Metonymy as Referential Dependency: Psycholinguistic and Neurolinguistic Arguments for a Unified Linguistic Treatment

Neural underpinnings of processing combinatorial unstated meaning and the influence of individual cognitive style

We investigated the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying the processing of combinatorial unstated meaning. Sentences like "Charles jumped for 5 minutes." engender an iterative meaning that is not explicitly stated but enriched by comprehenders beyond simple composition. Comprehending unstated meaning involves meaning contextualization-integrative meaning search in sentential-discourse context. Meanwhile, people differ in how they process information with varying context sensitivity. We hypothesized that unstated meaning processing would vary with individual socio-cognitive propensity indexed by the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ), accompanied by differential cortical engagements. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we examined the processing of sentences with unstated iterative meaning in typically-developed individuals and found an engagement of the fronto-parietal network, including the left pars triangularis (L.PT), right intraparietal (R.IPS), and parieto-occipital sulcus (R.POS). We suggest that the L.PT subserves a contextual meaning search, while the R.IPS/POS supports enriching unstated iteration in consideration of event durations and interval lengths. Moreover, the activation level of these regions negatively correlated with AQ. Higher AQ ties to lower L.PT activation, likely reflecting weaker context sensitivity, along with lower IPS activation, likely reflecting weaker computation of events' numerical-temporal specifications. These suggest that the L.PT and R.IPS/POS support the processing of combinatorial unstated meaning, with the activation level modulated by individual cognitive styles.

Solving the elusiveness of word meanings: two arguments for a continuous meaning space for language

I explore the hypothesis that the experience of meaning discreteness when we think about the "meaning" of a word is a "communicative" illusion. The illusion is created by processing-contextual constraints that impose disambiguation on the semantic input making salient a specific interpretation within a conceptual space that is otherwise continuous. It is this salience that we experience as discreteness. The understanding of word meaning as non-discrete raises the question of what is context; what are the mechanisms of constraint that it imposes and what is the nature of the conceptual space with which pronunciations (i.e., visual/oral signs) associate themselves. I address these questions by leveraging an algebraic continuous system for word meaning that is itself constrained by two fundamental parameters: control-asymmetry and connectedness. I evaluate this model by meeting two challenges to word meaning discreteness (1) cases where the same pronunciation is associated with multiple senses that are nonetheless interdependent, e.g., English "smoke," and (2) cases where the same pronunciation is associated with a family of meanings, minimally distinct from each other organized as a "cline," e.g., English "have." These cases are not marginal-they are ubiquitous in languages across the world. Any model that captures them is accounting for the meaning system for language. At the heart of the argumentation is the demonstration of how the parameterized space naturally organizes these kinds of cases without appeal for further categorization or segmentation of any kind. From this, I conclude that discreteness in word meaning is epiphenomenal: it is the experience of salience produced by contextual constraints. And that this is possible because, by and large, every time that we become consciously aware of the conceptual structure associated with a pronunciation, i.e., its meaning, we do so under real-time processing conditions which are biased toward producing a specific interpretation in reference to a specific situation in the world. Supporting it is a parameterized space that gives rise to lexico-conceptual representations: generalized algebraic structures necessary for the identification, processing, and encoding of an individual's understanding of the world.

Non-literal language processing is jointly supported by the language and theory of mind networks: Evidence from a novel meta-analytic fMRI approach

Going beyond the literal meaning of language is key to communicative success. However, the mechanisms that support non-literal inferences remain debated. Using a novel meta-analytic approach, we evaluate the contribution of linguistic, social-cognitive, and executive mechanisms to non-literal interpretation. We identified 74 fMRI experiments (n = 1,430 participants) from 2001 to 2021 that contrasted non-literal language comprehension with a literal control condition, spanning ten phenomena (e.g., metaphor, irony, indirect speech). Applying the activation likelihood estimation approach to the 825 activation peaks yielded six left-lateralized clusters. We then evaluated the locations of both the individual-study peaks and the clusters against probabilistic functional atlases (cf. anatomical locations, as is typically done) for three candidate brain networks-the language-selective network (Fedorenko, Behr, & Kanwisher, 2011), which supports language processing, the Theory of Mind (ToM) network (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), which supports social inferences, and the domain-general Multiple-Demand (MD) network (Duncan, 2010), which supports executive control. These atlases were created by overlaying individual activation maps of participants who performed robust and extensively validated 'localizer' tasks that selectively target each network in question (n = 806 for language; n = 198 for ToM; n = 691 for MD). We found that both the individual-study peaks and the ALE clusters fell primarily within the language network and the ToM network. These results suggest that non-literal processing is supported by both i) mechanisms that process literal linguistic meaning, and ii) mechanisms that support general social inference. They thus undermine a strong divide between literal and non-literal aspects of language and challenge the claim that non-literal processing requires additional executive resources.

Metonymy Processing in Chinese: A Linguistic Context-Sensitive Eye-Tracking Preliminary Study

Current cognitively oriented research on metaphor proposes that understanding metaphorical expressions is a process of building embodied simulations, which are constrained by past and present bodily experiences. However, it has also been shown that metaphor processing is also constrained by the linguistic context but, to our knowledge, there is no comparable work in the domain of metonymy. As an initial attempt to fill this gap, the present study uses eye-tracking experimentation to explore this aspect of Chinese metonymy processing. It complements previous work on how the length of preceding linguistic context influences metonymic processing by focusing on: (1) the contextual information of both the preceding target words; (2) the immediate spillover after the target words; and (3) whether the logical relationship between the preceding contextual information and the target word is strong or weak (a 2 × 2 between-subject experiment with target words of literal/metonymy and logic of strong/weak). Results show that readers take longer to arrive at a literal interpretation than at a metonymic one when the preceding information is in a weak logic relationship with target words, although this disparity can disappear when the logic is strong. Another finding is that both the preceding and the spillover contextual information contribute to metonymy processing when the spillover information does more to the metonymy than it does to the literal meaning. This study further complements cognitive and pragmatic approaches to metonymy, which are centered on its conceptual nature and its role in interpretation, by drawing attention to how the components of sentences contribute to the metonymic processing of target words. Based on an experiment, a contextual model of Chinese metonymy processing is proposed.

The Effects of Working Memory Capacity in Metaphor and Metonymy Comprehension in Mandarin-English Bilinguals’ Minds: An fMRI Study

This study investigated the role of working memory capacity (WMC) in metaphoric and metonymic processing in Mandarin–English bilinguals’ minds. It also explored the neural correlations between metaphor and metonymy computations. We adopted an event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) design, which consisted of 21 English dialogic sets of stimuli and 5 conditions: systematic literal, circumstantial literal, metaphor, systematic metonymy, and circumstantial metonymy, all contextualized in daily conversations. Similar fronto-temporal networks were found for the figurative language processing patterns: the superior temporal gyrus (STG) for metaphorical comprehension, and the inferior parietal junction (IPJ) for metonymic processing. Consistent brain regions have been identified in previous studies in the homologue right hemisphere of better WMC bilinguals. The degree to which bilateral strategies that bilinguals with better WMC or larger vocabulary size resort to is differently modulated by subtypes of metonymies. In particular, when processing circumstantial metonymy, the cuneus (where putamen is contained) is activated as higher-span bilinguals filter out irrelevant information, resorting to inhibitory control use. Cingulate gyrus activation has also been revealed in better WMC bilinguals, reflecting their mental flexibility to adopt the subjective perspective of critical figurative items with self-control. It is hoped that this research provides a better understanding of Mandarin–English bilinguals’ English metaphoric and metonymic processing in Taiwan.

In Search of a New Paradigm for Functional Magnetic Resonance Experimentation With Language

Human language can convey a broad range of entities and relationships through processes that are highly complex and structured. All of these processes are happening somewhere inside our brains, and one way of precising these locations is through the usage of the functional magnetic resonance imaging. The great obstacle when experimenting with complex processes, however, is the need to control them while still having data that are representative of reality. When it comes to language, an interactional phenomenon in its nature, and that integrates a wide range of processes, a question emerges concerning how compatible it is with the current experimental methodology, and how much of it is lost in order to fit the controlled experimental environment. Because of its particularities, the fMRI technique imposes several limitations to the expression of language during experimentation. This paper discusses the different conceptions of language as a research object, the hardships of combining this object with the requirements of fMRI, and what are the current perspectives for this field of research.