The role of dialecticism in objective and subjective attitudinal ambivalence

Understanding the Magnitude of Hypocrisy in Moral Contradictions: The Role of Surprise at Violating Strong Attitudes

Although two people could both enact similar forms of hypocrisy, one person might be judged as more hypocritical than the other. The present research advances a novel, theoretical explanation for a paradigmatic instance of this: the increased hypocrisy ascribed to contradicting a morally (vs. nonmorally) based attitude. In contrast to prior explanations, the present research shows that people infer targets holding morally (vs. nonmorally) based attitudes are more difficult to change. Consequently, when people are hypocritical on these stances, it elicits greater surprise, which amplifies the perceived hypocrisy. Through both statistical mediation and experimental moderation, we provide evidence for this process and show how our explanation generalizes to understanding heightened hypocrisy in other contexts, too (i.e., violating nonmoral attitudes held with certainty vs. uncertainty). Altogether, we provide an integrative, theoretical lens for predicting when moral and nonmoral acts of hypocrisy will be perceived as particularly hypocritical.

Certainty in holistic thinking and responses to contradiction: Dialectical proverbs, counter-attitudinal change and ambivalence

The present research examined whether consideration of individuals' certainty in their holism can enhance the ability of this individual difference to predict how they respond to contradiction-relevant outcomes. Across four studies, participants first completed a standardized measure of holistic-analytic thinking. Then, they rated how certain they were in their responses to the holism scale or were experimentally induced to feel high or low certainty. Next, participants were exposed to dialectical proverbs (Study 1a and 1b), to a counter-attitudinal change induction (Study 2), or to a paradigm of attitudinal ambivalence (Study 3). Results revealed that participants with higher certainty in their holistic thinking exhibited higher preference for dialectical proverbs (Study 1a and 1b), changed their attitude less following a counter-attitudinal task (Study 2) and showed weaker correspondence between objective and subjective ambivalence (Study 3). Beyond examining new domains and discovering novel findings, the present work was designed to be the first to show moderation of previously identified effects in the domain of holistic thinking and responses to contradiction.

Ambivalent attitudes promote support for extreme political actions

Political extremism varies across people and contexts, but which beliefs will a person support through extreme actions? We propose that ambivalent attitudes, despite reducing normative political actions like voting, increase support for extreme political actions. We demonstrate this hypothesized reversal using dozens of measures across six studies (N = 13,055). The effect was robust to relevant covariates and numerous methodological variations and was magnified when people's attitudinal or ideological positions were more polarized. It appears to occur because being conflicted about political issues can feel psychologically uncomfortable, making extreme actions more appealing. Notably, this emerged when people thought ambivalence was justified, whereas leading them to consider ambivalence unjustified suppressed the effect, suggesting that ambivalent people are coping with but not necessarily trying to reduce their ambivalence. These results highlight the interplay of affective and cognitive influences in extreme behavior, showing that beliefs people feel justifiably conflicted about can promote extremism.

Holism and Causal Responsibility: The Role of Number and Valence of Event Consequences

The present research examines the effect of holistic-analytic thinking style on causal responsibility. Across seven studies (N = 4,103), participants' thinking style was either measured or manipulated. Then, the valence or number of consequences varied in several scenarios involving a cause-consequence relationship. As a dependent measure, participants indicated the degree of responsibility attributed to the cause mentioned in each scenario. The results revealed that holistic (vs. analytic) participants assigned more responsibility to the cause when the consequences presented were a combination of positive and negative outcomes (vs. univalent), and when multiple (vs. single) consequences were triggered in the scenario. To explore the explanatory factor for these results, a final study manipulated the complexity of the consequences, along with the number. The results of this research suggested that holistic (vs. analytic) individuals consider the degree of complexity of consequences to establish causal attribution.

Cross-valence inhibition in forming and retrieving ambivalent attitudes

Many things in life are ambivalent, and it might sometimes be useful or necessary to ignore their positive attributes when judging their negative attributes and vice versa. Cross-valence inhibition may complicate this task, leading people to underestimate the positive and negative attributes of ambivalent stimuli. In three studies (total N = 155), participants learned to associate combined evaluative information (gains and losses) with attributes of unfamiliar objects (size and colour of Chernoff faces). Participants then estimated (Studies 1-3) or experienced and recalled (Study 3) the gains and losses associated with novel ambivalent attribute combinations. As predicted, both in estimation and recall, participants rated gains (losses) to be lower, the higher the losses (gains) associated with the stimulus. The effect occurred only when the two attributes were evaluatively conflicting (Study 2). Cross-valence inhibition might lead to maladaptive behaviour when positive and negative attributes are in fact separable in hedonic experience.