Brain death - too flawed to endure, too ingrained to abandon

Squaring the Circle. Brain death and organ transplantation

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

The adoption of brain death played a crucial role in the development of organ transplantation, but the concept has become increasingly controversial. This essay will explore the current state of the controversy and its implications for the field.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The brain death debate, long limited to the bioethics community, has in recent years burst into the public consciousness following several high-profile cases. This has culminated in the reevaluation of the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA), which is in the process of being updated. Any change to the UDDA has the potential to significantly impact the availability of organs.

SUMMARY

The current update to the UDDA introduces an element of uncertainty, one the brain death debate had not previously had.

Is Death Irreversible?

There are currently two legally established criteria for death: the irreversible cessation of circulation and respiration and the irreversible cessation of neurologic function. Recently, there have been technological developments that could undermine the irreversibility requirement. In this paper, I focus both on whether death should be identified as an irreversible state and on the proper scope of irreversibility in the biological definition of death. In this paper, I tackle the distinction between the commonsense definition of death and the biological definition of death to show that even the commonsense concept of death is specified by biological facts. Resting on this argument, I argue that any definition of death is a posteriori. Thus, irreversibility is part of any definition of death because the actual phenomenon of death is irreversible. In addition, I show that the proper domain of irreversibility in a definition of death is circumscribed by physical possibilities and that irreversibility in the definition of death refers to current possibilities for the reversal of relevant biological processes. I conclude that, despite recent technological advancements, death is still irreversible.

Pediatric brain death certification: a narrative review

In the five decades since its inception, brain death has become an accepted medical and legal concept throughout most of the world. There was initial reluctance to apply brain death criteria to children as they are believed more likely to regain neurologic function following injury. In spite of early trepidation, criteria for pediatric brain death certification were first proposed in 1987 by a multidisciplinary committee comprised of experts in the medical and legal communities. Protocols have since been developed to standardize brain death determination, but there remains substantial variability in practice throughout the world. In addition, brain death remains a topic of considerable ethical, philosophical, and legal controversy, and is often misrepresented in the media. In the present article, we discuss the history of brain death and the guidelines for its determination. We provide an overview of past and present challenges to its concept and diagnosis from biophilosophical, ethical and legal perspectives, and highlight differences between adult and pediatric brain death determination. We conclude by anticipating future directions for brain death as related to the emergence of new technologies. It is our position that providers should endorse the criteria for brain death diagnosis in children as proposed by the Society of Critical Care Medicine (SCCM), American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), and Child Neurology Society (CNS), in order to prevent controversy and subjectivity surrounding what constitutes life versus death.

More Than "Spending Time with the Body": The Role of a Family's Grief in Determinations of Brain Death

In many ways, grief is thought to be outside the realm of bioethics and clinical ethics, and grieving patients or family members may be passed off to grief counselors or therapists. Yet grief can play a particularly poignant role in the ethical encounter, especially in cases of brain death, where the line between life and death has been blurred. Although brain death is legally and medically recognized as death in the United States and elsewhere, the concept has been contentious since its inception in 1968. Yet in most cases, families are not allowed to reject the determination of brain death. Apart from religious exemptions, families have no recourse to reject this controversial determination of death. This paper explores the role of grief in brain death determinations and argues that bioethics has failed to address the complexity of grief in determinations of brain death. Grief ought to have epistemological weight in brain death determinations because of the contested nature of the diagnosis and the unique ways in which grief informs the situation. Thus, I argue that, in some rare cases, reasonable accommodation policies should be expanded to allow for refusals of brain death determinations based on the emotional and moral force of grief. By drawing on ethnographic accounts of grief in other cultures, I problematize the current procedural and linear understandings of grief in brain death determinations, and I conclude by offering a new way in which to understand the case of Jahi McMath.

When are you dead enough to be a donor? Can any feasible protocol for the determination of death on circulatory criteria respect the dead donor rule?

The basic question concerning the compatibility of donation after circulatory death (DCD) protocols with the dead donor rule is whether such protocols can guarantee that the loss of relevant biological functions is truly irreversible. Which functions are the relevant ones? I argue that the answer to this question can be derived neither from a proper understanding of the meaning of the term "death" nor from a proper understanding of the nature of death as a biological phenomenon. The concept of death can be made fully determinate only by stipulation. I propose to focus on the irreversible loss of the capacity for consciousness and the capacity for spontaneous breathing. Having accepted that proposal, the meaning of "irreversibility" need not be twisted in order to claim that DCD protocols can guarantee that the loss of these functions is irreversible. And this guarantee does not mean that reversing that loss is either conceptually impossible or known to be impossible with absolute certainty.

Realigning the Neural Paradigm for Death

Whole brain failure constitutes the diagnostic criterion for death determination in most clinical settings across the globe. Yet the conceptual foundation for its adoption was slow to emerge, has evoked extensive scientific debate since inception, underwent policy revision, and remains contentious in praxis even today. Complications result from the need to relate a unitary construal of the death event with an adequate account of organismal integration and that of the human organism in particular. Advances in the neuroscience of higher human faculties, such as the self, personal identity, and consciousness, and dynamical philosophy of science accounts, however, are yielding a portrait of higher order global integration shared between body and brain. Such conceptual models of integration challenge a praxis relying exclusively on a neurological criterion for death.

Clinical Practice Guidelines for Sustained Neuromuscular Blockade in the Adult Critically Ill Patient

OBJECTIVE

To update the 2002 version of "Clinical practice guidelines for sustained neuromuscular blockade in the adult critically ill patient."

DESIGN

A Task Force comprising 17 members of the Society of Critical Medicine with particular expertise in the use of neuromuscular-blocking agents; a Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development, and Evaluation expert; and a medical writer met via teleconference and three face-to-face meetings and communicated via e-mail to examine the evidence and develop these practice guidelines. Annually, all members completed conflict of interest statements; no conflicts were identified. This activity was funded by the Society for Critical Care Medicine, and no industry support was provided.

METHODS

Using the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development, and Evaluation system, the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development, and Evaluation expert on the Task Force created profiles for the evidence related to six of the 21 questions and assigned quality-of-evidence scores to these and the additional 15 questions for which insufficient evidence was available to create a profile. Task Force members reviewed this material and all available evidence and provided recommendations, suggestions, or good practice statements for these 21 questions.

RESULTS

The Task Force developed a single strong recommendation: we recommend scheduled eye care that includes lubricating drops or gel and eyelid closure for patients receiving continuous infusions of neuromuscular-blocking agents. The Task Force developed 10 weak recommendations. 1) We suggest that a neuromuscular-blocking agent be administered by continuous intravenous infusion early in the course of acute respiratory distress syndrome for patients with a PaO2/FIO2 less than 150. 2) We suggest against the routine administration of an neuromuscular-blocking agents to mechanically ventilated patients with status asthmaticus. 3) We suggest a trial of a neuromuscular-blocking agents in life-threatening situations associated with profound hypoxemia, respiratory acidosis, or hemodynamic compromise. 4) We suggest that neuromuscular-blocking agents may be used to manage overt shivering in therapeutic hypothermia. 5) We suggest that peripheral nerve stimulation with train-of-four monitoring may be a useful tool for monitoring the depth of neuromuscular blockade but only if it is incorporated into a more inclusive assessment of the patient that includes clinical assessment. 6) We suggest against the use of peripheral nerve stimulation with train of four alone for monitoring the depth of neuromuscular blockade in patients receiving continuous infusion of neuromuscular-blocking agents. 7) We suggest that patients receiving a continuous infusion of neuromuscular-blocking agent receive a structured physiotherapy regimen. 8) We suggest that clinicians target a blood glucose level of less than 180 mg/dL in patients receiving neuromuscular-blocking agents. 9) We suggest that clinicians not use actual body weight and instead use a consistent weight (ideal body weight or adjusted body weight) when calculating neuromuscular-blocking agents doses for obese patients. 10) We suggest that neuromuscular-blocking agents be discontinued at the end of life or when life support is withdrawn. In situations in which evidence was lacking or insufficient and the study results were equivocal or optimal clinical practice varies, the Task Force made no recommendations for nine of the topics. 1) We make no recommendation as to whether neuromuscular blockade is beneficial or harmful when used in patients with acute brain injury and raised intracranial pressure. 2) We make no recommendation on the routine use of neuromuscular-blocking agents for patients undergoing therapeutic hypothermia following cardiac arrest. 3) We make no recommendation on the use of peripheral nerve stimulation to monitor degree of block in patients undergoing therapeutic hypothermia. 4) We make no recommendation on the use of neuromuscular blockade to improve the accuracy of intravascular-volume assessment in mechanically ventilated patients. 5) We make no recommendation concerning the use of electroencephalogram-derived parameters as a measure of sedation during continuous administration of neuromuscular-blocking agents. 6) We make no recommendation regarding nutritional requirements specific to patients receiving infusions of neuromuscular-blocking agents. 7) We make no recommendation concerning the use of one measure of consistent weight over another when calculating neuromuscular-blocking agent doses in obese patients. 8) We make no recommendation on the use of neuromuscular-blocking agents in pregnant patients. 9) We make no recommendation on which muscle group should be monitored in patients with myasthenia gravis receiving neuromuscular-blocking agents. Finally, in situations in which evidence was lacking or insufficient but expert consensus was unanimous, the Task Force developed six good practice statements. 1) If peripheral nerve stimulation is used, optimal clinical practice suggests that it should be done in conjunction with assessment of other clinical findings (e.g., triggering of the ventilator and degree of shivering) to assess the degree of neuromuscular blockade in patients undergoing therapeutic hypothermia. 2) Optimal clinical practice suggests that a protocol should include guidance on neuromuscular-blocking agent administration in patients undergoing therapeutic hypothermia. 3) Optimal clinical practice suggests that analgesic and sedative drugs should be used prior to and during neuromuscular blockade, with the goal of achieving deep sedation. 4) Optimal clinical practice suggests that clinicians at the bedside implement measure to attenuate the risk of unintended extubation in patients receiving neuromuscular-blocking agents. 5) Optimal clinical practice suggests that a reduced dose of an neuromuscular-blocking agent be used for patients with myasthenia gravis and that the dose should be based on peripheral nerve stimulation with train-of-four monitoring. 6) Optimal clinical practice suggests that neuromuscular-blocking agents be discontinued prior to the clinical determination of brain death.

[Organ donation after circulatory death]

Approximately 17 million inhabitants live in the Netherlands. The number of potential organ donors in 1999 was the lowest in Europe with only 10 donors per million inhabitants. Medical associations, public health services, health insurance companies and the government had to find common solutions in order to improve organ allocation, logistics of donations and to increase the number of transplantations. After a prolonged debate on medical ethical issues of organ transplantation, all participants were able to agree on socio-medico-legal regulations for organ donation and transplantation. In addition to improving the procedure for organ donation after brain death (DBD) the most important step was the introduction of organ donation after circulatory death (DCD). Measures such as the introduction of a national organ donor database, improved information to the public, further education on intensive care units (ICU), guidelines for end of life care on the ICU, establishment of transplantation coordinators on site, introduction of autonomous explantation teams and strict procedures on the course of organ donations, answered many practical issues about logistics and responsibilities for DBD and DCD. In 2014 the number of postmortem organ donations rose to 16.4 per million inhabitants. Meanwhile, up to 60 % of organ donations in the Netherlands originate from a DCD procedure compared to approximately 10 % in the USA. This overview article discusses the developments and processes of deceased donation in the Netherlands after 15 years of experience with DCD.

The Case for Reasonable Accommodation of Conscientious Objections to Declarations of Brain Death

Since its inception in 1968, the concept of whole-brain death has been contentious, and four decades on, controversy concerning the validity and coherence of whole-brain death continues unabated. Although whole-brain death is legally recognized and medically entrenched in the United States and elsewhere, there is reasonable disagreement among physicians, philosophers, and the public concerning whether brain death is really equivalent to death as it has been traditionally understood. A handful of states have acknowledged this plurality of viewpoints and enacted "conscience clauses" that require "reasonable accommodation" of religious and moral objections to the determination of death by neurological criteria. This paper argues for the universal adoption of "reasonable accommodation" policies using the New Jersey statute as a model, in light of both the ongoing controversy and the recent case of Jahi McMath, a child whose family raised religious objections to a declaration of brain death. Public policies that accommodate reasonable, divergent viewpoints concerning death provide a practical and compassionate way to resolve those conflicts that are the most urgent, painful, and difficult to reconcile.

Revisiting the Persisting Tension Between Expert and Lay Views About Brain Death and Death Determination: A Proposal Inspired by Pragmatism

Brain death or determination of death based on the neurological criterion has been an enduring source of controversy in academic and clinical circles. The controversy chiefly concerns how death is defined, and it also bears on the justification of the proposed criteria for death determination and their interpretation. Part of the controversy on brain death and death determination stems from disputed crucial medical facts, but in this paper I formulate another hypothesis about the nature of ongoing controversies. At stake is a misunderstood relationship between, on the one hand, the nature of our lay (or our "manifest image") views about death and, on the other hand, the nature of scientific insights (and related conceptual refinements) into death and its determination (the "scientific image"). The misunderstanding of this relationship has partly anchored the controversy and continues to fuel it. Based on a perspective inspired by pragmatism, which stresses the positive contribution of science to ethical and policy debates but also challenges different forms of scientism in science and philosophy found in foundationalist interpretations, I scrutinize three different stances regarding the relationship between lay and scientific perspectives about the definition of death: (1) foundational lay views, (2) foundational expert views, and (3) co-evolving views. I argue that only the latter is sustainable given recent challenges to foundationalist interpretations.

The ethics of limiting informed debate: censorship of select medical publications in the interest of organ transplantation

Recently, several articles in the scholarly literature on medical ethics proclaim the need for "responsible scholarship" in the debate over the proper criteria for death, in which "responsible scholarship" is defined in terms of support for current neurological criteria for death. In a recent article, James M. DuBois is concerned that academic critiques of current death criteria create unnecessary doubt about the moral acceptability of organ donation, which may affect the public's willingness to donate. Thus he calls for a closing of the debate on current death criteria and for journal editors to publish only critiques that "substantially engage and advance the debate." We argue that such positions as DuBois' are a threat to responsible scholarship in medical ethics, especially scholarship that opposes popular stances, because it erodes academic freedom and the necessity of debate on an issue that is literally a matter of life and death, no matter what side a person defends.

Depictions of 'brain death' in the media: medical and ethical implications

BACKGROUND

Debates and controversies have shaped the understanding and the practices related to death determined by neurological criterion (DNC). Confusion about DNC in the public domain could undermine this notion. This confusion could further jeopardise confidence in rigorous death determination procedures, and raise questions about the integrity, sustainability, and legitimacy of modern organ donation practices.

OBJECTIVE

We examined the depictions of 'brain death' in major American and Canadian print media to gain insights into possible common sources of confusion about DNC and the relationship between expert and lay views on this crucial concept.

METHODS

We gathered 940 articles, available in electronic databases, published between 2005 and 2009 from high-circulation Canadian and American newspapers containing keywords 'brain dead' or 'brain death'. Articles were systematically examined for content (eg, definitions of brain death and criteria for determination of death) using the NVivo 8 software.

RESULTS

Our results showed problematic aspects in American and Canadian media, with some salient differences. DNC was used colloquially in 39% (N=366) of the articles and its medical meaning infrequently defined (2.7%; N=14 in the USA and 3.6%; N=15 in Canada). The neurological criterion for determination of death was mentioned in less than 10% of the articles, and life support in about 20% of the articles. Organ donation issues related to DNC were raised more often in Canadian articles than in American articles (33.5% vs 21.2%; p<0.0001).

INTERPRETATION

Further discussion is needed to develop innovative strategies to bridge media representations of DNC with experts' views in connection with organ donation practices.

Changing the conversation about brain death

We seek to change the conversation about brain death by highlighting the distinction between brain death as a biological concept versus brain death as a legal status. The fact that brain death does not cohere with any biologically plausible definition of death has been known for decades. Nevertheless, this fact has not threatened the acceptance of brain death as a legal status that permits individuals to be treated as if they are dead. The similarities between "legally dead" and "legally blind" demonstrate how we may legitimately choose bright-line legal definitions that do not cohere with biological reality. Not only does this distinction bring conceptual coherence to the conversation about brain death, but it has practical implications as well. Once brain death is recognized as a social construction not grounded in biological reality, we create the possibility of changing the social construction in ways that may better serve both organ donors and recipients alike.

Medical ethics in pediatric critical care

Ethically charged situations are common in pediatric critical care. Most situations can be managed with minimal controversy within the medical team or between the team and patients/families. Familiarity with institutional resources, such as hospital ethics committees, and national guidelines, such as publications from the American Academy of Pediatrics, American Medical Association, or Society of Critical Care Medicine, are an essential part of the toolkit of any intensivist. Open discussion with colleagues and within the multidisciplinary team can also ensure that when difficult situations arise, they are addressed in a proactive, evidence-based, and collegial manner.

Donation after circulatory death: burying the dead donor rule

Despite continuing controversies regarding the vital status of both brain-dead donors and individuals who undergo donation after circulatory death (DCD), respecting the dead donor rule (DDR) remains the standard moral framework for organ procurement. The DDR increases organ supply without jeopardizing trust in transplantation systems, reassuring society that donors will not experience harm during organ procurement. While the assumption that individuals cannot be harmed once they are dead is reasonable in the case of brain-dead protocols, we argue that the DDR is not an acceptable strategy to protect donors from harm in DCD protocols. We propose a threefold alternative to justify organ procurement practices: (1) ensuring that donors are sufficiently protected from harm; (2) ensuring that they are respected through informed consent; and (3) ensuring that society is fully informed of the inherently debatable nature of any criterion to declare death.

[Brain death: is it an appropriate term?]

INTRODUCTION

Brain death is generally accepted as a concept to indicate death. It was introduced about 40 years ago, and it was considered the ideal situation for donation of organs.

METHODS

During this time, however, there have been problems in the understanding of this concept both in the medical profession and in the general population. University students from medical and non-medical schools were tested for their understanding of this concept.

RESULTS

Our results show that less than one third of the non-medical students identified brain death as death. The data from the medical students changed as they progressed through their studies, but only 2/3 of the graduating medical class believed that brain death is death.

CONCLUSION

Similar results have been seen in other universities around the world, and a renewed effort on the re-education of the concept of brain death may be worthwhile. Although we cannot extrapolate these results to the general population, the confusion is probably similar; hence an effort should be made to solve this problem.

Ethical controversies at end of life after traumatic brain injury: defining death and organ donation

Death is more than a mere biological occurrence. It has important legal, medical, and social ramifications that make it imperative that those who are responsible for determination of death be accurate and above suspicion. The medical and legal definitions of death have evolved to include consideration of such concepts as loss of integration of the whole organism, loss of autonomy, and loss of personhood. Development of the concept of brain death coincided with advances in medical technology that facilitated artificial ventilation and organ transplantation. More recently, the process of "timed" death with subsequent organ donation (controlled donation after cardiac death transplantation) has raised controversial questions having to do with the limits of treatments that facilitate organ transplant but might hasten death, and the duration of cardiac arrest necessary for declaration of death and the commencement of organ procurement. In this review, we discuss the background and ethical ramifications of the concepts of brain death, and of controversies involved in controlled donation after cardiac death organ transplantation.

Scientific, legal, and ethical challenges of end-of-life organ procurement in emergency medicine

AIM

We review (1) scientific evidence questioning the validity of declaring death and procuring organs in heart-beating (i.e., neurological standard of death) and non-heart-beating (i.e., circulatory-respiratory standard of death) donation; (2) consequences of collaborative programs realigning hospital policies to maximize access of procurement coordinators to critically and terminally ill patients as potential donors on arrival in emergency departments; and (3) ethical and legal ramifications of current practices of organ procurement on patients and their families.

DATA SOURCES

Relevant publications in peer-reviewed journals and government websites.

RESULTS

Scientific evidence undermines the biological criteria of death that underpin the definition of death in heart-beating (i.e., neurological standard) and non-heart-beating (i.e., circulatory-respiratory standard) donation. Philosophical reinterpretation of the neurological and circulatory-respiratory standards in the death statute, to avoid the appearance of organ procurement as an active life-ending intervention, lacks public and medical consensus. Collaborative programs bundle procurement coordinators together with hospital staff for a team-huddle and implement a quality improvement tool for a Rapid Assessment of Hospital Procurement Barriers in Donation. Procurement coordinators have access to critically ill patients during the course of medical treatment with no donation consent and with family or surrogates unaware of their roles. How these programs affect the medical care of these patients has not been studied.

CONCLUSIONS

Policies enforcing end-of-life organ procurement can have unintended consequences: (1) erosion of care in the patient's best interests, (2) lack of transparency, and (3) ethical and legal ramifications of flawed standards of declaring death.

The dead donor rule: can it withstand critical scrutiny?

Transplantation of vital organs has been premised ethically and legally on "the dead donor rule" (DDR)-the requirement that donors are determined to be dead before these organs are procured. Nevertheless, scholars have argued cogently that donors of vital organs, including those diagnosed as "brain dead" and those declared dead according to cardiopulmonary criteria, are not in fact dead at the time that vital organs are being procured. In this article, we challenge the normative rationale for the DDR by rejecting the underlying premise that it is necessarily wrong for physicians to cause the death of patients and the claim that abandoning this rule would exploit vulnerable patients. We contend that it is ethical to procure vital organs from living patients sustained on life support prior to treatment withdrawal, provided that there is valid consent for both withdrawing treatment and organ donation. However, the conservatism of medical ethics and practical concerns make it doubtful that the DDR will be abandoned in the near future. This leaves the current practice of organ transplantation based on the "moral fiction" that donors are dead when vital organs are procured.

Assessment of the capacity to express informed consent for organ donation in patients with schizophrenia

In Italy, the "silent-consent" principle of donor's willingness regulates organ donation for postmortem transplantation, but civil incompetence excludes it. We investigated decisional capacity for organ donation for transplantation of 30 controls and 30 nonincompetent patients with schizophrenia as related to clinical symptoms, cognition, and functioning. Assessments were carried out through the Competence for Donation Assessment Scale (CDAS), Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS), Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS), Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms, Life Skills Profile (LSP), Raven's Colored Progressive Matrices (RCPM), Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, Rey RI, Rey RD, and Visual Search. Patients and controls differed on the CDAS Understanding and Choice Expression areas. Patients showed significant inverse bivariate correlations between CDAS Understanding and scores on total BPRS, LSP self-care scale, and RCPM cognitive test. Our results show that decisional capacity for participating in research does not predict decisional capacity for postmortem organ donation in patients with schizophrenic or schizoaffective psychosis; hence, before judging consent for donation, patients must be provided with enhanced information to better understand this delicate issue.

Israel's new brain-respiratory death act: one step forward or two steps backward?

Although the legalization of the concept of brain death in Israel may be similar to that in other developed countries, much doubt surrounds its wisdom and practical effect. The new Israeli act raises theoretical and practical concerns, which were not fully anticipated by lawmakers. The article describes the new law and elaborates on key issues deriving from the regulation of brain death. Its main argument is that the new legislation of brain-respiratory death suffers from some major problems that need to be addressed so that it will have some meaningful, let alone less detrimental bearing on the acceptance of brain death in Israel and the practice of its determination.

The bispectral index, a useful adjunct for the timely diagnosis of brain death in the comatose trauma patient

BACKGROUND

The bispectral index (BIS) is a processed electroencephalographic value (awake = 100, isoelectric = 0). The relationship of BIS and brain death (BD) is assessed.

METHODS

BIS was evaluated in GCS 3 head-injured patients with BD (no brain function including apnea) or near BD (no apnea or negative ancillary test [cerebral perfusion and electroencephalogram]).

RESULTS

In 27 patients, there were 37 BD evaluations (apnea assessment or ancillary test). BD was confirmed in 62% (n = 23). However, 38% (n = 14) showed near BD. BD BIS is 3 + or - 5 and near BD BIS is 36 + or - 31 (P = .002). In the 23 BD patients, BIS was <20 for 7 hours + or - 6 hours before a BD evaluation was performed. Of 14 near BD evaluations, 9 (64%) had BIS > or = 20. BIS <20 for predicting BD had a sensitivity of 100% (23/23), a positive predictive value of 84% (23/28), and a negative predictive value of 100% (9/9).

CONCLUSIONS

Distinguishing brain death and near brain death in severely comatose trauma patients is complex. By indicating the likelihood of brain death, BIS is an adjunct for efficient evaluation.

Brain death, states of impaired consciousness, and physician-assisted death for end-of-life organ donation and transplantation

In 1968, the Harvard criteria equated irreversible coma and apnea (i.e., brain death) with human death and later, the Uniform Determination of Death Act was enacted permitting organ procurement from heart-beating donors. Since then, clinical studies have defined a spectrum of states of impaired consciousness in human beings: coma, akinetic mutism (locked-in syndrome), minimally conscious state, vegetative state and brain death. In this article, we argue against the validity of the Harvard criteria for equating brain death with human death. (1) Brain death does not disrupt somatic integrative unity and coordinated biological functioning of a living organism. (2) Neurological criteria of human death fail to determine the precise moment of an organism's death when death is established by circulatory criterion in other states of impaired consciousness for organ procurement with non-heart-beating donation protocols. The criterion of circulatory arrest 75 s to 5 min is too short for irreversible cessation of whole brain functions and respiration controlled by the brain stem. (3) Brain-based criteria for determining death with a beating heart exclude relevant anthropologic, psychosocial, cultural, and religious aspects of death and dying in society. (4) Clinical guidelines for determining brain death are not consistently validated by the presence of irreversible brain stem ischemic injury or necrosis on autopsy; therefore, they do not completely exclude reversible loss of integrated neurological functions in donors. The questionable reliability and varying compliance with these guidelines among institutions amplify the risk of determining reversible states of impaired consciousness as irreversible brain death. (5) The scientific uncertainty of defining and determining states of impaired consciousness including brain death have been neither disclosed to the general public nor broadly debated by the medical community or by legal and religious scholars. Heart-beating or non-heart-beating organ procurement from patients with impaired consciousness is de facto a concealed practice of physician-assisted death, and therefore, violates both criminal law and the central tenet of medicine not to do harm to patients. Society must decide if physician-assisted death is permissible and desirable to resolve the conflict about procuring organs from patients with impaired consciousness within the context of the perceived need to enhance the supply of transplantable organs.

Enforcement of presumed-consent policy and willingness to donate organs as identified in the European Union Survey: the role of legislation in reinforcing ideology in pluralistic societies

To increase the supply of transplantable organs, some European Union (EU) countries have begun implementing and enforcing presumed consent policies for organ donation. Mossialos and colleagues performed an analysis of samples of citizens in 15 EU countries and found that legislation, enforcement, and awareness of presumed consent policies for organ donation increase people's willingness to donate their own organs and those of a deceased relative. The authors concluded that, in countries with enforced presumed consent, citizens are willing to donate because they accept organ donation as an ideology. This ideology originates in the thinking that organ donation is an implicit communal contract i.e., a mechanism by which individuals pay back society for the inclusion and social support that they have already experienced and hope to experience in the future. Acceptance of this ideology enhances people's willingness to donate organs and the efficiency in pursuing this collective action, thus, paving the way toward increased paternalism in society. We highlight some potential biases that may have been incorporated in the survey design and in Mossialos et al.'s conclusions, including (1) how the survey questions were constructed, (2) whether sufficient information was communicated about organ procurement practices in heart-beating and non-heart-beating donation before participants responded to the survey, and (3) whether respondents' knowledge about donation legislation can be equated with understanding of processes involved in organ donation. We address the consequences of using legislative authority to enforce the ideology of organ donation, thereby superseding the varying moral values, beliefs, and attitudes about human life and culture that are inherent in multicultural societies.

Ethical Issues of Transplant Coordinators in Japan and the Uk

Ethical problems surrounding organ donation have been discussed since before technologies supported the procedure. In addition to issues on a societal level (e.g. brain-stem death, resource allocation), ethical concerns permeate the clinical practice of health care staff. These latter have been little studied. Using qualitative methods, this study, focused on transplant co-ordinators and their descriptions of dilemmas, ethical concerns and actions in response to them. Interviews with three co-ordinators in Japan and two in the UK revealed five areas in which dilemmas occurred: aspects of discrimination; conditions placed on who should be the recipient and the related issues of directed donation; respect for a person's right to make a decision and the extent of information provided and understood by donors and recipients; potential issues of coercion, compensation and rewards in live-related and live-unrelated donations; and potential conflicts in duties. This study describes the dilemma areas revealed. Their meaning for co-ordinators will be presented in a subsequent report.

Truthfulness in transplantation: non-heart-beating organ donation

The current practice of organ transplantation has been criticized on several fronts. The philosophical and scientific foundations for brain death criteria have been crumbling. In addition, donation after cardiac death, or non-heartbeating-organ donation (NHBD) has been attacked on grounds that it mistreats the dying patient and uses that patient only as a means to an end for someone else's benefit.Verheijde, Rady, and McGregor attack the deception involved in NHBD, arguing that the donors are not dead and that potential donors and their families should be told that is the case. Thus, they propose abandoning the dead donor rule and allowing NHBD with strict rules concerning adequate informed consent. Such honesty about NHBD should be welcomed.However, NHBD violates a fundamental end of medicine, nonmaleficience, "do no harm." Physicians should not be harming or killing patients, even if it is for the benefit of others. Thus, although Verheijde and his colleages should be congratulated for calling for truthfulness about NHBD, they do not go far enough and call for an elimination of such an unethical procedure from the practice of medicine.