Children Trust a Consensus Composed of Outgroup Members-But Do Not Retain That Trust

The influence of observers on children's conformity in moral judgment behavior

Children autonomously make sound moral judgments based on internal criteria, but they tend to make erroneous judgments in the presence of social influences, and the reasons for these errors are not well understood. Thus, the current research investigated how the presence of observers who can see and listen to 3-year-old children's judgments but who do not present their opinions influences children's conformity in moral judgment behavior. In Experiment 1, the children (N = 30) were presented with pictures depicting prosocial behaviors and asked whether the behaviors were acceptable. The children's tendency to change their answers after hearing the counterintuitive opinions of informants was then measured. The results showed that the children's moral judgments were more likely to conform to that of the group in the presence of observers. Experiment 2 aimed to determine the reason children were more likely to conform to a group when being watched by observers in Experiment 1. Children (N = 30) were randomly assigned to two conditions with different observer conditions as follows. Observers were either wearing headsets, indicating that they could not hear the children's responses, or had them hanging around their necks, indicating that they could. The results showed that children's conformity behavior depended on whether observers could hear what they were saying. The current findings are expected to help elucidate not only social factors that affect children's moral judgments but also the developmental mechanism of an observer effect.

The effects of overhearing on vocabulary learning in ethnic majority and minority preschool children

Research shows that infants and preschoolers can learn novel words equally well through addressed speech as through overhearing two adults. However, most of this research draws from samples of ethnic majority children. The current study compares word learning in preschoolers (M age = 5;6) with an ethnic minority and an ethnic majority background (N = 132). An experimenter of the majority group (representative for most teachers in Flemish education) told a story in three different interaction situations: Addressed Speech, Overhearing Classroom and Overhearing Two Adults. Results show that children of both ethnic groups learn novel words in Addressed Speech and in Overhearing Classroom equally well. However, minority children learned significantly fewer words in Overhearing Two Adults. This study suggests important differences in how ethnic majority and minority children learn through indirect speech in educational (monolingual) settings. In addition, the study scrutinizes the potential role of social identification in overhearing mechanisms.

Claims of wrongdoing by outgroup members heighten children's ingroup biases

Little is known about how group bias may impact children's acceptance of unsubstantiated claims. Most children view cheating as unfair. However, in competitive situations, when ambiguity surrounds the potential intention to cheat, group affiliation may lead children to support claims of cheating based solely on the team affiliation of the claimant, even when those claims are not clearly substantiated. Therefore, it may be particularly important to consider the role ingroup bias may play in children's accusations of cheating in a competitive intergroup context. The current study investigated 4-10 year old children's (N = 137, M_Age = 6.71 years, SD_Age = 1.49; 47 % female) evaluations of ambiguous acts and unverified claims about those acts in a competitive, intergroup context. Results showed that children initially viewed an ambiguous act similarly, regardless of team affiliation, but demonstrated increasing ingroup biases after claims of wrongdoing were introduced. Implications for how unsubstantiated claims may impact intergroup interactions more broadly will be discussed.

Expanding the understanding of majority-bias in children's social learning

Prior experiments with children across seven different societies have indicated U-shaped age patterns in the likelihood of copying majority demonstrations. It is unclear which learning strategies underlie the observed responses that create these patterns. Here we broaden the understanding of children’s learning strategies by: (1) exploring social learning patterns among 6–13-year-olds (n = 270) from ethnolinguistically varied communities in Vanuatu; (2) comparing these data with those reported from other societies (n = 629), and (3) re-analysing our and previous data based on a theoretically plausible set of underlying strategies using Bayesian methods. We find higher rates of social learning in children from Vanuatu, a country with high linguistic and cultural diversity. Furthermore, our results provide statistical evidence for modest U-shaped age patterns for a more clearly delineated majority learning strategy across the current and previously investigated societies, suggesting that the developmental mechanisms structuring majority bias are cross-culturally highly recurrent and hence a fundamental feature of early human social learning.

Children and Adolescents’ Ingroup Biases and Developmental Differences in Evaluations of Peers Who Misinform

Previous developmental research shows that young children display a preference for ingroup members when it comes to who they accept information from – even when that information is false. However, it is not clear how this ingroup bias develops into adolescence, and how it affects responses about peers who misinform in intergroup contexts, which is important to explore with growing numbers of young people on online platforms. Given that the developmental span from childhood to adolescence is when social groups and group norms are particularly important, the present study took a Social Reasoning Developmental Approach. This study explored whether children and adolescents respond differently to a misinformer spreading false claims about a peer breaking COVID-19 rules, depending on (a) the group membership of the misinformer and their target and (b) whether the ingroup had a “critical” norm that values questioning information before believing it. 354 United Kingdom-based children (8–11 years old) and adolescents (12–16 years old) read about an intergroup scenario in which a peer spreads misinformation on WhatsApp about a competitor. Participants first made moral evaluations, which asked them to judge and decide whether or not to include the misinformer, with follow-up “Why?” questions to capture their reasoning. This was followed by asking them to attribute intentions to the misinformer. Results showed that ingroup preferences emerged both when participants morally evaluated the misinformer, and when they justified those responses. Participants were more likely to evaluate an ingroup compared to an outgroup misinformer positively, and more likely to accuse an outgroup misinformer of dishonesty. Adolescents attributed more positive intentions to the misinformer compared with children, with children more likely to believe an outgroup misinformer was deliberately misinforming. The critical norm condition resulted in children making more positive intentionality attributions toward an ingroup misinformer, but not an outgroup misinformer. This study’s findings highlight the importance of shared group identity with a misinformer when morally evaluating and reasoning about their actions, and the key role age plays in intentionality attributions surrounding a misinformer when their intentions are ambiguous.

The boss is not always right: Norwegian preschoolers do not selectively endorse the testimony of a novel dominant agent

Theories of cultural evolution posit that cues of competence-based prestige, rather than formidability-based dominance, should guide culturally transmitted learning, but recent work suggested that French and Kaqchikel Guatamalan preschoolers place their epistemic trust in dominant others. In contrast, this study shows that 249 three- to six-year-olds (116 girls, tested between 2016 and 2018 across metropolitan locations with varying ethnic composition and socioeconomic status) randomly endorsed the word-labels of dominant and subordinate agents in the egalitarian culture of Norway, using stimuli which solicit dominance inferences among infants and manipulating anonymity across studies to control for egalitarian desirability bias. A meta-analysis estimated that 48% endorsed the dominant's testimony. This demonstrates that the tendency to endorse the epistemic claims of dominant individuals does not emerge reliably in early childhood.

The ontogeny of selective social learning: Young children flexibly adopt majority- or payoff-based biases depending on task uncertainty

Humans have adapted well to diverse environments in part because of their ability to efficiently acquire information from their social environment. However, we still know very little as to how young children acquire cultural knowledge and in particular the circumstances under which children prioritize social learning over asocial learning. In this study, we asked whether children will selectively adopt either a majority-biased or payoff-biased social learning strategy in the presence or absence of asocial learning. The 3- to 5-year-olds (N = 117) were first shown a video in which four other children took turns in retrieving a capsule housing a reward from one of two boxes. Three of the children (the "majority") retrieved a capsule from the same box, and a single individual (the "minority") retrieved a capsule from the alternative box. Across four conditions, we manipulated both the value of the rewards available in each box (equal or unequal payoff) and whether children had knowledge of the payoff before making their own selection. Results show that children adopted a majority-biased learning strategy when they were unaware of the value of the rewards available but adopted a payoff-biased strategy when the payoff was known to be unequal. We conclude that children are strategic social learners who integrate both social and asocial learning to maximize personal gain.

Understanding Intergroup Relations in Childhood and Adolescence

There are various theoretical approaches for understanding intergroup biases among children and adolescents. This article focuses on the social identity approach and argues that existing research will benefit by more fully considering the implications of this approach for examining intergroup relations among youngsters. These implications include (a) the importance of self-categorization, (b) the role of self-stereotyping and group identification, (c) the relevance of shared understandings and developing ingroup consensus, and (d) the importance of coordinated action for positive and negative intergroup relations. These implications of the social identity approach suggest several avenues for investigating children’s and adolescents’ intergroup relations that have not been fully appreciated in the existing literature. However, there are also limitations to the social identity approach for the developmental understanding and some of these are discussed.

Children selectively endorse speculative conjectures

Young children are epistemically vigilant, attending to the reliability, expertise, and confidence of their informants and the prior probability and verifiability of their claims. But the pre-eminent requirement of any hypothesis is that it provides a potential solution to the question at hand. Given questions with no known answer, the ability to selectively adopt new, unverified, speculative proposals may be critical to learning. This study explores when people might reasonably reject known facts in favor of unverified conjectures. Across four experiments, when conjectures answer questions that available facts do not, both adults (n = 48) and children (4.0-7.9 years, n = 241, of diverse race and ethnicity) prefer the conjectures, even when the conjectures are preceded by uncertainty markers or explicitly violate prior expectations.

Group Identity and Ingroup Bias: The Social Identity Approach

This article discusses the social identity approach (social identity theory and self-categorization theory) for understanding children’s ingroup biases in attitudes and behaviors. It is argued that developmental research on ingroup bias will be enhanced by more fully considering the implications of this approach. These implications include (a) the conceptualization of group identity, (b) the importance of social reality and children’s epistemic motivation, (c) the role of processes of normative influence and social projection, and (d) the relevance of moral considerations. These four implications have not been fully considered in the developmental literature but indicate that the social identity approach offers the possibility for theoretically integrating and empirically examining various processes involved in children’s ingroup biases.

Of Kids and Unicorns: How Rational Is Children's Trust in Testimonial Knowledge?

When young children confront a vast array of adults' testimonial claims, they should decide which testimony to endorse. If they are unable to immediately verify the content of testimonial assertions, children adopt or reject their informants' statements on the basis of forming trust in the sources of testimony. This kind of trust needs to be based on some underlying reasons. The rational choice theory, which currently dominates the social, cognitive, and psychological sciences, posits that trust should be formed on a rational basis, as a result of probabilistic assessments and utility-maximizing calculations. In this paper, the predictions stemming from the rational choice approach to trust are systematically compared with the empirical evidence from the field of developmental psychology on how children establish their trust in testimonial statements. The results of this comparison demonstrate an obvious inadequacy of the rational choice explanation of the emergence and development of children's testimonial trust, regardless of which form of trust rationality-weighting, threshold, or ordering-is examined. As none of the three forms of rationality of children's trust in testimony squares with the empirical data, this paper introduces a new version of trust rationality, adaptively rational trust. It explores the compatibility of the concept of adaptively rational trust with the recent empirical findings in the area of developmental psychology and addresses some avenues for future research on the rationality of testimonial trust.

The Roles of Privacy and Trust in Children's Evaluations and Explanations of Digital Tracking

A "digital revolution" has introduced new privacy violations concerning access to information stored on electronic devices. The present two studies assessed how U.S. children ages 5-17 and adults (N = 416; 55% female; 67% white) evaluated those accessing digital information belonging to someone else, either location data (Study 1) or digital photos (Study 2). The trustworthiness of the tracker (Studies 1 and 2) and the privacy of the information (Study 2) were manipulated. At all ages, evaluations were more negative when the tracker was less trustworthy, and when information was private. However, younger children were substantially more positive overall about digital tracking than older participants. These results, yielding primarily medium-to-large effect sizes, suggest that with age, children increasingly appreciate digital privacy considerations.

How Children Learn From Others: An Analysis of Selective Word Learning

One way children are remarkable learners is that they learn from others. Critically, children are selective when assessing from whom to learn, particularly in the domain of word learning. We conducted an analysis of children's selective word learning, reviewing 63 papers on 6,525 participants. Children's ability to engage in selective word learning appeared to be present in the youngest samples surveyed. Their more metacognitive understanding that epistemic competence indicates reliability or that others are good sources of knowledge has more of a developmental trajectory. We also found that various methodological factors used to assess children influence performance. We conclude with a synthesis of theoretical accounts of how children learn from others.

Content counts: A trait and moral reasoning framework for children's selective social learning

We present evidence that evaluative information plays a major role in children's selective social learning. We demonstrate that social learning patterns differ as a function of whether children are exposed to positively or negatively valenced information (e.g., content; informant characteristics) and that these patterns can be understood in the context of children's schemas for social groups, morality, and trait understanding. We highlight that attention must be given to theoretical ties between social learning and children's trait judgments and moral reasoning to strengthen our understanding of selective trust and account for variations in children's sophistication when they judge potential sources of information. Finally, we suggest revisions to current theoretical frameworks and offer suggestions to move the field forward.

Trust in early childhood

Children need to build trust in their primary caregivers or significant others, as well as people who are unrelated to them, including those who belong to different social groups. The present chapter focuses on children's trust in unfamiliar individuals. How do they determine who to trust? Does putting trust in another person operate differently depending on the specific issue at hand? To address these questions, we differentiate between two forms of trust: children's trust in others' epistemic states to learn from others (epistemic trust) and trusting others for social support and reassurance (social trust), for example, when to expect that interaction partners will be truthful and keep promises. We first review the literature on epistemic trust to show that young children seem to value others' accuracy and competence when learning from them, even when these individuals are from different linguistic or racial groups than their own. We then present findings on social trust suggesting that young children trust those who are well-meaning and who keep their promises. Finally, we raise the question of whether there are environmental influences on the interaction of both epistemic and social trust with intergroup factors such as race, and we propose that research with infants will be useful to better illuminate the developmental roots of human trust.

Trust me, I'm a competent expert: Developmental differences in children's use of an expert's explanation quality to infer trustworthiness

In this study, we examined how 3-, 4-, 5-, and 7-year-old children respond when informants who are labeled as experts fail to provide high-quality explanations about phenomena within their realm of expertise. We found that 4-, 5-, and 7-year-olds discounted their initial trust in an expert who provided low-quality explanations in a task related to the expert's area of expertise. The 5-year-olds' distrust of the expert who provided low-quality explanations also generalized to additional learning tasks. When an expert provided explanations consistent with the expert's labeled expertise, 5-year-olds maintained a similar level of trust in the expert, but 7-year-olds displayed an increased level of trust in the expert within the expert's area of expertise. We did not find consistent preferences in 3-year-olds' judgments. We discuss the implications of these findings for age-based differences in children's relative weighting of trait-based versus real-time epistemic cues when evaluating informant reliability.

Children's selective trust: When a group majority is confronted with past accuracy

In two experiments, 3- to 5-year-old children were tested for their preferences when seeking and accepting information about novel animals. In Experiment 1, children watched as two adults named unfamiliar animals - one adult was predominantly accurate, whereas the other was predominantly inaccurate, as judged by a teacher. In a subsequent test phase, participants viewed additional unfamiliar animals and were invited to endorse one of two conflicting names. Either the predominantly accurate or the predominantly inaccurate adult proposed one name, whereas a majority of three unfamiliar adults proposed the other name. Children were more likely to endorse the predominantly accurate adult as compared to the majority but showed no significant preference for the predominantly inaccurate adult as compared to the majority. In Experiment 2, participants watched two adults correctly name three familiar animals, but only one named three additional unfamiliar animals whereas the other expressed uncertainty. On subsequent test trials, children preferred the apparently well-informed adult to the less-informed adult but, contrary to the results of Experiment 1, children preferred the information provided by a majority instead of the apparently well-informed adult. The implications of these results are discussed in the light of previous research on children's selective trust in an accurate informant as compared to a consensus. Statement of contribution What is already known on the subject? Young children monitor past accuracy and use this epistemic cue to decide whom to trust; Children are receptive to information coming from a consensus; Non-epistemic cues, such as familiarity and accent, also influence children's deference What does this study adds? Children favour a dissenter over a majority if the dissenter's past accuracy has been publicly highlighted. They favour a majority if a dissenter's past accuracy has not been publicly highlighted. A confident informant is preferred to a hesitant informant.

Smart Conformists: Children and Adolescents Associate Conformity With Intelligence Across Cultures

The current study used a novel methodology based on multivocal ethnography to assess the relations between conformity and evaluations of intelligence and good behavior among Western (U.S.) and non-Western (Ni-Vanuatu) children (6- to 11-year-olds) and adolescents (13- to 17-year-olds; N = 256). Previous research has shown that U.S. adults were less likely to endorse high-conformity children as intelligent than Ni-Vanuatu adults. The current data demonstrate that in contrast to prior studies documenting cultural differences between adults' evaluations of conformity, children and adolescents in the United States and Vanuatu have a conformity bias when evaluating peers' intelligence and behavior. Conformity bias for good behavior increases with age. The results have implications for understanding the interplay of conformity bias and trait psychology across cultures and development.

Face Processing in Infancy and Beyond: The Case of Social Categories

Prior reviews of infant face processing have emphasized how infants respond to faces in general. This review highlights how infants come to respond differentially to social categories of faces based on differential experience, with a focus on race and gender. We examine six different behaviors: preference, recognition, scanning, category formation, association with emotion, and selective learning. Although some aspects of infant responding to face race and gender may be accounted for by traditional models of perceptual development, other aspects suggest the need for a broader model that links perceptual development with social and emotional development. We also consider how responding to face race and gender in infancy may presage responding to these categories beyond infancy and discuss how social biases favoring own-race and female faces are formed.

Two sources of bias affecting the evaluation of autistic communication

We support Jaswal & Akhtar's interrogation of social motivational accounts of autism and discuss two sources of bias that contribute to how others construe autistic people's communications: (1) an experience-based bias that limits our ability to discern the speaker's action as communicative and (2) a prejudice against the credibility of certain speakers that limits a listener's willingness to believe their testimony.

The Theoretical and Methodological Opportunities Afforded by Guided Play With Young Children

For infants and young children, learning takes place all the time and everywhere. How children learn best both in and out of school has been a long-standing topic of debate in education, cognitive development, and cognitive science. Recently, guided play has been proposed as an integrative approach for thinking about learning as a child-led, adult-assisted playful activity. The interactive and dynamic nature of guided play presents theoretical and methodological challenges and opportunities. Drawing upon research from multiple disciplines, we discuss the integration of cutting-edge computational modeling and data science tools to address some of these challenges, and highlight avenues toward an empirically grounded, computationally precise and ecologically valid framework of guided play in early education.

The Development of Conformity Among Chinese Children Aged 9-15 Years in a Public Choice Task

Both children and adults exhibit moderate conformity behaviors when facing group pressure. While some studies purport that children conform more with age, others have shown the opposite. The publicity of decision-making might be a major factor influencing the development of children's conformity behavior. In this study, we recruited 295 Chinese children aged 9-15 years. We observed no significant correlation between children's age and conformity behaviors when their answers were kept confidential. However, older children showed stronger conformity behaviors when their answers were made public. According to cultural evolutionary theory, with age, children find group acceptance and social recognition increasingly more important, which explains why older children are more likely to conform-namely, doing so has adaptive value. Further research should explore the cross-cultural coherence of this phenomenon and the genuine motivation behind children's conformity behaviors. Meanwhile, designing a more reliable and valid experiment would also be a fruitful direction.

Group Membership Influences More Social Identification Than Social Learning or Overimitation in Children

Group membership is a strong driver of everyday life in humans, influencing similarity judgments, trust choices, and learning processes. However, its ontogenetic development remains to be understood. This study investigated how group membership, age, sex, and identification with a team influenced 39- to 60-month-old children (N = 94) in a series of similarity, trust, and learning tasks. Group membership had the most influence on similarity and trust tasks, strongly biasing choices toward in-groups. In contrast, prior experience and identification with the team were the most important factors in the learning tasks. Finally, overimitation occurred most when the children's team, but not the opposite, displayed meaningless actions. Future work must investigate how these cognitive abilities combine during development to facilitate cultural processes.

Cognitive Foundations of Learning from Testimony

Humans acquire much of their knowledge from the testimony of other people. An understanding of the way that information can be conveyed via gesture and vocalization is present in infancy. Thus, infants seek information from well-informed interlocutors, supply information to the ignorant, and make sense of communicative acts that they observe from a third-party perspective. This basic understanding is refined in the course of development. As they age, children's reasoning about testimony increasingly reflects an ability not just to detect imperfect or inaccurate claims but also to assess what inferences may or may not be drawn about informants given their particular situation. Children also attend to the broader characteristics of particular informants-their group membership, personality characteristics, and agreement or disagreement with other potential informants. When presented with unexpected or counterintuitive testimony, children are prone to set aside their own prior convictions, but they may sometimes defer to informants for inherently social reasons.

Young children communicate their ignorance and ask questions

Children acquire information, especially about the culture in which they are being raised, by listening to other people. Recent evidence has shown that young children are selective learners who preferentially accept information, especially from informants who are likely to be representative of the surrounding culture. However, the extent to which children understand this process of information transmission and actively exploit it to fill gaps in their knowledge has not been systematically investigated. We review evidence that toddlers exhibit various expressive behaviors when faced with knowledge gaps. They look toward an available adult, convey ignorance via nonverbal gestures (flips/shrugs), and increasingly produce verbal acknowledgments of ignorance ("I don't know"). They also produce comments and questions about what their interlocutors might know and adopt an interrogative stance toward them. Thus, in the second and third years, children actively seek information from interlocutors via nonverbal gestures or verbal questions and display a heightened tendency to encode and retain such sought-after information.

Parameterizing developmental changes in epistemic trust

Children rely on others for much of what they learn, and therefore must track who to trust for information. Researchers have debated whether to interpret children's behavior as inferences about informants' knowledgeability only or as inferences about both knowledgeability and intent. We introduce a novel framework for integrating results across heterogeneous ages and methods. The framework allows application of a recent computational model to a set of results that span ages 8 months to adulthood and a variety of methods. The results show strong fits to specific findings in the literature trust, and correctly fails to fit one representative result from an adjacent literature. In the aggregate, the results show a clear development in children's reasoning about informants' intent and no appreciable changes in reasoning about informants' knowledgeability, confirming previous results. The results extend previous findings by modeling development over a much wider age range and identifying and explaining differences across methods.

Is the tendency to conform influenced by the age of the majority?

The aim of the current study was to explore the influence that the age and the familiarity of a group majority has on copying fidelity in 4- to 6-year-old children. In Experiment 1, participants (N=120, M_age=68months) viewed five child models, all of whom were either younger than, the same age as, or older than themselves, open a puzzle box using an inefficient technique (four models) or an efficient technique (one model). In Experiment 2 (N=82, M_age=71months), the identical task was presented by groups of unfamiliar models. In both Experiments 1 and 2, a group of control participants saw an equal number of inefficient and efficient models. Results showed that the participants displayed conformity irrespective of the age, or the familiarity, of the individuals comprising the majority. However, the participants varied in their level of imitative fidelity depending on the identity of the group majority, with majorities that were either the same age as, or considerably older than, the participants eliciting the highest levels of over-imitation. In contrast, groups comprising individuals who were younger than the participants elicited a significantly lower level of over-imitation than that elicited by the same-aged and older majorities. We suggest that these findings demonstrate an interplay between conformist and model-based transmission biases.

What Makes Children Defy Majorities? The Role of Dissenters in Chinese and Spanish Preschoolers' Social Judgments

When many people say the same thing, the individual is more likely to endorse this information than when just a single person says the same. Yet, the influence of consensus information may be modulated by many personal, contextual and cultural variables. Here, we study the sensitivity of Chinese (N = 68) and Spanish (N = 82) preschoolers to consensus in social decision making contexts. Children faced two different types of peer-interaction events, which involved (1) uncertain or ambiguous scenarios open to interpretation (social interpretation context), and (2) explicit scenarios depicting the exclusion of a peer (moral judgment context). Children first observed a video in which a group of teachers offered their opinion about the events, and then they were asked to evaluate the information provided. Participants were assigned to two conditions that differed in the type of consensus: Unanimous majority (non-dissenter condition) and non-unanimous majority (dissenter condition). In the dissenter condition, we presented the conflicting opinions of three teachers vs. one teacher. In the non-dissenter condition, we presented the unanimous opinion of three teachers. The general results indicated that children’s sensitivity to consensus varies depending both on the degree of ambiguity of the social events and the presence or not of a dissenter: (1) Children were much more likely to endorse the majority view when they were uncertain (social interpretation context), than when they already had a clear interpretation of the situation (moral judgment context); (2) The presence of a dissenter resulted in a significant decrease in children’s confidence in majority. Interestingly, in the moral judgment context, Chinese and Spanish children differed in their willingness to defy a majority whose opinion run against their own. While Spanish children maintained their own criteria regardless of the type of condition, Chinese children did so when an “allied” dissenter was present (dissenter condition) but not when confronting a unanimous majority (non-dissenter condition). Tentatively, we suggest that this difference might be related to culture-specific patterns regarding children’s deference toward adults.

Using Behavioral Consensus to Learn about Social Conventions in Early Childhood

Adults make inferences about the conventionality of others’ behaviors based on their prevalence across individuals. Here, we look at whether children use behavioral consensus as a cue to conventionality, and whether this informs which cultural models children choose to learn from. We find that 2- to 5-year old children exhibit increasing sensitivity to behavioral consensus with age, suggesting that like adults, young humans use behavioral consensus to identify social conventions. However, unlike previous studies showing children’s tendencies to prefer and to learn from members of a consensus, the present study suggests that there are contexts in which children prefer and learn from unconventional individuals. The implications of these different preferences are discussed.

Infants' Selectively Pay Attention to the Information They Receive from a Native Speaker of Their Language

From the first moments of their life, infants show a preference for their native language, as well as toward speakers with whom they share the same language. This preference appears to have broad consequences in various domains later on, supporting group affiliations and collaborative actions in children. Here, we propose that infants' preference for native speakers of their language also serves a further purpose, specifically allowing them to efficiently acquire culture specific knowledge via social learning. By selectively attending to informants who are native speakers of their language and who probably also share the same cultural background with the infant, young learners can maximize the possibility to acquire cultural knowledge. To test whether infants would preferably attend the information they receive from a speaker of their native language, we familiarized 12-month-old infants with a native and a foreign speaker, and then presented them with movies where each of the speakers silently gazed toward unfamiliar objects. At test, infants' looking behavior to the two objects alone was measured. Results revealed that infants preferred to look longer at the object presented by the native speaker. Strikingly, the effect was replicated also with 5-month-old infants, indicating an early development of such preference. These findings provide evidence that young infants pay more attention to the information presented by a person with whom they share the same language. This selectivity can serve as a basis for efficient social learning by influencing how infants' allocate attention between potential sources of information in their environment.

Social Anxiety, Stress Type, and Conformity among Adolescents

Social anxiety and stress type can influence strong conformity among adolescents; however, the interaction between them is not clear. In this study, 152 adolescents were recruited and assigned one of two conditions: an interaction and a judgment condition. In the interaction condition, adolescents with high social anxiety (HSA) were less likely to conform when completing a modified Asch task, compared to adolescents who had low social anxiety. In the judgment condition, adolescents with HSA were more likely to conform to the opinions from the unanimous majority. The results suggest that adolescents with HSA may show different styles of strong conformity with the change of stress type. We believe that socially anxious adolescents avoid potential social situations with weaker conformity, while avoiding negative evaluations from others with stronger conformity. These findings contribute to a better understanding of the social dysfunctions among adolescents with HSA and provide a new direction for clinical interventions.

Preschoolers' credulity toward misinformation from ingroup versus outgroup speakers

The current research examined preschoolers' credulity toward misinformation from ingroup versus outgroup speakers. Experiment 1 showed that when searching for a hidden toy, Caucasian English monolingual 4-year-olds were credulous toward the false testimony of a race-and-accent ingroup speaker, despite their firsthand observations of the hiding event, but were skeptical when the false testimony was provided by a race-and-accent outgroup speaker. In the same experiment, 3-year-olds were credulous toward the false testimony of both speakers. Experiment 2 showed that when the false testimony was provided by a same-race-only or same-accent-only speaker, 4-year-olds were not particularly credulous or skeptical. The findings are discussed in relation to how intergroup bias might contribute to the selective credulity in the 4-year-olds as well as the factors that might explain the indiscriminate credulity in the 3-year-olds.

A developmental perspective on the cultural evolution of prosocial religious beliefs

Norenzayan et al. argue that prosocial religion develops through cultural evolution. Surprisingly, they give little attention to developmental accounts of prosocial religious beliefs. A consideration of the developmental literature supports some, but not all, of the authors’ conclusions.

Trust and doubt: An examination of children's decision to believe what they are told about food

The domain of food is one that is highly relevant and vital to the everyday lives of children. However, children's reasoning about this domain is poorly understood within the field of developmental psychology. Because children's learning about food, including its evaluative components (e.g., health, taste) is so heavily dependent on information conveyed by other people, a major developmental challenge that children face is determining who to distrust regarding food. In three studies, this investigation examined how 3- and 4-year-olds and adults (N=312) use different cues to determine when to ignore informant information (i.e., distrust what an informant tells them by choosing an alternative) in food- and non-food-specific scenarios. The results of Study 1 indicated that by age 4 years, children are less trusting of inaccurate sources of information compared with sources that have not demonstrated previous inaccuracy. Study 2 revealed that these results are applicable across the domain of objects. The results of Study 3 indicated that by age 4, children trust benevolent sources more often than malevolent ones. Thus, when reasoning about the evaluative components of food, by age 4, children appraise other people's untrustworthiness by paying attention to their inaccuracy and malevolence.

The role of consensus and culture in children's imitation of inefficient actions

A significant body of work has demonstrated children's imitative abilities when learning novel actions. Although some research has examined the role of cultural background in children's imitation of inefficient actions, to our knowledge no research has explored how culture and conformity interact when engaging in imitation. In Study 1, 87 Caucasian American and Chinese American preschoolers were presented with either one model or three models performing an inefficient action. Whereas there were no cultural differences in imitation in the Single Model condition, Chinese Americans were significantly more likely to copy the model's preference for an inefficient tool in the Consensus condition. Children's tool choice was associated with their justification for their choice as well as their memory for the model's action. Study 2 explored the impact of immigration status on the cultural differences in children's tool choice by including 16 first-generation Caucasian American children. When comparing the findings with the rates from Study 1, both groups of Caucasian American preschoolers imitated at rates significantly lower than the Chinese American preschoolers. We suggest that the tool choices of Caucasian American children relate to a tendency to engage in a perceptually driven mode of learning, whereas the choices of the Chinese American children reflect a greater likelihood to use a socially driven mode.