Topological approach to neural complexity

A new measure based on degree distribution that links information theory and network graph analysis

Background

Detailed connection maps of human and nonhuman brains are being generated with new technologies, and graph metrics have been instrumental in understanding the general organizational features of these structures. Neural networks appear to have small world properties: they have clustered regions, while maintaining integrative features such as short average pathlengths.

Results

We captured the structural characteristics of clustered networks with short average pathlengths through our own variable, System Difference (SD), which is computationally simple and calculable for larger graph systems. SD is a Jaccardian measure generated by averaging all of the differences in the connection patterns between any two nodes of a system. We calculated SD over large random samples of matrices and found that high SD matrices have a low average pathlength and a larger number of clustered structures. SD is a measure of degree distribution with high SD matrices maximizing entropic properties. Phi (Φ), an information theory metric that assesses a system’s capacity to integrate information, correlated well with SD - with SD explaining over 90% of the variance in systems above 11 nodes (tested for 4 to 13 nodes). However, newer versions of Φ do not correlate well with the SD metric.

Conclusions

The new network measure, SD, provides a link between high entropic structures and degree distributions as related to small world properties.

Optimizing brain networks topologies using multi-objective evolutionary computation

The analysis of brain network topological features has served to better understand these networks and reveal particular characteristics of their functional behavior. The distribution of brain network motifs is particularly useful for detecting and describing differences between brain networks and random and computationally optimized artificial networks. In this paper we use a multi-objective evolutionary optimization approach to generate optimized artificial networks that have a number of topological features resembling brain networks. The Pareto set approximation of the optimized networks is used to extract network descriptors that are compared to brain and random network descriptors. To analyze the networks, the clustering coefficient, the average path length, the modularity and the betweenness centrality are computed. We argue that the topological complexity of a brain network can be estimated using the number of evaluations needed by an optimization algorithm to output artificial networks of similar complexity. For the analyzed network examples, our results indicate that while original brain networks have a reduced structural motif number and a high functional motif number, they are not optimal with respect to these two topological features. We also investigate the correlation between the structural and functional motif numbers, the average path length and the clustering coefficient in random, optimized and brain networks.

Neural complexity: a graph theoretic interpretation

One of the central challenges facing modern neuroscience is to explain the ability of the nervous system to coherently integrate information across distinct functional modules in the absence of a central executive. To this end, Tononi et al. [Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA. 91, 5033 (1994)] proposed a measure of neural complexity that purports to capture this property based on mutual information between complementary subsets of a system. Neural complexity, so defined, is one of a family of information theoretic metrics developed to measure the balance between the segregation and integration of a system's dynamics. One key question arising for such measures involves understanding how they are influenced by network topology. Sporns et al. [Cereb. Cortex 10, 127 (2000)] employed numerical models in order to determine the dependence of neural complexity on the topological features of a network. However, a complete picture has yet to be established. While De Lucia et al. [Phys. Rev. E 71, 016114 (2005)] made the first attempts at an analytical account of this relationship, their work utilized a formulation of neural complexity that, we argue, did not reflect the intuitions of the original work. In this paper we start by describing weighted connection matrices formed by applying a random continuous weight distribution to binary adjacency matrices. This allows us to derive an approximation for neural complexity in terms of the moments of the weight distribution and elementary graph motifs. In particular, we explicitly establish a dependency of neural complexity on cyclic graph motifs.

Neural complexity and structural connectivity

Tononi [Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 91, 5033 (1994)] proposed a measure of neural complexity based on mutual information between complementary subsystems of a given neural network, which has attracted much interest in the neuroscience community and beyond. We develop an approximation of the measure for a popular Gaussian model which, applied to a continuous-time process, elucidates the relationship between the complexity of a neural system and its structural connectivity. Moreover, the approximation is accurate for weakly coupled systems and computationally cheap, scaling polynomially with system size in contrast to the full complexity measure, which scales exponentially. We also discuss connectivity normalization and resolve some issues stemming from an ambiguity in the original Gaussian model.

Measuring consciousness: relating behavioural and neurophysiological approaches

The resurgent science of consciousness has been accompanied by a recent emphasis on the problem of measurement. Having dependable measures of consciousness is essential both for mapping experimental evidence to theory and for designing perspicuous experiments. Here, we review a series of behavioural and brain-based measures, assessing their ability to track graded consciousness and clarifying how they relate to each other by showing what theories are presupposed by each. We identify possible and actual conflicts among measures that can stimulate new experiments, and we conclude that measures must prove themselves by iteratively building knowledge in the context of theoretical frameworks. Advances in measuring consciousness have implications for basic cognitive neuroscience, for comparative studies of consciousness and for clinical applications.