Statement on scientific publication and security

Making Security Viral: Shifting Engineering Biology Culture and Publishing

The ability to construct, synthesize, and edit genes and genomes at scale and with speed enables, in synergy with other tools of engineering biology, breakthrough applications with far-reaching implications for society. As SARS-CoV-2 spread around the world in early spring of 2020, researchers rapidly mobilized, using these tools in the development of diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines for COVID-19. The sharing of knowledge was crucial to making rapid progress. Several publications described the use of reverse genetics for the de novo construction of SARS-CoV-2 in the laboratory, one in the form of a protocol. Given the demonstrable harm caused by the virus, the unequal distribution of mitigating vaccines and therapeutics, their unknown efficacy against variants, and the interest in this research by laboratories unaccustomed to working with highly transmissible pandemic pathogens, there are risks associated with such publications, particularly as protocols. We describe considerations and offer suggestions for enhancing security in the publication of synthetic biology research and techniques. We recommend: (1) that protocol manuscripts for the de novo synthesis of certain pathogenic viruses undergo a mandatory safety and security review; (2) that if published, such papers include descriptions of the discussions or review processes that occurred regarding security considerations in the main text; and (3) the development of a governance framework for the inclusion of basic security screening during the publication process of engineering biology/synthetic biology manuscripts to build and support a safe and secure research enterprise that is able to maximize its positive impacts and minimize any negative outcomes.

Building and implementing a multi-level system of ethical code for biologists under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) of the United Nations

The recent global COVID-19 pandemic has had profound economic and social impacts on the world. It has highlighted an urgent need to strengthen existing international biosecurity governance mechanisms to prevent the misuse and malicious abuse of life science research and maintain international biological arms control norms. Biologists are at the front line of biotechnology development and are key to maintaining biosecurity awareness and moral self-discipline. As an important first step, biologists need to actively participate in the formulation and implementation of relevant biosecurity policies and measures to ensure their effectiveness and sustainability. Furthermore, efforts should be made to advocate for and promote the establishment of an ethical code of conduct for biologists to share safety responsibilities for global biosecurity. To maximize the impact of this ethical code of conduct, an effective approach to implementing codes of conduct for biologists at both national and international levels should be established under the framework of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).

Forbidden knowledge in machine learning reflections on the limits of research and publication

Certain research strands can yield “forbidden knowledge”. This term refers to knowledge that is considered too sensitive, dangerous or taboo to be produced or shared. Discourses about such publication restrictions are already entrenched in scientific fields like IT security, synthetic biology or nuclear physics research. This paper makes the case for transferring this discourse to machine learning research. Some machine learning applications can very easily be misused and unfold harmful consequences, for instance, with regard to generative video or text synthesis, personality analysis, behavior manipulation, software vulnerability detection and the like. Up till now, the machine learning research community embraces the idea of open access. However, this is opposed to precautionary efforts to prevent the malicious use of machine learning applications. Information about or from such applications may, if improperly disclosed, cause harm to people, organizations or whole societies. Hence, the goal of this work is to outline deliberations on how to deal with questions concerning the dissemination of such information. It proposes a tentative ethical framework for the machine learning community on how to deal with forbidden knowledge and dual-use applications.

Between Scylla and Charybdis: reconciling competing data management demands in the life sciences

BACKGROUND

The widespread sharing of biologicaConcluding Comments: Teaching Responsible Datal and biomedical data is recognised as a key element in facilitating translation of scientific discoveries into novel clinical applications and services. At the same time, twenty-first century states are increasingly concerned that this data could also be used for purposes of bioterrorism. There is thus a tension between the desire to promote the sharing of data, as encapsulated by the Open Data movement, and the desire to prevent this data from 'falling into the wrong hands' as represented by 'dual use' policies. Both frameworks posit a moral duty for life sciences researchers with respect to how they should make their data available. However, Open data and dual use concerns are rarely discussed in concert and their implementation can present scientists with potentially conflicting ethical requirements.

DISCUSSION

Both dual use and Open data policies frame scientific data and data dissemination in particular, though different, ways. As such they contain implicit models for how data is translated. Both approaches are limited by a focus on abstract conceptions of data and data sharing. This works to impede consensus-building between the two ethical frameworks. As an alternative, this paper proposes that an ethics of responsible management of scientific data should be based on a more nuanced understanding of the everyday data practices of life scientists. Responsibility for these 'micromovements' of data must consider the needs and duties of scientists as individuals and as collectively-organised groups. Researchers in the life sciences are faced with conflicting ethical responsibilities to share data as widely as possible, but prevent it being used for bioterrorist purposes. In order to reconcile the responsibilities posed by the Open Data and dual use frameworks, approaches should focus more on the everyday practices of laboratory scientists and less on abstract conceptions of data.

Scientometric analyses of studies on the role of innate variation in athletic performance

Historical events have produced an ideologically charged atmosphere in the USA surrounding the potential influences of innate variation on athletic performance. We tested the hypothesis that scientific studies of the role of innate variation in athletic performance were less likely to have authors with USA addresses than addresses elsewhere because of this cultural milieu. Using scientometric data collected from 290 scientific papers published in peer-reviewed journals from 2000–2012, we compared the proportions of authors with USA addresses with those that listed addresses elsewhere that studied the relationships between athletic performance and (a) prenatal exposure to androgens, as indicated by the ratio between digits 2 and 4, and (b) the genotypes for angiotensin converting enzyme, α-actinin-3, and myostatin; traits often associated with athletic performance. Authors with USA addresses were disproportionately underrepresented on papers about the role of innate variation in athletic performance. We searched NIH and NSF databases for grant proposals solicited or funded from 2000–2012 to determine if the proportion of authors that listed USA addresses was associated with funding patterns. NIH did not solicit grant proposals designed to examine these factors in the context of athletic performance and neither NIH nor NSF funded grants designed to study these topics. We think the combined effects of a lack of government funding and the avoidance of studying controversial or non-fundable topics by USA based scientists are responsible for the observation that authors with USA addresses were underrepresented on scientific papers examining the relationships between athletic performance and innate variation.

Data sharing and dual-use issues

The concept of dual-use encapsulates the potential for well-intentioned, beneficial scientific research to also be misused by a third party for malicious ends. The concept of dual-use challenges scientists to look beyond the immediate outcomes of their research and to develop an awareness of possible future (mis)uses of scientific research. Since 2001 much attention has been paid to the possible need to regulate the dual-use potential of the life sciences. Regulation initiatives fall under two broad categories-those that develop the ethical education of scientists and foster an awareness and responsibility of dual-use issues, and those which assess the regulation of information being generated by current research. Both types of initiatives are premised on a cautious, risk-adverse philosophy which advocates careful examination of all future endpoints of research endeavors. This caution advocated within initiatives such as pre-publication review of journal articles contrasts to the obligation to share underpinning data sharing discussions. As the dual-use debate has yet to make a significant impact on data sharing discussions (and vice versa) it is possible that these two areas of knowledge control may present areas of ethical conflict for scientists, and thus need to be more closely examined. This paper examines the tension between the obligation to share exemplified by data sharing principles and the concerns raised by the risk-cautious culture of the dual-use debates. The paper concludes by reflecting on the issues of responsibility as raised by dual-use as relating to data sharing, such as the chain of custody for shared data.

Synthetic poliovirus and other designer viruses: what have we learned from them?

Owing to known genome sequences, modern strategies of DNA synthesis have made it possible to recreate in principle all known viruses independent of natural templates. We describe the first synthesis of a virus (poliovirus) in 2002 that was accomplished outside living cells. We comment on the reaction of laypeople and scientists to the work, which shaped the response to de novo syntheses of other viruses. We discuss those viruses that have been synthesized since 2002, among them viruses whose precise genome sequence had to be established by painstakingly stitching together pieces of sequence information, and viruses involved in zoonosis. Synthesizing viral genomes provides a powerful tool for studying gene function and the pathogenic potential of these organisms. It also allows modification of viral genomes to an extent hitherto unthinkable. Recoding of poliovirus and influenza virus to develop new vaccine candidates and refactoring the phage T7 DNA genome are discussed as examples.

Towards the responsible conduct of scientific research: is ethics education enough?

Much of the discourse on 'beyond the laboratory door' biosecurity to date has focused on the need to raise awareness among the scientific community of the risks posed by the rapid advancement of biotechnology in recent decades. While education is undoubtedly important, a growing body of evidence suggests that ethics education does not necessarily translate into ethical behaviour. This trend has already been reported in clinical settings, where research has highlighted doctors' own reports of ethically dubious practices and challenges when confronted with moral dilemmas in their everyday work. The purpose of this paper is to critically evaluate the practical value of ethics education and show why it is an essential, although insufficient, measure for promoting a culture of responsible conduct of research. We conclude by highlighting the importance of continuing professional development as a way of maintaining life scientists' engagement with biosecurity issues and supporting them in active roles in the effective implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).

Synthetic viruses: a new opportunity to understand and prevent viral disease

Rapid progress in DNA synthesis and sequencing is spearheading the deliberate, large-scale genetic alteration of organisms. These new advances in DNA manipulation have been extended to the level of whole-genome synthesis, as evident from the synthesis of poliovirus, from the resurrection of the extinct 1918 strain of influenza virus and of human endogenous retroviruses and from the restructuring of the phage T7 genome. The largest DNA synthesized so far is the 582,970 base pair genome of Mycoplasma genitalium, although, as yet, this synthetic DNA has not been 'booted' to life. As genome synthesis is independent of a natural template, it allows modification of the structure and function of a virus's genetic information to an extent that was hitherto impossible. The common goal of this new strategy is to further our understanding of an organism's properties, particularly its pathogenic armory if it causes disease in humans, and to make use of this new information to protect from, or treat, human viral disease. Although only a few applications of virus synthesis have been described as yet, key recent findings have been the resurrection of the 1918 influenza virus and the generation of codon- and codon pair-deoptimized polioviruses.

Nanotechnology in global medicine and human biosecurity: private interests, policy dilemmas, and the calibration of public health law

This paper considers how best to approach dilemmas posed to global health and biosecurity policy by increasing advances in practical applications of nanotechnology. The type of nano-technology policy dilemmas discussed include: (1) expenditure of public funds, (2) public-funded research priorities, (3) public confidence in government and science and, finally, (4) public safety. The article examines the value in this context of a legal obligation that the development of relevant public health law be calibrated against less corporate-influenced norms issuing from bioethics and international human rights.

Bioterrorism and biodefence research: changing the focus of microbiology

Fear that terrorists can use biological agents as weapons of mass destruction is significantly impacting the conduct of microbiological research. Abundant new funds are available for biodefence research, and many researchers are racing to enter the field. There are some concerns, however, that a large emphasis on this issue could skew the microbiology research agenda. Furthermore, new responsibilities for safely conducting research with biothreat agents and concern that information might be misused could drive some researchers away from the field.

Protecting America's secrets while maintaining academic freedom

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent anthrax mail attacks, have had a profound impact on Americans' personal and professional lives and have sparked an active debate regarding the delicate balance between the need for national security and the pursuit of academic freedom. Although academic freedom can be defined in many ways, there are four primary tenets of freedom in an academic environment: freedom to research, freedom to publish, freedom to teach, and freedom to speak. Each of these tenets has come under attack in the wake of September 11, 2001. In this report the author further defines academic freedom and reflects upon recent events that have had a real or perceived impact on this freedom, including (1) attempts to categorize and restrict some research as "sensitive," (2) implementation of export control laws and select agent regulations, (3) limitations on the publication of research findings, (4) prohibition of certain foreign nationals from collaborating with U.S. researchers and receiving education and training in U.S. colleges and universities, and (5) restraint of faculty free speech. The author offers some suggestions as to how academia might achieve a proper balance between protecting our national security while promoting and maintaining academic freedom.

Coding ethical behaviour: the challenges of biological weapons

Since 11 September 2001 and the anthrax attacks that followed in the US, public and policy concerns about the security threats posed by biological weapons have increased significantly. With this has come an expansion of those activities in civil society deemed as potential sites for applying security controls. This paper examines the assumptions and implications of national and international efforts in one such area: how a balance or integration can take place between security and openness in civilian biomedical research through devising professional codes of conduct for scientists. Future attempts to establish such codes must find a way of reconciling or at least addressing dilemmatic and tension-ridden issues about the appropriateness of research; a topic that raises fundamental questions about the position of science within society.