1
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Murase Y, Hilbe C. Computational evolution of social norms in well-mixed and group-structured populations. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2024; 121:e2406885121. [PMID: 39116135 PMCID: PMC11331111 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2406885121] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/05/2024] [Accepted: 07/15/2024] [Indexed: 08/10/2024] Open
Abstract
Models of indirect reciprocity study how social norms promote cooperation. In these models, cooperative individuals build up a positive reputation, which in turn helps them in their future interactions. The exact reputational benefits of cooperation depend on the norm in place, which may change over time. Previous research focused on the stability of social norms. Much less is known about how social norms initially evolve when competing with many others. A comprehensive evolutionary analysis, however, has been difficult. Even among the comparably simple space of so-called third-order norms, there are thousands of possibilities, each one inducing its own reputation dynamics. To address this challenge, we use large-scale computer simulations. We study the reputation dynamics of each third-order norm and all evolutionary transitions between them. In contrast to established work with only a handful of norms, we find that cooperation is hard to maintain in well-mixed populations. However, within group-structured populations, cooperation can emerge. The most successful norm in our simulations is particularly simple. It regards cooperation as universally positive, and defection as usually negative-unless defection takes the form of justified punishment. This research sheds light on the complex interplay of social norms, their induced reputation dynamics, and population structure.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yohsuke Murase
- RIKEN Center for Computational Science, Kobe650-0047, Japan
| | - Christian Hilbe
- Max Planck Research Group Dynamics of Social Behavior, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön24306, Germany
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2
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Beese S, Graves JM, Postma J, Oneal G. The four stages of neighborhood trust: Classic grounded theory. Public Health Nurs 2024; 41:768-780. [PMID: 38639194 DOI: 10.1111/phn.13326] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/01/2023] [Revised: 03/26/2024] [Accepted: 03/28/2024] [Indexed: 04/20/2024]
Abstract
INTRODUCTION Neighborhoods are often overlooked as a determinant of health. Among recent research, the focus on "place-based effects," due to prolonged residential environmental exposure, has been of particular interest. These studies' purpose is to identify and examine how a healthy neighborhood is intentionally created to describe a transferable process-driven theory. METHOD A classic grounded theory approach was used in these studies. Data sources include individual in-depth interviews, historical documents, and a member-checking focus group, collected over 3-years. RESULTS Analysis generated the Four Stages of Neighborhood Trust Model, which is nested within the context of perceived neighborhood safety. The theory outlines a social process of four stages of neighborhood trust: (a) rules-based agreements, (b) shared values, (c) cooperation, and (d) neighborhood belonging. CONCLUSIONS We present the development of a process-driven theory that may be useful for public health nurses as they engage neighborhoods in health promotion activities. The stage of trust development will aid the nurse in identifying what is needed to move to the next stage in a healthy neighborhood process.
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Affiliation(s)
- Shawna Beese
- College of Agricultural, Human, and Natural Resource Sciences, Extension, Washington State University, Pullman, Washington, USA
- College of Nursing, Washington State University, Spokane, Washington, USA
| | - Janessa M Graves
- College of Nursing, Washington State University, Spokane, Washington, USA
- School of Medicine, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, USA
| | - Julie Postma
- College of Nursing, Washington State University, Spokane, Washington, USA
| | - Gail Oneal
- College of Nursing, Washington State University, Spokane, Washington, USA
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3
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Colnaghi M, Santos FP, Van Lange PAM, Balliet D. Adaptations to infer fitness interdependence promote the evolution of cooperation. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2023; 120:e2312242120. [PMID: 38055736 PMCID: PMC10723045 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2312242120] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/18/2023] [Accepted: 10/30/2023] [Indexed: 12/08/2023] Open
Abstract
The evolution of cooperation is a major question in the biological and behavioral sciences. While most theoretical studies model cooperation in the context of an isolated interaction (e.g., a Prisoner's Dilemma), humans live in heterogeneous social environments, characterized by large variations in fitness interdependence-the extent to which one's fitness is affected by others. Theoretical and experimental work indicates that humans can infer, and respond to, variations in interdependence. In a heterogeneous ancestral environment, these psychological mechanisms to infer fitness interdependence could have provided a selective advantage, allowing individuals to maximize their fitness by deciding when and with whom to cooperate. Yet, to date, the link between cognitive inference, variation in fitness interdependence, and cooperation remains unclear. Here we introduce a theoretical framework to study the evolution of inference and cooperation in heterogeneous social environments, where individuals experience interactions with varying levels of corresponding interests. Using a combination of evolutionary game theory and agent-based modeling, we model the evolution of adaptive agents, who incur a cost to infer interdependence, in populations of fixed-behavior agents who always cooperate or defect. Our results indicate that natural selection could promote the evolution of psychological mechanisms to infer fitness interdependence, provided that there is enough variation in fitness interdependence to offset the cost of inference. Under certain conditions, the fixation of adaptive agents results in higher levels of cooperation. This depends crucially on the type of inference performed and the features of the interdependence landscape.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marco Colnaghi
- Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Institute for Brain and Behaviour Amsterdam, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam1081BT, The Netherlands
| | - Fernando P. Santos
- Informatics Institute, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam1098XH, The Netherlands
| | - Paul A. M. Van Lange
- Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Institute for Brain and Behaviour Amsterdam, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam1081BT, The Netherlands
| | - Daniel Balliet
- Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Institute for Brain and Behaviour Amsterdam, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam1081BT, The Netherlands
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4
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Yaman A, Leibo JZ, Iacca G, Wan Lee S. The emergence of division of labour through decentralized social sanctioning. Proc Biol Sci 2023; 290:20231716. [PMID: 37876187 PMCID: PMC10598450 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2023.1716] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/31/2023] [Accepted: 09/19/2023] [Indexed: 10/26/2023] Open
Abstract
Human ecological success relies on our characteristic ability to flexibly self-organize into cooperative social groups, the most successful of which employ substantial specialization and division of labour. Unlike most other animals, humans learn by trial and error during their lives what role to take on. However, when some critical roles are more attractive than others, and individuals are self-interested, then there is a social dilemma: each individual would prefer others take on the critical but unremunerative roles so they may remain free to take one that pays better. But disaster occurs if all act thus and a critical role goes unfilled. In such situations learning an optimum role distribution may not be possible. Consequently, a fundamental question is: how can division of labour emerge in groups of self-interested lifetime-learning individuals? Here, we show that by introducing a model of social norms, which we regard as emergent patterns of decentralized social sanctioning, it becomes possible for groups of self-interested individuals to learn a productive division of labour involving all critical roles. Such social norms work by redistributing rewards within the population to disincentivize antisocial roles while incentivizing prosocial roles that do not intrinsically pay as well as others.
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Affiliation(s)
- Anil Yaman
- Computer Science Department, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands
| | | | - Giovanni Iacca
- Department of Information Engineering and Computer Science, University of Trento, Trento, Italy
| | - Sang Wan Lee
- Department of Bio and Brain Engineering, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon 34141, Republic of Korea
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5
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Goodman JR, Caines A, Foley RA. Shibboleth: An agent-based model of signalling mimicry. PLoS One 2023; 18:e0289333. [PMID: 37523380 PMCID: PMC10389733 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0289333] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/02/2022] [Accepted: 07/17/2023] [Indexed: 08/02/2023] Open
Abstract
Mimicry is an essential strategy for exploiting competitors in competitive co-evolutionary relationships. Protection against mimicry may, furthermore, be a driving force in human linguistic diversity: the potential harm caused by failing to detect mimicked group-identity signals may select for high sensitivity to mimicry of honest group members. Here we describe the results of five agent-based models that simulate multi-generational interactions between two groups of individuals: original members of a group with an honest identity signal, and members of an outsider group who mimic that signal, aiming to pass as members of the in-group. The models correspond to the Biblical story of Shibboleth, where a tribe in conflict with another determines tribe affiliation by asking individuals to pronounce the word, 'Shibboleth.' In the story, failure to reproduce the word phonetically resulted in death. Here, we run five different versions of a 'Shibboleth' model: a first, simple version, which evaluates whether a composite variable of mimicry quality and detection quality is a superior predictor to the model's outcome than is cost of detection. The models thereafter evaluate variations on the simple model, incorporating group-level behaviours such as altruistic punishment. Our results suggest that group members' sensitivity to mimicry of the Shibboleth-signal is a better predictor of whether any signal of group identity goes into fixation in the overall population than is the cost of mimicry detection. Thus, the likelihood of being detected as a mimic may be more important than the costs imposed on mimics who are detected. This suggests that theoretical models in biology should place greater emphasis on the likelihood of detection, which does not explicitly entail costs, rather than on the costs to individuals who are detected. From a language learning perspective, the results suggest that admission to group membership through linguistic signals is powered by the ability to imitate and evade detection as an outsider by existing group members.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jonathan R Goodman
- Leverhulme Centre for Human Evolutionary Studies, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom
- Darwin College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom
| | - Andrew Caines
- ALTA Institute, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom
| | - Robert A Foley
- Leverhulme Centre for Human Evolutionary Studies, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom
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6
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Frean M, Marsland S. Score-mediated mutual consent and indirect reciprocity. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2023; 120:e2302107120. [PMID: 37253000 PMCID: PMC10266034 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2302107120] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/06/2023] [Accepted: 04/26/2023] [Indexed: 06/01/2023] Open
Abstract
Helping strangers at a cost to oneself is a hallmark of many human interactions, but difficult to justify from the viewpoint of natural selection, particularly in anonymous one-shot interactions. Reputational scoring can provide the necessary motivation via "indirect reciprocity," but maintaining reliable scores requires close oversight to prevent cheating. We show that in the absence of such supervision, it is possible that scores might be managed by mutual consent between the agents themselves instead of by third parties. The space of possible strategies for such "consented" score changes is very large but, using a simple cooperation game, we search it, asking what kinds of agreement can i) invade a population from rare and ii) resist invasion once common. We prove mathematically and demonstrate computationally that score mediation by mutual consent does enable cooperation without oversight. Moreover, the most invasive and stable strategies belong to one family and ground the concept of value by incrementing one score at the cost of the other, thus closely resembling the token exchange that underlies money in everyday human transactions. The most successful strategy has the flavor of money except that agents without money can generate new score if they meet. This strategy is evolutionarily stable, and has higher fitness, but is not physically realizable in a decentralized way; when conservation of score is enforced more money-like strategies dominate. The equilibrium distribution of scores under any of this family of strategies is geometric, meaning that agents with score 0 are inherent to money-like strategies.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marcus Frean
- School of Engineering and Computer Science, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington6012, New Zealand
| | - Stephen Marsland
- School of Mathematics and Statistics, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington6012, New Zealand
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7
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Fujimoto Y, Ohtsuki H. Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2023; 120:e2300544120. [PMID: 37155910 PMCID: PMC10194006 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2300544120] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/25/2023] [Accepted: 04/09/2023] [Indexed: 05/10/2023] Open
Abstract
Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism that explains large-scale cooperation in humans. In indirect reciprocity, individuals use reputations to choose whether or not to cooperate with a partner and update others' reputations. A major question is how the rules to choose their actions and the rules to update reputations evolve. In the public reputation case where all individuals share the evaluation of others, social norms called Simple Standing (SS) and Stern Judging (SJ) have been known to maintain cooperation. However, in the case of private assessment where individuals independently evaluate others, the mechanism of maintenance of cooperation is still largely unknown. This study theoretically shows for the first time that cooperation by indirect reciprocity can be evolutionarily stable under private assessment. Specifically, we find that SS can be stable, but SJ can never be. This is intuitive because SS can correct interpersonal discrepancies in reputations through its simplicity. On the other hand, SJ is too complicated to avoid an accumulation of errors, which leads to the collapse of cooperation. We conclude that moderate simplicity is a key to stable cooperation under the private assessment. Our result provides a theoretical basis for the evolution of human cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yuma Fujimoto
- Research Center for Integrative Evolutionary Science, SOKENDAI (The Graduate University for Advanced Studies), Hayama240-0193, Japan
- Universal Biology Institute, The University of Tokyo, Bunkyo-ku113-0033, Japan
- CyberAgent, Inc., Shibuya-ku150-0042, Japan
| | - Hisashi Ohtsuki
- Research Center for Integrative Evolutionary Science, SOKENDAI (The Graduate University for Advanced Studies), Hayama240-0193, Japan
- Department of Evolutionary Studies of Biosystems, SOKENDAI, Hayama240-0193, Japan
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8
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Martinez-Vaquero LA. Inequality leads to the evolution of intolerance in reputation-based populations. CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2023; 33:033119. [PMID: 37003803 DOI: 10.1063/5.0135376] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/18/2022] [Accepted: 01/24/2023] [Indexed: 06/19/2023]
Abstract
This work studies the impact of economic inequality on the evolution of intolerance through a reputation-based model of indirect reciprocity. Results show that economic inequality is a powerful enhancer of intolerance, inducing the escalation of out-group discrimination even without the presence of new intolerant mutants. It also generates behavior modifications within tolerant disfavored minorities: their members either relax punishments against the uncooperative or prioritize helping the wealthy, even suffering discrimination in return. On the other hand, the redistribution of wealth is proven as a viable solution to avoid the spread of intolerance as long as it increases equality and is implemented before intolerance permeates part of the population.
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9
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Fujimoto Y, Ohtsuki H. Reputation structure in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment. Sci Rep 2022; 12:10500. [PMID: 35732644 PMCID: PMC9217807 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-022-14171-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/15/2022] [Accepted: 06/02/2022] [Indexed: 12/04/2022] Open
Abstract
Evaluation relationships are pivotal for maintaining a cooperative society. A formation of the evaluation relationships has been discussed in terms of indirect reciprocity, by modeling dynamics of good or bad reputations among individuals. Recently, a situation that individuals independently evaluate others with errors (i.e., noisy and private reputation) is considered, where the reputation structure (from what proportion of individuals in the population each receives good reputations, defined as goodness here) becomes complex, and thus has been studied mainly with numerical simulations. The present study gives a theoretical analysis of such complex reputation structure. We formulate the time change of goodness of individuals caused by updates of reputations among individuals. By considering a large population, we derive dynamics of the frequency distribution of goodnesses. An equilibrium state of the dynamics is approximated by a summation of Gaussian functions. We demonstrate that the theoretical solution well fits the numerical calculation. From the theoretical solution, we obtain a new interpretation of the complex reputation structure. This study provides a novel mathematical basis for cutting-edge studies on indirect reciprocity.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yuma Fujimoto
- Department of Evolutionary Studies of Biosystems, SOKENDAI, Shonan Village, Hayama, Kanagawa, 240-0193, Japan.
- Universal Biology Institute (UBI), The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Tokyo, Bunkyo-ku, 113-0033, Japan.
| | - Hisashi Ohtsuki
- Department of Evolutionary Studies of Biosystems, SOKENDAI, Shonan Village, Hayama, Kanagawa, 240-0193, Japan
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10
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Manrique HM, Zeidler H, Roberts G, Barclay P, Walker M, Samu F, Fariña A, Bshary R, Raihani N. The psychological foundations of reputation-based cooperation. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2021; 376:20200287. [PMID: 34601920 PMCID: PMC8487732 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0287] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 06/02/2021] [Indexed: 12/27/2022] Open
Abstract
Humans care about having a positive reputation, which may prompt them to help in scenarios where the return benefits are not obvious. Various game-theoretical models support the hypothesis that concern for reputation may stabilize cooperation beyond kin, pairs or small groups. However, such models are not explicit about the underlying psychological mechanisms that support reputation-based cooperation. These models therefore cannot account for the apparent rarity of reputation-based cooperation in other species. Here, we identify the cognitive mechanisms that may support reputation-based cooperation in the absence of language. We argue that a large working memory enhances the ability to delay gratification, to understand others' mental states (which allows for perspective-taking and attribution of intentions) and to create and follow norms, which are key building blocks for increasingly complex reputation-based cooperation. We review the existing evidence for the appearance of these processes during human ontogeny as well as their presence in non-human apes and other vertebrates. Based on this review, we predict that most non-human species are cognitively constrained to show only simple forms of reputation-based cooperation. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Héctor M. Manrique
- Department of Psychology and Sociology, Universidad de Zaragoza, Campus Universitario de Teruel, Ciudad Escolar, s/n. 44003 Teruel, Spain
| | - Henriette Zeidler
- Department of Psychology, School of Life and Health Sciences, Aston University, Birmingham, UK
| | | | - Pat Barclay
- Psychology, University of Guelph, Guelph, Canada
| | - Michael Walker
- Department of Zoology and Physical Anthropology, Universidad de Murcia, Murcia, Spain
| | - Flóra Samu
- The Institute for Analytical Sociology, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden
| | - Andrea Fariña
- Social, Economic, and Organizational Psychology, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands
| | - Redouan Bshary
- Biology, University of Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel, Switzerland
| | - Nichola Raihani
- Experimental Psychology, University College London, London, UK
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11
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Podder S, Righi S, Pancotto F. Reputation and punishment sustain cooperation in the optional public goods game. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2021; 376:20200293. [PMID: 34601913 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0293] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Cooperative behaviour has been extensively studied as a choice between cooperation and defection. However, the possibility to not participate is also frequently available. This type of problem can be studied through the optional public goods game. The introduction of the 'Loner' strategy' allows players to withdraw from the game, which leads to a cooperator-defector-loner cycle. While pro-social punishment can help increase cooperation, anti-social punishment-where defectors punish cooperators-causes its downfall in both experimental and theoretical studies. In this paper, we introduce social norms that allow agents to condition their behaviour to the reputation of their peers. We benchmark this with respect both to the standard optional public goods game and to the variant where all types of punishment are allowed. We find that a social norm imposing a more moderate reputational penalty for opting out than for defecting increases cooperation. When, besides reputation, punishment is also possible, the two mechanisms work synergically under all social norms that do not assign to loners a strictly worse reputation than to defectors. Under this latter set-up, the high levels of cooperation are sustained by conditional strategies, which largely reduce the use of pro-social punishment and almost completely eliminate anti-social punishment. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Shirsendu Podder
- Department of Computer Science, University College London, London, UK
| | - Simone Righi
- Department of Economics, Ca'Foscari University of Venice, Venezia, Italy
| | - Francesca Pancotto
- Department of Communication and Economics, Università degli Studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia, Reggio Emilia, Italy
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12
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Romano A, Giardini F, Columbus S, de Kwaadsteniet EW, Kisfalusi D, Triki Z, Snijders C, Hagel K. Reputation and socio-ecology in humans. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2021; 376:20200295. [PMID: 34601915 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0295] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Reputation is a fundamental feature of human sociality as it sustains cooperative relationships among unrelated individuals. Research from various disciplines provides insights on how individuals form impressions of others, condition their behaviours based on the reputation of their interacting partners and spread or learn such reputations. However, past research has often neglected the socio-ecological conditions that can shape reputation systems and their effect on cooperation. Here, we outline how social environments, cultural values and institutions come to play a crucial role in how people navigate reputation systems. Moreover, we illustrate how these socio-ecological dimensions affect the interdependence underlying social interactions (e.g. potential recipients of reputational benefits, degree of dependence) and the extent to which reputation systems promote cooperation. To do so, we review the interdisciplinary literature that illustrates how reputation systems are shaped by the variation of prominent ecological features. Finally, we discuss the implications of a socio-ecological approach to the study of reputation and outline potential avenues for future research. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.
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Affiliation(s)
- A Romano
- Social, Economic and Organizational Psychology, Leiden University, 2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands
| | - F Giardini
- Department of Sociology, University of Groningen and Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS), Groningen, The Netherlands
| | - S Columbus
- Department of Psychology, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - E W de Kwaadsteniet
- Social, Economic and Organizational Psychology, Leiden University, 2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands
| | - D Kisfalusi
- Computational Social Science-Research Centre for Educational and Network Studies (CSS-RECENS), Centre for Social Sciences, Eötvös Loránd Research Network, Budapest, Hungary
| | - Z Triki
- Institute of Biology, University of Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel, Switzerland.,Department of Zoology, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
| | - C Snijders
- Human-Technology Interaction Group, Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, The Netherlands
| | - K Hagel
- Department of Human Behaviour, Ecology and Culture, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany
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13
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Dumas M, Barker JL, Power EA. When does reputation lie? Dynamic feedbacks between costly signals, social capital and social prominence. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2021; 376:20200298. [PMID: 34601919 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0298] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/30/2022] Open
Abstract
Performing a dramatic act of religious devotion, creating an art exhibit, or releasing a new product are all examples of public acts that signal quality and contribute to building a reputation. Signalling theory predicts that these public displays can reliably reveal quality. However, data from ethnographic work in South India suggests that more prominent individuals gain more from reputation-building religious acts than more marginalized individuals. To understand this phenomenon, we extend signalling theory to include variation in people's social prominence or social capital, first with an analytical model and then with an agent-based model. We consider two ways in which social prominence/capital may alter signalling: (i) it impacts observers' priors, and (ii) it alters the signallers' pay-offs. These two mechanisms can result in both a 'reputational shield,' where low quality individuals are able to 'pass' as high quality thanks to their greater social prominence/capital, and a 'reputational poverty trap,' where high quality individuals are unable to improve their standing owing to a lack of social prominence/capital. These findings bridge the signalling theory tradition prominent in behavioural ecology, anthropology and economics with the work on status hierarchies in sociology, and shed light on the complex ways in which individuals make inferences about others. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marion Dumas
- Grantham Research Institute, London School of Economics & Political Science, London WC2A 2AE, UK
| | - Jessica L Barker
- Aarhus University Interacting Minds Centre, Alaska Dept of Health & Social Services, Aarhus 8000, Denmark
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14
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Számadó S, Balliet D, Giardini F, Power EA, Takács K. The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2021; 376:20200286. [PMID: 34601918 PMCID: PMC8487738 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0286] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 08/25/2021] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Large-scale non-kin cooperation is a unique ingredient of human success. This type of cooperation is challenging to explain in a world of self-interested individuals. There is overwhelming empirical evidence from different disciplines that reputation and gossip promote cooperation in humans in different contexts. Despite decades of research, important details of reputation systems are still unclear. Our goal with this theme issue is to promote an interdisciplinary approach that allows us to explore and understand the evolution and maintenance of reputation systems with a special emphasis on gossip and honest signalling. The theme issue is organized around four main questions: What are the necessary conditions for reputation-based systems? What is the content and context of reputation systems? How can reputations promote cooperation? And, what is the role of gossip in maintaining reputation systems and thus cooperation? This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.
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Affiliation(s)
- S. Számadó
- Department of Sociology and Communication, BUTE, Budapest, Hungary
- CSS-RECENS, Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest, Hungary
| | - D. Balliet
- Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
| | - F. Giardini
- Department of Sociology, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
| | - E. A. Power
- Department of Methodology, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
| | - K. Takács
- CSS-RECENS, Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest, Hungary
- Institute for Analytical Sociology, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden
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