Cooperation among non-relatives evolves by state-dependent generalized reciprocity

Emotional contagion and prosocial behaviour in fish: An evolutionary and mechanistic approach

In this review, we consider the definitions and experimental approaches to emotional contagion and prosocial behaviour in mammals and explore their evolutionary conceptualisation for studying their occurrence in the evolutionarily divergent vertebrate group of ray-finned fish. We present evidence for a diverse set of fish phenotypes that meet definitional criteria for prosocial behaviour and emotional contagion and discuss conserved mechanisms that may account for some preserved social capacities in fish. Finally, we provide some considerations on how to address the question of interdependency between emotional contagion and prosocial response, highlighting the importance of recognition processes, decision-making systems, and ecological context for providing evolutionary explanations.

Social bond dynamics and the evolution of helping

Empiricists often struggle to apply game theory models to real-life cases of animal cooperation. One reason is that many examples of cooperation occur in stable groups, where individuals form social bonds that influence exchanges of help in ways that are not well described by previous models, including the extent of reciprocity and how relationships are initiated. We present a game theory model exploring the conditions under which social bonds between group members promote cooperation. In the model, bonds build up from exchanges of help in a similar way as the strength of association increases in learning, as in the Rescorla-Wagner rule. The bonds in turn affect partner choice and influence helping amounts. The model has a mechanism of reciprocity for bonded pairs, which can evolve toward either loose or strict reciprocation. Several aspects of the model are inspired by observations of food sharing in vampire bats. We find that small social neighborhoods are required for the evolutionary stability of helping, either as small group sizes, or if bonded members of larger groups can form temporary (daily) smaller groupings. The costs of helping need to be fairly low, while the benefits can be substantial. The form of reciprocity that evolves is neither immediate nor very strict. Individuals in need request help based on bond strength, but there is also an evolved preference for initiating bonds with new group members. In contrast, if different groups come into temporary contact, the evolved tendency is to avoid forming bonds between groups.

Evidence suggesting that reindeer mothers allonurse according to the direct reciprocity and generalized reciprocity decision rules

Allonursing is the nursing of the offspring of other mothers. Cooperation is an emergent property of evolved decision rules. Cooperation can be explained by at least three evolved decision rules: 1) direct reciprocity, i.e. help someone who previously helped you, 2) kin discrimination, i.e. preferentially direct help to kin than to non-kin, and 3) generalized reciprocity, i.e. help anyone if helped by someone. We assessed if semi-domesticated reindeer, Rangifer tarandus, mothers allonursed according to the decision rules of direct reciprocity, generalized reciprocity and kin discrimination over 2 years. To assess if reindeer mothers allonursed according to the direct reciprocity decision rule, we predicted that mothers should give more help to those who previously helped them more often. To assess if reindeer mothers allonursed according to the kin discrimination decision rule, we predicted that help given should increase as pairwise genetic relatedness increased. To assess if reindeer mothers allonursed according to the generalized reciprocity decision rule, we predicted that the overall number of help given by reindeer mothers should increase as the overall number of help received by reindeer mothers increased. The number of help given i) increased as the number of help received from the same partner increased in the 2012 group but not in both 2013 groups, ii) was not influenced by relatedness, and iii) was not influenced by an interaction between the number of help received from the same partner and relatedness. iv) The overall number of help given increased as the overall number of help received increased. The results did not support the prediction that reindeer mothers allonursed according to the kin discrimination decision rule. The results suggest that reindeer mothers may allonurse according to the direct reciprocity and generalized reciprocity decision rules.

Why do Hymenopteran workers drift to non-natal groups? Generalized reciprocity and the maximization of group and parental success

Eusocial Hymenoptera are often characterized by having facultatively or obligately sterile worker castes. However, findings across an increasing number of species are that some workers are non-natal-they have 'drifted' away from where they were born and raised. Moreover, drifters are often indistinguishable from natal workers in the work and benefits provided to joined groups. This seems an evolutionary paradox of providing benefits to potentially unrelated individuals over close kin. Rather than being mistakes, drifting is proposed to be adaptive if joiners either gain inclusive fitness by preferentially moving to other kin groups or through generalized reciprocity in which exchanging workers across groups raises group-level genetic diversity and creates social heterosis. It is unclear, however, if reciprocity is unlikely because of a susceptibility to cheating. In resolving this question, a series of evolutionary simulations show: (1) Reciprocity can persist under a range of genetic assumptions and scenarios of cheating, (2) cheating almost always evolves, but can be expressed in a variety of ways that are not always predictable, (3) the inclusive fitness hypothesis is equally or more susceptible to cheating. Moreover, existing data in Hymenoptera (although not extensive) are more consistent with generalized reciprocity. This supports a hypothesis that drifting, as a phenomenon, may more often reflect maximization of group and parental fitness rather than fitness gains for the individual drifters.

Assessment of help value affects reciprocation in Norway rats

Wild-type Norway rats reciprocate help received in a well-replicated experimental food-giving task, but the criteria to appraise the received help's value are unclear. We tested whether quality or quantity of received help is more important when deciding to return help, and whether partner familiarity and own current need affect this evaluation. We experimentally varied recipients of help's hunger state, and familiar or unfamiliar partners provided either higher caloric food (enhanced quantity; carrots) or food higher in protein and fat (enhanced quality; cheese). Reciprocation of received help was our criterion for the rats' value assessment. Familiarity, food type and hunger state interacted and affected help returned by rats. Rats returned less help to familiar partners than to unfamiliar partners. With unfamiliar partners, rats returned more help to partners that had donated preferred food (cheese) than to partners that had donated less preferred food (carrots), and they returned help earlier if they were satiated and had received cheese. With familiar partners, food-deprived rats that had received cheese returned more help than satiated rats that had received carrots. Our results suggest that Norway rats assess the received help's value based on its quality, their current need and partner familiarity before reciprocating received help.

Prosocial behavior in competitive fish: the case of the archerfish

Humans are social creatures, demonstrate prosocial behaviors, and are sensitive to the actions and consequent payoff of others. This social sensitivity has also been found in many other species, though not in all. Research has suggested that prosocial tendencies are more pronounced in naturally cooperative species whose social structure requires a high level of interdependence and allomaternal care. The present study challenges this assumption by demonstrating, in a laboratory setting, that archerfish, competitive by nature, preferred targets rewarding both themselves and their tankmates, but only when the payoff was equal. With no tankmate on the other side of the partition, they exhibited no obvious preference. Finding evidence for prosocial behavior and negative responses to unequal distribution of reward to the advantage of the other fish suggests that in a competitive social environment, being prosocial may be the most adaptive strategy for personal survival, even if it benefits others as well.

The paradox of cooperation among selfish cancer cells

It is traditionally assumed that during cancer development, tumor cells abort their initially cooperative behavior (i.e., cheat) in favor of evolutionary strategies designed solely to enhance their own fitness (i.e., a "selfish" life style) at the expense of that of the multicellular organism. However, the growth and progress of solid tumors can also involve cooperation among these presumed selfish cells (which, by definition, should be noncooperative) and with stromal cells. The ultimate and proximate reasons behind this paradox are not fully understood. Here, in the light of current theories on the evolution of cooperation, we discuss the possible evolutionary mechanisms that could explain the apparent cooperative behaviors among selfish malignant cells. In addition to the most classical explanations for cooperation in cancer and in general (by-product mutualism, kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, group selection), we propose the idea that "greenbeard" effects are relevant to explaining some cooperative behaviors in cancer. Also, we discuss the possibility that malignant cooperative cells express or co-opt cooperative traits normally expressed by healthy cells. We provide examples where considerations of these processes could help understand tumorigenesis and metastasis and argue that this framework provides novel insights into cancer biology and potential strategies for cancer prevention and treatment.

The role of reciprocity in human-robot social influence

Humans are constantly influenced by others’ behavior and opinions. Of importance, social influence among humans is shaped by reciprocity: we follow more the advice of someone who has been taking into consideration our opinions. In the current work, we investigate whether reciprocal social influence can emerge while interacting with a social humanoid robot. In a joint task, a human participant and a humanoid robot made perceptual estimates and then could overtly modify them after observing the partner’s judgment. Results show that endowing the robot with the ability to express and modulate its own level of susceptibility to the human’s judgments represented a double-edged sword. On the one hand, participants lost confidence in the robot’s competence when the robot was following their advice; on the other hand, participants were unwilling to disclose their lack of confidence to the susceptible robot, suggesting the emergence of reciprocal mechanisms of social influence supporting human-robot collaboration.

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If a social robot is susceptible to our advice, we lose confidence in it

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However, robot’s susceptibility does not deteriorate social influence

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These effects do not appear during interaction with a computer

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Susceptible robots can promote reciprocity but also hinder social learning

Social partner cooperativeness influences brain oxytocin transcription in Trinidadian guppies (Poecilia reticulata)

For non-kin cooperation to be maintained, individuals need to respond adaptively to the cooperative behaviour of their social partners. Currently, however, little is known about the biological responses of individuals to experiencing cooperation. Here, we quantify the neuroregulatory response of Trinidadian guppies (Poecilia reticulata) experiencing cooperation or defection by examining the transcriptional response of the oxytocin gene (oxt; also known as isotocin), which has been implicated in cooperative decision-making. We exposed wild-caught females to social environments where partners either cooperated or defected during predator inspection, or to a control (non-predator inspection) context, and quantified the relative transcription of the oxt gene. We tested an experimental group, originating from a site where individuals are under high predation threat and have previous experience of large aquatic predators (HP), and a control group, where individuals are under low predation threat and naïve to large aquatic predators (LP). LP, but not HP, fish showed different behavioural responses to the behaviour of their social environment, cooperating with cooperative partners and defecting when paired with defecting ones. In HP, but not LP, fish brain mid-section oxt relative transcription varied depending on social partner behaviour. HP fish experiencing cooperation during predator inspection had lower oxt transcription than those experiencing defection. This effect was not present in the control population or in the control context, where the behaviour of social partners did not affect oxt transcription. Our findings provide insight into the neuromodulation underpinning behavioural responses to social experiences, and ultimately to the proximate mechanisms underlying social decision-making.

Reaching Out for Inaccessible Food Is a Potential Begging Signal in Cooperating Wild-Type Norway Rats, Rattus norvegicus

Begging is widespread in juvenile animals. It typically induces helpful behaviours in parents and brood care helpers. However, begging is sometimes also shown by adults towards unrelated social partners. Adult Norway rats (Rattus norvegicus) display a sequence of different behaviours in a reciprocal food provisioning task that have been interpreted as such signals of need. The first behaviour in this sequence represents reaching out for a food item the animal cannot obtain independently. This may reflect either an attempt to grasp the food object by itself, or a signal to the social partner communicating the need for help. To distinguish between these two possibilities, we tested in female wild-type Norway rats if the amount of reaching performed by a food-deprived rat changes with the presence/absence of food and a social partner. Focal rats displayed significantly more reaching behaviour, both in terms of number and total duration of events, when food and a potentially helpful partner were present compared to when either was missing. Our findings hence support the hypothesis that rats use reaching behaviour to signal need to social partners that can help them to obtain food.

Dogs fail to reciprocate the receipt of food from a human in a food-giving task

Domestic dogs have been shown to reciprocate help received from conspecifics in food-giving tasks. However, it is not yet known whether dogs also reciprocate help received from humans. Here, we investigated whether dogs reciprocate the receipt of food from humans. In an experience phase, subjects encountered a helpful human who provided them with food by activating a food dispenser, and an unhelpful human who did not provide them with food. Subjects later had the opportunity to return food to each human type, in a test phase, via the same mechanism. In addition, a free interaction session was conducted in which the subject was free to interact with its owner and with whichever human partner it had encountered on that day. Two studies were carried out, which differed in the complexity of the experience phase and the time lag between the experience phase and test phase. Subjects did not reciprocate the receipt of food in either study. Furthermore, no difference was observed in the duration subjects spent in proximity to, or the latency to approach, the two human partners. Although our results suggest that dogs do not reciprocate help received from humans, they also suggest that the dogs did not recognize the cooperative or uncooperative act of the humans during the experience phase. It is plausible that aspects of the experimental design hindered the emergence of any potential reciprocity. However, it is also possible that dogs are simply not prosocial towards humans in food-giving contexts.

Dynamic modulation of social influence by indirect reciprocity

Indirect reciprocity is a pervasive social norm that promotes human cooperation. Helping someone establishes a good reputation, increasing the probability of receiving help from others. Here we hypothesize that indirect reciprocity regulates not only cooperative behavior but also the exchange of opinions within a social group. In a novel interactive perceptual task (Experiment 1), we show that participants relied more on the judgments of an alleged human partner when a second alleged peer had been endorsing participants' opinions. By doing so, participants did not take into account the reliability of their partners' judgments and did not maximize behavioral accuracy and monetary reward. This effect declined when participants did not expect future interactions with their partners, suggesting the emergence of downstream mechanisms of reciprocity linked to the management of reputation. Importantly, all these effects disappeared when participants knew that the partners' responses were computer-generated (Experiment 2). Our results suggest that, within a social group, individuals may weight others' opinions through indirect reciprocity, highlighting the emergence of normative distortions in the process of information transmission among humans.

The smell of cooperation: rats increase helpful behaviour when receiving odour cues of a conspecific performing a cooperative task

Reciprocity can explain cooperative behaviour among non-kin, where individuals help others depending on their experience in previous interactions. Norway rats (Rattus norvegicus) cooperate reciprocally according to direct and generalized reciprocity. In a sequence of four consecutive experiments, we show that odour cues from a cooperating conspecific are sufficient to induce the altruistic help of rats in a food-exchange task. When rats were enabled to help a non-cooperative partner while receiving olfactory information from a rat helping a conspecific in a different room, they helped their non-cooperative partner as if it was a cooperative one. We further show that the cues inducing altruistic behaviour are released during the act of cooperation and do not depend on the identity of the cue provider. Remarkably, olfactory cues seem to be more important for cooperation decisions than experiencing a cooperative act per se. This suggests that rats may signal their cooperation propensity to social partners, which increases their chances to receive help in return.

Rats play tit-for-tat instead of integrating social experience over multiple interactions

Theoretical models of cooperation typically assume that agents use simple rules based on last encounters, such as 'tit-for-tat', to reciprocate help. By contrast, empiricists generally suppose that animals integrate multiple experiences over longer timespans. Here, we compared these two alternative hypotheses by exposing Norway rats to partners that cooperated on three consecutive days but failed to cooperate on the fourth day, and to partners that did the exact opposite. In additional controls, focal rats experienced cooperating and defecting partners only once. In a bar-pulling setup, focal rats based their decision to provide partners with food on last encounters instead of overall cooperation levels. To check whether this might be owing to a lack of memory capacity, we tested whether rats remember the outcome of encounters that had happened three days before. Cooperation was not diminished by the intermediate time interval. We conclude that rats reciprocate help mainly based on most recent encounters instead of integrating social experience over longer timespans.

Cooperation dynamics of generalized reciprocity in state-based social dilemmas

We introduce a framework for studying social dilemmas in networked societies where individuals follow a simple state-based behavioral mechanism based on generalized reciprocity, which is rooted in the principle "help anyone if helped by someone." Within this general framework, which applies to a wide range of social dilemmas including, among others, public goods, donation, and snowdrift games, we study the cooperation dynamics on a variety of complex network examples. By interpreting the studied model through the lenses of nonlinear dynamical systems, we show that cooperation through generalized reciprocity always emerges as the unique attractor in which the overall level of cooperation is maximized, while simultaneously exploitation of the participating individuals is prevented. The analysis elucidates the role of the network structure, here captured by a local centrality measure which uniquely quantifies the propensity of the network structure to cooperation by dictating the degree of cooperation displayed both at the microscopic and macroscopic level. We demonstrate the applicability of the analysis on a practical example by considering an interaction structure that couples a donation process with a public goods game.

BMCGM: A Behavior Economics-Based Message Transmission Cooperation Guarantee Mechanism in Vehicular Ad-hoc NETworks

Vehicular Ad-hoc NETwork (VANET) is a special mobile ad hoc network that composed of facilities such as vehicle nodes and roadside units. Message transfer among vehicle nodes has been a great challenge due to the network’s highly variable topology and the selfish nature of vehicle nodes. Thus, it is very necessary to propose a mechanism to improve the cooperation among vehicle nodes to guarantee the effective message transmission. Currently, incentive-based cooperation mechanisms are commonly used to encourage nodes to participate in message transmission. Those mechanisms are based on traditional economics and generally assume that the decision-making behavior of nodes is completely independent. Also, the cooperation of nodes depends on whether the cooperation behavior can obtain the higher utility. But researches in behavioral economics have shown that due to the existence of altruistic reciprocity, the behavior of nodes is affected by not only their utility but also the behavioral motives of other nodes, so as to obtain different results from traditional incentive-based mechanisms. Therefore, the paper introduces the reciprocal altruistic from behavioral economics and proposes the reciprocal altruistic factor to reconstruct the utility function of nodes. The reconstructed utility function reflects the interaction of behavioral motives among nodes, which promotes the node’s cooperative behavior. Also, since the Network Formation Game (NFG) is a common mathematical model for studying the interaction and communication links formation among network nodes, hence the paper regards NFG in traditional economics as the research object. A Behavior Economics-based Message Transmission Cooperation Guarantee Mechanism named BMCGM is proposed, which motivates nodes to participate in the message transmission to reduce the transmission delay ratio. The simulation results show that the BMCGM reduces message transmission delay by at least 30.3% compared with the recent representative cooperation transmission mechanism.

Universals and cultural diversity in the expression of gratitude

Gratitude is argued to have evolved to motivate and maintain social reciprocity among people, and to be linked to a wide range of positive effects-social, psychological and even physical. But is socially reciprocal behaviour dependent on the expression of gratitude, for example by saying 'thank you' as in English? Current research has not included cross-cultural elements, and has tended to conflate gratitude as an emotion with gratitude as a linguistic practice, as might appear to be the case in English. Here, we ask to what extent people express gratitude in different societies by focusing on episodes of everyday life where someone seeks and obtains a good, service or support from another, comparing these episodes across eight languages from five continents. We find that expressions of gratitude in these episodes are remarkably rare, suggesting that social reciprocity in everyday life relies on tacit understandings of rights and duties surrounding mutual assistance and collaboration. At the same time, we also find minor cross-cultural variation, with slightly higher rates in Western European languages English and Italian, showing that universal tendencies of social reciprocity should not be equated with more culturally variable practices of expressing gratitude. Our study complements previous experimental and culture-specific research on gratitude with a systematic comparison of audiovisual corpora of naturally occurring social interaction from different cultures from around the world.

Promoting cooperation by preventing exploitation: The role of network structure

A growing body of empirical evidence indicates that social and cooperative behavior can be affected by cognitive and neurological factors, suggesting the existence of state-based decision-making mechanisms that may have emerged by evolution. Motivated by these observations, we propose a simple mechanism of anonymous network interactions identified as a form of generalized reciprocity-a concept organized around the premise "help anyone if helped by someone'-and study its dynamics on random graphs. In the presence of such a mechanism, the evolution of cooperation is related to the dynamics of the levels of investments (i.e., probabilities of cooperation) of the individual nodes engaging in interactions. We demonstrate that the propensity for cooperation is determined by a network centrality measure here referred to as neighborhood importance index and discuss relevant implications to natural and artificial systems. To address the robustness of the state-based strategies to an invasion of defectors, we additionally provide an analysis which redefines the results for the case when a fraction of the nodes behave as unconditional defectors.

The concepts of asymmetric and symmetric power can help resolve the puzzle of altruistic and cooperative behaviour

Evolutionary theory predicts competition in nature yet altruistic and cooperative behaviour appears to reduce the ability to compete in order to help others compete better. This evolutionary puzzle is usually explained by kin selection where close relatives perform altruistic and cooperative acts to help each other and by reciprocity theory (i.e. direct, indirect and generalized reciprocity) among non-kin. Here, it is proposed that the concepts of asymmetry and symmetry in power and dominance are critical if we are ever to resolve the puzzle of altruism and cooperation towards non-kin. Asymmetry in power and dominance is likely to emerge under competition in nature as individuals strive to gain greater access to the scarce resources needed to survive and reproduce successfully. Yet asymmetric power presents serious problems for reciprocity theory in that a dominant individual faces a temptation to cheat in interactions with subordinates that is likely to far outweigh any individual selective benefits gained through reciprocal mechanisms. Furthermore, action taken by subordinates to deter non-reciprocation by dominants is likely to prove prohibitively costly to their fitness, making successful enforcement of reciprocal mechanisms unlikely. It is also argued here that many apparently puzzling forms of cooperation observed in nature (e.g. cooperative breeding in which unrelated subordinates help dominants to breed) might be best explained by asymmetry in power and dominance. Once it is recognized that individuals in these cooperative interactions are subject to the constraints and opportunities imposed on them by asymmetric power then they can be seen as pursuing a 'least bad' strategy to promote individual fitness - one that is nevertheless consistent with evolutionary theory. The concept of symmetric power also provides important insights. It can inhibit reciprocal mechanisms in the sense that symmetric power makes it easier for a cheat to appropriate common resources while incurring fewer penalties. Nevertheless under certain restrictive conditions, symmetric power is seen as likely to promote direct reciprocity through 'tit for tat'.

Experimental evidence for reciprocity in allogrooming among wild-type Norway rats

If individuals help more those who have previously helped them, stable cooperation may ensue through alternation of roles between donors and recipients. Allogrooming, which is costly to donors and beneficial to recipients, is often exchanged between social partners. Arguably, allogrooming and allopreening are the most frequently exchanged social services and have been used as a standard model of reciprocal cooperation. However, evidence for the application of reciprocity rules among social partners allogrooming each other hitherto is merely correlational. Here, we tested whether female Norway rats (Rattus norvegicus) apply the decision rule characterising direct reciprocity: help someone who has helped you before, by experimentally manipulating both the need for allogrooming and the behavioural response. Furthermore, we checked whether trading of grooming services is influenced by the rank of the social partner. We show that rats groom social partners reciprocally and prefer to do so up the hierarchy, i.e. they groom dominant partners more often than subordinates, while reciprocating with both. This provides experimental evidence that animals render a costly social service by applying reciprocity decision rules when showing a natural hygienic behaviour. The fact that allogrooming is more readily shown up the hierarchy may suggest an appeasing function.

Rats do not eat alone in public: Food-deprived rats socialize rather than competing for baits

Limited resources result in competition among social animals. Nevertheless, social animals also have innate preferences for cooperative behavior. In the present study, 12 dyads of food-deprived rats were tested in four successive trials, and then re-tested as eight triads of food-deprived rats that were unfamiliar to each other. We found that the food-deprived dyads or triads of rats did not compete for the food available to them at regular spatially-marked locations that they had previously learnt. Rather, these rats traveled together to collect the baits. One rat, or two rats in some triads, lead (ran ahead) to collect most of the baits, but "leaders" differed across trials so that, on average, each rat ultimately collected similar amounts of baits. Regardless of which rat collected the baits, the rats traveled together with no substantial difference among them in terms of their total activity. We suggest that rats, which are a social species that has been found to display reciprocity, have evolved to travel and forage together and to share limited resources. Consequently, they displayed a sort of 'peace economy' that on average resulted in equal access to the baits across trials. For social animals, this type of dynamics is more relaxed, tolerant, and effective in the management of conflicts. Rather than competing for the limited available food, the food-deprived rats socialized and coexisted peacefully.

Working dogs cooperate among one another by generalised reciprocity

Cooperation by generalised reciprocity implies that individuals apply the decision rule "help anyone if helped by someone". This mechanism has been shown to generate evolutionarily stable levels of cooperation, but as yet it is unclear how widely this cooperation mechanism is applied among animals. Dogs (Canis familiaris) are highly social animals with considerable cognitive potential and the ability to differentiate between individual social partners. But although dogs can solve complex problems, they may use simple rules for behavioural decisions. Here we show that dogs trained in an instrumental cooperative task to provide food to a social partner help conspecifics more often after receiving help from a dog before. Remarkably, in so doing they show no distinction between partners that had helped them before and completely unfamiliar conspecifics. Apparently, dogs use the simple decision rule characterizing generalised reciprocity, although they are probably capable of using the more complex decision rule of direct reciprocity: "help someone who has helped you". However, generalized reciprocity involves lower information processing costs and is therefore a cheaper cooperation strategy. Our results imply that generalised reciprocity might be applied more commonly than direct reciprocity also in other mutually cooperating animals.

The multiple functions of male song within the humpback whale (Megaptera novaeangliae) mating system: review, evaluation, and synthesis

Humpback whales (Megaptera novaeangliae) are seasonal breeders, annually migrating from high-latitude summer feeding grounds to low-latitude winter breeding grounds. The social matrix on the winter grounds is a loose network of interacting individuals and groups and notably includes lone males that produce long bouts of complex song that collectively yield an asynchronous chorus. Occasionally, a male will sing while accompanying other whales. Despite a wealth of knowledge about the social matrix, the full characterization of the mating system remains unresolved, without any firm consensus, as does the function of song within that system. Here, I consider and critically analyse three proposed functions of song that have received the most attention in the literature: female attraction to individual singers, determining or facilitating male-male interactions, and attracting females to a male aggregation within the context of a lekking system. Female attraction suggests that humpback song is an advertisement and invitation to females, but field observations and song playback studies reveal that female visits to individual singers are virtually absent. Other observations suggest instead that females might convey their presence to singers (or to other males) through the percussive sounds of flipper or tail slapping or possibly through vocalizations. There is some evidence for male-male interactions, both dominance and affiliative: visits to singers are almost always other lone males not singing at that time. The joiner may be seeking a coalition with the singer to engage cooperatively in attempts to obtain females, or may be seeking to disrupt the song or to affirm his dominance. Some observations support one or the other intent. However, other observations, in part based on the brevity of most pairings, suggest that the joiner is prospecting, seeking to determine whether the singer is accompanying a female, and if not soon departs. In the lekking hypothesis, the aggregation of vocalizing males on a winter ground and the visits there by non-maternal females apparently for mating meet the fundamental definition of a lekking system and its role though communal display in attracting females to the aggregation, although not to an individual singer. Communal singing is viewed as a form of by-product mutualism in which individuals benefit one another as incidental consequences of their own selfish actions. Possibly, communal singing may also act to stimulate female receptivity. Thus, there are both limitations and merit in all three proposals. Full consideration of song as serving multiple functions is therefore necessary to understand its role in the mating system and the forces acting on the evolution of song. I suggest that song may be the prime vector recruiting colonists to new winter grounds pioneered by vagrant males as population pressures increase or as former winter grounds become unavailable or undesirable, with such instances documented relatively recently. Speculatively, song may have evolved historically as an aggregating call during the dynamic ocean conditions and resulting habitat uncertainties in the late Miocene-early Pliocene epochs when Megaptera began to proliferate. Early song may have been comprised of simpler precursor sounds that through natural selection and ritualization evolved into complex song.

Cheating and punishment in cooperative animal societies

Cheaters-genotypes that gain a selective advantage by taking the benefits of the social contributions of others while avoiding the costs of cooperating-are thought to pose a major threat to the evolutionary stability of cooperative societies. In order for cheaters to undermine cooperation, cheating must be an adaptive strategy: cheaters must have higher fitness than cooperators, and their behaviour must reduce the fitness of their cooperative partners. It is frequently suggested that cheating is not adaptive because cooperators have evolved mechanisms to punish these behaviours, thereby reducing the fitness of selfish individuals. However, a simpler hypothesis is that such societies arise precisely because cooperative strategies have been favoured over selfish ones-hence, behaviours that have been interpreted as 'cheating' may not actually result in increased fitness, even when they go unpunished. Here, we review the empirical evidence for cheating behaviours in animal societies, including cooperatively breeding vertebrates and social insects, and we ask whether such behaviours are primarily limited by punishment. Our review suggests that both cheating and punishment are probably rarer than often supposed. Uncooperative individuals typically have lower, not higher, fitness than cooperators; and when evidence suggests that cheating may be adaptive, it is often limited by frequency-dependent selection rather than by punishment. When apparently punitive behaviours do occur, it remains an open question whether they evolved in order to limit cheating, or whether they arose before the evolution of cooperation.

Individual variation behind the evolution of cooperation

Life on Earth has two remarkable properties. The first is variation: even apart from the vast number of extant species, there are considerable differences between individuals within a single species. The second property is cooperation. It is surprising that until recently the interactions between these two properties have rarely been addressed from an evolutionary point of view. Here, I concentrate on how inter-individual differences influence the evolution of cooperation. First, I deal with cases where individuality is maintained by random processes like mutation or phenotypic noise. Second, I examine when differences in state cause differences in behaviour. Finally, I investigate the effects of individual role specialization. Variation can be important in several ways. Increased random variation can change the expectation about cooperativeness of future partners, altering behaviour in a current relationship. Differences in state may serve as a book-keeping mechanism that is necessary for the evolution of reciprocity. If the cost of cooperation can depend on state then strategic regulation of state makes it possible to coerce partners to cooperate. If conditions force individuals to specialize, cooperation becomes more valuable. My review of theoretical models suggests that variation plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation.

Correlated pay-offs are key to cooperation

The general belief that cooperation and altruism in social groups result primarily from kin selection has recently been challenged, not least because results from cooperatively breeding insects and vertebrates have shown that groups may be composed mainly of non-relatives. This allows testing predictions of reciprocity theory without the confounding effect of relatedness. Here, we review complementary and alternative evolutionary mechanisms to kin selection theory and provide empirical examples of cooperative behaviour among unrelated individuals in a wide range of taxa. In particular, we focus on the different forms of reciprocity and on their underlying decision rules, asking about evolutionary stability, the conditions selecting for reciprocity and the factors constraining reciprocal cooperation. We find that neither the cognitive requirements of reciprocal cooperation nor the often sequential nature of interactions are insuperable stumbling blocks for the evolution of reciprocity. We argue that simple decision rules such as 'help anyone if helped by someone' should get more attention in future research, because empirical studies show that animals apply such rules, and theoretical models find that they can create stable levels of cooperation under a wide range of conditions. Owing to its simplicity, behaviour based on such a heuristic may in fact be ubiquitous. Finally, we argue that the evolution of exchange and trading of service and commodities among social partners needs greater scientific focus.

Transient nature of cooperation by pay-it-forward reciprocity

Humans often forward kindness received from others to strangers, a phenomenon called the upstream or pay-it-forward indirect reciprocity. Some field observations and laboratory experiments found evidence of pay-it-forward reciprocity in which chains of cooperative acts persist in social dilemma situations. Theoretically, however, cooperation based on pay-it-forward reciprocity is not sustainable. We carried out laboratory experiments of a pay-it-forward indirect reciprocity game (i.e., chained gift-giving game) on a large scale in terms of group size and time. We found that cooperation consistent with pay-it-forward reciprocity occurred only in a first few decisions per participant and that cooperation originated from inherent pro-sociality of individuals. In contrast, the same groups of participants showed persisting chains of cooperation in a different indirect reciprocity game in which participants earned reputation by cooperating. Our experimental results suggest that pay-it-forward reciprocity is transient and disappears when a person makes decisions repeatedly, whereas the reputation-based reciprocity is stable in the same situation.

Wild Vervet Monkeys Trade Tolerance and Specific Coalitionary Support for Grooming in Experimentally Induced Conflicts

Grooming is a key social behavior in many primate species. Research has focused on three important aspects: the short- and long-term trading patterns of grooming for itself and/or for other commodities like tolerance or coalitionary support, the issue of whether exchanges are a convincing example for reciprocity, and what decision rules underlie trading. These issues remain largely unresolved due to the correlative nature of observational studies and the rarity of experimental studies. Here, we present a new experimental paradigm to address these questions in wild vervet monkeys (Chlorocebus pygerythrus). Adult females were first trained to approach a personal box, identifiable by unique color patterns, to access high-quality food. During the experiments, two boxes were placed next to each other to induce conflict through forced proximity. We found that while dominants were generally more tolerant toward bonded individuals, recent grooming increased tolerance independently of relationship quality. The latter result shows that vervet monkeys traded grooming for short-term tolerance, where dominants used a direct-reciprocity decision rule. In contrast, females invariably supported the higher-ranking opponent in a conflict, independently of who was the recent grooming partner. Nevertheless, recent grooming increased the probability that a female supported the partner during conflicts with a low-ranking third party. Thus, females' decisions about coalitionary support seem to integrate information about the current social hierarchy with recent grooming events. In conclusion, decision rules underlying trading of grooming for other commodities involve a variety of timescales and factors.

Cooperation and conflict: field experiments in Northern Ireland

The idea that cohesive groups, in which individuals help each other, have a competitive advantage over groups composed of selfish individuals has been widely suggested as an explanation for the evolution of cooperation in humans. Recent theoretical models propose the coevolution of parochial altruism and intergroup conflict, when in-group altruism and out-group hostility contribute to the group's success in these conflicts. However, the few empirical attempts to test this hypothesis do not use natural groups and conflate measures of in-group and unbiased cooperative behaviour. We conducted field experiments based on naturalistic measures of cooperation (school/charity donations and lost letters' returns) with two religious groups with an on-going history of conflict—Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. Conflict was associated with reduced donations to out-group schools and the return of out-group letters, but we found no evidence that it influences in-group cooperation. Rather, socio-economic status was the major determinant of cooperative behaviour. Our study presents a challenge to dominant perspectives on the origins of human cooperation, and has implications for initiatives aiming to promote conflict resolution and social cohesion.

Group augmentation and the evolution of cooperation

The group augmentation (GA) hypothesis states that if helpers in cooperatively breeding animals raise the reproductive success of the group, the benefits of living in a resulting larger group--improved survival or future reproductive success--favour the evolution of seemingly altruistic helping behaviour. The applicability of the GA hypothesis remains debatable, however, partly owing to the lack of a clear conceptual framework and a shortage of appropriate empirical studies. We conceptualise here the GA hypothesis and illustrate that benefits of GA can accrue via different evolutionary mechanisms that relate closely to well-supported general concepts of group living and cooperation. These benefits reflect several plausible explanations for the evolutionary maintenance of helping behaviour in cooperatively breeding animals.

Give what you get: capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) and 4-year-old children pay forward positive and negative outcomes to conspecifics

The breadth of human generosity is unparalleled in the natural world, and much research has explored the mechanisms underlying and motivating human prosocial behavior. Recent work has focused on the spread of prosocial behavior within groups through paying-it-forward, a case of human prosociality in which a recipient of generosity pays a good deed forward to a third individual, rather than back to the original source of generosity. While research shows that human adults do indeed pay forward generosity, little is known about the origins of this behavior. Here, we show that both capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) and 4-year-old children pay forward positive and negative outcomes in an identical testing paradigm. These results suggest that a cognitively simple mechanism present early in phylogeny and ontogeny leads to paying forward positive, as well as negative, outcomes.

Social evolution: reciprocity there is

The theory of cooperation predicts that altruism can be established by reciprocity, yet empirical evidence from nature is contentious. Increasingly though, experimental results from social vertebrates challenge the nearly exclusive explanatory power of relatedness for the evolution of cooperation.

Cooperation creates selection for tactical deception

Conditional social behaviours such as partner choice and reciprocity are held to be key mechanisms facilitating the evolution of cooperation, particularly in humans. Although how these mechanisms select for cooperation has been explored extensively, their potential to select simultaneously for complex cheating strategies has been largely overlooked. Tactical deception, the misrepresentation of the state of the world to another individual, may allow cheaters to exploit conditional cooperation by tactically misrepresenting their past actions and/or current intentions. Here we first use a simple game-theoretic model to show that the evolution of cooperation can create selection pressures favouring the evolution of tactical deception. This effect is driven by deception weakening cheater detection in conditional cooperators, allowing tactical deceivers to elicit cooperation at lower costs, while simple cheats are recognized and discriminated against. We then provide support for our theoretical predictions using a comparative analysis of deception across primate species. Our results suggest that the evolution of conditional strategies may, in addition to promoting cooperation, select for astute cheating and associated psychological abilities. Ultimately, our ability to convincingly lie to each other may have evolved as a direct result of our cooperative nature.

Evolution of cooperation driven by zealots

Recent experimental results with humans involved in social dilemma games suggest that cooperation may be a contagious phenomenon and that the selection pressure operating on evolutionary dynamics (i.e., mimicry) is relatively weak. I propose an evolutionary dynamics model that links these experimental findings and evolution of cooperation. By assuming a small fraction of (imperfect) zealous cooperators, I show that a large fraction of cooperation emerges in evolutionary dynamics of social dilemma games. Even if defection is more lucrative than cooperation for most individuals, they often mimic cooperation of fellows unless the selection pressure is very strong. Then, zealous cooperators can transform the population to be even fully cooperative under standard evolutionary dynamics.

Specific neural correlates of successful learning and adaptation during social exchanges

Cooperation and betrayal are universal features of social interactions, and knowing who to trust is vital in human society. Previous studies have identified brain regions engaged by decision making during social encounters, but the mechanisms supporting modification of future behaviour by utilizing social experience are not well characterized. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we show that cooperation and betrayal during social exchanges elicit specific patterns of neural activity associated with future behaviour. Unanticipated cooperation leads to greater behavioural adaptation than unexpected betrayal, and is signalled by specific neural responses in the striatum and midbrain. Neural responses to betrayal and willingness to trust novel partners both decrease as the number of individuals encountered during repeated social encounters increases. We propose that, as social groups increase in size, uncooperative or untrustworthy behaviour becomes progressively less surprising, with cooperation becoming increasingly important as a stimulus for social learning. Effects on reputation of non-trusting decisions may also act to drive pro-social behaviour. Our findings characterize the dynamic neural processes underlying social adaptation, and suggest that the brain is optimized to cooperate with trustworthy partners, rather than avoiding those who might betray us.

Reciprocal cooperation between unrelated rats depends on cost to donor and benefit to recipient

BACKGROUND

Although evolutionary models of cooperation build on the intuition that costs of the donor and benefits to the receiver are the most general fundamental parameters, it is largely unknown how they affect the decision of animals to cooperate with an unrelated social partner. Here we test experimentally whether costs to the donor and need of the receiver decide about the amount of help provided by unrelated rats in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game.

RESULTS

Fourteen unrelated Norway rats were alternately presented to a cooperative or defective partner for whom they could provide food via a mechanical apparatus. Direct costs for this task and the need of the receiver were manipulated in two separate experiments. Rats provided more food to cooperative partners than to defectors (direct reciprocity). The propensity to discriminate between helpful and non-helpful social partners was contingent on costs: An experimentally increased resistance in one Newton steps to pull food for the social partner reduced the help provided to defectors more strongly than the help returned to cooperators. Furthermore, test rats provided more help to hungry receivers that were light or in poor condition, which might suggest empathy, whereas this relationship was inverse when experimental partners were satiated.

CONCLUSIONS

In a prisoner's dilemma situation rats seem to take effect of own costs and potential benefits to a receiver when deciding about helping a social partner, which confirms the predictions of reciprocal cooperation. Thus, factors that had been believed to be largely confined to human social behaviour apparently influence the behaviour of other social animals as well, despite widespread scepticism. Therefore our results shed new light on the biological basis of reciprocity.