Scratching beneath the surface: intentionality in great ape signal production

Idiosyncratic gesture use in a mother-infant dyad in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii) in the wild

One promising method to tackle the question, "In which modality did language evolve?" is by studying the ontogenetic trajectory of signals in human's closest living relatives, including chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Concerning gestures, current debates centre on four different hypotheses: "phylogenetic ritualization", "social transmission through imitation", "ontogenetic ritualization", and "social negotiation". These differ in their predictions regarding idiosyncratic gestures, making such occurrences a crucial area of investigation. Here, we describe a novel and potential idiosyncratic behaviour - 'hand-on-eye' - which was initially observed in one mother-infant dyad in a community of chimpanzees living in the wild. We systematically investigated the form, sequential organisation, intentionality, usage, function, and distribution of the behaviour over a five-year period. The results showed that 'hand-on-eye' was nearly exclusively deployed in a single mother-infant dyad, was accompanied by hallmarks of intentionality, and served to initiate or resume joint dorsal travel. Although the behaviour was observed once in each of three other mother-infant dyads, these lacked the same frequency and hallmarks of intentionality. 'Hand-on-eye' thus qualifies as an idiosyncratic gesture. The proposed developmental pathway gives support to both the "ontogenetic ritualization" and "social negotiation" hypotheses. It also stresses the crucial need for longitudinal approaches to tackle developmental processes that are triggered by unique circumstances and unfold over relatively long time windows.

Evidence for the communicative function of human-directed gazing in 6- to 7-week-old dog puppies

In human infants, the ability to show gaze alternations between an object of interest and another individual is considered fundamental to the development of complex social-cognitive abilities. Here we show that well-socialised dog puppies show gaze alternations in two contexts at an early age, 6-7 weeks. Thus, 69.4% of puppies in a novel object test and 45.59% of puppies during an unsolvable task alternated their gaze at least once between a person's face and the object. In both contexts, the frequency of gaze alternations was positively correlated with the duration of whimpering, supporting the communicative nature of puppies' gazing. Furthermore, the number of gaze alternations in the two contexts was correlated, indicating an underlying propensity for gazing at humans despite likely different motivations in the two contexts. Similar to humans, and unlike great apes or wolves, domestic dogs show gaze alternations from an early age if they are well-socialised. They appear to have a genetic preparedness to communicate with humans via gaze alternations early in ontogeny, but they may need close contact with humans for this ability to emerge, highlighting the interactive effects of domestication and environmental factors on behavioural development in dogs.

An Integrated Perspective of Effort and Perception of Effort

Effort and the perception of effort (PE) have been extensively studied across disciplines, resulting in multiple definitions. These inconsistencies block scientific progress by impeding effective communication between and within fields. Here, we present an integrated perspective of effort and PE that is applicable to both physical and cognitive activities. We define effort as the energy utilized to perform an action. This definition can be applied to biological entities performing various voluntary or involuntary activities, irrespective of whether the effort contributes to goal achievement. Then, we define PE as the instantaneous experience of utilizing energy to perform an action. This definition builds on that of effort without conflating it with other subjective experiences. We explore the nature of effort and PE as constructs and variables and highlight key considerations in their measurement. Our integrated perspective aims to facilitate a deeper understanding of these constructs, refine research methodologies, and promote interdisciplinary collaborations.

The evolution of social play in songbirds, parrots and cockatoos - emotional or highly complex cognitive behaviour or both?

Social play has been described in many animals. However, much of this social behaviour among birds, particularly in adults, is still relatively unexplored in terms of the environmental, psychological, and social dynamics of play. This paper provides an overview of what we know about adult social play in birds and addresses areas in which subtleties and distinctions, such as in play initiation and social organisation and its relationship to expressions of play, are considered in detail. The paper considers emotional, social, innovative, and cognitive aspects of play, then the environmental conditions and affiliative bonds, suggesting a surprisingly complex framework of criteria awaiting further research. Adult social play has so far been studied in only a small number of avian species, exclusively in those with a particularly large brain relative to body size without necessarily addressing brain functions and lateralization. When lateralization of brain function is considered, it can further illuminate a possibly significant relevance of play behaviour to the evolution of cognition, to management of emotions, and the development of sociality.

Bodies at play: the role of intercorporeality and bodily affordances in coordinating social play in chimpanzees in the wild

The comparative approach is a crucial method to gain a better understanding of the behavior of living human and nonhuman animals to then draw informed inferences about the behavior of extinct ancestors. One focus has been on disentangling the puzzle of language evolution. Traditionally, studies have predominantly focused on intentionally produced signals in communicative interactions. However, in collaborative and highly dynamic interactions such as play, underlying intentionality is difficult to assess and often interactions are negotiated via body movements rather than signals. This "lack" of signals has led to this dynamic context being widely ignored in comparative studies. The aim of this paper is threefold: First, we will show how comparative research into communication can benefit from taking the intentionality-agnostic standpoint used in conversation analysis. Second, we will introduce the concepts of 'intercorporeality' and 'bodily affordance', and show how they can be applied to the analysis of communicative interactions of nonhuman animals. Third, we will use these concepts to investigate how chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) initiate, end, and maintain 'contact social play'. Our results showed that bodily affordances are able to capture elements of interactions that more traditional approaches failed to describe. Participants made use of bodily affordances to achieve coordinated engagement in contact social play. Additionally, these interactions could display a sequential organization by which one 'move' by a chimpanzee was responded to with an aligning 'move', which allowed for the co-construction of the activity underway. Overall, the present approach innovates on three fronts: First, it allows for the analysis of interactions that are often ignored because they do not fulfil criteria of intentionality, and/or consist of purely body movements. Second, adopting concepts from research on human interaction enables a better comparison of communicative interactions in other animal species without a too narrow focus on intentional signaling only. Third, adopting a stance from interaction research that highlights how practical action can also be communicative, our results show that chimpanzees can communicate through their embodied actions as well as through signaling. With this first step, we hope to inspire new research into dynamic day-to-day interactions involving both "traditional" signals and embodied actions, which, in turn, can provide insights into evolutionary precursors of human language.

Overcoming bias in the comparison of human language and animal communication

Human language is a powerful communicative and cognitive tool. Scholars have long sought to characterize its uniqueness, but each time a property is proposed to set human language apart (e.g., reference, syntax), some (attenuated) version of that property is found in animals. Recently, the uniqueness argument has shifted from linguistic rules to cognitive capacities underlying them. Scholars argue that human language is unique because it relies on ostension and inference, while animal communication depends on simple associations and largely hardwired signals. Such characterizations are often borne out in published data, but these empirical findings are driven by radical differences in the ways animal and human communication are studied. The field of animal communication has been dramatically shaped by the "code model," which imagines communication as involving information packets that are encoded, transmitted, decoded, and interpreted. This framework standardized methods for studying meaning in animal signals, but it does not allow for the nuance, ambiguity, or contextual variation seen in humans. The code model is insidious. It is rarely referenced directly, but it significantly shapes how we study animals. To compare animal communication and human language, we must acknowledge biases resulting from the different theoretical models used. By incorporating new approaches that break away from searching for codes, we may find that animal communication and human language are characterized by differences of degree rather than kind.

Great ape interaction: Ladyginian but not Gricean

Nonhuman great apes inform one another in ways that can seem very humanlike. Especially in the gestural domain, their behavior exhibits many similarities with human communication, meeting widely used empirical criteria for intentionality. At the same time, there remain some manifest differences, most obviously the enormous range and scope of human expression. How to account for these similarities and differences in a unified way remains a major challenge. Here, we make a key distinction between the expression of intentions (Ladyginian) and the expression of specifically informative intentions (Gricean), and we situate this distinction within a "special case of" framework for classifying different modes of attention manipulation. We hence describe how the attested tendencies of great ape interaction-for instance, to be dyadic rather than triadic, to be about the here-and-now rather than "displaced," and to have a high degree of perceptual resemblance between form and meaning-are products of its Ladyginian but not Gricean character. We also reinterpret video footage of great ape gesture as Ladyginian but not Gricean, and we distinguish several varieties of meaning that are continuous with one another. We conclude that the evolutionary origins of linguistic meaning lie not in gradual changes in communication systems, but rather in gradual changes in social cognition, and specifically in what modes of attention manipulation are enabled by a species' cognitive phenotype: first Ladyginian and in turn Gricean. The second of these shifts rendered humans, and only humans, "language ready."

Modeling intentionality in the human brain

This paper is focusing on a rather neglected issue that concerns both aspects of philosophy and neurobiology in relation to the concept of intentionality. Intentionality is concerned with the 'directedness' or 'aboutness' of mental phenomena towards an object. Despite the fact that in philosophy both concepts of aboutness and directedness are conceptually identical with intentionality, a careful neuroscientific approach can demonstrate that these two phenomena represent two distinct conceptual and neurobiological aspects of intentionality with complementary functions. We described the interaction between a series of intentionality and pathogenetic psychobiological factors, the corresponding brain topography, and the resulting clinical manifestation and psychopathology. A permanent failure of intentionality dominates in psychosis, which includes an inappropriateness of the intentional object or connection, from the outset, or even from the prodromal phase of the disorder. Affective disorders may result from imprecise interoceptive prediction error signals, due to a confused identification of the intentional object. In suicidal patients there is an emotional intentionality failure, characterized by an absence of intentional object or a loss of conscious access to normal intentional objects. We may model an 'intentional system' as a higher order system, with a monitoring and regulatory role attributed to the brain and behavior. Also, we may consider mental disorders as the result of a radical disruption of intentionality, due to an inappropriateness or lack of the intentional object or due to an inappropriate connection in some points of the suggested brain pathways of intentionality.

Intentional gestural communication amongst red-capped mangabeys (Cercocebus torquatus)

Apes, human's closest living relatives, are renowned for their intentional and highly flexible use of gestural communication. In stark contrast, evidence for flexible and intentional gestural communication in monkeys is scarce. Here, we investigated the intentionality and flexibility of spontaneous gesture use in red-capped mangabeys (Cercocebus torquatus). We applied established methods used in ape gesture research to analyse whether the body acts produced by a total of 17 individuals living in three different groups in captivity qualified as intentionally produced gesture instances. Results showed that signallers showed all hallmarks of intentionality during the production of 20 out of a total of 21 different types of body acts. These were only produced in the presence of other individuals, and the monkeys showed audience checking, sensitivity to the attentional states of recipients, adjustment of signal modality, and response waiting relative to their production. Moreover, in case of communication failure, the monkeys showed goal persistence, and regarding the production contexts they showed some signs of means-ends dissociation. Therefore, these monkeys are capable of flexible and intentional gestural communication and use this to communicate with conspecifics. Our results corroborate recent findings showing that intentional gestural communication was already present in the monkey lineage of catarrhine primates. We discuss our results in light of the comparative approach towards human language evolution and highlight our finding that these monkeys also showed flexible and intentional use of four 'free' manual gesture types.

Are ape gestures like words? Outstanding issues in detecting similarities and differences between human language and ape gesture

Opinion piece: ape gestures are made intentionally, inviting parallels with human language; but how similar are their gestures to words? Here we ask this in three ways, considering: flexibility and ambiguity, first- and second-order intentionality, and usage in interactive exchanges. Many gestures are used to achieve several, often very distinct, goals. Such apparent ambiguity in meaning is potentially disruptive for communication, but-as with human language-situational and interpersonal context may largely resolve the intended meaning. Our evidence for first-order intentional use of gesture is abundant, but how might we establish a case for the second-order intentional use critical to language? Finally, words are rarely used in tidy signal-response sequences but are exchanged in back-and-forth interaction. Do gestures share this property? In this paper, we examine these questions and set out ways in which they can be resolved, incorporating data from wild chimpanzees. This article is part of the theme issue 'Cognition, communication and social bonds in primates'.

Coordinating social action: a primer for the cross-species investigation of communicative repair

Human joint action is inherently cooperative, manifested in the collaborative efforts of participants to minimize communicative trouble through interactive repair. Although interactive repair requires sophisticated cognitive abilities, it can be dissected into basic building blocks shared with non-human animal species. A review of the primate literature shows that interactionally contingent signal sequences are at least common among species of non-human great apes, suggesting a gradual evolution of repair. To pioneer a cross-species assessment of repair this paper aims at (i) identifying necessary precursors of human interactive repair; (ii) proposing a coding framework for its comparative study in humans and non-human species; and (iii) using this framework to analyse examples of interactions of humans (adults/children) and non-human great apes. We hope this paper will serve as a primer for cross-species comparisons of communicative breakdowns and how they are repaired. This article is part of the theme issue 'Revisiting the human 'interaction engine': comparative approaches to social action coordination'.

Island Life: Use of Activity Budgets and Visibility to Evaluate a Multi-Species Within-Zoo Exhibit Move

Modern zoos strive to construct habitats which both enable and encourage animals to engage in species-specific behaviour, without compromising their visibility to visitors. Here, we present the findings of a within-zoo move to a custom-built exhibit (Islands at Chester Zoo, UK) with respect to the behaviour of four mammal species; the Sumatran orangutan (Pongo abelii), crested macaque (Macaca nigra), Malayan tapir (Tapirus indicus) and the Malayan sun bear (Helarctos malayanus). We used full activity budgets along with Compositional Data Analysis (CoDA) to gain insight into how the move to a more naturalistic exhibit influenced behaviour. Engagement in abnormal behaviour remained low during the study period for all four species, suggesting no adverse responses to the change in environment. Following the move, both the non-human primate species spent more time engaged in positive social interactions with conspecifics, highlighting the importance of social support during enclosure moves. Time spent visible to the public was largely unaffected by the enclosure move for the Sumatran orangutan, whilst the movement to a new environment increased visibility for the Malayan sun bear and decreased visibility for the crested macaque and Malayan tapir. We demonstrate the value of monitoring behaviour throughout the translocation of zoo-housed species and outline the positive behavioral impacts of providing individuals with naturalistic, species-appropriate environments.

Compositionality in Primate Gestural Communication and Multicomponent Signal Displays

Compositionality is the ability to combine meaningful elements into new combinations with novel meanings, and it has long been considered one of the main hallmarks of human communication. However, very few studies have addressed the compositional aspects of communication in species other than humans, although a comparative approach is essential to understand the evolutionary origins of human compositionality. We review previous research on compositionality in the gestural communication systems of nonhuman primates, with a special focus on the multicomponent aspects of compositionality. We start by discussing the importance of a comparative approach to study the evolution of human language and then compare the current state of the art on compositionality in the vocal, facial, and gestural communication systems of primates and other species. We further discuss alternative approaches to study compositionality in primates, which may help overcome some of the current methodological limitations in this research area. In particular, we 1) highlight the importance of interdisciplinary tools that facilitate the statistical identification of multicomponent and multimodal combinations of signals, 2) discuss different approaches to infer the meaning of signal combinations, with a special focus on the use of contextual cues and meta-communication, and 3) discuss temporal and intentional aspects of compositionality in primates. Finally, we outline possible lines of research for future studies in this area (e.g., more consistent use of terms across research areas, use of different methodological tools and larger datasets, inclusion of developmental approaches), which might shed light into the evolutionary origins of one of the most crucial properties of human communication.

Bared-teeth displays in bonobos (Pan paniscus): An assessment of the power asymmetry hypothesis

Facial expressions are key to navigating social group life. The Power Asymmetry Hypothesis of Motivational Emancipation predicts that the type of social organization shapes the meaning of communicative displays in relation to an individual's dominance rank. The bared-teeth (BT) display represents one of the most widely observed communicative signals across primate species. Studies in macaques indicate that the BT display in despotic species is often performed unidirectionally, from low- to high-ranking individuals (signaling submission), whereas the BT display in egalitarian species is usually produced irrespective of dominance (mainly signaling affiliation and appeasement). Despite its widespread presence, research connecting BT displays to the power asymmetry hypothesis outside the Macaca genus remains scarce. To extend this knowledge, we investigated the production of BT in relation to social dominance in dyadic interactions (N = 11,377 events) of 11 captive bonobos (Pan paniscus). Although adult bonobos were more despotic than previously suggested in the literature, BT displays were produced irrespective of dominance rank. Moreover, while adults produced the BT exclusively during socio-sexual interactions, especially during periods of social tension, immature bonobos produced the BT in a wider number of contexts. As such, the results indicate that the communicative meaning of the BT display is consistent with signaling appeasement, especially in periods of social tension. Moreover, the BT display does not seem to signal social status, supporting the prediction for species with a high degree of social tolerance. These results advance our understanding of the origins of communicative signals and their relation to species' social systems.

An intentional cohesion call in male chimpanzees of Budongo Forest

Many social animals travel in cohesive groups but some species, including chimpanzees, form flexible fission–fusion systems where individuals have some control over group cohesion and proximity to others. Here, we explored how male chimpanzees of the Sonso community of Budongo Forest, Uganda, use communication signals during resting, a context where the likelihood of group fission is high due to forthcoming travel. We focused on a context-specific vocalisation, the ‘rest hoo’, to investigate its function and determine whether it is produced intentionally. We found that this call was typically given towards the end of typical silent resting bouts, i.e., the period when individuals need to decide whether to continue travelling after a brief stop-over or to start a prolonged resting bout. Subjects rested longer after producing ‘rest hoos’ and their resting time increased with the number of calls produced. They also rested longer if their calls were answered. Furthermore, focal subjects’ resting time was prolonged after hearing others’ ‘rest hoos’. Subjects called more when with top proximity partners and in small parties and rested longer if a top proximity partner called. We also found an interaction effect between rank and grooming activity, with high-ranking males with a high grooming index calling less frequently than other males, suggesting that vocal communication may serve as a cohesion strategy alternative to tactile-based bonding. We discuss these different patterns and conclude that chimpanzee ‘rest hoos’ meet key criteria for intentional signalling. We suggest that ‘rest hoos’ are produced to prolong resting bouts with desired partners, which may function to increase social cohesion.

Inferential Communication: Bridging the Gap Between Intentional and Ostensive Communication in Non-human Primates

Communication, when defined as an act intended to affect the psychological state of another individual, demands the use of inference. Either the signaler, the recipient, or both must make leaps of understanding which surpass the semantic information available and draw from pragmatic clues to fully imbue and interpret meaning. While research into human communication and the evolution of language has long been comfortable with mentalistic interpretations of communicative exchanges, including rich attributions of mental state, research into animal communication has balked at theoretical models which describe mentalized cognitive mechanisms. We submit a new theoretical perspective on animal communication: the model of inferential communication. For use when existing proximate models of animal communication are not sufficient to fully explain the complex, flexible, and intentional communication documented in certain species, specifically non-human primates, we present our model as a bridge between shallower, less cognitive descriptions of communicative behavior and the perhaps otherwise inaccessible mentalistic interpretations of communication found in theoretical considerations of human language. Inferential communication is a framework that builds on existing evidence of referentiality, intentionality, and social inference in primates. It allows that they might be capable of applying social inferences to a communicative setting, which could explain some of the cognitive processes that enable the complexity and flexibility of primate communication systems. While historical models of animal communication focus on the means-ends process of behavior and apparent cognitive outcomes, inferential communication invites consideration of the mentalistic processes that must underlie those outcomes. We propose a mentalized approach to questions, investigations, and interpretations of non-human primate communication. We include an overview of both ultimate and proximate models of animal communication, which contextualize the role and utility of our inferential communication model, and provide a detailed breakdown of the possible levels of cognitive complexity which could be investigated using this framework. Finally, we present some possible applications of inferential communication in the field of non-human primate communication and highlight the role it could play in advancing progress toward an increasingly precise understanding of the cognitive capabilities of our closest living relatives.

Expression unleashed: The evolutionary and cognitive foundations of human communication

Human expression is open-ended, versatile, and diverse, ranging from ordinary language use to painting, from exaggerated displays of affection to micro-movements that aid coordination. Here we present and defend the claim that this expressive diversity is united by an interrelated suite of cognitive capacities, the evolved functions of which are the expression and recognition of informative intentions. We describe how evolutionary dynamics normally leash communication to narrow domains of statistical mutual benefit, and how expression is unleashed in humans. The relevant cognitive capacities are cognitive adaptations to living in a partner choice social ecology; and they are, correspondingly, part of the ordinarily developing human cognitive phenotype, emerging early and reliably in ontogeny. In other words, we identify distinctive features of our species' social ecology to explain how and why humans, and only humans, evolved the cognitive capacities that, in turn, lead to massive diversity and open-endedness in means and modes of expression. Language use is but one of these modes of expression, albeit one of manifestly high importance. We make cross-species comparisons, describe how the relevant cognitive capacities can evolve in a gradual manner, and survey how unleashed expression facilitates not only language use, but also novel behaviour in many other domains too, focusing on the examples of joint action, teaching, punishment, and art, all of which are ubiquitous in human societies but relatively rare in other species. Much of this diversity derives from graded aspects of human expression, which can be used to satisfy informative intentions in creative and new ways. We aim to help reorient cognitive pragmatics, as a phenomenon that is not a supplement to linguistic communication and on the periphery of language science, but rather the foundation of the many of the most distinctive features of human behaviour, society, and culture.

Operationalizing Intentionality in Primate Communication: Social and Ecological Considerations

An intentional transfer of information is central to human communication. When comparing nonhuman primate communication systems to language, a critical challenge is to determine whether a signal is used in intentional, goal-oriented ways. As it is not possible to directly observe psychological states in any species, comparative researchers have inferred intentionality via behavioral markers derived from studies on prelinguistic human children. Recent efforts to increase consistency in nonhuman primate communication studies undervalue the effect of possible sources of bias: some behavioral markers are not generalizable across certain signal types (gestures, vocalizations, and facial expressions), contexts, settings, and species. Despite laudable attempts to operationalize first-order intentionality across signal types, a true “multimodal” approach requires integration across their sensory components (visual-silent, contact, audible), as a signal from a certain type can comprise more than one sensory component. Here we discuss how the study of intentional communication in nonlinguistic systems is hampered by issues of reliability, validity, consistency, and generalizability. We then highlight future research avenues that may help to understand the use of goal-oriented communication by opting, whenever possible, for reliable, valid, and consistent behavioral markers, but also taking into account sampling biases and integrating detailed observations of intraspecific communicative interactions.

Chimpanzee facial gestures and the implications for the evolution of language

Great ape manual gestures are described as communicative, flexible, intentional, and goal-oriented. These gestures are thought to be an evolutionary pre-cursor to human language. Conversely, facial expressions are thought to be inflexible, automatic, and derived from emotion. However, great apes can make a wide range of movements with their faces, and they may possess the control needed to gesture with their faces as well as their hands. We examined whether chimpanzee facial expressions possess the four important gesture properties and how they compare to manual gestures. To do this, we quantified variables that have been previously described through largely qualitative means. Chimpanzee facial expressions met all four gesture criteria and performed remarkably similar to manual gestures. Facial gestures have implications for the evolution of language. If other mammals also show facial gestures, then the gestural origins of language may be much older than the human/great ape lineage.

What can animal communication teach us about human language?

Language has been considered by many to be uniquely human. Numerous theories for how it evolved have been proposed but rarely tested. The articles in this theme issue consider the extent to which aspects of language, such as vocal learning, phonology, syntax, semantics, intentionality, cognition and neurobiological adaptations, are shared with other animals. By adopting a comparative approach, insights into the mechanisms and origins of human language can be gained. While points of agreement exist among the authors, conflicting viewpoints are expressed on several issues, such as the presence of proto-syntax in animal communication, the neural basis of the Merge operation, and the neurogenetic changes necessary for vocal learning. Future comparative research in animal communication has the potential to teach us even more about the evolution, neurobiology and cognitive basis of human language. This article is part of the theme issue 'What can animal communication teach us about human language?'

Exploring the cerebral substrate of voice perception in primate brains

One can consider human language to be the Swiss army knife of the vast domain of animal communication. There is now growing evidence suggesting that this technology may have emerged from already operational material instead of being a sudden innovation. Sharing ideas and thoughts with conspecifics via language constitutes an amazing ability, but what value would it hold if our conspecifics were not first detected and recognized? Conspecific voice (CV) perception is fundamental to communication and widely shared across the animal kingdom. Two questions that arise then are: is this apparently shared ability reflected in common cerebral substrate? And, how has this substrate evolved? The paper addresses these questions by examining studies on the cerebral basis of CV perception in humans' closest relatives, non-human primates. Neuroimaging studies, in particular, suggest the existence of a ‘voice patch system’, a network of interconnected cortical areas that can provide a common template for the cerebral processing of CV in primates.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘What can animal communication teach us about human language?’