Trust in Testimony: Children's Use of True and False Statements

Goal inference in moral narratives

We often form beliefs about others based on narratives they tell about their own moral actions. When constructing such moral narratives, narrators balance multiple goals, such as conveying accurate information about what happened ('informational goals') and swaying audiences' impressions about their moral characters ('reputational goals'). Here, we ask to what extent audiences' detection of narrators' reputational goals guide or prevent them from making moral character judgments intended by narrators. Across two pre-registered experiments, audiences read narratives written by real narrators about their own moral actions. Each narrator was incentivized to write about the same action twice while trying to appear like a morally good or bad person (positive and negative reputational goals). Audiences detected narrators' reputational goals with high accuracy and made judgments about moral character that aligned with narrators' goals. However, audiences were more suspicious toward positive than negative reputational goals, requiring more evidence of high informational goals. These results demonstrate how audiences' inferences of reputational goals can both support and hinder narrators: accurate goal recognition increases the chance that audiences will make judgments intended by narrators, but inferred positive reputational goals can lead to doubts about accuracy. More generally, this provides a novel approach to studying how moral information about people is transmitted through naturalistic narratives.

The Cognitive Architecture of Infant Attachment

Meta-analytic evidence indicates that the quality of the attachment relationship that infants establish with their primary caregiver has enduring significance for socioemotional and cognitive outcomes. However, the mechanisms by which early attachment experiences contribute to subsequent development remain underspecified. According to attachment theory, early attachment experiences become embodied in the form of cognitive-affective representations, referred to as internal working models (IWMs), that guide future behavior. Little is known, however, about the cognitive architecture of IWMs in infancy. In this article, we discuss significant advances made in the field of infant cognitive development and propose that leveraging insights from this research has the potential to fundamentally shape our understanding of the cognitive architecture of attachment representations in infancy. We also propose that the integration of attachment research into cognitive research can shed light on the role of early experiences, individual differences, and stability and change in infant cognition, as well as open new routes of investigation in cognitive studies, which will further our understanding of human knowledge. We provide recommendations for future research throughout the article and conclude by using our collaborative research as an example.

Do Children with Autism Spectrum Disorders Show Selective Trust in Social Robots?

PURPOSE

Previous researches suggest that social robots can facilitate the learning of children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) by enhancing their interests, engagement, and attention. However, there is limited understanding regarding whether children with ASD can learn directly from the testimony of social robots and whether they can remain vigilant based on the perceived accuracy of these robots. Therefore, the present study was conducted to examine whether children with ASD demonstrated selective trust towards social robots.

METHODS

Twenty-nine children with ASD between ages of 4-7 years, and 38 typically-developing (TD) age and IQ-matched peers participated in classic selective trust tasks. During the tasks, they learned the names of novel objects from either a pair of social robots or a pair of human informants, where one informant had previously been established as accurate and the other inaccurate.

RESULTS

Children with ASD trusted information from an accurate social robot over an inaccurate one, similar to their performance with human informants. However, compared to TD children, children with ASD exhibited lower levels of selective trust regardless of the type of informants they learned from.

CONCLUSIONS

Our study suggests that children with ASD can selectively trust and acquire knowledge from social robots, shedding light on the potential use of social robots in supporting individuals with ASD.

The influence of observers on children's conformity in moral judgment behavior

Children autonomously make sound moral judgments based on internal criteria, but they tend to make erroneous judgments in the presence of social influences, and the reasons for these errors are not well understood. Thus, the current research investigated how the presence of observers who can see and listen to 3-year-old children's judgments but who do not present their opinions influences children's conformity in moral judgment behavior. In Experiment 1, the children (N = 30) were presented with pictures depicting prosocial behaviors and asked whether the behaviors were acceptable. The children's tendency to change their answers after hearing the counterintuitive opinions of informants was then measured. The results showed that the children's moral judgments were more likely to conform to that of the group in the presence of observers. Experiment 2 aimed to determine the reason children were more likely to conform to a group when being watched by observers in Experiment 1. Children (N = 30) were randomly assigned to two conditions with different observer conditions as follows. Observers were either wearing headsets, indicating that they could not hear the children's responses, or had them hanging around their necks, indicating that they could. The results showed that children's conformity behavior depended on whether observers could hear what they were saying. The current findings are expected to help elucidate not only social factors that affect children's moral judgments but also the developmental mechanism of an observer effect.

Younger, not older, children trust an inaccurate human informant more than an inaccurate robot informant

This study examined preschoolers' trust toward accurate and inaccurate robot informants versus human informants. Singaporean children aged 3-5 years (N = 120, 57 girls, mostly Asian; data collected from 2017 to 2018) viewed either a robot or a human adult label familiar objects either accurately or inaccurately. Children's trust was assessed by examining their subsequent willingness to accept novel object labels provided by the same informant. Regardless of age, children trusted accurate robots to a similar extent as accurate humans. However, while older children (dis)trusted inaccurate robots and humans comparably, younger children trusted inaccurate robots less than inaccurate humans. The results indicate a developmental change in children's reliance on informants' characteristics to decide whom to trust.

Children's expectations about the stability of others' knowledge and preference states

It is a crucial ability to predict others' psychological states across time and contexts. Focusing on cultural inventions such as songs and stories, we contrasted children's attributions of stability with others' knowledge and preference states across time and space and whether these attributions change as a function of children's familiarity with the known/liked items. Children (91 4-year-olds and 97 6-year-olds) were introduced to characters who knew or liked a song, a story, a game and a dance that were either novel or familiar. Children were asked whether the characters would still know/like these when they move to another city or when they grow up to be an adult. Both age groups expected these attributes to be more durable in the moving scenario compared with the growing-up scenario, but this trend became more robust with age. Whereas overall children did not judge knowledge as more durable than preferences, children found knowledge to be more enduring with age. The 6-year-olds' stability attributions also increased when known/liked items were familiar. These results suggest that, across the preschool years, children become more nuanced in their predictions about the future forms of knowledge and preference states.

Trusting young children to help causes them to cheat less

Trust and honesty are essential for human interactions. Philosophers since antiquity have long posited that they are causally linked. Evidence shows that honesty elicits trust from others, but little is known about the reverse: does trust lead to honesty? Here we experimentally investigated whether trusting young children to help can cause them to become more honest (total N = 328 across five studies; 168 boys; mean age, 5.94 years; s.d., 0.28 years). We observed kindergarten children's cheating behaviour after they had been entrusted by an adult to help her with a task. Children who were trusted cheated less than children who were not trusted. Our study provides clear evidence for the causal effect of trust on honesty and contributes to understanding how social factors influence morality. This finding also points to the potential of using adult trust as an effective method to promote honesty in children.

Do preschoolers trust a competent robot pointer?

How young children learn from different informants has been widely studied. However, most studies investigate how children learn verbally conveyed information. Furthermore, most studies investigate how children learn from humans. This study sought to investigate how 3-year-old children learn from, and come to trust, a competent robot versus an incompetent human when competency is established using a pointing paradigm. During an induction phase, a robot informant pointed at a toy inside a transparent box, whereas a human pointed at an empty box. During the test phase, both agents pointed at opaque boxes. We found that young children asked the robot for help to locate a hidden toy more than the human (ask questions) and correctly identified the robot to be accurate (judgment questions). However, children equally endorsed the locations pointed at by both the robot and the human (endorse questions). This suggests that 3-year-olds are sensitive to the epistemic characteristics of the informant even when its displayed social properties are minimal.

Epistemic trust: a comprehensive review of empirical insights and implications for developmental psychopathology

Originally rooted in philosophy and sociology, the concept of epistemic trust has recently transitioned to developmental psychopathology, illuminating social-cognitive processes in psychopathology. This narrative review synthesizes empirical evidence on epistemic trust to inform future research. A literature search highlighted 3 areas: i) the development of selective trust in children; ii) epistemic trust in non-clinical adults; iii) its link to mental health. Young children demonstrate selective learning from reliable sources using epistemic cues. Empirical studies beyond childhood were greatly facilitated in the last 2 years with the introduction of the Epistemic Trust, Mistrust and Credulity Questionnaire, a self-report scale measuring epistemic stance. Cross-sectional studies pinpointed dysfunctional epistemic strategies as factors in mental health vulnerability, and some qualitative work offered initial evidence linking restored epistemic trust to effective psychotherapy. For future research, we propose focusing on 3 primary areas. First, empirical investigations in adolescent samples are needed, as adolescence seems to be a pivotal phase in the development of epistemic trust. Second, more experimental research is required to assess dysfunctional and functional epistemic stances and how they relate to vulnerability to mental health disorders. Finally, intervention studies should explore the dynamics of epistemic stances within and between therapy sessions and their impact on therapeutic outcomes.

Children Use Teachers' Beliefs About Their Abilities to Calibrate Explore-Exploit Decisions

Models of the explore-exploit problem have explained how children's decision making is weighed by a bias for information (directed exploration), randomness, and generalization. These behaviors are often tested in domains where a choice to explore (or exploit) is guaranteed to reveal an outcome. An often overlooked but critical component of the assessment of explore-exploit decisions lies in the expected success of taking actions in the first place-and, crucially, how such decisions might be carried out when learning from others. Here, we examine how children consider an informal teacher's beliefs about the child's competence when deciding how difficult a task they want to pursue. We present a simple model of this problem that predicts that while learners should follow the recommendation of an accurate teacher, they should exploit easier games when a teacher overestimates their abilities, and explore harder games when she underestimates them. We tested these predictions in two experiments with adults (Experiment 1) and 6- to 8-year-old children (Experiment 2). In our task, participants' performance on a picture-matching game was either overestimated, underestimated, or accurately represented by a confederate (the "Teacher"), who then presented three new matching games of varying assessed difficulty (too easy, too hard, just right) at varying potential reward (low, medium, high). In line with our model's predictions, we found that both adults and children calibrated their choices to the teacher's representation of their competence. That is, to maximize expected reward, when she underestimated them, participants chose games the teacher evaluated as being too hard for them; when she overestimated them, they chose games she evaluated as being too easy; and when she was accurate, they chose games she assessed as being just right. This work provides insight into the early-emerging ability to calibrate explore-exploit decisions to others' knowledge when learning in informal pedagogical contexts.

Measuring trust with the Wayfinding Task: Implementing a novel task in immersive virtual reality and desktop setups across remote and in-person test environments

Trust is a key feature of social relationships. Common measures of trust, questionnaires and economic games, lack ecological validity. Hence, we sought to introduce an immersive, virtual reality (VR) measure for the behavioral assessment of trust across remote and in-person settings, building on the maze task of Hale et al. (2018). Our 'Wayfinding Task' consists of an interconnected urban environment for participants to navigate on the advice of two characters of differing trustworthiness. We present four studies implementing the Wayfinding Task in remote and in-person testing environments and comparing performance across head-mounted display (HMD)-based VR and desktop setups. In each study, the trustworthiness of two virtual characters was manipulated, through either a fact sheet providing trustworthiness information, or a behavior-based trustworthiness manipulation task termed the Door Game, based on Van der Biest et al., 2020. Participants then completed the Wayfinding Task. Overall, we found that participant behavior in the Wayfinding Task reflected the relative trustworthiness of the two characters; in particular, the trustworthy character was approached more often for advice, reflecting data from our Door Game. We found mostly null results for our novel outcome measure, interpersonal distance. Remote testing successfully achieved these effects. While HMD-based VR and desktop setups both showed these effects, there was a stronger effect of trustworthiness in the HMD VR version of the task. These results have implications for the measurement of trust in behavioral settings and the use of remote and VR-based testing in social experiments.

The cost of social influence: Own-gender and gender-stereotype social learning biases in adolescents and adults

Pervasive gender gaps in academic subject and career choices are likely to be underpinned by social influences, including gender stereotypes of competence in academic and career domains (e.g., men excel at engineering, women excel at care), and model-based social learning biases (i.e., selective copying of particular individuals). Here, we explore the influence of gender stereotypes on social learning decisions in adolescent and adult males and females. Participants (Exp 1: N = 69 adolescents; Exp 2: N = 265 adults) were presented with 16 difficult multiple-choice questions from stereotypically feminine (e.g., care) and masculine (e.g., engineering) domains. The answer choices included the correct response and three incorrect responses paired with a male model, a female model, or no model. Participants' gender stereotype knowledge and endorsement were measured, and adolescents (Exp. 1) listed their academic subject choices. As predicted, there was a bias towards copying answers paired with a model (Exp.1: 74%, Exp. 2: 65% ps < .001). This resulted in less success than would be expected by chance (Exp. 1: 12%, Exp. 2: 16% ps < .001), demonstrating a negative consequence of social information. Adults (Exp 2) showed gender stereotyped social learning biases; they were more likely to copy a male model in masculine questions and a female model in feminine questions (p = .012). However, adolescents (Exp 1) showed no evidence of this stereotype bias; rather, there was a tendency for male adolescents to copy male models regardless of domain (p = .004). This own-gender bias was not apparent in female adolescents. In Exp 1, endorsement of masculine stereotypes was positively associated with selecting more own-gender typical academic subjects at school and copying significantly more male models in the male questions. The current study provides evidence for the first time that decision-making in both adolescence and adulthood is impacted by gender biases.

Preschoolers selectively trust and selectively share with others based on their past accuracy and intentions

This study investigated whether preschool-age children consider both an individual's past accuracy and intentions when deciding whether to trust and share with that individual. The participants, 3- to 5-year-olds (N = 168), played a searching game with partners who varied in both accuracy (accurate or inaccurate) and intentions (prosocial or antisocial). Children received advice from partners about where to look for a hidden object, earning prizes for correct guesses. Then they were given an opportunity to share their prizes with their partner. Results indicated that children trusted sources who provided accurate advice (regardless of intentions) and shared with sources who provided accurate advice or demonstrated prosocial intentions. These findings suggest that children attend to both an individual's accuracy and intentions when deciding how to interact with social partners and may weigh this information differently to make different social decisions.

In the presence and absence of conflicting testimony, children's selective trust in the in-group informant in moral judgment and knowledge access

In this study, we assessed whether the trust model formed by children in a moral judgment context with an inaccurate in-group informant affected their corresponding trust model in the knowledge access context and whether conditions (the presence of conflicting testimony: an inaccurate in-group informant paired with an accurate out-group informant; the absence of conflicting testimony: only an inaccurate in-group informant) influenced the trust model. Children aged 3 to 6 years (N = 215; 108 girls) in blue T-shirts as in-group members completed selective trust tasks in the moral judgment and knowledge access contexts. Results for moral judgment showed that children under both conditions were more likely to trust informants based on accurate judgments and gave less consideration to group identity. Results for knowledge access showed that in the presence of conflicting testimony, 3- and 4-year-olds trusted the in-group informant at chance, but 5- and 6-year-olds trusted the accurate informant. In the absence of conflicting testimony, 3- and 4-year-olds agreed more with the inaccurate in-group informant, but 5- and 6-year-olds trusted the in-group informant at chance. The results indicated that older children considered the accuracy of the informant's previous moral judgment for selective trust in the context of knowledge access while ignoring group identity, but that younger children were affected by in-group identity. The study found that 3- to 6-year-olds' trust in inaccurate in-group informants was conditional and that their trust choices appeared to be experimentally conditioned, domain specific, and age differentiated.

Do I know what they know? Linking metacognition, theory of mind, and selective social learning

Young children are often dependent on learning from others and to this effect develop heuristics to help distinguish reliable sources from unreliable sources. Where younger children rely heavily on social cues such as familiarity with a source to make this distinction, older children tend to rely more on an informant's competence. Little is known about the cognitive mechanisms that help children to select the best informant; however, some evidence points toward mechanisms such as metacognition (thinking about thinking) and theory of mind (thinking about other's thoughts) being involved. The goals of the current study were to (a) explore how the monitoring and control components of metacognition may predict selective social learning in preschoolers and (b) attempt to replicate a reported link between selective social learning and theory of mind. In Experiment 1, no relationship was observed across the measures. In Experiment 2, only selective social learning and belief reasoning were found to be related as well as when both experiments' samples were combined. No links between selective social learning and metacognition were observed in the two experiments. These results suggest that theory of mind is a stronger correlate of selective learning than metacognition in young children. The implications regarding the kind of tasks used to measure metacognition are discussed.

Not all is forgotten: Children's associative matrices for features of a word learning episode

Word learning studies traditionally examine the narrow link between words and objects, indifferent to the rich contextual information surrounding objects. This research examined whether children attend to this contextual information and construct an associative matrix of the words, objects, people, and environmental context during word learning. In Experiment 1, preschool-aged children (age: 3;2-5;11 years) were presented with novel words and objects in an animated storybook. Results revealed that children constructed associations beyond words and objects. Specifically, children attended to and had the strongest associations for features of the environmental context but failed to learn word-object associations. Experiment 2 demonstrated that children (age: 3;0-5;8 years) leveraged strong associations for the person and environmental context to support word-object mapping. This work demonstrates that children are especially sensitive to the word learning context and use associative matrices to support word mapping. Indeed, this research suggests associative matrices of the environment may be foundational for children's vocabulary development.

Measuring Interpersonal Trust towards Virtual Humans with a Virtual Maze Paradigm

Virtual humans, including virtual agents and avatars, play an increasingly important role as VR technology advances. For example, virtual humans are used as digital bodies of users in social VR or as interfaces for AI assistants in online financing. Interpersonal trust is an essential prerequisite in real-life interactions, as well as in the virtual world. However, to date, there are no established interpersonal trust measurement tools specifically for virtual humans in virtual reality. This study fills the gap, by contributing a novel validated behavioural tool to measure interpersonal trust towards a specific virtual social interaction partner in social VR. This validated paradigm is inspired by a previously proposed virtual maze task that measures trust towards virtual characters. In the current study, a variant of this paradigm was implemented. The task of the users (the trustors) is to navigate through a maze in virtual reality, where they can interact with a virtual human (the trustee). They can choose to 1) ask for advice and 2) follow the advice from the virtual human if they want to. These measures served as behavioural measures of trust. We conducted a validation study with 70 participants in a between-subject design. The two conditions did not differ in the content of the advice but in the appearance, tone of voice and engagement of the trustees (alleged as avatars controlled by other participants). Results indicate that the experimental manipulation was successful, as participants rated the virtual human as more trustworthy in the trustworthy condition than in the untrustworthy condition. Importantly, this manipulation affected the trust behaviour of our participants, who, in the trustworthy condition, asked for advice more often and followed advice more often, indicating that the paradigm is sensitive to assessing interpersonal trust towards virtual humans. Thus, our paradigm can be used to measure differences in interpersonal trust towards virtual humans and may serve as a valuable research tool to study trust in virtual reality.

Sincere praise and flattery: reward value and association with the praise-seeking trait

Sincere praise reliably conveys positive or negative feedback, while flattery always conveys positive but unreliable feedback. These two praise types have not been compared in terms of communication effectiveness and individual preferences using neuroimaging. Through functional magnetic resonance imaging, we measured brain activity when healthy young participants received sincere praise or flattery after performing a visual search task. Higher activation was observed in the right nucleus accumbens during sincere praise than during flattery, and praise reliability correlated with posterior cingulate cortex activity, implying a rewarding effect of sincere praise. In line with this, sincere praise uniquely activated several cortical areas potentially involved in concern regarding others' evaluations. A high praise-seeking tendency was associated with lower activation of the inferior parietal sulcus during sincere praise compared to flattery after poor task performance, potentially reflecting suppression of negative feedback to maintain self-esteem. In summary, the neural dynamics of the rewarding and socio-emotional effects of praise differed.

Infants' selective imitation of a transitive agent and an intransitive agent

This study examined how the reliability (i.e., transitivity) of an agent's object choices affects 16-month-old infants' (N = 48) imitation of her unconventional way of turning on a touch light box with her head when her hands were available. When the agent made transitive choices (i.e., she chose Object A over Object B, Object B over Object C, and then A over C), infants imitated her head touch actions. When the agent made intransitive choices (i.e., after choosing A over B and B over C, she chose C over A), infants were more likely to use only their hands to touch the light box. In addition, when it was presumably difficult for infants to judge the transitivity of the agent's choices (i.e., she chose B over C, A over B, and then A over C), they used their hands more. These results demonstrate that infants' understanding informs their decisions to selectively imitate others' specific ways to act on novel artifacts, consistent with young children's selective trust in information provided by other people based on their epistemic reliability.

The effect of speaker reliability on word learning in monolingual and bilingual children

The present study examined the effect of speaker reliability on novel word learning in 4- and 5-year-old English-speaking monolingual (N=25) and Spanish-English bilingual (N=25) children, using an eye-tracking paradigm. Results revealed that children retained novel labels taught by both the reliable and the unreliable speaker. Yet, time-course analyses revealed that children showed faster word recognition in the reliable condition but demonstrated more persistent looks to target in the unreliable condition. This suggests that speaker reliability impacts the time-course of retrieval, but not the ultimate retention of novel words. No group differences were observed in children's overall accuracy of novel word learning, although monolingual and bilingual children did demonstrate subtle differences in the time-course of novel word recognition. Together, the findings suggest that while speaker cues shape the process by which children recognize newly-learned words, language experience has minimal influence on this process.

Children transition from simple associations to explicitly reasoned social learning strategies between age four and eight

To differentiate the use of simple associations from use of explicitly reasoned selective social learning, we can look for age-related changes in children’s behaviour that might signify a switch from one social learning strategy to the other. We presented 4- to 8-year-old children visiting a zoo in Scotland (N = 109) with a task in which the perceptual access of two informants was determined by the differing opacity of two screens of similar visual appearance during a hiding event. Initially success could be achieved by forming an association or inferring a rule based on salient visual (but causally irrelevant) cues. However, following a switch in the scenario, success required explicit reasoning about informants’ potential to provide valuable information based on their perceptual access. Following the switch, older children were more likely to select a knowledgeable informant. This suggests that some younger children who succeeded in the pre-switch trials had inferred rules or formed associations based on superficial, yet salient, visual cues, whereas older children made the link between perceptual access and the potential to inform. This late development and apparent cognitive challenge are consistent with proposals that such capacities are linked to the distinctiveness of human cumulative culture.

When the internet is wrong: Children's trust in an inaccurate internet or human source

Prior studies have shown that children can select and evaluate information based on the previous accuracy of an informant. The current study examines how 5- to 6-year-old kindergarteners (N = 46) and 7- to 8-year-old second-graders (N = 48) in China judge scientific information provided by the internet or a teacher, and how a source's history of inaccuracy influences participants' judgments. When lacking explicit information about previous accuracy, neither younger children nor older children showed differential trust in the internet or a teacher. After observing the internet providing inaccurate information, children in both age groups decreased their trust in statements from the internet. When the teacher was consistently inaccurate, children in both age groups also showed reduced preference for the teacher's statements. These findings demonstrate that 5- to 8-year-old children take into account history of inaccuracy when deciding whether to request or endorse information from the internet or a teacher.

The effects of information utility and teachers' knowledge on evaluations of under-informative pedagogy across development

Teaching is a powerful way to transmit knowledge, but with this power comes a hazard: When teachers fail to select the best set of evidence for the learner, learners can be misled to draw inaccurate inferences. Evaluating others' failures as teachers, however, is a nontrivial problem; people may fail to be informative for different reasons, and not all failures are equally blameworthy. How do learners evaluate the quality of teachers, and what factors influence such evaluations? Here, we present a Bayesian model of teacher evaluation that considers the utility of a teacher's pedagogical sampling given their prior knowledge. In Experiment 1 (N=1168), we test the model predictions against adults' evaluations of a teacher who demonstrated all or a subset of the functions on a novel device. Consistent with the model predictions, participants' ratings integrated information about the number of functions taught, their values, as well as how much the teacher knew. Using a modified paradigm for children, Experiments 2 (N=48) and 3 (N=40) found that preschool-aged children (2a, 3) and adults (2b) make nuanced judgments of teacher quality that are well predicted by the model. However, after an unsuccessful attempt to replicate the results with preschoolers (Experiment 4, N=24), in Experiment 5 (N=24) we further investigate the development of teacher evaluation in a sample of seven- and eight-year-olds. These older children successfully distinguished teachers based on the amount and value of what was demonstrated, and their ability to evaluate omissions relative to the teacher's knowledge state was related to their tendency to spontaneously reference the teacher's knowledge when explaining their evaluations. In sum, our work illustrates how the human ability to learn from others supports not just learning about the world but also learning about the teachers themselves. By reasoning about others' informativeness, learners can evaluate others' teaching and make better learning decisions.

Motivated to learn: An account of explanatory satisfaction

Many explanations have a distinctive, positive phenomenology: receiving or generating these explanations feels satisfying. Accordingly, we might expect this feeling of explanatory satisfaction to reinforce and motivate inquiry. Across five studies, we investigate how explanatory satisfaction plays this role: by motivating and reinforcing inquiry quite generally ("brute motivation" account), or by selectively guiding inquiry to support useful learning about the target of explanation ("aligned motivation" account). In Studies 1-2, we find that satisfaction with an explanation is related to several measures of perceived useful learning, and that greater satisfaction in turn predicts stronger curiosity about questions related to the explanation. However, in Studies 2-4, we find only tenuous evidence that satisfaction is related to actual learning, measured objectively through multiple-choice or free recall tests. In Study 4, we additionally show that perceptions of learning fully explain one seemingly specious feature of explanatory preferences studied in prior research: the preference for uninformative "reductive" explanations. Finally, in Study 5, we find that perceived learning is (at least in part) causally responsible for feelings of satisfaction. Together, these results point to what we call the "imperfectly aligned motivation" account: explanatory satisfaction selectively motivates inquiry towards learning explanatory information, but primarily through fallible perceptions of learning. Thus, satisfaction is likely to guide individuals towards lines of inquiry that support perceptions of learning, whether or not individuals actually are learning.

Unsafe to eat? How familiar cartoon characters affect children's learning about potentially harmful foods

Young children learn about the properties of foods, such as taste and healthiness, from others. By using selective trust tasks in which a familiar cartoon character and an unfamiliar informant provided different testimony about food safety, this study examined how an informant's familiarity affected 4- to 6-year-old children's selective social learning about food safety. In Experiment 1, when judging the safety of foods from the familiar cartoon character and the unfamiliar character, children across all age groups showed a preference for asking the familiar character for information. For endorse questions, 4- and 5-year-olds did not consistently accept or reject either character's statements, while 6-year-olds endorsed the unfamiliar cartoon character's statements more often than the familiar character's statements. In Experiment 2, when the unfamiliar informant was a real adult instead of a fictional cartoon character, children sought out information from the familiar character more often than from the adult, and they did not differentially endorse statements by either informant. Moreover, children who had less advanced theory of mind skills and who viewed cartoon characters as more real were more likely to ask the cartoon character. These results suggest that although children prefer to obtain information from familiar characters, they accept information about food safety from multiple kinds of sources and their social-cognitive skills play a role in their decisions.

There's more to consider than knowledge and belief

Phillips et al. present a number of arguments for the premise that knowledge is more basic than belief. Although their arguments are coherent and sound, they do not directly address numerous cases in which belief appears to be a developmental precursor to knowledge. I describe several examples, not necessarily as a direct challenge, but rather to better understand their framework.

The Origins of Social Knowledge in Altricial Species

Human infants are altricial, born relatively helpless and dependent on parental care for an extended period of time. This protracted time to maturity is typically regarded as a necessary epiphenomenon of evolving and developing large brains. We argue that extended altriciality is itself adaptive, as a prolonged necessity for parental care allows extensive social learning to take place. Human adults possess a suite of complex social skills, such as language, empathy, morality, and theory of mind. Rather than requiring hardwired, innate knowledge of social abilities, evolution has outsourced the necessary information to parents. Critical information for species-typical development, such as species recognition, may originate from adults rather than from genes, aided by underlying perceptual biases for attending to social stimuli and capacities for statistical learning of social actions. We draw on extensive comparative findings to illustrate that, across species, altriciality functions as an adaptation for social learning from caregivers.

Knowing How You Know: Toddlers Reevaluate Words Learned From an Unreliable Speaker

There has been little investigation of the way source monitoring, the ability to track the source of one's knowledge, may be involved in lexical acquisition. In two experiments, we tested whether toddlers (mean age 30 months) can monitor the source of their lexical knowledge and reevaluate their implicit belief about a word mapping when this source is proven to be unreliable. Experiment 1 replicated previous research (Koenig & Woodward, 2010): children displayed better performance in a word learning test when they learned words from a speaker who has previously revealed themself as reliable (correctly labeling familiar objects) as opposed to an unreliable labeler (incorrectly labeling familiar objects). Experiment 2 then provided the critical test for source monitoring: children first learned novel words from a speaker before watching that speaker labeling familiar objects correctly or incorrectly. Children who were exposed to the reliable speaker were significantly more likely to endorse the word mappings taught by the speaker than children who were exposed to a speaker who they later discovered was an unreliable labeler. Thus, young children can reevaluate recently learned word mappings upon discovering that the source of their knowledge is unreliable. This suggests that children can monitor the source of their knowledge in order to decide whether that knowledge is justified, even at an age where they are not credited with the ability to verbally report how they have come to know what they know.

Children selectively endorse speculative conjectures

Young children are epistemically vigilant, attending to the reliability, expertise, and confidence of their informants and the prior probability and verifiability of their claims. But the pre-eminent requirement of any hypothesis is that it provides a potential solution to the question at hand. Given questions with no known answer, the ability to selectively adopt new, unverified, speculative proposals may be critical to learning. This study explores when people might reasonably reject known facts in favor of unverified conjectures. Across four experiments, when conjectures answer questions that available facts do not, both adults (n = 48) and children (4.0-7.9 years, n = 241, of diverse race and ethnicity) prefer the conjectures, even when the conjectures are preceded by uncertainty markers or explicitly violate prior expectations.

Of Kids and Unicorns: How Rational Is Children's Trust in Testimonial Knowledge?

When young children confront a vast array of adults' testimonial claims, they should decide which testimony to endorse. If they are unable to immediately verify the content of testimonial assertions, children adopt or reject their informants' statements on the basis of forming trust in the sources of testimony. This kind of trust needs to be based on some underlying reasons. The rational choice theory, which currently dominates the social, cognitive, and psychological sciences, posits that trust should be formed on a rational basis, as a result of probabilistic assessments and utility-maximizing calculations. In this paper, the predictions stemming from the rational choice approach to trust are systematically compared with the empirical evidence from the field of developmental psychology on how children establish their trust in testimonial statements. The results of this comparison demonstrate an obvious inadequacy of the rational choice explanation of the emergence and development of children's testimonial trust, regardless of which form of trust rationality-weighting, threshold, or ordering-is examined. As none of the three forms of rationality of children's trust in testimony squares with the empirical data, this paper introduces a new version of trust rationality, adaptively rational trust. It explores the compatibility of the concept of adaptively rational trust with the recent empirical findings in the area of developmental psychology and addresses some avenues for future research on the rationality of testimonial trust.

Looking beyond person-specific cues indicative of credibility: Reward rules and executive function predict preschoolers' acceptance of (un)reliable assertions

We tested whether 3- and 4-year-olds (N = 88) can deduce individuals' credibility exclusively from situational cues such as game rules that reward competitive or cooperative behavior-and whether children's inferences are predicted by their executive function (EF) and theory of mind (ToM) skills. When presented with the game rules, children endorsed a partner's claims more often if the rules incentivized cooperation between participants and partners (e.g., by giving them prizes when trusting each other) versus when the rules incentivized deception (e.g., by giving prizes to partners who tricked the children). Notably, children's appropriate responses to partners' claims increased as their EF skills improved regardless of whether the rules supported trust or skepticism. ToM was not related to children's rule-based selectivity. Preschoolers' ability to make inferences based on cooperative versus competitive reward rules to determine whether the children's partner can be trusted is key to learning from individuals whose reputation or past behavior is completely unknown. In addition, findings of associations between EF and vigilance about others' claims contribute to the epistemological debate of whether people start in life as credulous learners.

The social meaning of common knowledge across development

Common knowledge can be a potent sign of shared social attributes among people, but not all knowledge is socially meaningful to the same extent. For instance, compared to shared knowledge of cultural practices, knowledge of self-evident facts might be a poorer indicator of shared group membership among individuals. Two studies explored adults' and 6-to-9 years old children's social inferences based on what others know as well as their sensitivity to the distinctions in the diagnostic potential of different kinds of knowledge. Participants were presented with targets who were knowledgeable about familiar things that are either culture-specific (e.g., a traditional dance) or general (e.g., a self-evident fact), and asked to make inferences about their language and where they live. Adults and 8-year-olds privileged culture-specific knowledge over general knowledge when making both kinds of inferences about the targets, whereas 6-year-olds did not distinguish between the two knowledge types. Thus, what others know is socially meaningful from early in life, and across development, children become increasingly aware of the diagnostic potential of culture-specific knowledge when making social inferences about others. These findings suggest novel social implications of knowledge assessment.

Specifying links between infants' theory of mind, associative learning, and selective trust

The psychological mechanisms underlying infants' selective social learning are currently a subject of controversy. The main goal of the present study was to contribute data to this debate by investigating whether domain-specific or domain-general abilities guide infants' selectivity. Eighteen-month-olds observed a reliable and an unreliable speaker, and then completed a forced-choice word learning paradigm, two theory of mind tasks, and an associative learning task. Results revealed that infants showed sensitivity to the verbal competence of the speaker. Additionally, infants with superior knowledge inference abilities were less likely to learn from the unreliable speaker. No link was observed between selective social learning and associative learning skills. These results replicate and extend previous findings demonstrating that socio-cognitive abilities are linked to infants' selective social learning.