Reason and value: making reasoning fit for practice

Philosophy and the clinic: Stigma, respect and shame

Since its foundation in 2010, the annual philosophy thematic edition of this journal has been a forum for authors from a wide range of disciplines and backgrounds, enabling contributors to raise questions of an urgent and fundamental nature regarding the most pressing problems facing the delivery and organization of healthcare. Authors have successfully exposed and challenged underlying assumptions that framed professional and policy discourse in diverse areas, generating productive and insightful dialogue regarding the relationship between evidence, value, clinical research and practice. These lively debates continue in this thematic edition, which includes a special section on stigma, shame and respect in healthcare. Authors address the problems with identifying and overcoming stigma in the clinic, interactional, structural and phenomenological accounts of stigma and the 'stigma-shame nexus'. Papers examine the lived experience of discreditation, discrimination and degradation in a range of contexts, from the labour room to mental healthcare and the treatment of 'deviancy' and 'looked-after children'. Authors raise challenging questions about the development of our uses of language in the context of care, and the relationship between stigma, disrespect and important analyses of power asymmetry and epistemic injustice. The relationship between respect, autonomy and personhood is explored with reference to contributions from an important conference series, which includes analyses of shame in the context of medically unexplained illness, humour, humiliation and obstetric violence.

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There is now broad agreement that ideas like person-centred care, patient expertise and shared decision-making are no longer peripheral to health discourse, fine ideals or merely desirable additions to sound, scientific clinical practice. Rather, their incorporation into our thinking and planning of health and social care is essential if we are to respond adequately to the problems that confront us: they need to be seen not as "ethical add-ons" but core components of any genuinely integrated, realistic and conceptually sound account of healthcare practice. This, the tenth philosophy thematic edition of the journal, presents papers conducting urgent research into the social context of scientific knowledge and the significance of viewing clinical knowledge not as something that "sits within the minds" of researchers and practitioners, but as a relational concept, the product of social interactions. It includes papers on the nature of reasoning and evidence, the on-going problems of how to 'integrate' different forms of scientific knowledge with broader, humanistic understandings of reasoning and judgement, patient and community perspectives. Discussions of the epistemological contribution of patient perspectives to the nature of care, and the crucial and still under-developed role of phenomenology in medical epistemology, are followed by a broad range of papers focussing on shared decision-making, analysing its proper meaning, its role in policy, methods for realising it and its limitations in real-world contexts.

Treating real people: Science and humanity

Something important is happening in applied, interdisciplinary research, particularly in the field of applied health research. The vast array of papers in this edition are evidence of a broad change in thinking across an impressive range of practice and academic areas. The problems of complexity, the rise of chronic conditions, overdiagnosis, co-morbidity, and multi-morbidity are serious and challenging, but we are rising to that challenge. Key conceptions regarding science, evidence, disease, clinical judgement, and health and social care are being revised and their relationships reconsidered: Boundaries are indeed being redrawn; reasoning is being made "fit for practice." Ideas like "person-centred care" are no longer phrases with potential to be helpful in some yet-to-be-clarified way: Theorists and practitioners are working in collaboration to give them substantive import and application.

Reasoning, evidence, and clinical decision-making: The great debate moves forward

When the editorial to the first philosophy thematic edition of this journal was published in 2010, critical questioning of underlying assumptions, regarding such crucial issues as clinical decision making, practical reasoning, and the nature of evidence in health care, was still derided by some prominent contributors to the literature on medical practice. Things have changed dramatically. Far from being derided or dismissed as a distraction from practical concerns, the discussion of such fundamental questions, and their implications for matters of practical import, is currently the preoccupation of some of the most influential and insightful contributors to the on-going evidence-based medicine debate. Discussions focus on practical wisdom, evidence, and value and the relationship between rationality and context. In the debate about clinical practice, we are going to have to be more explicit and rigorous in future in developing and defending our views about what is valuable in human life.

Phronesis: practical wisdom the role of professional practice knowledge in the clinical reasoning of Bobath instructors

RATIONALE, AIMS, AND OBJECTIVES

Clinical reasoning is an essential aspect of clinical practice, however is largely ignored in the current rehabilitation sciences evidence base. Literature related to clinical reasoning and clinical expertise has evolved concurrently although rehabilitation reasoning frameworks remain relatively generic. The purpose of this study was to explicate the clinical reasoning process of Bobath instructors of a widely used neuro-rehabilitation approach, the Bobath concept.

METHODS

A qualitative interpretive description approach consisting of stimulated recall using video-recorded treatment sessions and in-depth interviews. Purposive sampling was used to recruit members of the International Bobath Instructors Training Association (IBITA). Interview transcripts were transcribed verbatim providing the raw data. Data analysis was progressive, iterative, and inductive.

RESULTS

Twenty-two IBITA instructors from 7 different countries participated. Ranging in clinical experience from 12 to 40 years, and instructor experience from 1 to 35 years. Three themes were developed, (a) a Bobath clinical framework, (b) person-centered, and (c) a Bobath reasoning approach, highlighting the role of practical wisdom, phronesis in the clinical reasoning process. In particular the role of visuospatial-kinesthetic perception, an element of technical expertise, was illuminated as an integral aspect of clinical reasoning in this expert group.

CONCLUSIONS

This study provides an interpretive understanding of the clinical reasoning process used by IBITA instructors illustrating an inactive embodied view of clinical reasoning, specifically the role of phronesis, requiring further investigation in nonexpert Bobath therapists, as well as in novice and experienced therapists in other specialty areas.

Theory, experience and practice

Despite its potential hazards, the activity of questioning theoretical frameworks and proposing solutions is necessary if progress is even to be possible. Intellectual history has by no means ended, so we cannot expect to have all the answers, and from time to time the activity of critical questioning will be frustrating. But intellectual progress requires us to continue the process of asking fundamental questions. The alternative to thinking in this way is indeed unthinkable.

Just how wide should 'wide reading' be?

Educationalists introduce students to literature search strategies that, with rare exceptions, focus chiefly on the location of primary research reports and systematic reviews of those reports. These sources are, however, unlikely to adequately address the normative and/or metaphysical questions that nurses frequently and legitimately interest themselves in. To meet these interests, non-research texts exploring normative and/or metaphysical topics might and perhaps should, in some situations, be deemed suitable search targets. This seems plausible and, moreover, students are encouraged to 'read widely'. Yet accepting this proposition creates significant difficulties. Specifically, if non-research scholarly sources and artistic or literary (humanities) products dealing with normative/metaphysical issues were included in what are, at present, scientifically orientated searches, it is difficult to draw boundaries around what--if anything--is to be excluded. Engaging with this issue highlights problems with qualitative scholarship's designation as 'evidence'. Thus, absurdly, if qualitative scholarship's findings are labelled evidence because they generate practice-relevant understanding/insight, then any literary or artistic artefact (e.g. a throwaway lifestyle magazine) that generates kindred understandings/insights is presumably also evidence? This conclusion is rejected and it is instead proposed that while artistic, literary, and qualitative inquiries can provide practitioners with powerful and stimulating non-evidential understanding, these sources are not evidence as commonly conceived.

Developing occupational therapy students’ practice habits via qualitative inquiry education

Background

Accreditation standards and practice competencies underscore the importance of research for occupational therapy practice, but they do not guide how occupational therapy education addresses research. Despite the prominence of qualitative research in the health professions, there exists a need to articulate how and why qualitative inquiry is taught in occupational therapy education.

Purpose

We discuss how qualitative inquiry education can develop habits of reflection and reflexivity, criticality, and active engagement in preparation for occupational therapy practice.

Key Issues

We hold that our students’ professional abilities to practice in a well-reasoned, ethical, and responsive manner are enhanced by experiences with qualitative inquiry and suggest that there is potential in linking qualitative inquiry experiences to professional habit formation in occupational therapy education.

Implications

In addition to teaching research for its own sake, we suggest that educators can adopt a broader view of how qualitative inquiry functions within occupational therapy education.

Research report appraisal: how much understanding is enough?

When appraising research papers, how much understanding is enough? More specifically, in deciding whether research results can inform practice, do appraisers need to substantively understand how findings are derived or is it sufficient simply to grasp that suitable analytic techniques were chosen and used by researchers? The degree or depth of understanding that research appraisers need to attain before findings can legitimately/sensibly inform practice is underexplored. In this paper it is argued that, where knowledge/justified beliefs derived from research evidence prompt actions that materially affect patient care, appraisers have an epistemic duty to demand high (maximal) rather than low (minimal) levels of understanding regards finding derivation (i.e. appraisers have a duty to seek a superior epistemic situation). If this argument holds assumptions about appraiser competence/ability and the feasibility of current UK conceptions of evidence based practice are destabilized.

Uncovering values-based practice: VBP's implicit commitments to subjectivism and relativism

Despite assertions to the contrary, KWM Fulford's values-based practice is implicitly committed to subjectivism when it comes to reasoning about values. This renders the approach unworkable. The act of merely uncovering underlying values is not enough to effect change and, therefore, resolve problems if we have no way, even in principle, of determining which values are right and which are wrong. Fulford's only departure from subjectivism about value is his commitment to 'framework values', which seems grounded in a version of ethical relativism. I argue that we need to reject both subjectivism and relativism if progress within ethical discussions about practice is to be meaningful and a real possibility.