Cognitive consequences of cooperative breeding? A critical appraisal

Prosociality in a despotic society

Prosociality is the intent to improve others' well-being. Existing hypotheses postulate that enhanced social tolerance and inter-individual dependence may facilitate prosocial preferences, which may favor the evolution of altruism. While most studies are restricted to "tolerant" (cooperatively breeding and self-domesticated) species, despotic societies provide an alternative opportunity to investigate prosociality due to nepotism and ample inter-individual dependencies. Japanese macaques live in hierarchical matrilineal societies, with strong kin bonds. Besides, tolerance among non-kin may persist through reciprocity. Using a group service food-provision paradigm, we found prosocial preferences in a semi free-ranging group of Japanese macaques. The extent of provisioning was at levels comparable to tolerant species. Dyadic tolerance predicted the likelihood and magnitude of provisioning, while kinship predicted the magnitude. We emphasize the role of a complex socio-ecology fostering individual prosocial tendencies through kinship and tolerance. These findings necessitate a framework including different forms of interdependence beyond the generally tolerant species.

General cognitive performance declines with female age and is negatively related to fledging success in a wild bird

Identifying the causes and fitness consequences of intraspecific variation in cognitive performance is fundamental to understand how cognition evolves. Selection may act on different cognitive traits separately or jointly as part of the general cognitive performance (GCP) of the individual. To date, few studies have examined simultaneously whether individual cognitive performance covaries across different cognitive tasks, the relative importance of individual and social attributes in determining cognitive variation, and its fitness consequences in the wild. Here, we tested 38 wild southern pied babblers (Turdoides bicolor) on a cognitive test battery targeting associative learning, reversal learning and inhibitory control. We found that a single factor explained 59.5% of the variation in individual cognitive performance across tasks, suggestive of a general cognitive factor. GCP varied by age and sex; declining with age in females but not males. Older females also tended to produce a higher average number of fledglings per year compared to younger females. Analysing over 10 years of breeding data, we found that individuals with lower general cognitive performance produced more fledglings per year. Collectively, our findings support the existence of a trade-off between cognitive performance and reproductive success in a wild bird.

The primate workplace: Cooperative decision-making in human and non-human primates

The success of group foraging in primates is not only determined by ecological and social factors. It is also influenced by cognition. Group foraging success is constrained, for instance, by the challenges of coordination, synchrony and decision-making, and it is enhanced by the ability to share, learn from others and coordinate actions. However, what we currently know about the cognition of individuals in groups comes primarily from experiments on dyads, and what we know of the effect of ecological factors on group dynamics comes from larger wild groups. Our current knowledge of primate group behaviour is thus incomplete. In this review, we identify a gap in our knowledge of primate group dynamics between the dyadic studies on primate cooperation and the large group observational studies of behavioural ecology. We highlight the potential for controlled experimental studies on coordination and cooperation in primate groups. Currently, these exist primarily as studies of dyads, and these do not go far enough in testing limits of group-level behaviours. Controlled studies on primate groups beyond the dyad would be highly informative regarding the bounds of non-human primate collaboration. We look to the literature on how humans behave in groups, specifically from organisational psychology, draw parallels between human and non-human group dynamics and highlight approaches that could be applied across disciplines. Organisational psychology is explicitly concerned with the interactions between individuals in a group and the emergent properties at the group-level of these decisions. We propose that some of the major shortfalls in our understanding of primate social cognition and group dynamics can be filled by using approaches developed by organisational psychologists, particularly regarding the effects of group size and composition on group-level cooperation. To illustrate the potential applications, we provide a list of research questions drawn from organisational psychology that could be applied to non-human primates.

Relative Brain Volume of Carnivorans Has Evolved in Correlation with Environmental and Dietary Variables Differentially among Clades

Carnivorans possess relatively large brains compared to most other mammalian clades. Factors like environmental complexity (Cognitive Buffer Hypothesis) and diet quality (Expensive-Tissue Hypothesis) have been proposed as mechanisms for encephalization in other large-brained clades. We examine whether the Cognitive Buffer and Expensive-Tissue Hypotheses account for brain size variation within Carnivora. Under these hypotheses, we predict a positive correlation between brain size and environmental complexity or protein consumption. Relative endocranial volume (phylogenetic generalized least-squares residual from species' mean body mass) and 9 environmental and dietary variables were collected from the literature for 148 species of terrestrial and marine carnivorans. We found that the correlation between relative brain volume and environment and diet differed among clades, a trend consistent with other larger brained vertebrates (i.e., Primates, Aves). Mustelidae and Procyonidae demonstrate larger brains in species with higher-quality diets, consistent with the Expensive-Tissue Hypothesis, while in Herpestidae, correlations between relative brain size and environment are consistent with the Cognitive Buffer Hypothesis. Our results indicate that carnivorans may have evolved relatively larger brains under similar selective pressures as primates despite the considerable differences in life history and behavior between these two clades.

Problems with using comparative analyses of avian brain size to test hypotheses of cognitive evolution

There are multiple hypotheses for the evolution of cognition. The most prominent hypotheses are the Social Intelligence Hypothesis (SIH) and the Ecological Intelligence Hypothesis (EIH), which are often pitted against one another. These hypotheses tend to be tested using broad-scale comparative studies of brain size, where brain size is used as a proxy of cognitive ability, and various social and/or ecological variables are included as predictors. Here, we test how robust conclusions drawn from such analyses may be. First, we investigate variation in brain and body size measurements across >1000 bird species. We demonstrate that there is substantial variation in brain and body size estimates across datasets, indicating that conclusions drawn from comparative brain size models are likely to differ depending on the source of the data. Following this, we subset our data to the Corvides infraorder and interrogate how modelling decisions impact results. We show that model results change substantially depending on variable inclusion, source and classification. Indeed, we could have drawn multiple contradictory conclusions about the principal drivers of brain size evolution. These results reflect concerns from a growing number of researchers that conclusions drawn from comparative brain size studies may not be robust. We suggest that to interrogate hypotheses of cognitive evolution, a fruitful way forward is to focus on testing cognitive performance within and between closely related taxa, with an emphasis on understanding the relationship between informational uncertainty and cognitive evolution.

The human fear paradox: Affective origins of cooperative care

Already as infants humans are more fearful than our closest living primate relatives, the chimpanzees. Yet heightened fearfulness is mostly considered maladaptive, as it is thought to increase the risk of developing anxiety and depression. How can this human fear paradox be explained? The fearful ape hypothesis presented herein stipulates that, in the context of cooperative caregiving and provisioning unique to human great ape group life, heightened fearfulness was adaptive. This is because from early in ontogeny fearfulness expressed and perceived enhanced care-based responding and provisioning from, while concurrently increasing cooperation with, mothers and others. This explanation is based on a synthesis of existing research with human infants and children, demonstrating a link between fearfulness, greater sensitivity to and accuracy in detecting fear in others, and enhanced levels of cooperative behaviors. These insights critically advance current evolutionary theories of human cooperation by adding an early-developing affective component to the human cooperative makeup. Moreover, the current proposal has important cultural, societal, and health implications, as it challenges the predominant view in Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies that commonly construe fearfulness as a maladaptive trait, potentially ignoring its evolutionary adaptive functions.

Adult bonobos show no prosociality in both prosocial choice task and group service paradigm

Previous studies reported contrasting conclusions concerning bonobo prosociality, which are likely due to differences in the experimental design, the social dynamics among subjects and characteristics of the subjects themselves. Two hypotheses have been proposed to explain the occurrence of prosociality in animals: the cooperative breeding hypothesis and the self-domestication hypothesis. While the former predicts low levels of prosociality in bonobos because they are non-cooperative breeders, the latter predicts high levels of prosociality because self-domestication has been proposed to select for high levels of tolerance in this species. Here, we presented a group of thirteen bonobos with two platform food-provisioning tasks: the prosocial choice task (PCT) and the group service paradigm (GSP). The latter has so far never been applied to bonobos. To allow for free choice of participation and partner, we implemented both tasks in a group setting. Like in previous PCT studies, bonobos did not choose the prosocial option more often when a group member could benefit vs not benefit. In the GSP, where food provisioning is costly, only subadult bonobos showed a limited amount of food provisioning, which was much lower than what was previously reported for chimpanzees. In both experiments, adult subjects were highly motivated to obtain rewards for themselves, suggesting that bonobos behaved indifferently to the gains of group members. We suggest that previous positive food-provisioning prosociality results in bonobos are mainly driven by the behaviour of subadult subjects. The lack of prosociality in this study corresponds to the hypothesis that proactive food provisioning co-occurs with cooperative breeding and suggests that proactive prosociality might not be part of the self-domestication syndrome in bonobos.

Rapid spatial learning in cooperative and non-cooperative cichlids

The number, duration and depth of social relationships that an individual maintains can impact social cognition, but the connection between sociality and other aspects of cognition has hardly been explored. To date, the link between social living and intelligence has been mainly supported by studies on primates, and far fewer tests connecting sociality to cognitive abilities have used other taxa. Here, we present the first comparative study in fishes that examines whether complex social living is associated with better performance on a cognitively demanding spatial task. Using three cooperative, group-living cichlid fish species and three of their non-cooperative, more solitary close relatives, we studied maze learning and employed a new statistical extension for the 'lme4' and 'glmmTMB' packages in R that allows phylogeny to be included as a random effect term. Across trials, the three cooperative and the three non-cooperative species completed the maze faster, made fewer mistakes, and improved their inhibitory control. Although fish improved their performance, we did not detect any differences in the extent of improvement between cooperative and non-cooperative species. Both the cooperative species and the non-cooperative species took similar amounts of time to complete the maze, had comparable numbers of mistakes, and exhibited similar inhibitory control while in the maze. Our results suggest that living and breeding in complex social groups does not necessarily imply enhancement of other forms of cognition nor, more specifically, an enhanced spatial learning capacity.

Association of social group with both life-history traits and brain size in cooperatively breeding birds

Social group is associated with life-history traits and can predict brain size variation in cooperative primates and some other mammal groups, but such explicit relationships remain enigmatic in cooperatively breeding birds. Indeed, some compositions of social group in cooperative species (e.g., helper number and group size) would affect the fitness of breeders by providing alloparental care. Here, we conducted comparative tests of the relationship between the social group and both life-history traits and brain size across 197 species of cooperatively breeding birds using phylogenetically controlled comparative analyses. We did not find any correlations between helper numbers and both life-history traits and brain size. However, we found that maximum group size was positively associated with clutch size. Moreover, average group size has positive associations with body mass and relative brain size. Our findings suggest that helper numbers cannot promote variation in relative brain size, while larger groups may predict bigger brains in cooperatively breeding birds.

A Cooperation Advantage for Theory of Mind in Children and Adults

Three studies test whether people engage in mental state reasoning or theory of mind (ToM) differently across two fundamental social contexts: cooperation and competition. Study 1 examines how children with an emerging understanding of false beliefs deploy ToM across these contexts. We find that young preschool children are better able to plant false beliefs in others' minds in a cooperative versus competitive context; this difference does not emerge for other cognitive capacities tested (e.g., executive functioning, memory). Studies 2a and 2b reveal the same systematic difference in adults' ToM for cooperation and competition, even after accounting for relevant predictors (e.g., preference for a task condition, feelings about deception). Together, these findings provide initial evidence for enhanced ToM for cooperation versus competition in early development and also adulthood.

Sex-specific effects of cooperative breeding and colonial nesting on prosociality in corvids

The investigation of prosocial behavior is of particular interest from an evolutionary perspective. Comparisons of prosociality across non-human animal species have, however, so far largely focused on primates, and their interpretation is hampered by the diversity of paradigms and procedures used. Here, we present the first systematic comparison of prosocial behavior across multiple species in a taxonomic group outside the primate order, namely the bird family Corvidae. We measured prosociality in eight corvid species, which vary in the expression of cooperative breeding and colonial nesting. We show that cooperative breeding is positively associated with prosocial behavior across species. Also, colonial nesting is associated with a stronger propensity for prosocial behavior, but only in males. The combined results of our study strongly suggest that both cooperative breeding and colonial nesting, which may both rely on heightened social tolerance at the nest, are likely evolutionary pathways to prosocial behavior in corvids.

Marmoset prosociality is intentional

Marmoset monkeys show high levels of proactive prosociality, a trait shared with humans, presumably because both species rely on allomaternal care. However, it is not clear whether the proximate regulation of this convergent trait is also similar, in particular with regard to intentionality, which is a defining characteristic of prosocial behavior in the human literature. The aim of this paper was to investigate whether marmoset monkeys' prosociality fulfils the criteria of intentionality developed in primate communication research. The results show that marmoset prosocial behavior (i) has some degree of flexibility, since individuals can use multiple means to reach their goal and adjust them to specific conditions, (ii) depends on the presence of an audience, i.e. potential recipients (social use), and (iii) is goal-directed, because (a) it continues exactly until the putative goal is reached, and (b) individuals check back and look at/for their partner when their prosocial actions do not achieve the putative goal (i.e. if their actions don't lead to the expected outcome, this elicits distinct reactions in the actor). These results suggest that marmoset prosociality is under some degree of voluntary, intentional control. They are in line with other findings that marmosets perceive each other as intentional agents, and only learn socially from actions that are perceived as intentional. The most parsimonious conclusion is, therefore, that prosocial behavior is fundamentally under voluntary control in marmosets, just as it is in humans, even though our more sophisticated cognitive abilities allow for a far more complex integration of prosociality into a broader variety of contexts and of behavioral goals.

How animals collaborate: Underlying proximate mechanisms

Collaboration or social interactions in which two or more individuals coordinate their behavior to produce outcomes from which both individuals benefit are common in nature. Individuals from many species hunt together, defend their territory, and form coalitions in intragroup competition. However, we still know very little about the proximate mechanisms underlying these behaviors. Recent theories of human cognitive evolution have emphasized the role collaboration may have played in the selection of socio-cognitive skills. It has been argued that the capacity to form shared goals and joint intentions with others, is what allows humans to collaborate so flexibly and efficiently. Although there is no evidence that nonhuman animals are capable of shared intentionality, there is conceivably a wide range of proximate mechanisms that support forms of, potentially flexible, collaboration in other species. We review the experimental literature with the aim of evaluating what we know about how other species achieve collaboration; with a particular focus on chimpanzees. We structure the review with a new categorization of collaborative behavior that focuses on whether individuals intentionally coordinate actions with others. We conclude that for a wider comparative perspective we need more data from other species but the findings so far suggest that chimpanzees, and possibly other great apes, are capable of understanding the causal role of a partner in collaboration. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition Psychology > Comparative Psychology.

Hypotheses for the Evolution of Reduced Reactive Aggression in the Context of Human Self-Domestication

Parallels in anatomy between humans and domesticated mammals suggest that for the last 300,000 years, Homo sapiens has experienced more intense selection against the propensity for reactive aggression than other species of Homo. Selection against reactive aggression, a process that can also be called self-domestication, would help explain various physiological, behavioral, and cognitive features of humans, including the unique system of egalitarian male hierarchy in mobile hunter-gatherers. Here I review nine leading proposals for the occurrence of self-domestication in H. sapiens. To account for the domestication syndrome, proposals must explain what led to a decline in fitness of highly aggressive males, and why the explanatory factor applies only to H. sapiens and not to other species of Homo. The proposed explanations invoke genetic group selection; group-structured culture selection (also known as cultural group selection); social selection by female mate choice; social selection by male partner choice; increased self-control; cooperative breeding; high population density; use of lethal weapons; and language-based conspiracy. Most of these proposals face difficulties in accounting for the origins and/or maintenance of reduced reactive aggression. I conclude that the evolution of language-based conspiracy, which is a form of collective intentionality, was the key factor initiating and maintaining self-domestication in H. sapiens, because it is the most convincing mechanism for explaining the selective pressure against individually powerful fighters. Sophisticated language enabled males of low fighting prowess to cooperatively plan the execution of physically aggressive and domineering alpha males. This system is known today as a leveling mechanism in small-scale societies. Group-structured culture selection possibly accelerated the process.

With a little help from her friends (and family) part I: the ecology and evolution of non-maternal care in mammals

In the class Mammalia, most young are cared for exclusively by their mothers. In species where mothers receive help, however, non-maternal caregivers may play a crucial role in development and life history trajectories. In turn, recipients of such care may have important impacts on caregivers of all types. In Part I of this overview, we briefly review the evolutionary barriers to widespread non-maternal care in mammals, and explain why the exceptions are of particular theoretical importance. We also summarize the current understanding of the selective forces leading to non-maternal care, and the taxa and types of caretakers amongst which it occurs. Finally, we argue for a fresh look at the categorization schemes that have traditionally been used to separate various types of mammalian non-maternal caregivers. This two-part introduction is aimed at scientists from multiple disciplines who study diverse organismal systems. It draws from the social and biological sciences literatures to provide an overview of this special issue of Physiology and Behavior's suite of methodological offerings and theoretical underpinnings.

Looking for unity in diversity: human cooperative childcare in comparative perspective

Humans engage in cooperative childcare, which includes some elements not found in other animals, such as the presence of post-reproductive helpers, extensive food sharing among adults and a pervasive sexual division of labour. In animals, cooperative offspring care has typically been studied in two different contexts. The first mainly involves helpers contributing care in cooperatively breeding family groups; the second context is allomaternal care in species usually not categorized as cooperative breeders (e.g. plural and communal breeders, often without male care). Comparative analyses suggest that cooperative breeding and allomaternal care in plural and communal breeders have distinct evolutionary origins, with humans fitting neither pathway entirely. Nevertheless, some critical proximate mechanisms of helping, including hormonal regulators, are likely to be shared across species. Other mechanisms may vary among species, such as social tolerance, proactive prosociality or conditional mother-infant bonding. These are presumably associated with specific details of the care system, such as whether all group members contribute, or whether mothers can potentially raise offspring alone. Thus, cooperative offspring care is seen in different contexts across animal lineages, but may nonetheless share several important psychological characteristics. We end by discussing how work on humans may play a unifying role in studying cooperative offspring care.

Sociality does not drive the evolution of large brains in eusocial African mole-rats

The social brain hypothesis (SBH) posits that the demands imposed on individuals by living in cohesive social groups exert a selection pressure favouring the evolution of large brains and complex cognitive abilities. Using volumetry and the isotropic fractionator to determine the size of and numbers of neurons in specific brain regions, here we test this hypothesis in African mole-rats (Bathyergidae). These subterranean rodents exhibit a broad spectrum of social complexity, ranging from strictly solitary through to eusocial cooperative breeders, but feature similar ecologies and life history traits. We found no positive association between sociality and neuroanatomical correlates of information-processing capacity. Solitary species are larger, tend to have greater absolute brain size and have more neurons in the forebrain than social species. The neocortex ratio and neuronal counts correlate negatively with social group size. These results are clearly inconsistent with the SBH and show that the challenges coupled with sociality in this group of rodents do not require brain enlargement or fundamental reorganization. These findings suggest that group living or pair bonding per se does not select strongly for brain enlargement unless coupled with Machiavellian interactions affecting individual fitness.

Social complexity and kinship in animal societies

Studies of eusocial invertebrates regard complex societies as those where there is a clear division of labour and extensive cooperation between breeders and helpers. In contrast, studies of social mammals identify complex societies as those where differentiated social relationships influence access to resources and reproductive opportunities. We show here that, while traits associated with social complexity of the first kind occur in social mammals that live in groups composed of close relatives, traits associated with the complexity of social relationships occur where average kinship between female group members is low. These differences in the form of social complexity appear to be associated with variation in brain size and probably reflect contrasts in the extent of conflicts of interest between group members. Our results emphasise the limitations of any unitary concept of social complexity and show that variation in average kinship between group members has far-reaching consequences for animal societies.

Inference of ecological and social drivers of human brain-size evolution

The human brain is unusually large. It has tripled in size from Australopithecines to modern humans ¹ and has become almost six times larger than expected for a placental mammal of human size ² . Brains incur high metabolic costs ³ and accordingly a long-standing question is why the large human brain has evolved ⁴ . The leading hypotheses propose benefits of improved cognition for overcoming ecological^5-7, social^8-10 or cultural^11-14 challenges. However, these hypotheses are typically assessed using correlative analyses, and establishing causes for brain-size evolution remains difficult^15,16. Here we introduce a metabolic approach that enables causal assessment of social hypotheses for brain-size evolution. Our approach yields quantitative predictions for brain and body size from formalized social hypotheses given empirical estimates of the metabolic costs of the brain. Our model predicts the evolution of adult Homo sapiens-sized brains and bodies when individuals face a combination of 60% ecological, 30% cooperative and 10% between-group competitive challenges, and suggests that between-individual competition has been unimportant for driving human brain-size evolution. Moreover, our model indicates that brain expansion in Homo was driven by ecological rather than social challenges, and was perhaps strongly promoted by culture. Our metabolic approach thus enables causal assessments that refine, refute and unify hypotheses of brain-size evolution.

Living in stable social groups is associated with reduced brain size in woodpeckers (Picidae)

Group size predicts brain size in primates and some other mammal groups, but no such relationship has been found in birds. Instead, stable pair-bonding and bi-parental care have been identified as correlates of larger brains in birds. We investigated the relationship between brain size and social system within the family Picidae, using phylogenetically controlled regression analysis. We found no specific effect of duration or strength of pair-bonds, but brain sizes were systematically smaller in species living in long-lasting social groups of larger sizes. Group-living may only present a cognitive challenge in groups in which members have individually competitive relationships; we therefore propose that groups functioning for cooperative benefit may allow disinvestment in expensive brain tissue.

Proactive prosociality in a cooperatively breeding corvid, the azure-winged magpie (Cyanopica cyana)

One of the contemporary hypotheses concerning the evolution of human altruism is the cooperative breeding hypothesis (CBH) which has recently been tested in non-human primates. Using a similar paradigm, we investigated prosociality in a cooperatively breeding corvid, the azure-winged magpie. We found that the magpies delivered food to their group members at high rates, and unlike other corvids, they did so without any cues provided by others. In two control conditions, the magpies stopped participating over time, indicating that they learned to discriminate prosocial tests from controls. Azure-winged magpies are thus the first birds that experimentally show proactive prosociality. Our findings are in line with the CBH; however, additional corvid species need to be tested in this promising paradigm.

Meerkats (Suricata suricatta) fail to prosocially donate food in an experimental set-up

Although humans are usually believed to be prosocial, the evolutionary origins of prosociality are largely debated. One hypothesis is that cooperative breeding has been one major precursor to the emergence of prosociality. In vertebrates, however, experimental evidence of prosociality has been mainly gathered in non-human primates. In this study, we tested the cooperative breeding hypothesis in cooperative breeding meerkats (Suricata suricatta). In particular, we tested whether meerkats take into account partners' benefits when distributing food rewards. Nine individuals were presented with two platforms baited with different food distributions (providing food to themselves, to a partner or both). In all conditions, the decision to operate the apparatus was based on the presence of food on the subject's side, and not on the possible benefits to partners. Despite being cooperative breeders, meerkats in this study failed to be prosocial, suggesting that prosociality in this species may be limited to specific contexts.

The importance of the altricial - precocial spectrum for social complexity in mammals and birds - a review

Various types of long-term stable relationships that individuals uphold, including cooperation and competition between group members, define social complexity in vertebrates. Numerous life history, physiological and cognitive traits have been shown to affect, or to be affected by, such social relationships. As such, differences in developmental modes, i.e. the ‘altricial-precocial’ spectrum, may play an important role in understanding the interspecific variation in occurrence of social interactions, but to what extent this is the case is unclear because the role of the developmental mode has not been studied directly in across-species studies of sociality. In other words, although there are studies on the effects of developmental mode on brain size, on the effects of brain size on cognition, and on the effects of cognition on social complexity, there are no studies directly investigating the link between developmental mode and social complexity. This is surprising because developmental differences play a significant role in the evolution of, for example, brain size, which is in turn considered an essential building block with respect to social complexity. Here, we compiled an overview of studies on various aspects of the complexity of social systems in altricial and precocial mammals and birds. Although systematic studies are scarce and do not allow for a quantitative comparison, we show that several forms of social relationships and cognitive abilities occur in species along the entire developmental spectrum. Based on the existing evidence it seems that differences in developmental modes play a minor role in whether or not individuals or species are able to meet the cognitive capabilities and requirements for maintaining complex social relationships. Given the scarcity of comparative studies and potential subtle differences, however, we suggest that future studies should consider developmental differences to determine whether our finding is general or whether some of the vast variation in social complexity across species can be explained by developmental mode. This would allow a more detailed assessment of the relative importance of developmental mode in the evolution of vertebrate social systems.

The nature of prosociality in chimpanzees

An important debate centres around the nature of prosociality in nonhuman primates. Chimpanzees help other individuals in some experimental settings, yet they do not readily share food. One solution to this paradox is that they are motivated to help others provided there are no competing interests. However, benefits to recipients could arise as by-products of testing. Here we report two studies that separate by-product from intended helping in chimpanzees using a GO/NO-GO paradigm. Actors in one group could help a recipient by releasing a food box, but the same action for another group prevented a recipient from being able to get food. We find no evidence for helping-chimpanzees engaged in the test regardless of the effects on their partners. Illusory prosocial behaviour could arise as a by-product of task design.

Harnessing learning biases is essential for applying social learning in conservation

Social learning can influence how animals respond to anthropogenic changes in the environment, determining whether animals survive novel threats and exploit novel resources or produce maladaptive behaviour and contribute to human-wildlife conflict. Predicting where social learning will occur and manipulating its use are, therefore, important in conservation, but doing so is not straightforward. Learning is an inherently biased process that has been shaped by natural selection to prioritize important information and facilitate its efficient uptake. In this regard, social learning is no different from other learning processes because it too is shaped by perceptual filters, attentional biases and learning constraints that can differ between habitats, species, individuals and contexts. The biases that constrain social learning are not understood well enough to accurately predict whether or not social learning will occur in many situations, which limits the effective use of social learning in conservation practice. Nevertheless, we argue that by tapping into the biases that guide the social transmission of information, the conservation applications of social learning could be improved. We explore the conservation areas where social learning is highly relevant and link them to biases in the cues and contexts that shape social information use. The resulting synthesis highlights many promising areas for collaboration between the fields and stresses the importance of systematic reviews of the evidence surrounding social learning practices.

Critical issues in experimental studies of prosociality in non-human species

Prosociality and acts of altruism are defined as behaviours which benefit another with either no gain or some immediate cost to the self. To understand the evolutionary origins of these behaviours, in recent years, studies have extended to primate species; however, studies on non-primates are still scarce. In light of the fact that phylogenetic closeness to humans does not appear to correlate with prosocial tendencies, but rather differences in the propensity towards prosociality may be linked to allomaternal care or collaborative foraging, it appears that convergent selection pressures may be at work in the evolution of prosociality. It would hence seem particularly important to extend such studies to species outside the primate clade, to allow for comparative hypothesis testing of the factors affecting the evolution of prosocial behaviours. In the current review, we focus on the experimental paradigms which have been used so far (i.e. the prosocial choice task, helping paradigms and food-sharing tests) and highlight the strengths and weaknesses of each method. In line with the aim of encouraging a broader comparative approach to the topic of prosociality, particular emphasis is placed on the methodological issues that need to be taken into account. We conclude that although a number of the paradigms used so far may be successfully applied to non-primate species, there is a need to simplify the cognitive demands of the tasks and ensure task comprehension to allow for a 'fair' comparative approach of prosocial tendencies across species.

Fundamental problems with the cooperative breeding hypothesis. A reply to Burkart & van Schaik

The cooperative breeding hypothesis (CBH) states that cooperative breeding, a social system in which group members help to rear offspring that are not their own, has important socio‐cognitive consequences. Thornton & McAuliffe (2015; henceforth T&M) critiqued this idea on both conceptual and empirical grounds, arguing that there is no reason to predict that cooperative breeding should favour the evolution of enhanced social cognition or larger brains, nor any clear evidence that it does. In response to this critique, Burkart & van Schaik (2016 henceforth B&vS) attempt to clarify the causal logic of the CBH, revisit the data and raise the possibility that the hypothesis may only apply to primates. They concede that cooperative breeding is unlikely to generate selection pressures for enhanced socio‐cognitive abilities, but argue instead that the CBH operates purely through cooperative breeding reducing social or energetic constraints. Here, we argue that this revised hypothesis is also untenable because: (1) it cannot explain why resources so released would be allocated to cognitive traits per se rather than any other fitness‐related traits, (2) key assumptions are inconsistent with available evidence and (3) ambiguity regarding the predictions leaves it unclear what evidence would be required to falsify it. Ultimately, the absence of any compelling evidence that cooperative breeding is associated with elevated cognitive ability or large brains (indeed data suggest the opposite is true in non‐human primates) also casts doubt on the capacity of the CBH to explain variation in cognitive traits.

No evidence for larger brains in cooperatively breeding cichlid fishes

The social brain hypothesis posits that frequent social interactions, characteristic of group living species, select for greater socio-cognitive abilities and the requisite neural machinery. An extension of the social brains hypothesis, known as the cooperative breeding brain hypothesis, postulates that cooperatively breeding species, which live in stable social groups and provide allocare, face particularly pronounced cognitive demands because they must recognize, remember, and differentially respond to multiple group members. These socio-cognitive challenges are thought to have selected for increased cognitive capacity, supported by a bigger brain. To test the prediction that cooperative breeders have larger brains, we performed a phylogenetically controlled comparison of the whole brain masses of adult fish from 16 closely related species of cooperatively and independently breeding lamprologine cichlid species from Lake Tanganyika. We collected data on brain mass from males of eight species of lamprologine cichlids and added this to brain mass data from eight more species found in the published literature. Controlling for body size and phylogeny, we found that cooperative breeding species did not have larger brains, and this was true of for both our field-collected data set and the expanded data set including published values. This study adds to a growing body of literature from other taxa that cast doubt on the cooperative breeding brain hypothesis.