Intertemporal choice reflects value comparison rather than self-control: insights from confidence judgements

Temporal discounting predicts procrastination in the real world

People procrastinate, but why? One long-standing hypothesis is that temporal discounting drives procrastination: in a task with a distant future reward, the discounted future reward fails to provide sufficient motivation to initiate work early. However, empirical evidence for this hypothesis has been lacking. Here, we used a long-term real-world task and a novel measure of procrastination to examine the association between temporal discounting and real-world procrastination. To measure procrastination, we critically measured the entire time course of the work progress instead of a single endpoint, such as task completion day. This approach allowed us to compute a fine-grained metric of procrastination. We found a positive correlation between individuals' degree of future reward discounting and their level of procrastination, suggesting that temporal discounting is a cognitive mechanism underlying procrastination. We found no evidence of a correlation when we, instead, measured procrastination by task completion day or by survey. This association between temporal discounting and procrastination offers empirical support for targeted interventions that could mitigate procrastination, such as modifying incentive systems to reduce the delay to a reward and lowering discount rates.

Waiting for it: Anorexia Risk, Future Orientation, and Intertemporal Discounting

Anorexia Nervosa is a severe eating disorder characterized by food restriction in service of a future goal: thinness and weight loss. Prior work suggests abnormal intertemporal decision-making in anorexia, with more farsighted decisions observed in patients with acute anorexia. Prospective future thinking in daily life, or temporal orientation, promotes more farsighted delay discounting. However, whether temporal orientation is altered in anorexia, and underlies reduced delay discounting in this population, remains unclear. Further, because changes in delay discounting could reflect cognitive effects of an acute clinical state, it is important to determine whether reduced delay discounting is observed in subclinical, at-risk samples. We measured delay discounting behavior and temporal orientation in a large sample of never-diagnosed individuals at risk of anorexia nervosa. We found that farsighted delay discounting was associated with elevated risk for anorexia nervosa. Anorexia nervosa risk was also associated with increased future-oriented cognition. Future-oriented cognition mediated the difference in delay-discounting behavior between high and low-risk groups. These results were unrelated to subjective time perception and were independent of mood and anxiety symptomatology. These findings establish future-oriented cognition as a cognitive mechanism underlying altered intertemporal decision-making in individuals at risk of developing anorexia nervosa.

Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny

Humans possess the remarkable capacity to imagine possible worlds and to demarcate possibilities and impossibilities in reasoning. We can think about what might happen in the future and consider what the present would look like had the past turned out differently. We reason about cause and effect, weigh up alternative courses of action and regret our mistakes. In this theme issue, leading experts from across the life sciences provide ground-breaking insights into the proximate questions of how thinking about possibilities works and develops, and the ultimate questions of its adaptive functions and evolutionary history. Together, the contributions delineate neurophysiological, cognitive and social mechanisms involved in mentally simulating possible states of reality; and point to conceptual changes in the understanding of singular and multiple possibilities during human development. The contributions also demonstrate how thinking about possibilities can augment learning, decision-making and judgement, and highlight aspects of the capacity that appear to be shared with non-human animals and aspects that may be uniquely human. Throughout the issue, it becomes clear that many developmental milestones achieved during childhood, and many of the most significant evolutionary and cultural triumphs of the human species, can only be understood with reference to increasingly complex reasoning about possibilities. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.

Intertemporal choice reflects value comparison rather than self-control: insights from confidence judgements

Intertemporal decision-making has long been assumed to measure self-control, with prominent theories treating choices of smaller, sooner rewards as failed attempts to override immediate temptation. If this view is correct, people should be more confident in their intertemporal decisions when they 'successfully' delay gratification than when they do not. In two pre-registered experiments with built-in replication, adult participants (n = 117) made monetary intertemporal choices and rated their confidence in having made the right decisions. Contrary to assumptions of the self-control account, confidence was not higher when participants chose delayed rewards. Rather, participants were more confident in their decisions when possible rewards were further apart in time-discounted subjective value, closer to the present, and larger in magnitude. Demonstrating metacognitive insight, participants were more confident in decisions that better aligned with their separate valuation of possible rewards. Decisions made with less confidence were more prone to changes-of-mind and more susceptible to a patience-enhancing manipulation. Together, our results establish that confidence in intertemporal choice tracks uncertainty in estimating and comparing the value of possible rewards-just as it does in decisions unrelated to self-control. Our findings challenge self-control views and instead cast intertemporal choice as a form of value-based decision-making about future possibilities. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.

Metacognitive deficits are associated with lower sensitivity to preference reversals in nicotine dependence

Deficits in impulse control belong to the core profile of nicotine dependence. Smokers might thus benefit from voluntarily self-restricting their access to the immediate temptation of nicotine products (precommitment) in order to avoid impulse control failures. However, little is known about how smokers' willingness to engage in voluntary self-restrictions is determined by metacognitive insight into their general preferences for immediate over delayed rewards. Here, with a series of monetary intertemporal choice tasks, we provide empirical evidence for reduced metacognitive accuracy in smokers relative to non-smokers and show that smokers overestimate the subjective value of delayed rewards relative to their revealed preferences. In line with the metacognitive deficits, smokers were also less sensitive to the risk of preference reversals when deciding whether or not to restrict their access to short-term financial rewards. Taken together, the current findings suggest that deficits not only in impulse control but also in metacognition may hamper smokers' resistance to immediate rewards and capacity to pursue long-term goals.