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Syropoulos S, Law KF, Mah A, Young L. Intergenerational concern relates to constructive coping and emotional reactions to climate change via increased legacy concerns and environmental cognitive alternatives. BMC Psychol 2024; 12:182. [PMID: 38566114 PMCID: PMC10986099 DOI: 10.1186/s40359-024-01690-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/20/2023] [Accepted: 03/27/2024] [Indexed: 04/04/2024] Open
Abstract
As the threat of climate change looms large, and we experience first-hand the impacts of rapid global warming, researchers and clinicians emphasize the need to better understand the impact of these changes on our mental health. Existing research suggests that coping with and emotional reactions to climate change can promote action to adapt to and mitigate the impacts of climate change and reduce its negative impacts to one's mental health. In this pre-registered study (N = 771) we examined whether people who display extreme intergenerational concern would also constructively cope with climate change. Empirically-identified individuals showing high intergenerational concern reported more problem-focused and meaning-based coping, and less avoidant coping strategies with climate change. Further, even though they felt guilty, angry, sorrowful and isolated, these individuals also felt hopeful about the future. These effects were explained by increased concerns about one's legacy and higher access to environmental cognitive alternatives. By instilling values that highlight intergenerational concern as a key priority, we could thus not only increase pro-climate action, but also help individuals actively and constructively cope with changes produced by climate change.
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Affiliation(s)
- Stylianos Syropoulos
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, USA.
- The Schiller Institute for Integrated Science and Society, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, USA.
| | - Kyle Fiore Law
- Department of Psychology, University at Albany, State University of New York Albany, Albany, NY, USA
| | - Andrea Mah
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Amherst, MA, USA
| | - Liane Young
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, USA
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2
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Grigoreva AD, Rottman J, Tasimi A. When does "no" mean no? Insights from sex robots. Cognition 2024; 244:105687. [PMID: 38154450 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105687] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/29/2023] [Revised: 11/29/2023] [Accepted: 12/05/2023] [Indexed: 12/30/2023]
Abstract
Although sexual assault is widely accepted as morally wrong, not all instances of sexual assault are evaluated in the same way. Here, we ask whether different characteristics of victims affect people's moral evaluations of sexual assault perpetrators, and if so, how. We focus on sex robots (i.e., artificially intelligent humanoid social robots designed for sexual gratification) as victims in the present studies because they serve as a clean canvas onto which we can paint different human-like attributes to probe people's moral intuitions regarding sensitive topics. Across four pre-registered experiments conducted with American adults on Prolific (N = 2104), we asked people to evaluate the wrongness of sexual assault against AI-powered robots. People's moral judgments were influenced by the victim's mental capacities (Studies 1 & 2), the victim's interpersonal function (Study 3), the victim's ontological type (Study 4), and the transactional context of the human-robot relationship (Study 4). Overall, by investigating moral reasoning about transgressions against AI robots, we were able to gain unique insights into how people's moral judgments about sexual transgressions can be influenced by victim attributes.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Joshua Rottman
- Department of Psychology, Franklin & Marshall College, P.O. Box 3003, Lancaster, PA 17604, USA
| | - Arber Tasimi
- Department of Psychology, Emory University, 36 Eagle Row, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA
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3
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Zhou K, Lan L, Yan Z. Human's moral judgements towards different social actors: A cross-sectional study. BRITISH JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 2023; 41:343-357. [PMID: 37553814 DOI: 10.1111/bjdp.12460] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/14/2022] [Accepted: 05/01/2023] [Indexed: 08/10/2023]
Abstract
The proliferation of artificial intelligence may pose new challenges to people's moral judgements. We examined moral judgements towards different social actors and their influencing factors in children, adolescents and adults. Moral judgements were measured with ship problems which will ask participants whether they would choose to save humans, dogs, humanoid robots or animaloid robots. Results showed that (1) both adolescents and adults considered humans morally most important, followed by dogs, humanoid robots and animaloid robots. Children have not yet developed the tendency to morally prioritize humanoid robots over animaloid robots; (2) Individuals' moral judgements are influenced by their age, anthropomorphism and animacy of social actors; (3) With the development of individuals, animacy of social actors always have a greater impact on individuals' moral judgements than anthropomorphism of social actors. Findings indicated that the concept of moral judgement is more complex in the era of artificial intelligence and requires more attention from developmental psychology researchers.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ke Zhou
- Department of Psychology, Hunan Normal University, Changsha, China
| | - Luo Lan
- Department of Psychology, Hunan Normal University, Changsha, China
| | - Zhiqiang Yan
- Department of Psychology, Hunan Normal University, Changsha, China
- Cognition and Human Behavior Key Laboratory of Hunan Province, Hunan Normal University, Changsha, China
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Starmans C. Autonomy, the moral circle, and the limits of ownership. Behav Brain Sci 2023; 46:e350. [PMID: 37813432 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x23001243] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/17/2023]
Abstract
Why can't we own people? Boyer proposes that the key consideration concerns inclusion in the moral circle. I propose an alternative, which is that specific mental capacities, especially the capacity for autonomy, play a key role in determining judgments about human and animal ownership. Autonomous beings are viewed as owning themselves, which precludes them from being owned by others.
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Jaeger B, Wilks M. The Relative Importance of Target and Judge Characteristics in Shaping the Moral Circle. Cogn Sci 2023; 47:e13362. [PMID: 37807673 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.13362] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/27/2023] [Revised: 07/14/2023] [Accepted: 09/22/2023] [Indexed: 10/10/2023]
Abstract
People's treatment of others (humans, nonhuman animals, or other entities) often depends on whether they think the entity is worthy of moral concern. Recent work has begun to investigate which entities are included in a person's moral circle, examining how certain target characteristics (e.g., species category, perceived intelligence) and judge characteristics (e.g., empathy, political orientation) shape moral inclusion. However, the relative importance of target and judge characteristics in predicting moral inclusion remains unclear. When predicting whether a person will deem an entity worthy of moral consideration, how important is it to know who is making the judgment (i.e., characteristics of the judge), who is being judged (i.e., characteristics of the target), and potential interactions between the two factors? Here, we address this foundational question by conducting a variance component analysis of the moral circle. In two studies with participants from the Netherlands, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia (N = 836), we test how much variance in judgments of moral concern is explained by between-target differences, between-judge differences, and by the interaction between the two factors. We consistently find that all three components explain substantial amounts of variance in judgments of moral concern. Our findings provide two important insights. First, an increased focus on interactions between target and judge characteristics is needed, as these interactions explain as much variance as target and judge characteristics separately. Second, any theoretical account that aims to provide an accurate description of moral inclusion needs to consider target characteristics, judge characteristics, and their interaction.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Matti Wilks
- Department of Psychology, University of Edinburgh
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Rottman J, Foster-Hanson E, Bellersen S. One strike and you're a lout: Cherished values increase the stringency of moral character attributions. Cognition 2023; 239:105570. [PMID: 37536142 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105570] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/21/2022] [Revised: 07/17/2023] [Accepted: 07/18/2023] [Indexed: 08/05/2023]
Abstract
Moral dilemmas are inescapable in daily life, and people must often choose between two desirable character traits, like being a diligent employee or being a devoted parent. These moral dilemmas arise because people hold competing moral values that sometimes conflict. Furthermore, people differ in which values they prioritize, so we do not always approve of how others resolve moral dilemmas. How are we to think of people who sacrifice one of our most cherished moral values for a value that we consider less important? The "Good True Self Hypothesis" predicts that we will reliably project our most strongly held moral values onto others, even after these people lapse. In other words, people who highly value generosity should consistently expect others to be generous, even after they act frugally in a particular instance. However, reasoning from an error-management perspective instead suggests the "Moral Stringency Hypothesis," which predicts that we should be especially prone to discredit the moral character of people who deviate from our most deeply cherished moral ideals, given the potential costs of affiliating with people who do not reliably adhere to our core moral values. In other words, people who most highly value generosity should be quickest to stop considering others to be generous if they act frugally in a particular instance. Across two studies conducted on Prolific (N = 966), we found consistent evidence that people weight moral lapses more heavily when rating others' membership in highly cherished moral categories, supporting the Moral Stringency Hypothesis. In Study 2, we examined a possible mechanism underlying this phenomenon. Although perceptions of hypocrisy played a role in moral updating, personal moral values and subsequent judgments of a person's potential as a good cooperative partner provided the clearest explanation for changes in moral character attributions. Overall, the robust tendency toward moral stringency carries significant practical and theoretical implications.
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Affiliation(s)
- Joshua Rottman
- Department of Psychology, Franklin and Marshall College, United States of America.
| | | | - Sam Bellersen
- Department of Philosophy, Franklin and Marshall College, United States of America
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Danaher J. Moral Uncertainty and Our Relationships with Unknown Minds. Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2023:1-14. [PMID: 37496126 DOI: 10.1017/s0963180123000191] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 07/28/2023]
Abstract
We are sometimes unsure of the moral status of our relationships with other entities. Recent case studies in this uncertainty include our relationships with artificial agents (robots, assistant AI, etc.), animals, and patients with "locked-in" syndrome. Do these entities have basic moral standing? Could they count as true friends or lovers? What should we do when we do not know the answer to these questions? An influential line of reasoning suggests that, in such cases of moral uncertainty, we need meta-moral decision rules that allow us to either minimize the risks of moral wrongdoing or improve the choice-worthiness of our actions. One particular argument adopted in this literature is the "risk asymmetry argument," which claims that the risks associated with accepting or rejecting some moral facts may be sufficiently asymmetrical as to warrant favoring a particular practical resolution of this uncertainty. Focusing on the case study of artificial beings, this article argues that this is best understood as an ethical-epistemic challenge. The article argues that taking potential risk asymmetries seriously can help resolve disputes about the status of human-AI relationships, at least in practical terms (philosophical debates will, no doubt, continue); however, the resolution depends on a proper, empirically grounded assessment of the risks involved. Being skeptical about basic moral status, but more open to the possibility of meaningful relationships with such entities, may be the most sensible approach to take.
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Affiliation(s)
- John Danaher
- School of Law, University of Galway, Galway, Ireland
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8
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McLoughlin N. Dehumanization: insights from developmental science. Curr Opin Behav Sci 2023. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cobeha.2023.101262] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 03/12/2023]
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Mendez MF. A Functional and Neuroanatomical Model of Dehumanization. Cogn Behav Neurol 2023; 36:42-47. [PMID: 36149395 PMCID: PMC9991937 DOI: 10.1097/wnn.0000000000000316] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/22/2022] [Accepted: 04/26/2022] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
Abstract
The dehumanization of others is a major scourge of mankind; however, despite its significance, physicians have little understanding of the neurobiological mechanisms for this behavior. We can learn much about dehumanization from its brain-behavior localization and its manifestations in people with brain disorders. Dehumanization as an act of denying to others human qualities includes two major forms. Animalistic dehumanization (also called infrahumanization) results from increased inhibition of prepotent tendencies for emotional feelings and empathy for others. The mechanism may be increased activity in the inferior frontal gyrus. In contrast, mechanistic dehumanization results from a loss of perception of basic human nature and decreased mind-attribution. The mechanism may be hypofunction of a mentalization network centered in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and adjacent subgenual anterior cingulate cortex. Whereas developmental factors may promote animalistic dehumanization, brain disorders, such as frontotemporal dementia, primarily promote mechanistic dehumanization. The consideration of these two processes as distinct, with different neurobiological origins, could help guide efforts to mitigate expression of this behavior.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mario F. Mendez
- Department of Neurology, University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California
- Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, David Geffen School of Medicine, University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California
- Neurology Service, Neurobehavior Unit, V.A. Greater Los Angeles Healthcare System, Los Angeles, California
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Kirkland K, Crimston CR, Jetten J, Rudnev M, Acevedo-Triana C, Amiot CE, Ausmees L, Baguma P, Barry O, Becker M, Bilewicz M, Boonyasiriwat W, Castelain T, Costantini G, Dimdins G, Espinosa A, Finchilescu G, Fischer R, Friese M, Gastardo-Conaco MC, Gómez Á, González R, Goto N, Halama P, Jiga-Boy GM, Kuppens P, Loughnan S, Markovik M, Mastor KA, McLatchie N, Novak LM, Onyekachi BN, Peker M, Rizwan M, Schaller M, Suh EM, Talaifar S, Tong EMW, Torres A, Turner RN, Van Lange PAM, Vauclair CM, Vinogradov A, Wang Z, Yeung VWL, Bastian B. Moral Expansiveness Around the World: The Role of Societal Factors Across 36 Countries. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PERSONALITY SCIENCE 2022. [DOI: 10.1177/19485506221101767] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
What are the things that we think matter morally, and how do societal factors influence this? To date, research has explored several individual-level and historical factors that influence the size of our ‘moral circles.' There has, however, been less attention focused on which societal factors play a role. We present the first multi-national exploration of moral expansiveness—that is, the size of people’s moral circles across countries. We found low generalized trust, greater perceptions of a breakdown in the social fabric of society, and greater perceived economic inequality were associated with smaller moral circles. Generalized trust also helped explain the effects of perceived inequality on lower levels of moral inclusiveness. Other inequality indicators (i.e., Gini coefficients) were, however, unrelated to moral expansiveness. These findings suggest that societal factors, especially those associated with generalized trust, may influence the size of our moral circles.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Ángel Gómez
- Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED), Madrid, Spain
| | | | | | - Peter Halama
- Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava, Slovakia
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Mark Schaller
- The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada
| | | | | | | | - Ana Torres
- Universidade Federal da Paraíba, João Pessoa, Brazil
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Cameron CD, Lengieza ML, Hadjiandreou E, Swim JK, Chiles RM. Empathic choices for animals versus humans: the role of choice context and perceived cost. The Journal of Social Psychology 2022; 162:161-177. [PMID: 35037571 DOI: 10.1080/00224545.2021.1997890] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/09/2023]
Abstract
People appear to empathize with cases of animal suffering yet to disregard such suffering when it conflicts with human needs. In three studies, we used an empathy regulation measure - the empathy selection task - to test whether people choose or avoid sharing in experiences of animals versus humans. In Study 1, when choosing between sharing experiences of animals or humans, participants preferred humans and rated sharing animal (versus human) experiences as more cognitively costly. In Studies 2a-2b, the choice to share experiences or be objective was done without a forced choice between animals and humans. When empathy opportunities for humans and animals were not contrasted against each other, participants avoided experience sharing for humans but not for animals. Manipulations of prosocial cost in these studies did not consistently moderate choice differences. Freeing people from contexts that pit empathy for animals against empathy for humans may diminish motivated disregard of animals' experiences.
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Sánchez Díez S, Zlobina A. How much could your heart embrace? What about your behavior? The Socio‐moral Radar as a behavioral expression of moral regard. JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2021. [DOI: 10.1002/jts5.117] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Sara Sánchez Díez
- Departamento de Antropología Social y Psicología Social Universidad Complutense de Madrid Pozuelo de Alarcón Madrid Spain
| | - Anna Zlobina
- Departamento de Antropología Social y Psicología Social Universidad Complutense de Madrid Pozuelo de Alarcón Madrid Spain
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Sætra HS. Challenging the Neo-Anthropocentric Relational Approach to Robot Rights. Front Robot AI 2021; 8:744426. [PMID: 34621792 PMCID: PMC8490959 DOI: 10.3389/frobt.2021.744426] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/20/2021] [Accepted: 09/01/2021] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
When will it make sense to consider robots candidates for moral standing? Major disagreements exist between those who find that question important and those who do not, and also between those united in their willingness to pursue the question. I narrow in on the approach to robot rights called relationalism, and ask: if we provide robots moral standing based on how humans relate to them, are we moving past human chauvinism, or are we merely putting a new dress on it? The background for the article is the clash between those who argue that robot rights are possible and those who see a fight for robot rights as ludicrous, unthinkable, or just outright harmful and disruptive for humans. The latter group are by some branded human chauvinists and anthropocentric, and they are criticized and portrayed as backward, unjust, and ignorant of history. Relationalism, in contrast, purportedly opens the door for considering robot rights and moving past anthropocentrism. However, I argue that relationalism is, quite to the contrary, a form of neo-anthropocentrism that recenters human beings and their unique ontological properties, perceptions, and values. I do so by raising three objections: 1) relationalism centers human values and perspectives, 2) it is indirectly a type of properties-based approach, and 3) edge cases reveal potentially absurd implications in practice.
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Affiliation(s)
- Henrik Skaug Sætra
- Faculty of Computer Sciences, Engineering and Economics, Østfold University College, Halden, Norway
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