Rotating with rotated text: a natural behavior approach to investigating cognitive offloading

Children's metacognition and cognitive offloading in an immediate memory task

Cognitive offloading is used to supplement internal processing demands through external actions such as writing down information. While metacognition plays a critical role in adults' cognitive offloading decisions, less is known about the relation between metacognition and cognitive offloading in children. Here, we introduced an immediate memory task to 11- to 12-year-olds under two conditions: no choice to offload and choice to offload. Participants made metacognitive judgements about their memory capacity, and the task performance components such as accuracy and effort. Our results revealed that recall accuracy of the to-be-remembered items increased in the choice condition. Interestingly, while there was a consensus amongst participants that they chose to offload to maximise accuracy and reduce effort, there was no relation between offloading behaviour and metacognitions about accuracy and effort. On the other hand, metacognition for memory capacity was related to offloading behaviour. We discuss the implications for further understanding of the relation between cognitive offloading and metacognition in children.

Influence of the physical effort of reminder-setting on strategic offloading of delayed intentions

Intention offloading involves using external reminders such as diaries, to-do lists, and digital alerts to help us remember delayed intentions. Recent studies have provided evidence for various cognitive and metacognitive factors that guide intention offloading, but little research has investigated the physical cost of reminder-setting itself. Here, we present two pre-registered experiments investigating how the cost of physical effort associated with reminder-setting influences strategic intention offloading under different levels of memory load. At all memory loads, reminder-setting was reduced when it was more effortful. The ability to set reminders allowed participants to compensate for the influence of memory load on accuracy in the low-effort condition; this effect was attenuated in the high-effort condition. In addition, there was evidence that participants with less confidence in their memory abilities were more likely to set reminders. Contrary to prediction, physical effort had the greatest effect on reminder-setting at intermediate memory loads. We speculate that the physical costs of reminder-setting might have the greatest impact when participants are uncertain about their strategy choice. These results demonstrate the importance of physical effort as one of the factors relevant to cost-benefit decision-making about cognitive offloading strategies.

Switching between different cognitive strategies induces switch costs as evidenced by switches between manual and mental object rotation

Switching between tasks entails costs when compared to repeating the same task. It is unclear whether switch costs also occur when repeating the same task but switching the underlying cognitive strategy (CS). Here, we investigated whether CS switch costs exist despite overlap in mental processing between CSs and a lack of abstract goal (always "solve task X") or answer key binding switches. Specifically, we asked participants to judge the identity of two misaligned objects by either mental or manual computer-mediated object rotation. In each trial of Block 1, to measure switch costs without choice-related cognitive processes, a cue indicated which CS (mental/manual) to use. In Block 2, the CS was freely chosen. Participants exhibited considerable CS switch costs for both cued and freely chosen switches. Moreover, Block 1 switch costs moderately predicted Block 2 switch frequency, while an overall tendency for CS repetition was observed. In sum, we found that switch costs are not confined to situations in which tasks are switched but generalize to situations in which the task stays identical and the CS is switched instead. The results have implications for modern computerized cognitive environments in which a multitude of cognitive strategies is available for the same task.

Sound localization in noisy contexts: performance, metacognitive evaluations and head movements

Localizing sounds in noisy environments can be challenging. Here, we reproduce real-life soundscapes to investigate the effects of environmental noise on sound localization experience. We evaluated participants' performance and metacognitive assessments, including measures of sound localization effort and confidence, while also tracking their spontaneous head movements. Normal-hearing participants (N = 30) were engaged in a speech-localization task conducted in three common soundscapes that progressively increased in complexity: nature, traffic, and a cocktail party setting. To control visual information and measure behaviors, we used visual virtual reality technology. The results revealed that the complexity of the soundscape had an impact on both performance errors and metacognitive evaluations. Participants reported increased effort and reduced confidence for sound localization in more complex noise environments. On the contrary, the level of soundscape complexity did not influence the use of spontaneous exploratory head-related behaviors. We also observed that, irrespective of the noisy condition, participants who implemented a higher number of head rotations and explored a wider extent of space by rotating their heads made lower localization errors. Interestingly, we found preliminary evidence that an increase in spontaneous head movements, specifically the extent of head rotation, leads to a decrease in perceived effort and an increase in confidence at the single-trial level. These findings expand previous observations regarding sound localization in noisy environments by broadening the perspective to also include metacognitive evaluations, exploratory behaviors and their interactions.

Mutual interplay between cognitive offloading and secondary task performance

Various modern tools, such as smartphones, allow for cognitive offloading (i.e., the externalization of cognitive processes). In this study, we examined the use and consequences of cognitive offloading in demanding situations in which people perform multiple tasks concurrently-mimicking the requirements of daily life. In a preregistered study, we adapted the dual-task paradigm so that one of the tasks allowed for cognitive offloading. As a primary task, our participants (N = 172) performed the pattern copy task-a highly demanding working memory task that allows for offloading at various degrees. In this task, we manipulated the temporal costs of offloading. Concurrently, half of the participants responded to a secondary N-back task. As our main research question, we investigated the impact of offloading behavior on secondary task performance. We observed that more pronounced offloading in the condition without temporal costs was accompanied by a more accurate performance in the N-back task. Furthermore, the necessity to respond to the N-back task increased offloading behavior. These results suggest an interplay between offloading and secondary task performance: in demanding situations, individuals increasingly use cognitive offloading, which releases internal resources that can then be devoted to improving performance in other, concurrent tasks.

Eye and head movements while encoding and recognizing panoramic scenes in virtual reality

One approach to studying the recognition of scenes and objects relies on the comparison of eye movement patterns during encoding and recognition. Past studies typically analyzed the perception of flat stimuli of limited extent presented on a computer monitor that did not require head movements. In contrast, participants in the present study saw omnidirectional panoramic scenes through an immersive 3D virtual reality viewer, and they could move their head freely to inspect different parts of the visual scenes. This allowed us to examine how unconstrained observers use their head and eyes to encode and recognize visual scenes. By studying head and eye movement within a fully immersive environment, and applying cross-recurrence analysis, we found that eye movements are strongly influenced by the content of the visual environment, as are head movements-though to a much lesser degree. Moreover, we found that the head and eyes are linked, with the head supporting, and by and large mirroring the movements of the eyes, consistent with the notion that the head operates to support the acquisition of visual information by the eyes.

Outsourcing Memory to External Tools: A Review of 'Intention Offloading'

How do we remember delayed intentions? Three decades of research into prospective memory have provided insight into the cognitive and neural mechanisms involved in this form of memory. However, we depend on more than just our brains to remember intentions. We also use external props and tools such as calendars and diaries, strategically placed objects, and technologies such as smartphone alerts. This is known as 'intention offloading'. Despite the progress in our understanding of brain-based prospective memory, we know much less about the role of intention offloading in individuals' ability to fulfil delayed intentions. Here, we review recent research into intention offloading, with a particular focus on how individuals decide between storing intentions in internal memory versus external reminders. We also review studies investigating how intention offloading changes across the lifespan and how it relates to underlying brain mechanisms. We conclude that intention offloading is highly effective, experimentally tractable, and guided by metacognitive processes. Individuals have systematic biases in their offloading strategies that are stable over time. Evidence also suggests that individual differences and developmental changes in offloading strategies are driven at least in part by metacognitive processes. Therefore, metacognitive interventions could play an important role in promoting individuals' adaptive use of cognitive tools.

Know Your Cognitive Environment! Mental Models as Crucial Determinant of Offloading Preferences

OBJECTIVE

Human problem solvers possess the ability to outsource parts of their mental processing onto cognitive "helpers" (cognitive offloading). However, suboptimal decisions regarding which helper to recruit for which task occur frequently. Here, we investigate if understanding and adjusting a specific subcomponent of mental models-beliefs about task-specific expertise-regarding these helpers could provide a comparatively easy way to improve offloading decisions.

BACKGROUND

Mental models afford the storage of beliefs about a helper that can be retrieved when needed.

METHODS

Arithmetic and social problems were solved by 192 participants. Participants could, in addition to solving a task on their own, offload cognitive processing onto a human, a robot, or one of two smartphone apps. These helpers were introduced with either task-specific (e.g., stating that an app would use machine learning to "recognize faces" and "read emotions") or task-unspecific (e.g., stating that an app was built for solving "complex cognitive tasks") descriptions of their expertise.

RESULTS

Providing task-specific expertise information heavily altered offloading behavior for apps but much less so for humans or robots. This suggests (1) strong preexisting mental models of human and robot helpers and (2) a strong impact of mental model adjustment for novel helpers like unfamiliar smartphone apps.

CONCLUSION

Creating and refining mental models is an easy approach to adjust offloading preferences and thus improve interactions with cognitive environments.

APPLICATION

To efficiently work in environments in which problem-solving includes consulting other people or cognitive tools ("helpers"), accurate mental models-especially regarding task-relevant expertise-are a crucial prerequisite.

Impact of Intrinsic Cognitive Skills and Metacognitive Beliefs on Tool Use Performance

Cognitive tools (e.g., calculators) provide all users with the same potential. Yet when people use such cognitive tools, interindividual variations are observed. Previous findings have indicated that 2 main factors could explain these variations: intrinsic cognitive skills (i.e., the “non–tool use” cognitive skills associated with the task targeted) and metacognitive beliefs about one's performance with tool use. In this study we sought to reproduce these findings and to investigate in more detail the nature of the relationships (i.e., linear vs. exponential) between tool use performance and intrinsic cognitive skills. In Experiment 1, 200 participants completed 2 cognitive tasks (calculation and geography) in 2 conditions (non–tool use vs. tool use). In Experiment 2, 70 participants performed a geography task in 2 conditions (non–tool use vs. tool use) and estimated their performance in each condition before completing the task. Results indicated that intrinsic cognitive skills and, to a lesser extent, metacognitive beliefs improved tool use performance: The higher the intrinsic cognitive skills and the higher participants estimated their tool use performance, the higher this tool use performance was. The nature of the relationship between tool use performance and intrinsic cognitive skills appeared to be linear rather than exponential. These findings extend previous research showing a strong impact of intrinsic cognitive skills on the performance associated with the use of cognitive tools or external aids.

Recognition of rotated objects and cognitive offloading in dogs

Recognition of rotated images can challenge visual systems. Humans often diminish the load of cognitive tasks employing bodily actions (cognitive offloading). To investigate these phenomena from a comparative perspective, we trained eight dogs (Canis familiaris) to discriminate between bidimensional shapes. We then tested the dogs with rotated versions of the same shapes, while measuring their accuracy and head tilts. Although generalization to rotated stimuli challenged dogs (overall accuracy: 55%), three dogs performed differently from chance level with rotated stimuli. The amplitude of stimulus rotation did not influence dogs' performance. Interestingly, dogs tilted their head following the direction and amplitude of rotated stimuli. These small head movements did not influence their performance. Hence, we show that dogs might be capable of recognizing rotated 2D objects, but they do not use a cognitive offloading strategy in this task. This work paves the way to further investigation of cognitive offloading in non-human species.

The Toolman effect: Preexisting non-tool-use experience improves subsequent tool-use performance

This study explores whether performing a cognitive task without using a tool (i.e., preexisting non-tool-use experience) impacts subsequent tool-use performance. Sixty participants moved an avatar within a maze in four directions (up, down, left, right). The keys were remapped 90° anticlockwise (e.g., the right key → upward). Therefore, the participants had to learn the mental-rotation-based perceptual-motor transformation to complete the path as quickly as possible and with as few errors as possible. In Tool trials, a cognitive tool (i.e., an arrow symbol) helped the participants to find the correct key. In No Tool trials, they completed the task without the cognitive tool. The tool was introduced either early or late in the task. At the end of the task, all participants completed the task without the tool. Results indicated that preexisting non-tool-use experience improved subsequent tool-use efficiency (i.e., completion times). In addition, the early introduction of the tool induced an effectiveness bias (i.e., accuracy) that persisted even after the removal of the tool. By contrast, its late introduction favored the emergence of an efficiency bias that persisted even after the introduction of the tool. These findings provide new insights into the role of users' intrinsic cognitive skills in tool use.

Children boost their cognitive performance with a novel offloading technique

Ninety-seven children aged 4-11 (49 males, 48 females, mostly White) were given the opportunity to improve their problem-solving performance by devising and implementing a novel cognitive offloading strategy. Across two phases, they searched for hidden rewards using maps that were either aligned or misaligned with the search space. In the second phase, maps were presented on rotatable turntables, thus allowing children to manually align all maps and alleviate mental rotation demand. From age six onwards, children showed strong evidence of both mentally rotating misaligned maps in phase 1 and manually aligning them in phase 2. Older children used this form of cognitive offloading more frequently, which substantially improved performance and eliminated the individual differences observed in phase 1.

Trusting Other Vehicles' Automatic Emergency Braking Decreases Self-Protective Driving

OBJECTIVE

We focused on drivers in close proximity to vehicles with advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS). We examined whether the belief that an approaching vehicle is equipped with automatic emergency braking (AEB) influences behavior of those drivers.

BACKGROUND

In addition to benefits of ADAS, previous studies have demonstrated negative behavioral adaptation, that is, behavioral changes after introduction of ADAS, by its users. However, little is known about whether negative behavioral adaptation can occur for nonusers in close proximity to vehicles with ADAS.

METHOD

Experienced (Experiment 1) and novice (Experiment 2) drivers drove a simulator vehicle without ADAS and tried to pass through intersections. We manipulated participants' belief about whether an approaching vehicle had AEB and time-to-arrival of the approaching vehicle. Participants kept constant speed or pressed the brake pedal before entering each intersection. In Experiment 2, participants rated their trust in AEB by a questionnaire after driving.

RESULTS

In both experiments, belief about the approaching vehicle's AEB did not influence braking probability; however, belief delayed initiation of braking. The effect of belief on braking latency was only observed when trust in AEB was higher in Experiment 2.

CONCLUSION

Negative behavioral adaptation can occur for nonusers in close proximity to users of AEB, and trust in AEB plays an important role.

APPLICATION

When evaluating the effect of ADAS, the possible behavioral change of surrounding nonusers as well as users should be taken into account. To establish consumers' trust accurately, advertisements (e.g., TV commercials) must carefully consider their messages.

Individual differences in cognitive offloading: a comparison of intention offloading, pattern copy, and short-term memory capacity

The cognitive load of many everyday life tasks exceeds known limitations of short-term memory. One strategy to compensate for information overload is cognitive offloading which refers to the externalization of cognitive processes such as reminder setting instead of memorizing. There appears to be remarkable variance in offloading behavior between participants which poses the question whether there is a common factor influencing offloading behavior across different tasks tackling short-term memory processes. To pursue this question, we studied individual differences in offloading behavior between two well-established offloading paradigms: the intention offloading task which tackles memory for intentions and the pattern copy task which tackles continuous short-term memory load. Our study also included an unrelated task measuring short-term memory capacity. Each participant completed all tasks twice on two consecutive days in order to obtain reliability scores. Despite high reliability scores, individual differences in offloading behavior were uncorrelated between the two offloading tasks. In both tasks, however, individual differences in offloading behavior were correlated with the individual differences in an unrelated short-term memory task. Our results therefore show that offloading behavior cannot simply be explained in terms of a single common factor driving offloading behavior across tasks. We discuss the implications of this finding for future research investigating the interrelations of offloading behavior across different tasks.

Two people, one graph: the effect of rotated viewpoints on accessibility of data visualizations

In co-located, multi-user settings such as multi-touch tables, user interfaces need to be accessible from multiple viewpoints. In this project, we investigated how this goal can be achieved for depictions of data in bar graphs. We designed a laboratory task in which participants answered simple questions based on information depicted in bar graphs presented from differently rotated points of view. As the dependent variable, we measured differences in response onsets relative to the standard viewpoint (i.e., upright graphs). In Experiment 1, we manipulated graph and label orientation independently of each other. We observed that rotations of the labels rather than rotations of the graph itself pose a challenge for accessing depicted information from rotated viewpoints. In Experiment 2, we studied whether replacing word labels with pictographs could overcome the detrimental effects of rotated labels. Rotated pictographs were less detrimental than rotated word labels, but performance was still worse than in the unrotated baseline condition. In Experiment 3, we studied whether color coding could overcome the detrimental effects of rotated labels. Indeed, for multicolored labels, the detrimental effect of label rotation was in the negligible range. We discuss the implications of our findings for the underlying psychological theory as well as for the design of depicted statistical information in multi-user settings.

Consequences of cognitive offloading: Boosting performance but diminishing memory

Modern technical tools such as tablets allow for the temporal externalisation of working memory processes (i.e., cognitive offloading). Although such externalisations support immediate performance on different tasks, little is known about potential long-term consequences of offloading behaviour. In the current set of experiments, we studied the relationship between cognitive offloading and subsequent memory for the offloaded information as well as the interplay of this relationship with the goal to acquire new memory representations. Our participants solved the Pattern Copy Task, in which we manipulated the costs of cognitive offloading and the awareness of a subsequent memory test. In Experiment 1 (N = 172), we showed that increasing the costs for offloading induces reduced offloading behaviour. This reduction in offloading came along with lower immediate task performance but more accurate memory in an unexpected test. In Experiment 2 (N = 172), we confirmed these findings and observed that offloading behaviour remained detrimental for subsequent memory performance when participants were aware of the upcoming memory test. Interestingly, Experiment 3 (N = 172) showed that cognitive offloading is not detrimental for long-term memory formation under all circumstances. Those participants who were forced to offload maximally but were aware of the memory test could almost completely counteract the negative impact of offloading on memory. Our experiments highlight the importance of the explicit goal to acquire new memory representations when relying on technical tools as offloading did have detrimental effects on memory without such a goal.

Can rotated words be processed automatically? Evidence from rotated repetition priming

Visual word processing has its own dedicated neural system that, due to the novelty of this activity, is unlikely to have acquired its specialization through natural selection. Understanding the properties of this system could shed light on its recruitment and the background of its disorders. Although recognition of simple visual objects is orientation invariant, this is not necessarily the case for written words. We used a masked repetition priming paradigm to find out whether words retain their readability when viewed in atypical orientations. Subjects had to read out upright target words that were preceded by rotated prime words of the same or different identity. Priming duration was varied in Experiment 1 to assess the temporal emergence of a rotated priming effect. In Experiment 2, the letter order of the prime words was reversed in order to differentiate the processing stage where priming occurs. The orientational pattern of the priming effects seen in our results mostly confirms earlier word recognition models, but also serves a more detailed view about the effects of orientation on word form processing.

Problem Solvers Adjust Cognitive Offloading Based on Performance Goals

When incorporating the environment into mental processing (cf., cognitive offloading), one creates novel cognitive strategies that have the potential to improve task performance. Improved performance can, for example, mean faster problem solving, more accurate solutions, or even higher grades at university.¹ Although cognitive offloading has frequently been associated with improved performance, it is yet unclear how flexible problem solvers are at matching their offloading habits with their current performance goals (can people improve goal-related instead of generic performance, e.g., when being in a hurry and aiming for a "quick and dirty" solution?). Here, we asked participants to solve a cognitive task, provided them with different goals-maximizing speed (SPD) or accuracy (ACC), respectively-and measured how frequently (Experiment 1) and how proficiently (Experiment 2) they made use of a novel external resource to support their cognitive processing. Experiment 1 showed that offloading behavior varied with goals: Participants offloaded less in the SPD than in the ACC condition. Experiment 2 showed that this differential offloading behavior was associated with high goal-related performance: fast answers in the SPD, accurate answers in the ACC condition. Simultaneously, goal-unrelated performance was sacrificed: inaccurate answers in the SPD, slow answers in the ACC condition. The findings support the notion of humans as canny offloaders who are able to successfully incorporate their environment in pursuit of their current cognitive goals. Future efforts should be focused on the finding's generalizability, for example, to settings without feedback or with high mental workload.

Turning the (virtual) world around: Patterns in saccade direction vary with picture orientation and shape in virtual reality

Research investigating gaze in natural scenes has identified a number of spatial biases in where people look, but it is unclear whether these are partly due to constrained testing environments (e.g., a participant with their head restrained and looking at a landscape image framed within a computer monitor). We examined the extent to which image shape (square vs. circle), image rotation, and image content (landscapes vs. fractal images) influence eye and head movements in virtual reality (VR). Both the eyes and head were tracked while observers looked at natural scenes in a virtual environment. In line with previous work, we found a bias for saccade directions parallel to the image horizon, regardless of image shape or content. We found that, when allowed to do so, observers move both their eyes and head to explore images. Head rotation, however, was idiosyncratic; some observers rotated a lot, whereas others did not. Interestingly, the head rotated in line with the rotation of landscape but not fractal images. That head rotation and gaze direction respond differently to image content suggests that they may be under different control systems. We discuss our findings in relation to current theories on head and eye movement control and how insights from VR might inform more traditional eye-tracking studies.

Developmental origins of cognitive offloading

Many animals manipulate their environments in ways that appear to augment cognitive processing. Adult humans show remarkable flexibility in this domain, typically relying on internal cognitive processing when adequate but turning to external support in situations of high internal demand. We use calendars, calculators, navigational aids and other external means to compensate for our natural cognitive shortcomings and achieve otherwise unattainable feats of intelligence. As yet, however, the developmental origins of this fundamental capacity for cognitive offloading remain largely unknown. In two studies, children aged 4-11 years (n = 258) were given an opportunity to manually rotate a turntable to eliminate the internal demands of mental rotation--to solve the problem in the world rather than in their heads. In study 1, even the youngest children showed a linear relationship between mental rotation demand and likelihood of using the external strategy, paralleling the classic relationship between angle of mental rotation and reaction time. In study 2, children were introduced to a version of the task where manually rotating inverted stimuli was sometimes beneficial to performance and other times redundant. With increasing age, children were significantly more likely to manually rotate the turntable only when it would benefit them. These results show how humans gradually calibrate their cognitive offloading strategies throughout childhood and thereby uncover the developmental origins of this central facet of intelligence.

When does rotation disrupt letter encoding? Testing the resilience of letter detectors in the initial moments of processing

Previous research has reported that both letter and word identification are slower when the stimuli are presented at rotations above 45° than when presented in their canonical horizontal view. Indeed, influential models of word recognition posit that letter detectors in the visual word recognition system are disrupted by rotation angles above 40° or 45° (e.g., Local Combinations Detector model; Dehaene, Cohen, Sigman, & Vinckier, 2005, Trends in Cognitive Sciences). However, recent experiments have shown robust masked identity/form priming effects for 90° rotated words, thus calling into question this assumption. Here we aimed to isolate the degree to which letter detectors are disrupted when manipulating letter rotation in three masked identity priming letter match experiments. Probes and targets were always presented in the canonical upright position, whereas forwardly masked primes were rotated in different angles. The rotation angles were 0° versus 45° (Experiment 1), 22.5° versus 67.5° (Experiment 2), and 45° versus 90° (Experiment 3). Results showed a sizeable masked identity priming effect regardless of the rotation angle, hence demonstrating that letter detectors are not disrupted by rotations smaller than 90° in the early moments of letter processing. This pattern suggests that letter detectors are more resilient to changes in visual form than predicted by the LCD model.

Offloading memory leaves us vulnerable to memory manipulation

We often offload memory demands onto external artefacts (e.g., smartphones). While this practice allows us to subvert the limitations of our biological memory, storing memories externally exposes them to manipulation. To examine the impact of such manipulation, we report three experiments, two of which were pre-registered. Individuals performed a memory task where they could offload to-be-recalled information to an external store and on a critical trial, we surreptitiously manipulated the information in that store. Results demonstrated that individuals rarely noticed this manipulation. In addition, when individuals had information inserted into their external memory stores, they often encoded it into their biological memory, thereby leading to the creation of a false memory. The reported results highlight one of the cognitive consequences of offloading our memory to external artefacts.

Spatial organization to facilitate action

Humans exert a great deal of control over our local environments-selecting and arranging the many objects around us on the basis of conflicting task-demands, aesthetic preferences, and habitual convenience. Because routine behaviour necessitates that we regularly find and access these objects, the particular arrangements we choose can influence the likelihood and difficulty of engaging in different tasks and actions. Despite this importance, relatively little research has directly examined human organizational behaviours and tendencies. Here we investigate how objects in a computer-based search task are freely and dynamically arranged by participants over time, while manipulating the statistics of the target sequence. We report common organizational behaviours including reduction of distance between targets as well as separation of target subsets with high community. However, the extent of these behaviours and their relationship to individual differences in performance varies as a function of the target sequence structure. In particular, tasks composed of a larger number of smaller groups of targets lead to better organizational and performance outcomes than tasks composed of fewer larger groups.

Using Tools to Help Us Think: Actual but Also Believed Reliability Modulates Cognitive Offloading

OBJECTIVE

A distributed cognitive system is a system in which cognitive processes are distributed between brain-based internal and environment-based external resources. In the current experiment, we examined the influence of metacognitive processes on external resource use (i.e., cognitive offloading) in such systems.

BACKGROUND

High-tech working environments oftentimes represent distributed cognitive systems. Because cognitive offloading can both support and harm performance, depending on the specific circumstances, it is essential to understand when and why people offload their cognition.

METHOD

We used an extension of the mental rotation paradigm. It allowed participants to rotate stimuli either internally as in the original paradigm or with a rotation knob that afforded rotating stimuli externally on a computer screen. Two parameters were manipulated: the knob's actual reliability (AR) and an instruction altering participants' beliefs about the knob's reliability (believed reliability; BR). We measured cognitive offloading proportion and perceived knob utility.

RESULTS

Participants were able to quickly and dynamically adjust their cognitive offloading proportion and subjective utility assessments in response to AR, suggesting a high level of offloading proficiency. However, when BR instructions were presented that falsely described the knob's reliability to be lower than it actually was, participants reduced cognitive offloading substantially.

CONCLUSION

The extent to which people offload their cognition is not based solely on utility maximization; it is additionally affected by possibly erroneous preexisting beliefs.

APPLICATION

To support users in efficiently operating in a distributed cognitive system, an external resource's utility should be made transparent, and preexisting beliefs should be adjusted prior to interaction.

Which cognitive tools do we prefer to use, and is that preference rational?

This work aims to address the issue of which kind of cognitive tools we prefer, and whether this preference is rational. To do so, we proposed three experiments in which participants had to play the game Guess Who? by choosing between three tools that assisted them in three distinct cognitive functions (Working memory vs. Selective visual attention vs. Decision-making). In Experiment 3, additional tasks were proposed to assess participants' performance and meta-representations in working memory, selective visual attention and decision-making. Our findings indicate that participants preferred to use a cognitive tool assisting working memory over selective visual attention and decision-making. The meta-representation of participants' performance influenced the decision to use one cognitive tool over the others much more than individual performance itself. These results suggest that a search for effectiveness rather than efficiency, as well as the meta-representations of cognitive performance might be two key predictors of people's preference toward a cognitive tool.

Reading sentences of words with rotated letters: An eye movement study

Participants' eye movements were measured as they read sentences in which individual letters within words were rotated. Both the consistency of direction and the magnitude of rotation were manipulated (letters rotated all in the same direction, or alternately clockwise and anti-clockwise, by 30° or 60°). Each sentence included a target word that was manipulated for frequency of occurrence. Our objectives were threefold: To quantify how change in the visual presentation of individual letters disrupted word identification, and whether disruption was consistent with systematic change in visual presentation; to determine whether inconsistent letter transformation caused more disruption than consistent letter transformation; and to determine whether such effects were comparable for words that were high and low frequency to explore the extent to which they were visually or linguistically mediated. We found that disruption to reading was greater as the magnitude of letter rotation increased, although even small rotations affected processing. The data also showed that alternating letter rotations were significantly more disruptive than consistent rotations; this result is consistent with models of lexical identification in which encoding occurs over units of more than one adjacent letter. These rotation manipulations also showed significant interactions with word frequency on the target word: Gaze durations and total fixation duration times increased disproportionately for low-frequency words when they were presented at more extreme rotations. These data provide a first step towards quantifying the relative contribution of the spatial relationships between individual letters to word recognition and eye movement control in reading.

Representation control increases task efficiency in complex graphical representations

In complex graphical representations, the relevant information for a specific task is often distributed across multiple spatial locations. In such situations, understanding the representation requires internal transformation processes in order to extract the relevant information. However, digital technology enables observers to alter the spatial arrangement of depicted information and therefore to offload the transformation processes. The objective of this study was to investigate the use of such a representation control (i.e. the users' option to decide how information should be displayed) in order to accomplish an information extraction task in terms of solution time and accuracy. In the representation control condition, the participants were allowed to reorganize the graphical representation and reduce information density. In the control condition, no interactive features were offered. We observed that participants in the representation control condition solved tasks that required reorganization of the maps faster and more accurate than participants without representation control. The present findings demonstrate how processes of cognitive offloading, spatial contiguity, and information coherence interact in knowledge media intended for broad and diverse groups of recipients.

Neural Mechanisms for Adaptive Learned Avoidance of Mental Effort

Humans tend to avoid mental effort. Previous studies have demonstrated this tendency using various demand-selection tasks; participants generally avoid options associated with higher cognitive demand. However, it remains unclear whether humans avoid mental effort adaptively in uncertain and nonstationary environments. If so, it also remains unclear what neural mechanisms underlie such learned avoidance and whether they remain the same regardless of cognitive-demand types. We addressed these issues by developing novel demand-selection tasks where associations between choice options and cognitive-demand levels change over time, with two variations using mental arithmetic and spatial reasoning problems (males/females: 29:4 and 18:2). Most participants showed avoidance, and their choices depended on the demand experienced on multiple preceding trials. We assumed that participants updated the expected cost of mental effort through experience, and fitted their choices by reinforcement learning models, comparing several possibilities. Model-based fMRI analyses revealed that activity in the dorsomedial and lateral frontal cortices was positively correlated with the trial-by-trial expected cost for the chosen option commonly across the different types of cognitive demand. Analyses also revealed a trend of negative correlation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. We further identified correlates of cost-prediction error at time of problem presentation or answering the problem, the latter of which partially overlapped with or were proximal to the correlates of expected cost at time of choice cue in the dorsomedial frontal cortex. These results suggest that humans adaptively learn to avoid mental effort, having neural mechanisms to represent expected cost and cost-prediction error, and the same mechanisms operate for various types of cognitive demand.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT In daily life, humans encounter various cognitive demands and tend to avoid high-demand options. However, it remains unclear whether humans avoid mental effort adaptively under dynamically changing environments. If so, it also remains unclear what the underlying neural mechanisms are and whether they operate regardless of cognitive-demand types. To address these issues, we developed novel tasks where participants could learn to avoid high-demand options under uncertain and nonstationary environments. Through model-based fMRI analyses, we found regions whose activity was correlated with the expected mental effort cost, or cost-prediction error, regardless of demand type. These regions overlap, or are adjacent with each other, in the dorsomedial frontal cortex. This finding helps clarify the mechanisms for cognitive-demand avoidance, and provides empirical building blocks for the emerging computational theory of mental effort.

Cognitive Offloading

If you have ever tilted your head to perceive a rotated image, or programmed a smartphone to remind you of an upcoming appointment, you have engaged in cognitive offloading: the use of physical action to alter the information processing requirements of a task so as to reduce cognitive demand. Despite the ubiquity of this type of behavior, it has only recently become the target of systematic investigation in and of itself. We review research from several domains that focuses on two main questions: (i) what mechanisms trigger cognitive offloading, and (ii) what are the cognitive consequences of this behavior? We offer a novel metacognitive framework that integrates results from diverse domains and suggests avenues for future research.

Arranging Objects in Space: Measuring Task-Relevant Organizational Behaviors During Goal Pursuit

Human behavior unfolds primarily in built environments, where the arrangement of objects is a result of ongoing human decisions and actions, yet these organizational decisions have received limited experimental study. In two experiments, we introduce a novel paradigm designed to explore how individuals organize task-relevant objects in space. Participants completed goals by locating and accessing sequences of objects in a computer-based task, and they were free to rearrange the positions of objects at any time. We measure a variety of organization changes and evaluate how these measures relate to individual differences in performance. In Experiment 1, we show that with weak structure in task demands, changes in object positions that arise through performance of the task lead to improved order, characterized predominantly by a centralization of frequently used items and a peripheralization of infrequently used objects. In Experiment 2, with increased task structure, we observe more refined organizational tendencies, with selective contraction and clustering of interrelated task-relevant objects. We further demonstrate that these more selective organization behaviors are reliably associated with individual differences in task performance. Collectively, these two studies reveal properties of space and of task demands that support and facilitate effective organization of the environment in support of ongoing behavior.

Storing information in-the-world: Metacognition and cognitive offloading in a short-term memory task

We often store to-be-remembered information externally (e.g., written down on a piece of paper) rather than internally. In the present investigation, we examine factors that influence the decision to store information in-the-world versus in-the-head using a variant of a traditional short term memory task. In Experiments 1a and 1b participants were presented with to-be-remembered items and either had to rely solely on internal memory or had the option to write down the presented information. In Experiments 2a and 2b participants were presented with the same stimuli but made metacognitive judgments about their predicted performance and effort expenditure. The spontaneous use of external storage was related both to the number of items to be remembered and an individual's actual and perceived short-term-memory capacity. Interestingly, individuals often used external storage despite its use affording no observable benefit. Implications for understanding how individuals integrate external resources in pursuing cognitive goals are discussed.

Toward a more embedded/extended perspective on the cognitive function of gestures

Gestures are often considered to be demonstrative of the embodied nature of the mind (Hostetter and Alibali, 2008). In this article, we review current theories and research targeted at the intra-cognitive role of gestures. We ask the question how can gestures support internal cognitive processes of the gesturer? We suggest that extant theories are in a sense disembodied, because they focus solely on embodiment in terms of the sensorimotor neural precursors of gestures. As a result, current theories on the intra-cognitive role of gestures are lacking in explanatory scope to address how gestures-as-bodily-acts fulfill a cognitive function. On the basis of recent theoretical appeals that focus on the possibly embedded/extended cognitive role of gestures (Clark, 2013), we suggest that gestures are external physical tools of the cognitive system that replace and support otherwise solely internal cognitive processes. That is gestures provide the cognitive system with a stable external physical and visual presence that can provide means to think with. We show that there is a considerable amount of overlap between the way the human cognitive system has been found to use its environment, and how gestures are used during cognitive processes. Lastly, we provide several suggestions of how to investigate the embedded/extended perspective of the cognitive function of gestures.