When is bigger better? The effects of group size on the evolution of helping behaviours

Cultural evolution: Where we have been and where we are going (maybe)

The study of cultural evolution using ideas from population biology began about 50 y ago, with the work of L.L. Cavalli-Sforza, Marcus Feldman, and ourselves. It has grown from this small beginning into a vital field with many publications and its own scientific society. In this essay, we give our perspective on the origins of the field and current unanswered questions.

Cross-societal variation in norm enforcement systems

Across human societies, people are sometimes willing to punish norm violators. Such punishment can take the form of revenge from victims, seemingly altruistic intervention from third parties, or legitimized sanctioning from institutional representatives. Although prior work has documented cross-cultural regularities in norm enforcement, substantial variation exists in the prevalence and forms of punishment across societies. Such cross-societal variation may arise from universal psychological mechanisms responding to different socio-ecological conditions, or from cultural evolutionary processes, resulting in different norm enforcement systems. To date, empirical evidence from comparative studies across diverse societies has remained disconnected, owing to a lack of interdisciplinary integration and a prevalent tendency of empirical studies to focus on different underpinnings of variation in norm enforcement. To provide a more complete view of the shared and unique aspects of punishment across societies, we review prior research in anthropology, economics and psychology, and take a first step towards integrating the plethora of socio-ecological and cultural factors proposed to explain cross-societal variation in norm enforcement. We conclude by discussing how future cross-societal research can use diverse methodologies to illuminate key questions on the domain-specificity of punishment, the diversity of tactics supporting social norms, and their role in processes of norm change. This article is part of the theme issue 'Social norm change: drivers and consequences'.

The shirker's dilemma and the prospect of cooperation in large groups

Cooperation usually becomes harder to sustain as groups become larger because incentives to shirk increase with the number of potential contributors to collective action. But is this always the case? Here we study a binary-action cooperative dilemma where a public good is provided as long as not more than a given number of players shirk from a costly cooperative task. We find that at the stable polymorphic equilibrium, which exists when the cost of cooperation is low enough, the probability of cooperating increases with group size and reaches a limit of one when the group size tends to infinity. Nevertheless, increasing the group size may increase or decrease the probability that the public good is provided at such an equilibrium, depending on the cost value. We also prove that the expected payoff to individuals at the stable polymorphic equilibrium (i.e., their fitness) decreases with group size. For low enough costs of cooperation, both the probability of provision of the public good and the expected payoff converge to positive values in the limit of large group sizes. However, we also find that the basin of attraction of the stable polymorphic equilibrium is a decreasing function of group size and shrinks to zero in the limit of very large groups. Overall, we demonstrate non-trivial comparative statics with respect to group size in an otherwise simple collective action problem.

Experimental evidence that group size generates divergent benefits of cooperative breeding for male and female ostriches

Cooperative breeding allows the costs of parental care to be shared, but as groups become larger, such benefits often decline as competition increases and group cohesion breaks down. The counteracting forces of cooperation and competition are predicted to select for an optimal group size, but variation in groups is ubiquitous across cooperative breeding animals. Here, we experimentally test if group sizes vary because of sex differences in the costs and benefits of cooperative breeding in captive ostriches, Struthio camelus, and compare this to the distribution of group sizes in the wild. We established 96 groups with different numbers of males (1 or 3) and females (1, 3, 4, or 6) and manipulated opportunities for cooperation over incubation. There was a clear optimal group size for males (one male with four or more females) that was explained by high costs of competition and negligible benefits of cooperation. Conversely, female reproductive success was maximised across a range of group sizes due to the benefits of cooperation with male and female group members. Reproductive success in intermediate sized groups was low for both males and females due to sexual conflict over the timing of mating and incubation. Our experiments show that sex differences in cooperation and competition can explain group size variation in cooperative breeders.

Who to help? Helping decisions in a cooperatively breeding bird with redirected care

Abstract 

Cooperative breeding sometimes occurs when adult breeders form groups following natal dispersal and mating. In such cases, individuals typically face a choice of social partner with whom to cooperate. Selecting appropriate social partners is crucial to maximising the fitness payoffs from cooperation, but our understanding of the criteria guiding partner choice is limited. Here, we analyse helping decisions by long-tailed tits (Aegithalos caudatus), which may redirect their care to assist breeders in raising offspring following the failure of their own nests. In this species, helpers prefer to help relatives at nearby nests, but it is unclear whether other criteria that may affect helper fitness also influence helping decisions. When choosing among broods of equivalent kinship, we found that helpers did not prefer those broods that offered the greatest indirect fitness returns. Further analyses revealed that helpers did not choose nests on the basis of brood size or age, but were more likely to help broods that were closer to their own failed nests and that were already being cared for by other helpers. Both effects likely reflect the limited choice available to helpers: although individuals breed close to relatives within kin neighbourhoods, a high rate of nest predation constrains helpers’ choice of broods. In other species where cooperatively breeding groups form after natal dispersal, a greater range of options may be available and here detailed analysis of group formation will be helpful for determining the decision rules that underpin partner choice and permit stable cooperation in the face of alternative options.

Significance statement

Cooperative breeding occurs most frequently when offspring delay dispersal from their natal site and help to care for their younger siblings. In some species, however, individuals first disperse and then come together as adults to cooperate in rearing young. In the latter case, multiple social partners may be available — what then determines which partner is helped? We studied partner choice in long-tailed tits, which may help to feed other broods if their own brood fails. When multiple related broods were available, individuals were more likely to help those close by but showed no preference for broods offering the greatest indirect fitness returns. One explanation for this result is that helping options for most individuals are limited by high levels of nest predation, favouring a simpler decision-making process based on identifying close relatives breeding in close proximity.

Evolution of warfare by resource raiding favours polymorphism in belligerence and bravery

From protists to primates, intergroup aggression and warfare over resources have been observed in several taxa whose populations typically consist of groups connected by limited genetic mixing. Here, we model the coevolution between four traits relevant to this setting: (i) investment into common-pool resource production within groups (helping); (ii) proclivity to raid other groups to appropriate their resources (belligerence); and investments into (iii) defense and (iv) offense of group contests (defensive and offensive bravery). We show that when traits coevolve, the population often experiences disruptive selection favouring two morphs: 'Hawks', who express high levels of both belligerence and offensive bravery; and 'Doves', who express neither. This social polymorphism involves further among-traits associations when the fitness costs of helping and bravery interact. In particular, if helping is antagonistic with both forms of bravery, coevolution leads to the coexistence of individuals that either: (i) do not participate into common-pool resource production but only in its defense and appropriation (Scrounger Hawks) or (ii) only invest into common pool resource production (Producer Doves). Provided groups are not randomly mixed, these findings are robust to several modelling assumptions. This suggests that inter-group aggression is a potent mechanism in favouring within-group social diversity and behavioural syndromes. This article is part of the theme issue 'Intergroup conflict across taxa'.

Optimal strategies and cost-benefit analysis of the [Formula: see text]-player weightlifting game

The study of cooperation has been extensively studied in game theory. Especially, two-player two-strategy games have been categorized according to their equilibrium strategies and fully analysed. Recently, a grand unified game covering all types of two-player two-strategy games, i.e., the weightlifting game, was proposed. In the present study, we extend this two-player weightlifting game into an [Formula: see text]-player game. We investigate the conditions for pure strategy Nash equilibria and for Pareto optimal strategies, expressed in terms of the success probability and benefit-to-cost ratio of the weightlifting game. We also present a general characterization of [Formula: see text]-player games in terms of the proposed game. In terms of a concrete example, we present diagrams showing how the game category varies depending on the benefit-to-cost ratio. As a general rule, cooperation becomes difficult to achieve as group size increases because the success probability of weightlifting saturates towards unity. The present study provides insights into achieving behavioural cooperation in a large group by means of a cost-benefit analysis.

Large-scale cooperation in small-scale foraging societies

We present evidence that people in small-scale mobile hunter-gatherer societies cooperated in large numbers to produce collective goods. Foragers engaged in large-scale communal hunts and constructed shared capital facilities; they made shared investments in improving the local environment; and they participated in warfare, formed enduring alliances, and established trading networks. Large-scale collective action often played a crucial role in subsistence. The provision of public goods involved the cooperation of many individuals, so each person made only a small contribution. This evidence suggests that large-scale cooperation occurred in the Pleistocene societies that encompass most of human evolutionary history, and therefore it is unlikely that large-scale cooperation in Holocene food producing societies results from an evolved psychology shaped only in small-group interactions. Instead, large-scale human cooperation needs to be explained as an adaptation, likely rooted in distinctive features of human biology, grammatical language, increased cognitive ability, and cumulative cultural adaptation.

Five decades of misunderstanding in the social Hymenoptera: a review and meta-analysis of Michener's paradox

In a much-cited 1964 paper entitled "Reproductive efficiency in relation to colony size in hymenopterous societies," Charles Michener investigated the correlation between a colony's size and its reproductive efficiency - the ability of its adult females to produce reproductives, measured as per-capita output. Based on his analysis of published data from destructively sampled colonies in 18 species, he reported that in most of these species efficiency decreased with increasing colony size. His conclusion that efficiency is higher in smaller groups has since gained widespread acceptance. But it created a seeming paradox: how can natural selection maintain social behaviour when a female apparently enjoys her highest per-capita output by working alone? Here we treat Michener's pattern as a hypothesis and perform the first large-scale test of its prediction across the eusocial Hymenoptera. Because data on actual output of reproductives were not available for most species, Michener used various proxies, such as nest size, numbers of brood, or amounts of stored food. We show that for each of Michener's data sets the reported decline in per-capita productivity can be explained by factors other than decreasing efficiency, calling into question his conclusion that declining efficiency is the cause of the pattern. The most prominent cause of bias is the failure of the proxy to capture all forms of output in which the colony invests during the course of its ontogeny. Other biasing factors include seasonal effects and a variety of methodological flaws in the data sets he used. We then summarize the results of 215 data sets drawn from post-1964 studies of 80 species in 33 genera that better control for these factors. Of these, 163 data sets are included in two meta-analyses that statistically synthesize the available data on the relationship between colony size and efficiency, accounting for variable sample sizes and non-independence among the data sets. The overall effect, and those for most taxonomic subgroups, indicates no loss of efficiency with increasing colony size. Two exceptional taxa, the halictid bees and independent-founding paper wasps, show negative trends consistent with the Michener hypothesis in some species. We conclude that in most species, particularly those with large colony sizes, the hypothesis of decreasing efficiency with increasing colony size is not supported. Finally, we explore potential mechanisms through which the level of efficiency can decrease, be maintained, or even increase, as colonies increase in size.

The evolution of mechanisms to produce phenotypic heterogeneity in microorganisms

In bacteria and other microorganisms, the cells within a population often show extreme phenotypic variation. Different species use different mechanisms to determine how distinct phenotypes are allocated between individuals, including coordinated, random, and genetic determination. However, it is not clear if this diversity in mechanisms is adaptive-arising because different mechanisms are favoured in different environments-or is merely the result of non-adaptive artifacts of evolution. We use theoretical models to analyse the relative advantages of the two dominant mechanisms to divide labour between reproductives and helpers in microorganisms. We show that coordinated specialisation is more likely to evolve over random specialisation in well-mixed groups when: (i) social groups are small; (ii) helping is more "essential"; and (iii) there is a low metabolic cost to coordination. We find analogous results when we allow for spatial structure with a more detailed model of cellular filaments. More generally, this work shows how diversity in the mechanisms to produce phenotypic heterogeneity could have arisen as adaptations to different environments.

Multilevel selection favors fragmentation modes that maintain cooperative interactions in multispecies communities

Reproduction is one of the requirements for evolution and a defining feature of life. Yet, across the tree of life, organisms reproduce in many different ways. Groups of cells (e.g., multicellular organisms, colonial microbes, or multispecies biofilms) divide by releasing propagules that can be single-celled or multicellular. What conditions determine the number and size of reproductive propagules? In multicellular organisms, existing theory suggests that single-cell propagules prevent the accumulation of deleterious mutations (e.g., cheaters). However, groups of cells, such as biofilms, sometimes contain multiple metabolically interdependent species. This creates a reproductive dilemma: small daughter groups, which prevent the accumulation of cheaters, are also unlikely to contain the species diversity that is required for ecological success. Here, we developed an individual-based, multilevel selection model to investigate how such multi-species groups can resolve this dilemma. By tracking the dynamics of groups of cells that reproduce by fragmenting into smaller groups, we identified fragmentation modes that can maintain cooperative interactions. We systematically varied the fragmentation mode and calculated the maximum mutation rate that communities can withstand before being driven to extinction by the accumulation of cheaters. We find that for groups consisting of a single species, the optimal fragmentation mode consists of releasing single-cell propagules. For multi-species groups we find various optimal strategies. With migration between groups, single-cell propagules are favored. Without migration, larger propagules sizes are optimal; in this case, group-size dependent fissioning rates can prevent the accumulation of cheaters. Our work shows that multi-species groups can evolve reproductive strategies that allow them to maintain cooperative interactions.

The cultural evolution and ecology of institutions

Human societies are structured by what we refer to as 'institutions', which are socially created and culturally inherited proscriptions on behaviour that define roles and set expectations about social interactions. The study of institutions in several social science fields has provided many important insights that have not been fully appreciated in the evolutionary human sciences. However, such research has often lacked a shared understanding of general processes of change that shape institutional diversity across space and time. We argue that evolutionary theory can provide a useful framework for synthesizing information from different disciplines to address issues such as how and why institutions change over time, how institutional rules co-evolve with other culturally inherited traits, and the role that ecological factors might play in shaping institutional diversity. We argue that we can gain important insights by applying cultural evolutionary thinking to the study of institutions, but that we also need to expand and adapt our approaches to better handle the ways that institutions work, and how they might change over time. In this paper, we illustrate our approach by describing macro-scale empirical comparative analyses that demonstrate how evolutionary theory can be used to generate and test hypotheses about the processes that have shaped some of the major patterns we see in institutional diversity over time and across the world today. We then go on to discuss how we might usefully develop micro-scale models of institutional change by adapting concepts from game theory and agent-based modelling. We end by considering current challenges and areas for future research, and the potential implications for other areas of study and real-world applications. This article is part of the theme issue 'Foundations of cultural evolution'.

Cooperation in large-scale human societies-What, if anything, makes it unique, and how did it evolve?

To resolve the major controversy about why prosocial behaviors persist in large-scale human societies, we propose that two questions need to be answered. First, how do social interactions in small-scale and large-scale societies differ? By reviewing the exchange and collective-action dilemmas in both small-scale and large-scale societies, we show they are not different. Second, are individual decision-making mechanisms driven by self-interest? We extract from the literature three types of individual decision-making mechanism, which differ in their social influence and sensitivity to self-interest, to conclude that humans interacting with non-relatives are largely driven by self-interest. We then ask: what was the key mechanism that allowed prosocial behaviors to continue as societies grew? We show the key role played by new social interaction mechanisms-change in the rules of exchange and collective-action dilemmas-devised by the interacting individuals, which allow for self-interested individuals to remain prosocial as societies grow.

Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present

The evolution of cooperation has been one of the main topics in evolutionary biology. If cooperators maintain interaction with cooperators and halt interaction with defectors, then cooperation can pay and can be favored by natural selection. This is called an exit option. Here, not only cooperation in dyadic interactions but also cooperation in sizable groups can be observed. Rivalry is about whether usage of the benefit by one individual reduces its availability to others or not. A common good is a rivalrous good, whereas a public good is a non-rivalrous good. In this paper, by analyzing n-player prisoner's dilemma games, we examine whether the effect of the group size on cooperation is positive or negative in the context of exit option. When goods are common goods, defectors always dominate cooperators when the group size is infinitely large. Thus, the group size has only negative effects on the evolution of cooperation when goods are common goods. In contrast, when goods are public goods, an increase in group size has positive effects as well as negative effects on the evolution of cooperation. In addition, we reveal that it has both positive and negative effects on the evolution of cooperation for cooperators to tolerate some defection and hope to keep the interaction.

How evolutionary behavioural sciences can help us understand behaviour in a pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic has brought science into the public eye and to the attention of governments more than ever before. Much of this attention is on work in epidemiology, virology and public health, with most behavioural advice in public health focusing squarely on 'proximate' determinants of behaviour. While epidemiological models are powerful tools to predict the spread of disease when human behaviour is stable, most do not incorporate behavioural change. The evolutionary basis of our preferences and the cultural evolutionary dynamics of our beliefs drive behavioural change, so understanding these evolutionary processes can help inform individual and government decision-making in the face of a pandemic. Lay summary: The COVID-19 pandemic has brought behavioural sciences into the public eye: Without vaccinations, stopping the spread of the virus must rely on behaviour change by limiting contact between people. On the face of it, "stop seeing people" sounds simple. In practice, this is hard. Here we outline how an evolutionary perspective on behaviour change can provide additional insights. Evolutionary theory postulates that our psychology and behaviour did not evolve to maximize our health or that of others. Instead, individuals are expected to act to maximise their inclusive fitness (i.e, spreading our genes) - which can lead to a conflict between behaviours that are in the best interests for the individual, and behaviours that stop the spread of the virus. By examining the ultimate explanations of behaviour related to pandemic-management (such as behavioural compliance and social distancing), we conclude that "good of the group" arguments and "one size fits all" policies are unlikely to encourage behaviour change over the long-term. Sustained behaviour change to keep pandemics at bay is much more likely to emerge from environmental change, so governments and policy makers may need to facilitate significant social change - such as improving life experiences for disadvantaged groups.

Cooperation can promote rescue or lead to evolutionary suicide during environmental change

The adaptation of populations to changing conditions may be affected by interactions between individuals. For example, when cooperative interactions increase fecundity, they may allow populations to maintain high densities and thus keep track of moving environmental optima. Simultaneously, changes in population density alter the marginal benefits of cooperative investments, creating a feedback loop between population dynamics and the evolution of cooperation. Here we model how the evolution of cooperation interacts with adaptation to changing environments. We hypothesize that environmental change lowers population size and thus promotes the evolution of cooperation, and that this, in turn, helps the population keep up with the moving optimum. However, we find that the evolution of cooperation can have qualitatively different effects, depending on which fitness component is reduced by the costs of cooperation. If the costs decrease fecundity, cooperation indeed speeds adaptation by increasing population density; if, in contrast, the costs decrease viability, cooperation may instead slow adaptation by lowering the effective population size, leading to evolutionary suicide. Thus, cooperation can either promote or-counterintuitively-hinder adaptation to a changing environment. Finally, we show that our model can also be generalized to other social interactions by discussing the evolution of competition during environmental change.

From disorganized equality to efficient hierarchy: how group size drives the evolution of hierarchy in human societies

A manifest trend is that larger and more productive human groups shift from distributed to centralized decision-making. Voluntary theories propose that human groups shift to hierarchy to limit scalar stress, i.e. the increase in cost of organization as a group grows. Yet, this hypothesis lacks a mechanistic model to investigate the organizational advantage of hierarchy and its role on its evolution. To fill this gap, we describe social organization by the distribution of individuals' capacity to influence others. We then integrate this formalization into models of social dynamics and evolutionary dynamics. First, our results demonstrate that hierarchy strongly reduces scalar stress, and that this benefit can emerge solely because leaders and followers differ in their capacity to influence others. Second, the model demonstrates that this benefit can be sufficient to drive the evolution of leader and follower behaviours and ultimately, the transition from small egalitarian to large hierarchical groups.

Cultural group selection and human cooperation: a conceptual and empirical review

Cultural group selection has been proposed as an explanation for humans' highly cooperative nature. This theory argues that social learning mechanisms, combined with rewards and punishment, can stabilise any group behaviour, cooperative or not. Equilibrium selection can then operate, resulting in cooperative groups outcompeting less-cooperative groups. This process may explain the widespread cooperation between non-kin observed in humans, which is sometimes claimed to be altruistic. This review explores the assumptions of cultural group selection to assess whether it provides a convincing explanation for human cooperation. Although competition between cultural groups certainly occurs, it is unclear whether this process depends on specific social learning mechanisms (e.g. conformism) or a norm psychology (to indiscriminately punish norm-violators) to stabilise groups at different equilibria as proposed by existing cultural group selection models. Rather than unquestioningly adopt group norms and institutions, individuals and groups appear to evaluate, design and shape them for self-interested reasons (where possible). As individual fitness is frequently tied to group fitness, this often coincides with constructing group-beneficial norms and institutions, especially when groups are in conflict. While culture is a vital component underlying our species' success, the extent to which current conceptions of cultural group selection reflect human cooperative evolution remains unclear.

Social influences on survival and reproduction: Insights from a long-term study of wild baboons

For social species, the environment has two components: physical and social. The social environment modifies the individual's interaction with the physical environment, and the physical environment may in turn impact individuals' social relationships. This interplay can generate considerable variation among individuals in survival and reproduction. Here, I synthesize more than four decades of research on the baboons of the Amboseli basin in southern Kenya to illustrate how social and physical environments interact to affect reproduction and survival. For immature baboons, social behaviour can both mitigate and exacerbate the challenge of survival. Only c. 50% of live-born females and c. 44% of live-born males reach the median age of first reproduction. Variation in pre-adult survival, growth and development is associated with multiple aspects of the social environment. For instance, conspecifics provide direct care and are a major source of social knowledge about food and the environment, but conspecifics can also represent a direct threat to survival through infanticide. In adulthood, both competition (within and between social groups) and cooperative affiliation (i.e. collective action and/or the exchange of social resources such as grooming) are prominent features of baboon social life and have important consequences for reproduction and survival. For instance, adult females with higher social dominance ranks have accelerated reproduction, and adult females that engage in more frequent affiliative social interactions have higher survival throughout adulthood. The early life environment also has important consequences for adult reproduction and survival, as in a number of other bird and mammal species. In seasonal breeders, early life effects often apply to entire cohorts; in contrast, in nonseasonal and highly social species such as baboons, early life effects are more individual-specific, stemming from considerable variation not only in the early physical environment (even if they are born in the same year) but also in the particulars of their social environment.

The Institutional Approach for Modeling the Evolution of Human Societies

Artificial life is concerned with understanding the dynamics of human societies. A defining feature of any society is its institutions. However, defining exactly what an institution is has proven difficult, with authors often talking past each other. This article presents a dynamic model of institutions, which views them as political game forms that generate the rules of a group's economic interactions. Unlike most prior work, the framework presented here allows for the construction of explicit models of the evolution of institutional rules. It takes account of the fact that group members are likely to try to create rules that benefit themselves. Following from this, it allows us to determine the conditions under which self-interested individuals will create institutional rules that support cooperation-for example, that prevent a tragedy of the commons. The article finishes with an example of how a model of the evolution of institutional rewards and punishments for promoting cooperation can be created. It is intended that this framework will allow artificial life researchers to examine how human groups can themselves create conditions for cooperation. This will help provide a better understanding of historical human social evolution, and facilitate the resolution of pressing societal social dilemmas.

Social learning and the demise of costly cooperation in humans

Humans have a sophisticated ability to learn from others, termed social learning, which has allowed us to spread over the planet, construct complex societies, and travel to the moon. It has been hypothesized that social learning has played a pivotal role in making human societies cooperative, by favouring cooperation even when it is not favoured by genetical selection. However, this hypothesis lacks direct experimental testing, and the opposite prediction has also been made, that social learning disfavours cooperation. We experimentally tested how different aspects of social learning affect the level of cooperation in public-goods games. We found that: (i) social information never increased cooperation and usually led to decreased cooperation; (ii) cooperation was lowest when individuals could observe how successful individuals behaved; and (iii) cooperation declined because individuals preferred to copy successful individuals, who cooperated less, rather than copy common behaviours. Overall, these results suggest that individuals use social information to try and improve their own success, and that this can lead to lower levels of cooperation.