What makes recognition without awareness appear to be elusive? Strategic factors that influence the accuracy of guesses

An ERP measure of non-conscious memory reveals dissociable implicit processes in human recognition using an open-source automated analytic pipeline

Non-conscious processing of human memory has traditionally been difficult to objectively measure and thus understand. A prior study on a group of hippocampal amnesia (N = 3) patients and healthy controls (N = 6) used a novel procedure for capturing neural correlates of implicit memory using event-related potentials (ERPs): old and new items were equated for varying levels of memory awareness, with ERP differences observed from 400 to 800 ms in bilateral parietal regions that were hippocampal-dependent. The current investigation sought to address the limitations of that study by increasing the sample of healthy subjects (N = 54), applying new controls for construct validity, and developing an improved, open-source tool for automated analysis of the procedure used for equating levels of memory awareness. Results faithfully reproduced prior ERP findings of parietal effects that a series of systematic control analyses validated were not contributed to nor contaminated by explicit memory. Implicit memory effects extended from 600 to 1000 ms, localized to right parietal sites. These ERP effects were found to be behaviorally relevant and specific in predicting implicit memory response times, and were topographically dissociable from other traditional ERP measures of implicit memory (miss vs. correct rejections) that instead occurred in left parietal regions. Results suggest first that equating for reported awareness of memory strength is a valid, powerful new method for revealing neural correlates of non-conscious human memory, and second, behavioral correlations suggest that these implicit effects reflect a pure form of priming, whereas misses represent fluency leading to the subjective experience of familiarity.

Larger capacity for unconscious versus conscious episodic memory

Episodic memory is the memory for experienced events. A peak competence of episodic memory is the mental combination of events to infer commonalities. Inferring commonalities may proceed with and without consciousness of events. Yet what distinguishes conscious from unconscious inference? This question inspired nine experiments that featured strongly and weakly masked cartoon clips presented for unconscious and conscious inference. Each clip featured a scene with a visually impenetrable hiding place. Five animals crossed the scene one-by-one consecutively. One animal trajectory represented one event. The animals moved through the hiding place, where they might linger or not. The participants' task was to observe the animals' entrances and exits to maintain a mental record of which animals hid simultaneously. We manipulated information load to explore capacity limits. Memory of inferences was tested immediately, 3.5 or 6 min following encoding. The participants retrieved inferences well when encoding was conscious. When encoding was unconscious, the participants needed to respond intuitively. Only habitually intuitive decision makers exhibited a significant delayed retrieval of inferences drawn unconsciously. Their unconscious retrieval performance did not drop significantly with increasing information load, while conscious retrieval performance dropped significantly. A working memory network, including hippocampus, was activated during both conscious and unconscious inference and correlated with retrieval success. An episodic retrieval network, including hippocampus, was activated during both conscious and unconscious retrieval of inferences and correlated with retrieval success. Only conscious encoding/retrieval recruited additional brain regions outside these networks. Hence, levels of consciousness influenced the memories' behavioral impact, memory capacity, and the neural representational code.

Context influences the FN400 recognition event-related potential

Recognition of studied items often elicit more positive event-related potentials (ERPs) than unstudied items at mid-frontal electrodes about 300-500 ms (i.e., the FN400). The debate over the psychological processes associated with the FN400 has led to two competing hypotheses. One hypothesis is that the FN400 reflects familiarity, whereas another hypothesis is that it reflects conceptual implicit memory (i.e., conceptual fluency). The present experiment tested these hypotheses by presenting meaningless images that lack familiarity and conceptual fluency, off-brand products that lack pre-experimental familiarity, and name-brand products that have both pre-experimental familiarity and conceptual fluency. ERPs were recorded during judgments of lifetime and recent recognition. During both forms of recognition, ERPs in the FN400 window were greater for meaningless images than name- or off-brand products. Because this evidence is difficult to reconcile with either the familiarity or conceptual fluency hypotheses, the results are interpreted within a broader theoretical framework that includes top-down psychological (i.e., context) influences on the FN400.

Task-based memory systems in contextual-cueing of visual search and explicit recognition

Visual search is facilitated when observers encounter targets in repeated display arrangements. This 'contextual-cueing' (CC) effect is attributed to incidental learning of spatial distractor-target relations. Prior work has typically used only one recognition measure (administered after the search task) to establish whether CC is based on implicit or explicit memory of repeated displays, with the outcome depending on the diagnostic accuracy of the test. The present study compared two explicit memory tests to tackle this issue: yes/no recognition of a given search display as repeated versus generation of the quadrant in which the target (which was replaced by a distractor) had been located during the search task, thus closely matching the processes involved in performing the search. While repeated displays elicited a CC effect in the search task, both tests revealed above-chance knowledge of repeated displays, though explicit-memory accuracy and its correlation with contextual facilitation in the search task were more pronounced for the generation task. These findings argue in favor of a one-system, explicit-memory account of CC. Further, they demonstrate the superiority of the generation task for revealing the explicitness of CC, likely because both the search and the memory task involve overlapping processes (in line with 'transfer-appropriate processing').

Long-Lasting Verbatim Memory for the Words of Books After a Single Reading Without Any Learning Intention

The present study reveals an intriguing ability of our human memory: when reading a book once without any intention of learning, we store long-lasting verbatim memories of the words written in the book without being aware of it. Participants read a book chapter consisting of 32 pages (3,772 words) once without knowing that their memory would be tested later. In memory tests immediately after reading and 1 week after reading, they were asked to remember exactly which word was written at a specific position in the book chapter. Only memory for words was tested that were theme-unrelated and non-central. To measure memory, a two-alternative forced choice recognition test was used where a page was shown either as read before or with the replacement of one single word by a synonym. For each response, participants indicated whether the response was based on phenomenal memory experience (recollection or familiarity) or guessing. In the immediate test, participants claimed to have phenomenal memory experience for about a quarter of the tested positions, truly remembering the word in about half of cases. In the 1-week-delayed test, phenomenal memory experience was nearly entirely absent and completely uninformative. When claiming to have no phenomenal memory experience, participants still truly remembered the word for about 10% of the tested positions in both the immediate test and the 1-week-delayed test, without any forgetting. These findings demonstrate that we store more from read texts in memory than commonly believed.

Neural correlates of the Dunning-Kruger effect

The Dunning-Kruger effect (DKE) is a metacognitive phenomenon of illusory superiority in which individuals who perform poorly on a task believe they performed better than others, yet individuals who performed very well believe they under-performed compared to others. This phenomenon has yet to be directly explored in episodic memory, nor explored for physiological correlates or reaction times. We designed a novel method to elicit the DKE via a test of item recognition while electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded. Throughout the task, participants were asked to estimate the percentile in which they performed compared to others. Results revealed participants in the bottom 25th percentile over-estimated their percentile, while participants in the top 75th percentile under-estimated their percentile, exhibiting the classic DKE. Reaction time measures revealed a condition-by-group interaction whereby over-estimators responded faster than under-estimators when estimating being in the top percentile and responded slower when estimating being in the bottom percentile. Between-group EEG differences were evident between over-estimators and under-estimators during Dunning-Kruger responses, which revealed FN400-like effects of familiarity supporting differences for over-estimators, whereas "old-new" memory event-related potential effects revealed a late parietal component associated with recollection-based processing for under-estimators that was not evident for over-estimators. Findings suggest over- and under-estimators use differing cognitive processes when assessing their performance, such that under-estimators may rely on recollection during memory while over-estimators may draw upon excess familiarity when over-estimating their performance. Episodic memory thus appears to play a contributory role in metacognitive judgements of illusory superiority.

The temporal dynamics of perceptual and conceptual fluency on recognition memory

Recognition memory can be driven by both perceptual and conceptual fluency, but when and to what extent they contribute to recognition memory remains an open question. The present study used event-related potentials (ERPs) to investigate the neural correlates of perceptual and conceptual fluency, when they gave rise to recognition. We manipulated the perceptual and conceptual fluency of retrieval cues in the recognition test independently to obtain the effects of different types of fluency. Behavioral results showed that perceptual fluency selectively affected K hits, while conceptual fluency affected R hits and K false alarms. In addition, conceptual fluency facilitated the response times of R hits. The ERP results showed that perceptual fluency effect appeared at 100-200 ms and conceptual fluency effect appeared at 300-500 ms. The parietal LPC peaked earlier for conceptually primed trials compared to unprimed trials. These results suggest that perceptual and conceptual fluency had different effects on recognition judgments, and these two types of fluency can be delineated by distinct ERP correlates. The current finding indicates that unconscious memory processes can support recognition and have provided insights into the underlying mechanism involved in recognition memory.

Subliminal encoding and flexible retrieval of objects in scenes

Our episodic memory stores what happened when and where in life. Episodic memory requires the rapid formation and flexible retrieval of where things are located in space. Consciousness of the encoding scene is considered crucial for episodic memory formation. Here, we question the necessity of consciousness and hypothesize that humans can form unconscious episodic memories. Participants were presented with subliminal scenes, that is, scenes invisible to the conscious mind. The scenes displayed objects at certain locations for participants to form unconscious object-in-space memories. Later, the same scenes were presented supraliminally, that is, visibly, for retrieval testing. Scenes were presented absent the objects and rotated by 90°-270° in perspective to assess the representational flexibility of unconsciously formed memories. During the test phase, participants performed a forced-choice task that required them to place an object in one of two highlighted scene locations and their eye movements were recorded. Evaluation of the eye tracking data revealed that participants remembered object locations unconsciously, irrespective of changes in viewing perspective. This effect of gaze was related to correct placements of objects in scenes, and an intuitive decision style was necessary for unconscious memories to influence intentional behavior to a significant degree. We conclude that conscious perception is not mandatory for spatial episodic memory formation.

Accessing forgotten memory traces from long-term memory via visual movements

Because memory retrieval often requires overt responses, it is difficult to determine to what extend forgetting occurs as a problem in explicit accessing of long-term memory traces. In this study, we used eye-tracking measures in combination with a behavioral task that favored high forgetting rates to investigate the existence of memory traces from long-term memory in spite of failure in accessing them consciously. In two experiments, participants were encouraged to encode a large set of sound-picture-location associations. In a later test, sounds were presented and participants were instructed to visually scan, before a verbal memory report, for the correct location of the associated pictures in an empty screen. We found the reactivation of associated memories by sound cues at test biased oculomotor behavior towards locations congruent with memory representations, even when participants failed to consciously provide a memory report of it. These findings reveal the emergence of a memory-guided behavior that can be used to map internal representations of forgotten memories from long-term memory.

Priming and implicit recognition depend on similar temporal changes in perceptual representations

Previous studies have reported that longer stimulus presentation decreases the magnitude of priming. In the present study, we used meaningless kaleidoscope images, which were reported to minimize conceptual processing, to investigate the mechanism of the phenomenon. We assessed the impact of stimulus duration on perceptual priming (Experiment 1) and implicit recognition memory (Experiment 2). Both the magnitude of priming and the accuracy of implicit recognition were lower with the longer stimulus presentation (350 ms) compared with the shorter presentation (250 ms). This coincidence of temporal dynamics between priming and implicit recognition suggests similar underlying memory mechanisms. In both cases, the decrease of performance with longer presentation can be explained by either changes in perceptual processes or interference from explicit memory retrieval.

The necessity of the medial temporal lobe for statistical learning

The sensory input that we experience is highly patterned, and we are experts at detecting these regularities. Although the extraction of such regularities, or statistical learning (SL), is typically viewed as a cortical process, recent studies have implicated the medial temporal lobe (MTL), including the hippocampus. These studies have employed fMRI, leaving open the possibility that the MTL is involved but not necessary for SL. Here, we examined this issue in a case study of LSJ, a patient with complete bilateral hippocampal loss and broader MTL damage. In Experiments 1 and 2, LSJ and matched control participants were passively exposed to a continuous sequence of shapes, syllables, scenes, or tones containing temporal regularities in the co-occurrence of items. In a subsequent test phase, the control groups exhibited reliable SL in all conditions, successfully discriminating regularities from recombinations of the same items into novel foil sequences. LSJ, however, exhibited no SL, failing to discriminate regularities from foils. Experiment 3 ruled out more general explanations for this failure, such as inattention during exposure or difficulty following test instructions, by showing that LSJ could discriminate which individual items had been exposed. These findings provide converging support for the importance of the MTL in extracting temporal regularities.

On the pervasive influences of implicit memory

In Voss, Lucas, and Paller (2012) we reviewed evidence that behavioral, neural and subjective phenomena often considered to be hallmarks of explicit memory can be powerfully influenced by processing related to implicit memory. We argued that, as a result, behavioral and neuroimaging experiments designed to measure explicit memory are sometimes prone to capture aspects of implicit memory instead. The nine commentaries published in response to our target article largely resonated with these conclusions. Here we highlight the numerous additional insights offered by these commentaries regarding the circumstances and precise mechanisms that may characterize relationships between implicit and explicit memory, and we describe similarities and differences with our interpretations.

Disruption of dorsolateral but not ventrolateral prefrontal cortex improves unconscious perceptual memories

Attentive encoding often leads to more accurate responses in recognition memory tests. However, previous studies have described conditions under which taxing explicit memory resources by attentional distraction improved perceptual recognition memory without awareness. These findings lead to the hypothesis that explicit memory processes mediated by the prefrontal cortex (PFC) can interfere with memory processes necessary for implicit recognition memory. The present study directly tested this hypothesis by applying transcranial magnetic stimulation separately over either dorsolateral (DLPFC) or ventrolateral PFC (VLPFC) in humans before performance of a visual memory task. Disruption of DLPFC function led to improvement in recognition accuracy only in responses in which the participant's awareness of memory retrieval was absent. However, disruption of VLPFC function led to subtle shifts in recollection and familiarity accuracy. We conclude that explicit memory processes mediated by the DLPFC can indirectly interfere with implicit recognition memory.

Detecting and categorizing fleeting emotions in faces

Expressions of emotion are often brief, providing only fleeting images from which to base important social judgments. We sought to characterize the sensitivity and mechanisms of emotion detection and expression categorization when exposure to faces is very brief, and to determine whether these processes dissociate. Observers viewed 2 backward-masked facial expressions in quick succession, 1 neutral and the other emotional (happy, fearful, or angry), in a 2-interval forced-choice task. On each trial, observers attempted to detect the emotional expression (emotion detection) and to classify the expression (expression categorization). Above-chance emotion detection was possible with extremely brief exposures of 10 ms and was most accurate for happy expressions. We compared categorization among expressions using a d' analysis, and found that categorization was usually above chance for angry versus happy and fearful versus happy, but consistently poor for fearful versus angry expressions. Fearful versus angry categorization was poor even when only negative emotions (fearful, angry, or disgusted) were used, suggesting that this categorization is poor independent of decision context. Inverting faces impaired angry versus happy categorization, but not emotion detection, suggesting that information from facial features is used differently for emotion detection and expression categorizations. Emotion detection often occurred without expression categorization, and expression categorization sometimes occurred without emotion detection. These results are consistent with the notion that emotion detection and expression categorization involve separate mechanisms.

It is time to fill in the gaps left by simple dissociations

Abstract Our field has been dominated by the quest for dissociations. A number of the dissociations have gotten us far and the implicit/explicit one is an excellent example. It holds in the vast majority of cases and has furthered our understanding of memory considerably. There are now several very interesting exceptions to this basic rule that highlight how systems may interact and how independence is an option or a default, but not a necessity. We should not throw away the fundamental dissociation, but nor should we fail to learn from the interesting exceptions.

Many roads lead to recognition: electrophysiological correlates of familiarity derived from short-term masked repetition priming

The neural mechanisms that underlie familiarity memory have been extensively investigated, but a consensus understanding remains elusive. Behavioral evidence suggests that familiarity sometimes shares sources with instances of implicit memory known as priming, in that the same increases in processing fluency that give rise to priming can engender familiarity. One underappreciated implication of this account is that patterns of neural activity that appear to index familiarity in a generic sense may instead reflect fluency-related precursors of recognition. In a novel illustration of this principle, we examined brain potentials during recognition tests for visual words. In two experiments, fluency was selectively enhanced for half of the test cues via masked repetition priming. Replicating previous findings, the proportion of words endorsed as "old" was greater for words immediately preceded by a matching masked word versus an unrelated one. In addition, N400 potentials were more positive for test cues preceded by matching versus unrelated masked words. Similar N400 differences were observed when false alarms were compared to correct rejections for the subset of unstudied words that were preceded by matching masked words. These N400 effects were topographically dissociable from other potentials that correlated with familiarity for studied words. We conclude that experiences of familiarity can have different neural correlates that signal the operation of distinct neurocognitive precursors of recognition judgments. Conceptualizations of the neural basis of recognition memory must account for a plurality of mechanisms that produce familiarity memory.

The role of consciousness in cognitive control and decision making

Here we review studies on the complexity and strength of unconscious information processing. We focus on empirical evidence that relates awareness of information to cognitive control processes (e.g., response inhibition, conflict resolution, and task-switching), the life-time of information maintenance (e.g., working memory) and the possibility to integrate multiple pieces of information across space and time. Overall, the results that we review paint a picture of local and specific effects of unconscious information on various (high-level) brain regions, including areas in the prefrontal cortex. Although this neural activation does not elicit any conscious experience, it is functional and capable of influencing many perceptual, cognitive (control) and decision-related processes, sometimes even for relatively long periods of time. However, recent evidence also points out interesting dissociations between conscious and unconscious information processing when it comes to the duration, flexibility and the strategic use of that information for complex operations and decision-making. Based on the available evidence, we conclude that the role of task-relevance of subliminal information and meta-cognitive factors in unconscious cognition need more attention in future work.

Examining ERP correlates of recognition memory: evidence of accurate source recognition without recollection

Recollection is typically associated with high recognition confidence and accurate source memory. However, subjects sometimes make accurate source memory judgments even for items that are not confidently recognized, and it is not known whether these responses are based on recollection or some other memory process. In the current study, we measured event related potentials (ERPs) while subjects made item and source memory confidence judgments in order to determine whether recollection supported accurate source recognition responses for items that were not confidently recognized. In line with previous studies, we found that recognition memory was associated with two ERP effects: an early on-setting FN400 effect, and a later parietal old-new effect [late positive component (LPC)], which have been associated with familiarity and recollection, respectively. The FN400 increased gradually with item recognition confidence, whereas the LPC was only observed for highly confident recognition responses. The LPC was also related to source accuracy, but only for items that had received a high confidence item recognition response; accurate source judgments to items that were less confidently recognized did not exhibit the typical ERP correlate of recollection or familiarity, but rather showed a late, broadly distributed negative ERP difference. The results indicate that accurate source judgments of episodic context can occur even when recollection fails.

The hippocampus reevaluated in unconscious learning and memory: at a tipping point?

Classic findings from the neuropsychological literature invariably indicated that performances on tests of memory that can be accomplished without conscious awareness were largely spared in amnesia, while those that required conscious retrieval (e.g., via recognition or recall) of information learned in the very same sessions was devastatingly impaired. Based on reports of such dissociations, it was proposed that one of the fundamental distinctions between memory systems is whether or not they support conscious access to remembered content. Only recently have we come to realize that the putative systemic division of labor between conscious and unconscious memory is not so clean. A primary goal of this review is to examine recent evidence that has been advanced against the view that the hippocampus is selectively critical for conscious memory. Along the way, consideration is given to criticisms that have been levied against these findings, potential explanations for differences in the reported results are proposed, and methodological pitfalls in investigations of unconscious memory are discussed. Ultimately, it is concluded that a tipping point has been reached, and that while conscious recollection depends critically on hippocampal integrity, the reach of the hippocampus extends to unconscious aspects of memory performance when relational memory processing and representation are required.

More than a feeling: Pervasive influences of memory without awareness of retrieval

The subjective experiences of recollection and familiarity have featured prominently in the search for neurocognitive mechanisms of memory. However, these two explicit expressions of memory, which involve conscious awareness of memory retrieval, are distinct from an entire category of implicit expressions of memory that do not entail such awareness. This review summarizes recent evidence showing that neurocognitive processing related to implicit memory can powerfully influence the behavioral and neural measures typically associated with explicit memory. Although there are striking distinctions between the neurocognitive processing responsible for implicit versus explicit memory, tests designed to measure only explicit memory nonetheless often capture implicit memory processing as well. In particular, the evidence described here suggests that investigations of familiarity memory are prone to the accidental capture of implicit memory processing. These findings have considerable implications for neurocognitive accounts of memory, as they suggest that many neural and behavioral measures often accepted as signals of explicit memory instead reflect the distinct operation of implicit memory mechanisms that are only sometimes related to explicit memory expressions. Proper identification of the explicit and implicit mechanisms for memory is vital to understanding the normal operation of memory, in addition to the disrupted memory capabilities associated with many neurological disorders and mental illnesses. We suggest that future progress requires utilizing neural, behavioral, and subjective evidence to dissociate implicit and explicit memory processing so as to better understand their distinct mechanisms as well as their potential relationships. When searching for the neurocognitive mechanisms of memory, it is important to keep in mind that memory involves more than a feeling.

Implicit recognition based on lateralized perceptual fluency

In some circumstances, accurate recognition of repeated images in an explicit memory test is driven by implicit memory. We propose that this “implicit recognition” results from perceptual fluency that influences responding without awareness of memory retrieval. Here we examined whether recognition would vary if images appeared in the same or different visual hemifield during learning and testing. Kaleidoscope images were briefly presented left or right of fixation during divided-attention encoding. Presentation in the same visual hemifield at test produced higher recognition accuracy than presentation in the opposite visual hemifield, but only for guess responses. These correct guesses likely reflect a contribution from implicit recognition, given that when the stimulated visual hemifield was the same at study and test, recognition accuracy was higher for guess responses than for responses with any level of confidence. The dramatic difference in guessing accuracy as a function of lateralized perceptual overlap between study and test suggests that implicit recognition arises from memory storage in visual cortical networks that mediate repetition-induced fluency increments.