Evaluating and approaching a strange animal: children's trust in informant testimony

Impact of measurement activities on young children's epistemic and interpersonal trust

The purpose of the current study was to examine the impact of activities conducted by children's teachers twice a week, which emphasize the importance of measurement and mathematical data for decision making, on children's informant selection and interpersonal trust decisions. In total, 55 children participated in the study for epistemic trust, and 54 children participated for interpersonal trust. Children interacted with two research assistants, one providing precise information and the other providing relative information regarding quantities, length, and weight. The findings revealed that, for epistemic trust, children from both groups preferred the relative informant over the precise informant both before and after the test. Regarding interpersonal trust decisions, the treatment groups showed a significant increase in the selection of the precise informant from the pretest to the posttest, whereas the control group's selection decreased. The difference in the selection of the precise informant between the interpersonal trust decision groups from pretest to posttest was significant, favoring the treatment group. The reasons revealed that children considered competence in their epistemic trust decisions.

Children use disagreement to infer what happened

In a rapidly changing and diverse world, the ability to reason about conflicting perspectives is critical for effective communication, collaboration, and critical thinking. The current pre-registered experiments with children ages 7 to 11 years investigated the developmental foundations of this ability through a novel social reasoning paradigm and a computational approach. In the inference task, children were asked to figure out what happened based on whether two speakers agreed or disagreed in their interpretation. In the prediction task, children were provided information about what happened and asked to predict whether two speakers will agree or disagree. Together, these experiments assessed children's understanding that disagreement often results from ambiguity about what happened, and that ambiguity about what happened is often predictive of disagreement. Experiment 1 (N = 52) showed that children are more likely to infer that an ambiguous utterance occurred after learning that people disagreed (versus agreed) about what happened and found that these inferences become stronger with age. Experiment 2 (N = 110) similarly found age-related change in children's inferences and also showed that children could reason in the forward direction, predicting that an ambiguous utterance would lead to disagreement. A computational model indicated that although children's ability to predict when disagreements might arise may be critical for making the reverse inferences, it did not fully account for age-related change.

Detecting lies through others' eyes: Children use perceptual access cues to evaluate listeners' beliefs about informants' deception

Children are often third-party observers of conversations between informants and receivers. Although 5- and 6-year-olds can identify and reject informants' false testimony, it remains unclear whether they expect others to do the same. Accurately assessing others' impressions of informants and their testimony in a conversational setting is essential for children's navigation of the social world. Using a novel second-order lie detection task, the current study examined whether 4- to 7-year-olds (N = 74; Mage = 69 months) take receivers' epistemic states into account when predicting whether a receiver would think an informant is truthful or deceptive. We pitted children's firsthand observations of reality against informants' false testimony while manipulating receivers' perceptual access to a sticker-hiding event. Results showed that when the receiver had perceptual access and was knowledgeable, children predicted that the receiver would think the informant is lying. Critically, when the receiver lacked perceptual access and was ignorant, children were significantly more likely to predict that the receiver would think the informant is telling the truth. Second-order theory of mind and executive function strengthened this effect. Findings are interpreted using a dual-process framework and provide new insights into children's understanding of others' selective trust and susceptibility to deception.

Epistemic trust: a comprehensive review of empirical insights and implications for developmental psychopathology

Originally rooted in philosophy and sociology, the concept of epistemic trust has recently transitioned to developmental psychopathology, illuminating social-cognitive processes in psychopathology. This narrative review synthesizes empirical evidence on epistemic trust to inform future research. A literature search highlighted 3 areas: i) the development of selective trust in children; ii) epistemic trust in non-clinical adults; iii) its link to mental health. Young children demonstrate selective learning from reliable sources using epistemic cues. Empirical studies beyond childhood were greatly facilitated in the last 2 years with the introduction of the Epistemic Trust, Mistrust and Credulity Questionnaire, a self-report scale measuring epistemic stance. Cross-sectional studies pinpointed dysfunctional epistemic strategies as factors in mental health vulnerability, and some qualitative work offered initial evidence linking restored epistemic trust to effective psychotherapy. For future research, we propose focusing on 3 primary areas. First, empirical investigations in adolescent samples are needed, as adolescence seems to be a pivotal phase in the development of epistemic trust. Second, more experimental research is required to assess dysfunctional and functional epistemic stances and how they relate to vulnerability to mental health disorders. Finally, intervention studies should explore the dynamics of epistemic stances within and between therapy sessions and their impact on therapeutic outcomes.

Shared social groups or shared experiences? The effect of shared knowledge on children's perspective-taking

Although the ability to consider others' visual perspectives to interpret ambiguous communication emerges during childhood, people sometimes fail to attend to their partner's perspective. Two studies investigated whether 4- to 6-year-olds show a "closeness-communication bias" in their consideration of a partner's perspective in a communication task. Participants played a game that required them to take their partner's visual perspective in order to interpret an ambiguous instruction. If children, like adults, perform worse when they overestimate the extent to which their perspective is aligned with that of a partner, then they should make more perspective-taking errors when interacting with a socially close partner compared with a more socially distant partner. In Study 1, social closeness was based on belonging to the same social group. In Study 2, social closeness was based on caregiving, a long-standing social relationship with a close kinship bond. Although social group membership did not affect children's consideration of their partner's perspective, children did make more perspective-taking errors when interacting with a close caregiver compared with a novel experimenter. These findings suggest that close personal relationships may be more likely to lead children to overestimate perspective alignment and hinder children's perspective-taking than shared social group membership, and they highlight important questions about the mechanisms underlying the effects of partner characteristics in perspective-taking tasks.

Fear modulates parental orienting during childhood and adolescence

Adults quickly orient toward sources of danger and deploy fight-or-flight tactics to manage threatening situations. In contrast, infants who cannot implement the safety strategies available to adults and depend heavily on caregivers for survival are more likely to turn toward familiar adults, such as their parents, to help them navigate threatening circumstances. However, work has yet to investigate how readily children and adolescents orient toward their parents in threatening or fearful contexts. The current work addressed this question using a visual search paradigm that included arrays of parents' and strangers' faces as target and distractor stimuli, preceded by a fear or neutral emotional priming procedure. Linear mixed-effects models showed that children and adolescents (N = 88, age range = 4-17 years; 42M/46F) were faster to search for the face of their parent than of a stranger. However, fear priming attenuated this effect of the parent on search times, such that children and adolescents were significantly slower to orient toward their parent in an array of strangers' faces if they were first primed with fear as opposed to a neutral video. This work indicates that fear priming may phasically interfere with parental orienting during childhood and adolescence, possibly because fear reallocates attention away from parents and toward (potentially threatening) unfamiliar people in the environment to facilitate the development of independent threat learning and coping systems.

Social cognition and trust: Exploring the role of theory of mind and hostile attribution bias in children's skepticism of inaccurate informants

A growing body of research has examined the role of individual differences in children's selective trust. The current study was designed to explore how individual differences in theory of mind and hostile attribution bias affect children's trust. Four- and five-year-old children took part in a standard selective trust paradigm in which they had the choice between a previously inaccurate informant and an unfamiliar informant. They were also asked to interpret why the previously inaccurate informant had provided incorrect information in the past. Finally, children completed a hostile attribution bias task and a theory of mind task. Children with better theory of mind ability were more likely to defer to the unfamiliar informant on the selective trust task. Children with greater hostile attribution bias were more likely to interpret previous inaccuracy as a result of "being tricky" rather than having "made a mistake." However, these interpretations did not influence children's choices on the selective trust task. Therefore, although there is reason to believe that establishing selective trust involves both cognitive and social processes, the current study raises questions about the nature of this relationship and how children draw on different sociocognitive skills when establishing epistemic trust.

Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Associations Among Children's Interpersonal Trust, Reputation for Trustworthiness, and Relationship Closeness

Interpersonal trust plays a crucial role in the formation and maintenance of social relationships. The present cross-sectional and longitudinal research examines the development of interpersonal trust judgments with reference to (1) the trustee's reputation for trustworthiness, and (2) the nature of the trustor's relationship closeness with the trustee. There were 194 7- to 13-year-olds who participated in the first wave of the study, and 107 of those individuals also participated in two subsequent waves across a 2-year period. Both cross-sectional and longitudinal results showed that with age, reputation for trustworthiness becomes less important and relationship closeness become more important. We also found that relationship closeness played a greater role in interpersonal trust evaluations for girls than for boys. These findings indicate that the way children make trust evaluations becomes increasingly relationship-specific over time and is more relationship-specific for girls than for boys.

When positive outcomes and reality collide: Children prefer optimists as social partners

Optimists, by definition, make inaccurate (overly positive) predictions regarding future event outcomes. Adults favor optimists as social partners. If children also prefer optimists, that preference could indicate early social benefits of being optimistic and might also shape how and what children learn regarding the likelihood of future outcomes. The present study thus sought to determine how children integrate the conflicting dimensions of optimism and accuracy in their social (friendship) preferences. Across two experiments (N = 133) 3- to 6-year-old children chose optimists over realists as social partners even if they were able to correctly identify the realist as being the most accurate of the two. However, when children made mistakes in identification, those mistakes primarily took the form of identifying the optimist as most accurate. These findings suggest that young children weigh optimism more heavily than accuracy in their affiliative relationships. Misidentifying the optimist as accurate also supports the notion that children have a bias to expect others to provide positive information. Further, a social preference for optimists might impact children's abilities to learn the true likelihood of event outcomes, as affiliating with optimists may result in setting oneself up to receive more positive (mis)information in the future. Such a preference suggests a mechanism by which optimism is perpetuated and points to potential social benefits that derive from being optimistic.

Of Kids and Unicorns: How Rational Is Children's Trust in Testimonial Knowledge?

When young children confront a vast array of adults' testimonial claims, they should decide which testimony to endorse. If they are unable to immediately verify the content of testimonial assertions, children adopt or reject their informants' statements on the basis of forming trust in the sources of testimony. This kind of trust needs to be based on some underlying reasons. The rational choice theory, which currently dominates the social, cognitive, and psychological sciences, posits that trust should be formed on a rational basis, as a result of probabilistic assessments and utility-maximizing calculations. In this paper, the predictions stemming from the rational choice approach to trust are systematically compared with the empirical evidence from the field of developmental psychology on how children establish their trust in testimonial statements. The results of this comparison demonstrate an obvious inadequacy of the rational choice explanation of the emergence and development of children's testimonial trust, regardless of which form of trust rationality-weighting, threshold, or ordering-is examined. As none of the three forms of rationality of children's trust in testimony squares with the empirical data, this paper introduces a new version of trust rationality, adaptively rational trust. It explores the compatibility of the concept of adaptively rational trust with the recent empirical findings in the area of developmental psychology and addresses some avenues for future research on the rationality of testimonial trust.

Children's reputation management: Learning to identify what is socially valued and acting upon it

Much of what people do is motivated by a concern with social evaluation. We argue that the process of figuring out what others value and making effective use of this information presents significant cognitive challenges. These challenges include reasoning about the relevance of different forms of information and making inferences about the mental lives of others. They also include modifying one's behavior in light of whatever personal qualities appear to be valued in an effort to appeal to different audiences. We argue that the foundations of many of the important skills needed to meet these challenges are already in place early during childhood, but that the challenges themselves persist well into adulthood.

Children's Informant Judgments and Recall of Valenced Facts at a Science Center

In laboratory-based research, children recognize who is an expert and demonstrate an interest in learning from that person. However, children prefer positive information in the moment and sometimes prioritize positivity over expertise. To what extent do these social judgments (e.g., a preference for positivity) relate to information that children remember? We investigated the relation between these judgments and memory at a local science center to better understand children's learning outcomes in naturalistic settings. We examined the extent to which 4- to 8-year-olds accepted facts about an unfamiliar animal from a zookeeper informant (i.e., expert) and a maternal figure (i.e., non-expert) when these facts were positive, negative, or neutral. Children endorsed positive information as correct, regardless of expertise, but demonstrated the strongest memory for neutral information. We discuss the implications of this dissociation for learning outcomes in naturalistic contexts as well as theoretical frameworks regarding children's learning from others.

Children's and Adults' Beliefs about the Stability of Traits from Infancy to Adulthood: Contributions of Age and Executive Function

We examined developmental differences and sources of variability in trait reasoning. Four- to 10-year-olds and adults (N=198) rated how mean or nice "medium-mean" and "medium-nice" babies, kids, and teenagers were earlier in their lifetime and would be at older ages. Participants expected nice-labeled characters to be nice throughout their lives (participant age effects were null). In contrast, we documented age-related differences in judgments about meanness. With increasing participant age, individuals expected that meanness present in infancy, childhood, and adolescence would persist into adulthood. We discovered a curvilinear pattern in assessments of whether meanness originates during infancy: Four- to 5-year-olds and adults expected mean-labeled kids and teenagers to have been nicer as babies than did 6- to 10-year-olds. Controlling for age and working memory, participants with better inhibitory control more frequently expected mean-labeled individuals to remain mean across the lifespan, but inhibitory control was unrelated to judgments about nice-labeled individuals.

The friendly fossa: The effect of anthropomorphic language on learning about unfamiliar animals through both storybooks and live animal experiences

Children's storybooks about animals often use elements of fantasy; even educational storybooks intended to teach children about factual and biological properties include talking animals depicted as more like humans than animals. Previous research has found that anthropomorphic images, specifically in storybooks, hinder factual learning and thus should not be used in the context of educational experiences. However, little research has explored the impact of anthropomorphic language alone as well as its use in other contexts such as zoos where parents often naturally use anthropomorphic language. The current studies explored the impact of anthropomorphic language on learning about an unfamiliar animal (fossa) across two contexts: storybooks (Study 1; N = 48; age range = 4;0-6;3 [years; months]) and a zoo (Study 2a; N = 29; age range = 4;5-7;10). An adult comparison group (Study 2b, N = 82) was also included. Across both studies, there was no evidence that anthropomorphic language decreased factual learning. However, children given anthropomorphic information about a fossa were more likely to generalize anthropomorphic traits, such as emotions, intentions, and preferences, to other fossas, and this was consistent with the adult comparison group. We discuss considerations for parents and educators regarding the appropriateness of fantastical language about animals in experiences specifically designed to support biological learning.

In sickness and in filth: Developing a disdain for dirty people

Cleanliness is universally valued, and people who are dirty are routinely marginalized. In this research, we measured the roots of negative attitudes toward physically unclean individuals and examined the differences that exist in these attitudes between childhood and adulthood. We presented 5- to 9-year-old children and adults (total N = 260) with paired photographs of a dirty person and a clean person, and we measured biases with a selective trust task and an explicit evaluation task. In Study 1, where images of adults were evaluated, both children and adults demonstrated clear biases, but adults were more likely to selectively trust the clean informant. Study 2 instead used images of children and included several additional tasks measuring implicit attitudes (e.g., an implicit association task) and overt behaviors (a resource distribution task) and also manipulated the cause of dirtiness to include illness, enjoyment of filth, and accidental spillage. Children and adults again revealed strong biases regardless of the cause of dirtiness, but only children exhibited a bias on the explicit evaluation task. Study 3 replicated these findings in India, a country that has historically endorsed strong purity norms. Overall, this research indicates that dirty people are targets of discrimination from early in development, that this is not merely a Western phenomenon, and that this pervasive bias is most strongly directed at individuals of similar ages.

Content counts: A trait and moral reasoning framework for children's selective social learning

We present evidence that evaluative information plays a major role in children's selective social learning. We demonstrate that social learning patterns differ as a function of whether children are exposed to positively or negatively valenced information (e.g., content; informant characteristics) and that these patterns can be understood in the context of children's schemas for social groups, morality, and trait understanding. We highlight that attention must be given to theoretical ties between social learning and children's trait judgments and moral reasoning to strengthen our understanding of selective trust and account for variations in children's sophistication when they judge potential sources of information. Finally, we suggest revisions to current theoretical frameworks and offer suggestions to move the field forward.

Children's selective information sharing based on the recipient's role

Two experiments investigate whether children ages 5 through 10 (n = 121) take into account an individual's role when choosing what information to share or with whom to share it. In Experiment 1, children heard statements about an unfamiliar animal's behavior and appearance. They then chose one statement to share with each of two characters with different job descriptions. Seven-year-olds consistently shared the information that aligned with each character's role, but 5-year-olds and a subset of 9-year-olds did not. Experiment 2 showed that children's decisions about what to share were not driven by their personal preferences for the information they were sharing. In addition, when children were provided with a single fact and had to choose with whom to share it, 7- and 9-year-olds shared information with the recipient for whom it was most relevant. Together, the findings suggest that by age 7, children can use information about an individual's occupational role in order to infer what information to share.

Trait or testimony? Children's preferences for positive informants

Research indicates that children often show a positivity bias, or a tendency to favor positive information over negative information, in assessments of informant credibility in social and nonsocial situations. The current study investigated whether young children prioritize positive informant traits (i.e., nice vs. mean informant) as compared with positive speech content (i.e., positive vs. negative evaluation) in conflicting assessments of a work product. A total of 123 4- to 8-year-olds heard stories about a nice informant who gave a negative evaluation of a painting and a mean informant who gave a positive evaluation of the painting. Participants were asked who they would endorse, who they would ask about a future painting, and their friendship preferences. Children endorsed and asked the mean informant who provided positive testimony, but they chose to befriend the nice informant who provided negative testimony. Endorsements of positive testimony increased with age. Findings are considered in the context of the broader literature on selective social learning and trait understanding.

The role of intergroup biases in children's endorsement of information about novel individuals

A great body of evidence suggests that children are remarkably selective in accepting information from different sources. Yet, very few studies have focused on children's learning about the attributes of others. In three experiments, we examined how 6- and 7-year-olds' ingroup and outgroup biases about novel target individuals and their biases to follow ingroup informants interact in social learning contexts. Overall, children exhibited a positivity bias, accepting positive testimony about ingroup and outgroup targets, but this bias was significantly higher for ingroup targets. Furthermore, whereas children accepted the positive testimony about ingroup targets regardless of the informant's group membership, children selectively relied on ingroup informants when endorsing information about outgroup targets. These results suggest that children's existing biases interact with their acquisition of knowledge in complex ways and shape their social evaluations. These findings may have important implications for developing strategies to prevent negative biases against outgroup individuals among children.

Does the Past Shape Anticipation for the Future?

Abstract. A positive association between executive function (a set of higher order, self-regulatory cognitive skills) and theory of mind (beliefs about mental states) has been well documented during early childhood. As investigations extend beyond false belief understanding (that the mind can misrepresent reality), there is growing interest in examining contributions of executive function to more advanced aspects of theory of mind in older age groups. To add to this literature, we showed 4- to 10-year-olds and adults (N = 274) scenarios in which a perpetrator acted positively (P) and/or negatively (N) toward a focal character on two separate days (PP, NN, NP, and PN). Participants inferred focal characters’ future-oriented mental states upon seeing perpetrators for the third time. Children and adults also completed executive function measures (working memory and inhibitory control). Both age and executive function independently predicted higher life history theory of mind: Recognition that prior life experiences influence how individuals think, feel, and make decisions about the future.

When Peer Performance Matters: Effects of Expertise and Traits on Children's Self-Evaluations After Social Comparison

The present research examined the influence of peer characteristics on children's reactions to upward social comparisons. In Experiment 1, one hundred twenty-six 5-, 8-, and 10-year-olds were told that they were outperformed by an expert or novice peer. Older children reported higher self-evaluations after comparisons with an expert rather than a novice, whereas 5-year-olds reported high self-evaluations broadly. In Experiment 2, ninety-eight 5- to 6-year-olds and 9- to 10-year-olds were told that the peer possessed a positive or negative trait that was task relevant (i.e., intelligence) or task irrelevant (i.e., athleticism). Older children reported higher self-evaluations after hearing about positive rather than negative traits, irrespective of relevance. Younger children reported high self-evaluations indiscriminately. Results inform the understanding of social comparison development in childhood.

The impact of counter-perceptual testimony on children's categorization after a delay

When preschoolers are presented with a label for an entity that conflicts with its appearance, they sometimes rely on the new label rather than on the entity's appearance to categorize the entity and to infer its properties. We examined whether children's learning from such claims is short-lived or long-lasting and whether the persistence of their learning depends on the degree of fit between those claims and the available perceptual evidence. Children aged 3-5years (N=71) were asked to categorize hybrids. These hybrids combined 75% of the features from one animal or object with 25% of the features from a different animal or object. After categorizing each hybrid, children heard an informant provide a contrary label. Immediately after they were provided with this new label, children often recategorized the entities accordingly, especially when the label matched the hybrid's predominant features. Children's endorsement of the informant's label proved to be long-lasting when it matched the hybrid's predominant features, typically persisting even after 5weeks. In contrast, children's endorsement often faded over time when the informant's label did not match the hybrid's predominant features. Overall, children were more skeptical of testimony that was more discrepant with the perceptual evidence available to them, and they were less likely to continue endorsing it after a delay. The findings have implications for our understanding of how children eventually come to represent and believe in counter-perceptual and counterintuitive concepts.

Parameterizing developmental changes in epistemic trust

Children rely on others for much of what they learn, and therefore must track who to trust for information. Researchers have debated whether to interpret children's behavior as inferences about informants' knowledgeability only or as inferences about both knowledgeability and intent. We introduce a novel framework for integrating results across heterogeneous ages and methods. The framework allows application of a recent computational model to a set of results that span ages 8 months to adulthood and a variety of methods. The results show strong fits to specific findings in the literature trust, and correctly fails to fit one representative result from an adjacent literature. In the aggregate, the results show a clear development in children's reasoning about informants' intent and no appreciable changes in reasoning about informants' knowledgeability, confirming previous results. The results extend previous findings by modeling development over a much wider age range and identifying and explaining differences across methods.

Trust and doubt: An examination of children's decision to believe what they are told about food

The domain of food is one that is highly relevant and vital to the everyday lives of children. However, children's reasoning about this domain is poorly understood within the field of developmental psychology. Because children's learning about food, including its evaluative components (e.g., health, taste) is so heavily dependent on information conveyed by other people, a major developmental challenge that children face is determining who to distrust regarding food. In three studies, this investigation examined how 3- and 4-year-olds and adults (N=312) use different cues to determine when to ignore informant information (i.e., distrust what an informant tells them by choosing an alternative) in food- and non-food-specific scenarios. The results of Study 1 indicated that by age 4 years, children are less trusting of inaccurate sources of information compared with sources that have not demonstrated previous inaccuracy. Study 2 revealed that these results are applicable across the domain of objects. The results of Study 3 indicated that by age 4, children trust benevolent sources more often than malevolent ones. Thus, when reasoning about the evaluative components of food, by age 4, children appraise other people's untrustworthiness by paying attention to their inaccuracy and malevolence.

The better part of not knowing: Virtuous ignorance

Suppose you are presented with 2 informants who have provided answers to the same question. One provides a precise and confident answer, and the other says that they do not know. If you were asked which of these 2 informants was more of an expert, intuitively you would select the informant who provided the certain answer over the ignorant informant. However, for cases in which precise information is practically or actually unknowable (e.g., the number of leaves on all the trees in the world), certainty and confidence indicate a lack of competence, while expressions of ignorance may indicate greater expertise. In 3 experiments, we investigated whether children and adults are able to use this "virtuous ignorance" as a cue to expertise. Experiment 1 found that adults and children older than 9 years selected confident informants for knowable information and ignorant informants for unknowable information. However, 5-6-year-olds overwhelmingly favored the confident informant, even when such certainty was completely implausible. In Experiment 2 we replicated the results of Experiment 1 with a new set of items focused on predictions about the future, rather than numerical information. In Experiment 3, we demonstrated that 5-8-year-olds and adults are both able to distinguish between knowable and unknowable items when asked how difficult the information would be to acquire, but those same children failed to reject the precise and confident informant for unknowable items. We suggest that children have difficulty integrating information about the knowability of particular facts into their evaluations of expertise. (PsycINFO Database Record

Expertise in unexpected places: Children's acceptance of information from gender counter-stereotypical experts

The current study examined children's willingness to accept novel information from expert informants with nontraditional gender role interests. Four- to 8-year-olds heard conflicting information about traditionally feminine or masculine domains from a gender counter-stereotypical expert (e.g., a boy with expertise in ballet) and a layperson of the other gender (e.g., a girl with little knowledge about ballet). Participants were asked which informant was correct, who they would prefer to learn from in the future, and to rate their liking of each informant. Overall, participants selected the gender counter-stereotypical expert as correct. Four- to 5-year-olds reported a preference to learn from same-gender participants in the future irrespective of expertise, whereas 6- to 8-year-olds reported wanting to learn from counter-stereotypical experts. Boys showed relatively greater acceptance of information from a male counter-stereotypical expert than from a female counter-stereotypical expert. Although participants reported greater liking of same-gender informants, liking evaluations were largely positive irrespective of gender norm deviations. Implications for children's acceptance of gender nonconforming activities are discussed.

Developing expectations regarding the boundaries of expertise

Three experiments examined elementary school-aged children's and adults' expectations regarding what specialists (i.e., those with narrow domains of expertise) and generalists (i.e., those with broad domains of expertise) are likely to know. Experiment 1 demonstrated developmental differences in the ability to differentiate between generalists and specialists, with younger children believing generalists have more specific trivia knowledge than older children and adults believed. Experiment 2 demonstrated that children and adults expected generalists to have more underlying principles knowledge than specific trivia knowledge about unfamiliar animals. However, they believed that generalists would have more of both types of knowledge than themselves. Finally, Experiment 3 demonstrated that children and adults recognized that underlying principles knowledge can be generalized between topics closely related to the specialists' domains of expertise. However, they did not recognize when this knowledge was generalizable to topics slightly less related, expecting generalists to know only as much as they would. Importantly, this work contributes to the literature by showing how much of and what kinds of knowledge different types of experts are expected to have. In sum, this work provides insight into some of the ways children's notions of expertise change over development. The current research demonstrates that between the ages of 5 and 10, children are developing the ability to recognize how experts' knowledge is likely to be limited. That said, even older children at times struggle to determine the breadth of an experts' knowledge.