrically using a novel method of distributing an assumed R-value over the disease course based on the relative rates of daily viral shedding from human and animal studies of cognate orthopoxvirus infections. Our results suggest that vaccination prophylaxis is sufficient to control the outbreak when caused either by a minimally contagious virus or when a very high percentage of the population receives prophylaxis. As vaccination coverage of the affected population decreases below 70%, vaccine prophylaxis alone is progressively less capable of controlling outbreaks, even those caused by a less contagious virus (R0 less than 4). In these scenarios, tecovirimat treatment is required to control the outbreak (total number of cases under an order of magnitude more than the number of initial infections). The first study to determine the relative importance of smallpox prophylaxis and treatment under a range of highly uncertain epidemiological parameters, this work provides public health decision-makers with an evidence-based guide for responding to a large-scale smallpox outbreak.

The effects of post-exposure smallpox vaccination on clinical disease presentation: addressing the data gaps between historical epidemiology and modern surrogate model data

Decades after public health interventions - including pre- and post-exposure vaccination - were used to eradicate smallpox, zoonotic orthopoxvirus outbreaks and the potential threat of a release of variola virus remain public health concerns. Routine prophylactic smallpox vaccination of the public ceased worldwide in 1980, and the adverse event rate associated with the currently licensed live vaccinia virus vaccine makes reinstatement of policies recommending routine pre-exposure vaccination unlikely in the absence of an orthopoxvirus outbreak. Consequently, licensing of safer vaccines and therapeutics that can be used post-orthopoxvirus exposure is necessary to protect the global population from these threats. Variola virus is a solely human pathogen that does not naturally infect any other known animal species. Therefore, the use of surrogate viruses in animal models of orthopoxvirus infection is important for the development of novel vaccines and therapeutics. Major complications involved with the use of surrogate models include both the absence of a model that accurately mimics all aspects of human smallpox disease and a lack of reproducibility across model species. These complications limit our ability to model post-exposure vaccination with newer vaccines for application to human orthopoxvirus outbreaks. This review seeks to (1) summarize conclusions about the efficacy of post-exposure smallpox vaccination from historic epidemiological reports and modern animal studies; (2) identify data gaps in these studies; and (3) summarize the clinical features of orthopoxvirus-associated infections in various animal models to identify those models that are most useful for post-exposure vaccination studies. The ultimate purpose of this review is to provide observations and comments regarding available model systems and data gaps for use in improving post-exposure medical countermeasures against orthopoxviruses.

Countermeasures and vaccination against terrorism using smallpox: pre-event and post-event smallpox vaccination and its contraindications

Smallpox, when used as a biological weapon, presents a serious threat to civilian populations. Core components of the public health management of a terrorism attack using smallpox are: vaccination (ring vaccination and mass vaccination), adverse event monitoring, confirmed and suspected smallpox case management, contact management, identifying, tracing, monitoring contacts, and quarantine. Above all, pre-event and post-event vaccination is an indispensable part of the strategies. Since smallpox patients are most infectious from onset of the rash through the first 7-10 days of the rash, vaccination should be administered promptly within a limited time frame. However, vaccination can accompany complications, such as postvaccinial encephalitis, progressive vaccinia, eczema vaccinatum, and generalized vaccinia. Therefore, vaccination is not recommended for certain groups. Public health professionals, as well as physicians and government officials, should also be well equipped with all information necessary for appropriate and effective smallpox management in the face of such a bioterrorism attack.

Smallpox as a Weapon for Bioterrorism

Smallpox, the only disease ever eradicated, is one of the six pathogens considered a serious threat for biological terrorism (Henderson et al., 1999; Mahy, 2003; Whitley, 2003). Smallpox has several attributes that make it a potential threat. It can be grown in large amounts. It spreads via the respiratory route. It has a 30% mortality rate. The potential for an attack using smallpox motivated President Bush to call for phased vaccination of a substantial number of American health care and public health workers (Grabenstein and Winkenwerder, 2003; Stevenson and Stolberg, 2002). Following September 11, 2001, the United States rebuilt its supplies of vaccine and Vaccinia Immune Globulin (VIG), expanded the network of laboratories capable of testing for variola virus, and engaged in a broad education campaign to help health care workers and the general public understand the disease (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2003a). This chapter summarizes the scientific and theoretical bases for use of smallpox as a bioweapon and options for preparation for defense against it.

Extracting key information from historical data to quantify the transmission dynamics of smallpox

Background

Quantification of the transmission dynamics of smallpox is crucial for optimizing intervention strategies in the event of a bioterrorist attack. This article reviews basic methods and findings in mathematical and statistical studies of smallpox which estimate key transmission parameters from historical data.

Main findings

First, critically important aspects in extracting key information from historical data are briefly summarized. We mention different sources of heterogeneity and potential pitfalls in utilizing historical records. Second, we discuss how smallpox spreads in the absence of interventions and how the optimal timing of quarantine and isolation measures can be determined. Case studies demonstrate the following. (1) The upper confidence limit of the 99th percentile of the incubation period is 22.2 days, suggesting that quarantine should last 23 days. (2) The highest frequency (61.8%) of secondary transmissions occurs 3–5 days after onset of fever so that infected individuals should be isolated before the appearance of rash. (3) The U-shaped age-specific case fatality implies a vulnerability of infants and elderly among non-immune individuals. Estimates of the transmission potential are subsequently reviewed, followed by an assessment of vaccination effects and of the expected effectiveness of interventions.

Conclusion

Current debates on bio-terrorism preparedness indicate that public health decision making must account for the complex interplay and balance between vaccination strategies and other public health measures (e.g. case isolation and contact tracing) taking into account the frequency of adverse events to vaccination. In this review, we summarize what has already been clarified and point out needs to analyze previous smallpox outbreaks systematically.

Smallpox

The WHO declared smallpox eradicated in 1980. However, concern over its potential use by terrorists or in biowarfare has led to striking growth in research related to this much-feared disease. Modern molecular techniques and new animal models are advancing our understanding of smallpox and its interaction with the host immune system. Rapid progress is likewise being made in smallpox laboratory diagnostics, smallpox vaccines, and antiviral medications. WHO and several nations are developing stockpiles of smallpox vaccine for use in the event the disease is reintroduced. National and international public-health agencies have also drawn up plans to help with early detection of and response to a smallpox outbreak. These plans hinge on physicians' ability to recognise the clinical features of smallpox and to distinguish it from other illnesses characterised by rashes.

Mass vaccination and surveillance/containment in the eradication of smallpox

The Smallpox Eradication Program, initiated by the WHO in 1966, was originally based on mass vaccination. The program emphasized surveillance from the beginning, largely to track the success of the program and further our understanding of the epidemiology of the disease. Early observations in West Africa, bolstered by later data from Indonesia and the Asian subcontinent, showed that smallpox did not spread rapidly, and outbreaks could be quickly controlled by isolation of patients and vaccination of their contacts. Contacts were usually easy to find because transmission of smallpox usually required prolonged face-to-face contact. The emphasis therefore shifted to active searches to find cases, coupled with contact tracing, rigorous isolation of patients, and vaccination and surveillance of contacts to contain outbreaks. This shift away from mass vaccination resulted in an acceleration of the program's success.

The weapon potential of a microbe

The designation of a microbe as a potential biological weapon poses the vexing question of how such a decision is made given the many pathogenic microbes that cause disease. Analysis of the properties of microbes that are currently considered biological weapons against humans revealed no obvious relationship to virulence, except that all are pathogenic for humans. Notably, the weapon potential of a microbe rather than its pathogenic properties or virulence appeared to be the major consideration when categorizing certain agents as biological weapons. In an effort to standardize the assessment of the risk that is posed by microbes as biological warfare agents using the basic principles of microbial communicability (defined here as a parameter of transmission) and virulence, a simple formula is proposed for estimating the weapon potential of a microbe.

Logistics of community smallpox control through contact tracing and ring vaccination: a stochastic network model

Background

Previous smallpox ring vaccination models based on contact tracing over a network suggest that ring vaccination would be effective, but have not explicitly included response logistics and limited numbers of vaccinators.

Methods

We developed a continuous-time stochastic simulation of smallpox transmission, including network structure, post-exposure vaccination, vaccination of contacts of contacts, limited response capacity, heterogeneity in symptoms and infectiousness, vaccination prior to the discontinuation of routine vaccination, more rapid diagnosis due to public awareness, surveillance of asymptomatic contacts, and isolation of cases.

Results

We found that even in cases of very rapidly spreading smallpox, ring vaccination (when coupled with surveillance) is sufficient in most cases to eliminate smallpox quickly, assuming that 95% of household contacts are traced, 80% of workplace or social contacts are traced, and no casual contacts are traced, and that in most cases the ability to trace 1–5 individuals per day per index case is sufficient. If smallpox is assumed to be transmitted very quickly to contacts, it may at times escape containment by ring vaccination, but could be controlled in these circumstances by mass vaccination.

Conclusions

Small introductions of smallpox are likely to be easily contained by ring vaccination, provided contact tracing is feasible. Uncertainties in the nature of bioterrorist smallpox (infectiousness, vaccine efficacy) support continued planning for ring vaccination as well as mass vaccination. If initiated, ring vaccination should be conducted without delays in vaccination, should include contacts of contacts (whenever there is sufficient capacity) and should be accompanied by increased public awareness and surveillance.

Risks and benefits of preexposure and postexposure smallpox vaccination

This article presents a model and decision criteria for evaluating a person's risk of pre- or postexposure smallpox vaccination in light of serious vaccine-related adverse events (death, postvaccine encephalitis and progressive vaccinia). Even at a 1-in-10 risk of 1,000 initial smallpox cases, a person in a population of 280 million has a greater risk for serious vaccine-related adverse events than a risk for smallpox. For a healthcare worker to accept preexposure vaccination, the risk for contact with an infectious smallpox case-patient must be >1 in 100, and the probability of 1,000 initial cases must be >1 in 1,000. A member of an investigation team would accept preexposure vaccination if his or her anticipated risk of contact is 1 in 2.5 and the risk of attack is assumed to be >1 in 16,000. The only circumstances in which postexposure vaccination would not be accepted are the following: if vaccine efficacy were <1%, the risk of transmission were <1%, and (simultaneously) the risk for serious vaccine-related adverse events were >1 in 5,000.

Can postexposure vaccination against smallpox succeed?

What can be achieved by the vaccination of individuals exposed to smallpox virus after release of the virus by bioterrorists? There exist several past sources of information on postexposure vaccination failures from which it may be inferred that prompt vaccination of contacts (i.e., individuals exposed to smallpox) often prevented smallpox altogether, that revaccination of previously vaccinated individuals at any time during the first week of the incubation period was largely protective, and that revaccination done even as late as the second week of the incubation period attenuated disease and prevented most deaths. Primary vaccination done within 4 days of exposure was also usually protective at least from serious illness. Modern contingency planning against the release of smallpox virus during a bioterrorist attack should therefore include the capacity for prompt tracing and (re)vaccination of all contacts. Because a growing majority of the population has never before been vaccinated against smallpox and, so, may be unreachable within 4 days, anticipatory vaccination of sections of the populations of potential target countries should be considered if the bioterrorist threat intensifies.

Variola minor in Braganca Paulista County, 1956: household aggregation of the disease and the influence of household size on the attack rate

Household aggregation of cases, one possible characteristic of person-to-person transmitted disease, was formally tested in one epidemic of variola minor by using a pair statistic. A significant result was found for all households as well as for households grouped by the type of environment, or by the phase of the epidemic growth in time. Secondary attack rates, when related to household size (number of susceptibles) showed only a marginal trend in rural households but no trend in urban or semi-rural households.