From perceptual to language-mediated categorization

Testing the Labeling Effect in Autistic Children

PURPOSE

Our objective was to test the labeling effect in autistic children. The effect has been robustly tested in typically developing (TD) individuals. TD children expect that any two objects that receive the same linguistic label will have similar properties, which suggests that they generate concepts based on acts of labeling. The labeling effect has not been tested on autistic children, who may not be equally attuned to the relevance of linguistic clues or may not generalize as swiftly as TD children.

METHODS

We reproduced Graham et al.,'s (Frontiers in Psychology 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00586, 2013) design on 30 autistic children of different ages. Participants were divided into two groups depending on whether objects presented to them were named alike or differently (Same or Distinct Label between-individuals condition). The dependent variable was the number of target actions the child performed on an object, depending on whether that object made the same sound as a previously shown test object.

RESULTS

We did not reproduce results similar to those reported in Graham et al., (Frontiers in Psychology 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00586, 2013). Children in the Same Label group did not perform significantly more actions than children in the Distinct Label group when the objects that were handed to the children did not make the same sound as the test object.

CONCLUSIONS

Autistic children do not seem to be sensitive to the labeling effect to the same extent as TD children. If these results are confirmed, intervention programs for autistic children should consider trainings on this way of generating concepts shared by their linguistic community.

Causal Influence of Linguistic Learning on Perceptual and Conceptual Processing: A Brain-Constrained Deep Neural Network Study of Proper Names and Category Terms

Language influences cognitive and conceptual processing, but the mechanisms through which such causal effects are realized in the human brain remain unknown. Here, we use a brain-constrained deep neural network model of category formation and symbol learning and analyze the emergent model's internal mechanisms at the neural circuit level. In one set of simulations, the network was presented with similar patterns of neural activity indexing instances of objects and actions belonging to the same categories. Biologically realistic Hebbian learning led to the formation of instance-specific neurons distributed across multiple areas of the network, and, in addition, to cell assembly circuits of "shared" neurons responding to all category instances-the network correlates of conceptual categories. In two separate sets of simulations, the network learned the same patterns together with symbols for individual instances ["proper names" (PN)] or symbols related to classes of instances sharing common features ["category terms" (CT)]. Learning CT remarkably increased the number of shared neurons in the network, thereby making category representations more robust while reducing the number of neurons of instance-specific ones. In contrast, proper name learning prevented a substantial reduction of instance-specific neurons and blocked the overgrowth of category general cells. Representational similarity analysis further confirmed that the neural activity patterns of category instances became more similar to each other after category-term learning, relative to both learning with PN and without any symbols. These network-based mechanisms for concepts, PN, and CT explain why and how symbol learning changes object perception and memory, as revealed by experimental studies.

Neurobiological mechanisms for language, symbols and concepts: Clues from brain-constrained deep neural networks

Neural networks are successfully used to imitate and model cognitive processes. However, to provide clues about the neurobiological mechanisms enabling human cognition, these models need to mimic the structure and function of real brains. Brain-constrained networks differ from classic neural networks by implementing brain similarities at different scales, ranging from the micro- and mesoscopic levels of neuronal function, local neuronal links and circuit interaction to large-scale anatomical structure and between-area connectivity. This review shows how brain-constrained neural networks can be applied to study in silico the formation of mechanisms for symbol and concept processing and to work towards neurobiological explanations of specifically human cognitive abilities. These include verbal working memory and learning of large vocabularies of symbols, semantic binding carried by specific areas of cortex, attention focusing and modulation driven by symbol type, and the acquisition of concrete and abstract concepts partly influenced by symbols. Neuronal assembly activity in the networks is analyzed to deliver putative mechanistic correlates of higher cognitive processes and to develop candidate explanations founded in established neurobiological principles.

The sound of silence: Reconsidering infants' object categorization in silence, with labels, and with nonlinguistic sounds

A large body of research based on a specific stimulus set (dinosaur/fish) has argued that auditory labels and novel communicative signals (such as beeps used in a communicative context) facilitate category formation in infants, that such effects can be attributed to the auditory signals' communicative nature, and that other auditory stimuli have no effect on categorization. A contrasting view, the auditory overshadowing hypothesis, maintains that auditory signals disrupt processing of visual information and, therefore, interfere with categorization, with more unfamiliar sounds having a more disruptive effect than familiar ones. Here, we used the dinosaur/fish stimulus set to test these contrasting theories in two experiments. In Experiment 1 (N = 17), we found that 6-month-old infants were able to form categories of these stimuli in silence, weakening the claim that labels facilitated their categorization in infants. These results imply that prior findings of no categorization of these stimuli in the presence of nonlinguistic sounds must be due to disruptive effects of such sounds. In Experiment 2 (N = 17), we showed that familiarity modulated the disruptive effect of nonlinguistic sounds on infants' categorization of these stimuli. Together, these results support the auditory overshadowing hypothesis and provide new insights into the interaction between visual and auditory information in infants' category formation.

Influence of language on perception and concept formation in a brain-constrained deep neural network model

A neurobiologically constrained model of semantic learning in the human brain was used to simulate the acquisition of concrete and abstract concepts, either with or without verbal labels. Concept acquisition and semantic learning were simulated using Hebbian learning mechanisms. We measured the network's category learning performance, defined as the extent to which it successfully (i) grouped partly overlapping perceptual instances into a single (abstract or concrete) conceptual representation, while (ii) still distinguishing representations for distinct concepts. Co-presence of linguistic labels with perceptual instances of a given concept generally improved the network's learning of categories, with a significantly larger beneficial effect for abstract than concrete concepts. These results offer a neurobiological explanation for causal effects of language structure on concept formation and on perceptuo-motor processing of instances of these concepts: supplying a verbal label during concept acquisition improves the cortical mechanisms by which experiences with objects and actions along with the learning of words lead to the formation of neuronal ensembles for specific concepts and meanings. Furthermore, the present results make a novel prediction, namely, that such 'Whorfian' effects should be modulated by the concreteness/abstractness of the semantic categories being acquired, with language labels supporting the learning of abstract concepts more than that of concrete ones. This article is part of the theme issue 'Concepts in interaction: social engagement and inner experiences'.

Acceptance of a Novel Food is Related to Caregiver Perceptions of Infant and Toddler Food-related Receptive Language

OBJECTIVE

Language development, both what is understood (receptive language) and spoken (expressive language), is considered critical to a child's ability to understand and interact with their environment. However, little research has investigated the role children's early language skills might play in their food acceptance. The objective of this study was to explore the relationships between young children's food-related receptive language (FRL) and food-related expressive language (FEL) and acceptance of novel food.

METHODS

Caregivers (n = 54) reported their perceptions of children's (aged 7-24 months) FRL and FEL using the MacArthur-Bates Communicative Development Inventory. Novel food acceptance was observed (grams consumed) during a laboratory visit. Multivariable linear regression tested associations between FRL, FEL, and novel food acceptance, by child age (infants [aged from 7 to < 12 months], toddlers [aged 12-24 months]), and at a significance level of P < 0.1 for hypothesis-generating research.

RESULTS

Children's FRL and food acceptance differed by age (F = 8.08, P = 0.01). Among toddlers, greater FRL was associated with greater novel food acceptance (0.22 g [95% confidence interval, -0.04 to 0.49]), P = 0.09). In infants, greater FRL was associated with lower novel food acceptance (-0.80 g [95% confidence interval, -1.53 to -0.07], P = 0.03). No association between FEL and novel food acceptance was noted in either group.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Toddlers' understanding of food-related vocabulary may facilitate food acceptance; however, young infants may not yet have sufficient FRL to facilitate novel food acceptance.

Language level predicts perceptual categorization of complex reversible events in children

Language plays a well-documented role in perceptual object categorization, but little is known about its role in the categorization of complex events. We explored this here with a perspective from age or developmentally appropriate language capacities in neurotypical children between the ages of two and four years (N = 21), and from delayed language development in a clinical group of children (N = 20), whose verbal mental ages (VMA) often fell far below their chronological ages (CAs). All participants watched two demonstrations of a series of transitive events (e.g. tiger jumps over a girl). The toy agents were then moved out of sight, and participants had to act out the same event type, based on a different tiger and girl that were selected among two distractors. We aimed to determine how mastery of this task relates to CA in the neurotypical group, and whether task performance in the clinical group was predicted by VMA and a standardized measure of grammatical comprehension. Results from a series of logistic mixed-effect regression models showed that neurotypical children start to perform correctly on this task with a chance of around 50% during their third year of CA but reach ceiling performance only during their fourth. A similar pattern emerged for VMA in the clinical group, despite a wide range of CAs and diagnoses. In addition, grammatical comprehension predicted performance. These patterns suggest that language competence plays a role in the perceptual categorization and encoding of complex reversible events.

•

Mental representations of complex event types were investigated.

•

An event imitation task was used in children with and without language disorders.

•

Chronological age and verbal mental age both predicted performance.

•

Grammatical comprehension in the clinical group did as well.

•

Cognizing complex events may be linguistically conditioned.

How We Tell Apart Fiction from Reality

The human ability to tell apart reality from fiction is intriguing. Through a range of media, such as novels and movies, we are able to readily engage in fictional worlds and experience alternative realities. Yet even when we are completely immersed and emotionally engaged within these worlds, we have little difficulty in leaving the fictional landscapes and getting back to the day-to-day of our own world. How are we able to do this? How do we acquire our understanding of our real world? How is this similar to and different from the development of our knowledge of fictional worlds? In exploring these questions, this article makes the case for a novel multilevel explanation (called BLINCS) of our implicit understanding of the reality–fiction distinction, namely that it is derived from the fact that the worlds of fiction, relative to reality, are bounded, inference-light, curated, and sparse.

Visual object categorization in infancy

Categorization is the basis of thinking and reasoning. Through the analysis of infants’ gaze, we describe the trajectory through which visual object representations in infancy incrementally match categorical object representations as mapped onto adults’ visual cortex. Using a methodological approach that allows for a comparison of findings obtained with behavioral and brain measures in infants and adults, we identify the transition from visual exploration guided by perceptual salience to an organization of objects by categories, which begins with the animate–inanimate distinction in the first months of life and continues with a spurt of biologically relevant categories (human bodies, nonhuman bodies, nonhuman faces, small natural objects) through the second year of life.

Humans make sense of the world by organizing things into categories. When and how does this process begin? We investigated whether real-world object categories that spontaneously emerge in the first months of life match categorical representations of objects in the human visual cortex. Using eye tracking, we measured the differential looking time of 4-, 10-, and 19-mo-olds as they looked at pairs of pictures belonging to eight animate or inanimate categories (human/nonhuman, faces/bodies, real-world size big/small, natural/artificial). Taking infants’ looking times as a measure of similarity, for each age group, we defined a representational space where each object was defined in relation to others of the same or of a different category. This space was compared with hypothesis-based and functional MRI-based models of visual object categorization in the adults’ visual cortex. Analyses across different age groups showed that, as infants grow older, their looking behavior matches neural representations in ever-larger portions of the adult visual cortex, suggesting progressive recruitment and integration of more and more feature spaces distributed over the visual cortex. Moreover, the results characterize infants’ visual categorization as an incremental process with two milestones. Between 4 and 10 mo, visual exploration guided by saliency gives way to an organization according to the animate–inanimate distinction. Between 10 and 19 mo, a category spurt leads toward a mature organization. We propose that these changes underlie the coupling between seeing and thinking in the developing mind.

Labels and object categorization in six- and nine-month-olds: tracking labels across varying carrier phrases

Language shapes object categorization in infants. This starts as a general enhanced attentional effect of language, which narrows to a specific link between labels and categories by twelve months. The current experiments examined this narrowing effect by investigating when infants track a consistent label across varied input. Six-month-old infants (N = 48) were familiarized to category exemplars, each presented with the exact same labeling phrase or the same label in different phrases. Evidence of object categorization at test was only found with the same phrase, suggesting that infants were not tracking the label's consistency, but rather that of the entire input. Nine-month-olds (N = 24) did show evidence of categorization across the varied phrases, suggesting that they were tracking the consistent label across the varied input.

The hippocampal-entorhinal system represents nested hierarchical relations between words during concept learning

A fundamental skill of an intelligent mind is that of being able to rapidly discover the structural organization underlying the relations across the objects or the events in the world. Humans, thanks to language, master this skill. For example, a child learning that dolphins and cats can also be referred to as mammals, not only will infer the presence of a hierarchical organization for which dolphins and cats are subordinate exemplars of the category mammals, but will also derive that dolphins are, at least at one conceptual level, more similar to cats than to sharks, despite their indisputable higher perceptual similarity to the latter. The hippocampal-entorhinal system, classically known for its involvement in relational and inferential memory, is a likely candidate to construct and hold these complex relational structures between concepts. To test this hypothesis, we trained healthy human adults to organize a novel audio-visual object space into categories labeled with novel words. Crucially, a hierarchical taxonomy existed between the object categories, and participants discovered it via inference during a simple associative object-to-word training. Using functional MRI after learning, and a combination of ROI-based multivariate analyses, we found that both the mid-anterior hippocampus and the entorhinal cortex represented the inferred hierarchical structure between words: subordinate-level words were represented more similarly to their related superordinate than to unrelated ones. This was paired, in the entorhinal cortex, by an additional signature of internalized structural representation of nested hierarchy: words referring to subordinate concepts belonging to the same superordinate category were represented more similarly compared with those not belonging to the same superordinate level: interestingly, this similarity was never directly taught to subjects nor it was made explicit during the task, but only indirectly derived through a logical inferential process and, crucially, contrasted the evidence coming from the definitional perceptual properties of the concepts. None of these results were observed before learning, when the same words were not yet semantically organized. A whole-brain searchlight revealed that the effect in the entorhinal cortex extends to a wider network of areas, encompassing the prefrontal, temporal, and parietal cortices, partially overlapping with the semantic network.

Superordinate categorization of negative facial expressions in infancy: The influence of labels

Accurate perception of emotional (facial) expressions is an essential social skill. It is currently debated whether emotion categorization in infancy emerges in a "broad-to-narrow" pattern and the degree to which language influences this process. We used an habituation paradigm to explore (a) whether 14- and 18-month-old infants perceive different facial expressions (anger, sad, disgust) as belonging to a superordinate category of negative valence and (b) how verbal labels influence emotion category formation. Results indicated that infants did not spontaneously form a superordinate category of negative valence (Experiments 1 and 3). However, when a novel label ("toma") was added to each event during habituation trials (Experiments 2 and 4), infants formed this superordinate valance category when habituated to disgust and sad expressions (but not when habituated to anger and sadness). These labeling effects were obtained with two stimuli sets (Radboud Face Database and NimStim), even when controlling for the presence of teeth in the expressions. The results indicate that infants, at 14 and 18 months of age, show limited superordinate categorization based on the valence of different negative facial expressions. Specifically, infants only form this abstract emotion category when labels were provided, and the labeling effect depends on which emotions are presented during habituation. These findings have important implications for developmental theories of emotion. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Developing an Understanding of Emotion Categories: Lessons from Objects

How and when infants and young children begin to develop emotion categories is not yet well understood. Research has largely treated the learning problem as one of identifying perceptual similarities among exemplars (typically posed, stereotyped facial configurations). However, recent meta-analyses and reviews converge to suggest that emotion categories are abstract, involving high-dimensional and situationally variable instances. In this paper we consult research on the development of abstract object categorization to guide hypotheses about how infants might learn abstract emotion categories because the two domains present infants with similar learning challenges. In particular, we consider how a developmental cascades framework offers opportunities to understand how and when young children develop emotion categories.

Does category-training facilitate 11-month-olds' acquisition of unfamiliar category-property associations?

The ability to form category-property links allows infants to extend a property from one category member to another. In two experiments, we examined whether orienting infants to the demands of the task, through categorization training, would facilitate 11-month-old infants' category-property extensions when familiarized with a single exemplar of an unfamiliar animal category. In Experiment 1, 11-month-olds (N = 35) were trained with two familiar animal-sound pairings (i.e., dog-bark, cat-meow), familiarized with two unfamiliar animal-sound pairings and then tested on their learning and generalization of the unfamiliar animal-sound associations. Across two conditions, Experiment 2 familiarized 11-month-olds (N = 69) to one familiar (i.e., dog-bark) and one novel animal-sound pairing. Conditions differed in their presentation of familiarization trials (i.e., random or blocked). Infants were then tested on their learning and extension of the animal-sound associations. In both experiments, infants did not demonstrate learning of the original animal sound pairing, nor generalization of the sound property to new members of the animal categories. These results indicate that the two category training paradigms implemented in the current studies did not facilitate 11-month-olds' ability to learn or generalize an unfamiliar animal-sound association, when familiarized with a single exemplar.

Do Preverbal Infants Understand Discrete Facial Expressions of Emotion?

An ongoing debate in affective science concerns whether certain discrete, “basic” emotions have evolutionarily based signals (facial expressions) that are easily, universally, and (perhaps) innately identified. Studies with preverbal infants (younger than 24 months) have the potential to shed light on this debate. This review summarizes what is known about preverbal infants’ understanding of discrete emotional facial expressions. Overall, while many studies suggest that preverbal infants differentiate positive and negative facial expressions, few studies have tested whether infants understand discrete emotions (e.g., anger vs. disgust). Moreover, results vary greatly based on methodological factors. This review also (a) discusses how language may influence the development of emotion understanding, and (b) proposes a new developmental hypothesis for infants’ discrete emotion understanding.

Atypical shape bias and categorization in autism: Evidence from children and computational simulations

The shape bias, a preference for mapping new word labels onto the shape rather than the color or texture of referents, has been postulated as a word-learning mechanism. Previous research has shown deficits in the shape bias in children with autism even though they acquire sizeable lexicons. While previous explanations have suggested the atypical use of color for label extension in individuals with autism, we hypothesize an atypical mapping of novel labels to novel objects, regardless of the physical properties of the objects. In Experiment 1, we demonstrate this phenomenon in some individuals with autism, but the novelty of objects only partially explains their lack of shape bias. In a second experiment, we present a computational model that provides a developmental account of the shape bias in typically developing children and in those with autism. This model is based on theories of neurological dysfunctions in autism, and it integrates theoretical and empirical findings in the literature of categorization, word learning, and the shape bias. The model replicates the pattern of results of our first experiment and shows how individuals with autism are more likely to categorize experimental objects together on the basis of their novelty. It also provides insights into possible mechanisms by which children with autism learn new words, and why their word referents may be idiosyncratic. Our model highlights a developmental approach to autism that emphasizes deficient representations of categories underlying an impaired shape bias.

Animacy cues facilitate 10-month-olds' categorization of novel objects with similar insides

In this experiment, we examined whether sensitivity to the relevance of object insides for the categorization of animate objects is in place around 10 months of age. Using an object examining paradigm, 10-month-old infants' (N = 58) were familiarized to novel objects with varying outward appearances but shared insides in one of three groups: No cues, Eyes, and Cue control. During test trials, infants were presented with a novel in-category test object followed by an out-of-category test object. When objects were presented with animacy cues (i.e., Eyes), infants categorized the objects together. In contrast, when objects were presented without any added cues or when they were presented with a shared perceptual marker (Cue control, i.e., plastic spoons placed on top of the objects), infants showed no evidence of categorization. These results indicate that by 10 months of age, eyes signal to infants that objects share some kind of uniting commonality that may not be obvious or readily perceptually available.

Curiosity-based learning in infants: a neurocomputational approach

Infants are curious learners who drive their own cognitive development by imposing structure on their learning environment as they explore. Understanding the mechanisms by which infants structure their own learning is therefore critical to our understanding of development. Here we propose an explicit mechanism for intrinsically motivated information selection that maximizes learning. We first present a neurocomputational model of infant visual category learning, capturing existing empirical data on the role of environmental complexity on learning. Next we "set the model free", allowing it to select its own stimuli based on a formalization of curiosity and three alternative selection mechanisms. We demonstrate that maximal learning emerges when the model is able to maximize stimulus novelty relative to its internal states, depending on the interaction across learning between the structure of the environment and the plasticity in the learner itself. We discuss the implications of this new curiosity mechanism for both existing computational models of reinforcement learning and for our understanding of this fundamental mechanism in early development.

Linking Language and Cognition in Infancy

Human language, a signature of our species, derives its power from its links to human cognition. For centuries, scholars have been captivated by this link between language and cognition. In this article, we shift this focus. Adopting a developmental lens, we review recent evidence that sheds light on the origin and developmental unfolding of the link between language and cognition in the first year of life. This evidence, which reveals the joint contributions of infants' innate capacities and their sensitivity to experience, highlights how a precocious link between language and cognition advances infants beyond their initial perceptual and conceptual capacities. The evidence also identifies the conceptual advantages this link brings to human infants. By tracing the emergence of a language-cognition link in infancy, this article reveals a dynamic developmental cascade in infants' first year, with each developmental advance providing a foundation for subsequent advances.

Learned Labels Shape Pre-speech Infants' Object Representations

Infants rapidly learn both linguistic and nonlinguistic representations of their environment and begin to link these from around 6 months. While there is an increasing body of evidence for the effect of labels heard in-task on infants' online processing, whether infants' learned linguistic representations shape learned nonlinguistic representations is unclear. In this study 10-month-old infants were trained over the course of a week with two 3D objects, one labeled, and one unlabeled. Infants then took part in a looking time task in which 2D images of the objects were presented individually in a silent familiarization phase, followed by a preferential looking trial. During the critical familiarization phase, infants looked for longer at the previously labeled stimulus than the unlabeled stimulus, suggesting that learning a label for an object had shaped infants' representations as indexed by looking times. We interpret these results in terms of label activation and novelty response accounts and discuss implications for our understanding of early representational development.

Categories, Concepts, and Conceptual Development

Concepts (i.e., lexicalized classes of real or fictitious entities) play a central role in many human intellectual activities, including planning, thinking, reasoning, problem solving, and decision making. How do people acquire concepts in the course of development and learning and use them in their thinking about the world? In this article, we attempt to provide an overview of conceptual development. We suggest that concepts can originate (1) in interactions with the world and get lexicalized later or (2) in the language and get grounded later. The first route is from category learning to a concept, and we discuss this route by focusing on the mechanisms of category learning and developmental changes in these mechanisms. The second route is from a word to a concept, and we discuss this route by focusing on inferring word meanings without visual referents. We then consider proposals of how concepts get organized into networks and hierarchies.

TRACX2: a connectionist autoencoder using graded chunks to model infant visual statistical learning

Even newborn infants are able to extract structure from a stream of sensory inputs; yet how this is achieved remains largely a mystery. We present a connectionist autoencoder model, TRACX2, that learns to extract sequence structure by gradually constructing chunks, storing these chunks in a distributed manner across its synaptic weights and recognizing these chunks when they re-occur in the input stream. Chunks are graded rather than all-or-nothing in nature. As chunks are learnt their component parts become more and more tightly bound together. TRACX2 successfully models the data from five experiments from the infant visual statistical learning literature, including tasks involving forward and backward transitional probabilities, low-salience embedded chunk items, part-sequences and illusory items. The model also captures performance differences across ages through the tuning of a single-learning rate parameter. These results suggest that infant statistical learning is underpinned by the same domain-general learning mechanism that operates in auditory statistical learning and, potentially, in adult artificial grammar learning.This article is part of the themed issue 'New frontiers for statistical learning in the cognitive sciences'.

Disrupted development and imbalanced function in the global neuronal workspace: a positive-feedback mechanism for the emergence of ASD in early infancy

Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is increasingly being conceptualized as a spectrum disorder of connectome development. We review evidence suggesting that ASD is characterized by a positive feedback loop that amplifies small functional variations in early-developing sensory-processing pathways into structural and functional imbalances in the global neuronal workspace. Using vision as an example, we discuss how early functional variants in visual processing may be feedback-amplified to produce variant object categories and disrupted top-down expectations, atypically large expectation-to-perception mismatches, problems re-identifying individual people and objects, socially inappropriate, generally aversive emotional responses and disrupted sensory-motor coordination. Viewing ASD in terms of feedback amplification of small functional variants allows a number of recent models of ASD to be integrated with neuroanatomical, neurofunctional and genetic data.

Naming influences 9-month-olds' identification of discrete categories along a perceptual continuum

A growing body of evidence documents that naming guides 9-month-old infants as they organize their visual experiences into categories. In particular, this evidence reveals that naming highlights categories when these are visually distinct. Here we advance this work in by introducing an anticipatory looking design to assess how naming influences infants' categorization of objects that vary along a perceptual continuum. We introduced 9-month-old infants (n = 48) to continua of novel creature-like objects. During the learning phase, infants had an opportunity to observe that objects from one end of the perceptual continuum moved to the left and objects from the other end moved to the right. What varied was how the objects were named. Infants in theone-name condition heard the same novel noun applied to all objects along the continuum; those in the two-name condition heard one name for objects from one end of the continuum and a second name for objects at the other end. At test, all infants viewed new objects from the same continuum. At issue was whether infants would anticipate the side to which the test objects would move and whether their expectations varied as a function of naming condition. Infants in the one-name condition formed a single overarching category and therefore searched for new test objects at either location; those in the two-name condition discerned two categories and therefore correctly anticipated the likely location of the test objects, whether these were close to the poles or to the center of the continuum. This provides the first evidence that by 9 months, naming supports both the number of categories infants impose along a perceptual continuum and the clarity of the category boundaries.

The role of verbal labels on flexible memory retrieval at 12-months of age

The provision of verbal labels enhances 12-month-old infants' memory flexibility across a form change in a puppet imitation task (Herbert, 2011), although the mechanisms for this effect remain unclear. Here we investigate whether verbal labels can scaffold flexible memory retrieval when task difficulty increases and consider the mechanism responsible for the effect of language cues on early memory flexibility. Twelve-month-old infants were provided with English, Chinese, or empty language cues during a difficult imitation task, a combined change in the puppet's colour and form at the test (Hayne et al., 1997). Imitation performance by infants in the English language condition only exceeded baseline performance after the 10-min delay. Thus, verbal labels facilitated flexible memory retrieval on this task. There were no correlations between infants' language comprehension and imitation performance. Thus, it is likely that verbal labels facilitate both attention and categorisation during encoding and retrieval.

Segregation of anterior temporal regions critical for retrieving names of unique and non-unique entities reflects underlying long-range connectivity

Lesion-deficit studies support the hypothesis that the left anterior temporal lobe (ATL) plays a critical role in retrieving names of concrete entities. They further suggest that different regions of the left ATL process different conceptual categories. Here we test the specificity of these relationships and whether the anatomical segregation is related to the underlying organization of white matter connections. We reanalyzed data from a previous lesion study of naming and recognition across five categories of concrete entities. In voxelwise logistic regressions of lesion-deficit associations, we formally incorporated measures of disconnection of long-range association fiber tracts (FTs) and covaried for recognition and non-category-specific naming deficits. We also performed fiber tractwise analyses to assess whether damage to specific FTs was preferentially associated with category-selective naming deficits. Damage to the basolateral ATL was associated with naming deficits for both unique (famous faces) and non-unique entities, whereas the damage to the temporal pole was associated with naming deficits for unique entities only. This segregation pattern remained after accounting for comorbid recognition deficits or naming deficits in other categories. The tractwise analyses showed that damage to the uncinate fasciculus (UNC) was associated with naming impairments for unique entities, while damage to the inferior longitudinal fasciculus (ILF) was associated with naming impairments for non-unique entities. Covarying for FT transection in voxelwise analyses rendered the cortical association for unique entities more focal. These results are consistent with the partial segregation of brain system support for name retrieval of unique and non-unique entities at both the level of cortical components and underlying white matter fiber bundles. Our study reconciles theoretic accounts of the functional organization of the left ATL by revealing both category-related processing and semantic hub sectors.

Linguistic labels, dynamic visual features, and attention in infant category learning

How do words affect categorization? According to some accounts, even early in development words are category markers and are different from other features. According to other accounts, early in development words are part of the input and are akin to other features. The current study addressed this issue by examining the role of words and dynamic visual features in category learning in 8- to 12-month-old infants. Infants were familiarized with exemplars from one category in a label-defined or motion-defined condition and then tested with prototypes from the studied category and from a novel contrast category. Eye-tracking results indicated that infants exhibited better category learning in the motion-defined condition than in the label-defined condition, and their attention was more distributed among different features when there was a dynamic visual feature compared with the label-defined condition. These results provide little evidence for the idea that linguistic labels are category markers that facilitate category learning.

When words fail us: insights into language processing from developmental and acquired disorders

Acquired disorders of language represent loss of previously acquired skills, usually with relatively specific impairments. In children with developmental disorders of language, we may also see selective impairment in some skills; but in this case, the acquisition of language or literacy is affected from the outset. Because systems for processing spoken and written language change as they develop, we should beware of drawing too close a parallel between developmental and acquired disorders. Nevertheless, comparisons between the two may yield new insights. A key feature of connectionist models simulating acquired disorders is the interaction of components of language processing with each other and with other cognitive domains. This kind of model might help make sense of patterns of comorbidity in developmental disorders. Meanwhile, the study of developmental disorders emphasizes learning and change in underlying representations, allowing us to study how heterogeneity in cognitive profile may relate not just to neurobiology but also to experience. Children with persistent language difficulties pose challenges both to our efforts at intervention and to theories of learning of written and spoken language. Future attention to learning in individuals with developmental and acquired disorders could be of both theoretical and applied value.

Lexical learning and lexical processing in children with developmental language impairments

Lexical skills are a crucial component of language comprehension and production. This paper reviews evidence for lexical-level deficits in children and young people with developmental language impairment (LI). Across a range of tasks, LI is associated with reduced vocabulary knowledge in terms of both breadth and depth and difficulty with learning and retaining new words; evidence is emerging from on-line tasks to suggest that low levels of language skill are associated with differences in lexical competition in spoken word recognition. The role of lexical deficits in understanding the nature of LI is also discussed.