The Reemergent 1977 H1N1 Strain and the Gain-of-Function Debate

Use of a risk assessment tool to determine the origin of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)

The origin of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is contentious. Most studies have focused on a zoonotic origin, but definitive evidence such as an intermediary animal host is lacking. We used an established risk analysis tool for differentiating natural and unnatural epidemics, the modified Grunow-Finke assessment tool (mGFT) to study the origin of SARS-COV-2. The mGFT scores 11 criteria to provide a likelihood of natural or unnatural origin. Using published literature and publicly available sources of information, we applied the mGFT to the origin of SARS-CoV-2. The mGFT scored 41/60 points (68%), with high inter-rater reliability (100%), indicating a greater likelihood of an unnatural than natural origin of SARS-CoV-2. This risk assessment cannot prove the origin of SARS-CoV-2 but shows that the possibility of a laboratory origin cannot be easily dismissed.

One hundred years of influenza A evolution

Leveraging the simplicity of nucleotide mismatch distributions, we provide an intuitive window into the evolution of the human influenza A 'nonstructural' (NS) gene segment. In an analysis suggested by the eminent Danish biologist Freddy B. Christiansen, we illustrate the existence of a continuous genetic "backbone" of influenza A NS sequences, steadily increasing in nucleotide distance to the 1918 root over more than a century. The 2009 influenza A/H1N1 pandemic represents a clear departure from this enduring genetic backbone. Utilizing nucleotide distance maps and phylogenetic analyses, we illustrate remaining uncertainties regarding the origin of the 2009 pandemic, highlighting the complexity of influenza evolution. The NS segment is interesting precisely because it experiences less pervasive positive selection, and departs less strongly from neutral evolution than e.g. the HA antigen. Consequently, sudden deviations from neutral diversification can indicate changes in other genes via the hitchhiking effect. Our approach employs two measures based on nucleotide mismatch counts to analyze the evolutionary dynamics of the NS gene segment. The rooted Hamming map of distances between a reference sequence and all other sequences over time, and the unrooted temporal Hamming distribution which captures the distribution of genotypic distances between simultaneously circulating viruses, thereby revealing patterns of nucleotide diversity and epi-evolutionary dynamics.

Many potential pathways to future pandemic influenza

Although influenza A viruses have caused pandemics for centuries, future pandemics cannot be predicted with our current understanding and resources. Concern about an H5N1 avian influenza pandemic has caused alarm since 1997, but there are many other possible routes to pandemic influenza.

SARS-CoV-2, aging, and Post-COVID-19 neurodegeneration

As the world continues to experience the effects of SARS-CoV-2, there is evidence to suggest that the sequelae of viral infection (the post-COVID-19 condition; PCC) at both an individual and population level will be significant and long-lasting. The history of pandemics or epidemics in the last 100 years caused by members of the RNA virus family, of which coronaviruses are a member, provides ample evidence of the acute neurological effects. However, except for the H1N1 influenza pandemic of 1918/1919 (the Spanish flu) with its associated encephalitis lethargica, there is little information on long-term neurological sequelae. COVID-19 is the first pandemic that has occurred in a setting of an aging population, especially in several high-income countries. Its survivors are at the greatest risk for developing neurodegenerative conditions as they age, rendering the current pandemic a unique paradigm not previously witnessed. The SARS-CoV-2 virus, among the largest of the RNA viruses, is a single-stranded RNA that encodes for 29 proteins that include the spike protein that contains the key domains required for ACE2 binding, and a complex array of nonstructural proteins (NSPs) and accessory proteins that ensure the escape of the virus from the innate immune response, allowing for its efficient replication, translation, and exocytosis as a fully functional virion. Increasingly, these proteins are also recognized as potentially contributing to biochemical and molecular processes underlying neurodegeneration. In addition to directly being taken up by brain endothelium, the virus or key protein constituents can be transported to neurons, astrocytes, and microglia by extracellular vesicles and can accelerate pathological fibril formation. The SARS-CoV-2 nucleocapsid protein is intrinsically disordered and can participate in liquid condensate formation, including as pathological heteropolymers with neurodegenerative disease-associated RNA-binding proteins such as TDP-43, FUS, and hnRNP1A. As the SARS-CoV-2 virus continues to mutate under the immune pressure exerted by highly efficacious vaccines, it is evolving into a virus with greater transmissibility but less severity compared with the original strain. The potential of its lingering impact on the nervous system thus has the potential to represent an ongoing legacy of an even greater global health challenge than acute infection.

What do we know about the origin of COVID-19 three years later?

More than three years have passed since the first case of a new coronavirus infection (SARS-CoV-2) in the city of Wuhan (Hubei, China). The Wuhan Institute of Virology was founded in that city in 1956 and the country's first biosafety level 4 laboratory opened within that center in 2015. The coincidence that the first cases of infection emerged in the city where the virology institute's headquarters is located, the failure to 100% identify the virus' RNA in any of the coronaviruses isolated in bats, and the lack of evidence on a possible intermediate animal host in the contagion's transmission make it so that at present, there are doubts about the real origin of SARS-CoV-2. This article will review two theories: SARS-CoV-2 as a virus of zoonotic origin or as a leak from the high-level biosafety laboratory in Wuhan.

Gain-of-function and origin of Covid19

In nature, wild viruses adapted for transmission circulate in many animal species (bats, birds, primates…). Contamination of other animals, including humans, may occur by crossing of the species barrier. Genetic manipulations have been carried out on wild viruses to favor the species jumping and to increase of viral virulence. The aim was to identify the critical genes for pathogenicity. This has been mainly performed on potentially epidemic pathogens, as Myxovirus influenzae of avian flu and coronaviruses of SARS and MERS epidemics. These dangerous experiments were subject to a moratorium in the United States (2014-2017). Three years after the emergence of Covid-19, the origin of du SARS-CoV2 remains a mystery. Covid19 appeared in Wuhan, officially in December 2019, but probably during the autumn 2019. The virus was identified in January 2020. It belongs to the genus Betacoronavirus (subgenus Sarbecovirus). It was at once highly contagious. In addition, the primary isolates were genetically very homogeneous, differing only by two nucleotides without evidence for adaptive mutations. In addition, the Spike protein, a major virulence factor, has a furin site, not found in any other known sarbecovirus. Unlike the SARS and MERS epidemics, no intermediate host has been detected so far. Finally, no other outbreaks were reported at the beginning of the pandemic outside of Wuhan, contrary to what happened with the emergence of SARS (2002) and H7N9 avian influenza (2013). Today, there are two scenarios to explain the emergence of SARS-CoV2. Proponents of the natural origin argue that the bat virus might have directly infected humans, spreading silently at a low level in humans for years, without eliminating the existence of undetected intermediate hosts. This does not explain the origin in Wuhan, far away from the natural virus reservoirs. The furin site would have arisen spontaneously from other coronaviruses. The alternative scenario is that of a laboratory accident after gain-of-function manipulations from a SARS-like virus, or even the occurrence of a human contamination by a natural CoV virus grown on cells in Wuhan. This article is an update to the Quarterly Medical Review (QMR) devoted to the history of modern pandemics. To access this QMR contents, please go here: https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/la-presse-medicale/vol/51/issue/3.

Tracing the origin of Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2): A systematic review and narrative synthesis

The aim of the study was to trace and understand the origin of Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) through various available literatures and accessible databases. Although the world enters the third year of the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic, health and socioeconomic impacts continue to mount, the origin and mechanisms of spill-over of the SARS-CoV-2 into humans remain elusive. Therefore, a systematic review of the literature was performed that showcased the integrated information obtained through manual searches, digital databases (PubMed, CINAHL, and MEDLINE) searches, and searches from legitimate publications (1966-2022), followed by meta-analysis. Our systematic analysis data proposed three postulated hypotheses concerning the origin of the SARS-CoV-2, which include zoonotic origin (Z), laboratory origin (L), and obscure origin (O). Despite the fact that the zoonotic origin for SARS-CoV-2 has not been conclusively identified to date, our data suggest a zoonotic origin, in contrast to some alternative concepts, including the probability of a laboratory incident or leak. Our data exhibit that zoonotic origin (Z) has higher evidence-based support as compared to laboratory origin (L). Importantly, based on all the studies included, we generated the forest plot with 95% confidence intervals (CIs) of the risk ratio estimates. Our meta-analysis further supports the zoonotic origin of SARS/SARS-CoV-2 in the included studies.

The origins of COVID-19 pandemic: A brief overview

The novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak that emerged at the end of 2019 has now swept the world for more than 2 years, causing immeasurable damage to the lives and economies of the world. It has drawn so much attention to discovering how the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) originated and entered the human body. The current argument revolves around two contradictory theories: a scenario of laboratory spillover events and human contact with zoonotic diseases. Here, we reviewed the transmission, pathogenesis, possible hosts, as well as the genome and protein structure of SARS-CoV-2, which play key roles in the COVID-19 pandemic. We believe the coronavirus was originally transmitted to human by animals rather than by a laboratory leak. However, there still needs more investigations to determine the source of the pandemic. Understanding how COVID-19 emerged is vital to developing global strategies for mitigating future outbreaks.

Molecular adaptations during viral epidemics

In 1977, the world witnessed both the eradication of smallpox and the beginning of the modern age of genomics. Over the following half-century, 7 epidemic viruses of international concern galvanized virologists across the globe and led to increasingly extensive virus genome sequencing. These sequencing efforts exerted over periods of rapid adaptation of viruses to new hosts, in particular, humans provide insight into the molecular mechanisms underpinning virus evolution. Investment in virus genome sequencing was dramatically increased by the unprecedented support for phylogenomic analyses during the COVID-19 pandemic. In this review, we attempt to piece together comprehensive molecular histories of the adaptation of variola virus, HIV-1 M, SARS, H1N1-SIV, MERS, Ebola, Zika, and SARS-CoV-2 to the human host. Disruption of genes involved in virus-host interaction in animal hosts, recombination including genome segment reassortment, and adaptive mutations leading to amino acid replacements in virus proteins involved in host receptor binding and membrane fusion are identified as the key factors in the evolution of epidemic viruses.

High-risk human-caused pathogen exposure events from 1975-2016

Biological agents and infectious pathogens have the potential to cause very significant harm, as the natural occurrence of disease and pandemics makes clear. As a way to better understand the risk of Global Catastrophic Biological Risks due to human activities, rather than natural sources, this paper reports on a dataset of 71 incidents involving either accidental or purposeful exposure to, or infection by, a highly infectious pathogenic agent. There has been significant effort put into both reducing the risk of purposeful spread of biological weapons, and biosafety intended to prevent the exposure to, or release of, dangerous pathogens in the course of research. Despite these efforts, there are incidents of various types that could potentially be controlled or eliminated by different lab and/or bioweapon research choices and safety procedures. The dataset of events presented here was compiled during a project conducted in 2019 to better understand biological risks from anthropic sources. The events which are listed are unrelated to clinical treatment of naturally occurring outbreaks, and are instead entirely the result of human decisions and mistakes. While the events cover a wide range of cases, the criteria used covers a variety of events previously scattered across academic, policy, and other unpublished or not generally available sources.

Human seasonal influenza under COVID-19 and the potential consequences of influenza lineage elimination

Annual epidemics of seasonal influenza cause hundreds of thousands of deaths, high levels of morbidity, and substantial economic loss. Yet, global influenza circulation has been heavily suppressed by public health measures and travel restrictions since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Notably, the influenza B/Yamagata lineage has not been conclusively detected since April 2020, and A(H3N2), A(H1N1), and B/Victoria viruses have since circulated with considerably less genetic diversity. Travel restrictions have largely confined regional outbreaks of A(H3N2) to South and Southeast Asia, B/Victoria to China, and A(H1N1) to West Africa. Seasonal influenza transmission lineages continue to perish globally, except in these select hotspots, which will likely seed future epidemics. Waning population immunity and sporadic case detection will further challenge influenza vaccine strain selection and epidemic control. We offer a perspective on the potential short- and long-term evolutionary dynamics of seasonal influenza and discuss potential consequences and mitigation strategies as global travel gradually returns to pre-pandemic levels.

COVID-19 control measures have suppressed circulation of other infections including influenza. Here, the authors analyse WHO global influenza sequence and case report data and describe changes in the phylogenetic and geographic distribution of influenza lineages during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The beginning and ending of a respiratory viral pandemic-lessons from the Spanish flu

The COVID‐19 pandemic goes into its third year and the world population is longing for an end to the pandemic. Computer simulations of the future development of the pandemic have wide error margins and predictions on the evolution of new viral variants of SARS‐CoV‐2 are uncertain. It is thus tempting to look into the development of historical viral respiratory pandemics for insight into the dynamic of pandemics. The Spanish flu pandemic of 1918 caused by the influenza virus H1N1 can here serve as a potential model case. Epidemiological observations on the shift of influenza mortality from very young and old subjects to high mortality in young adults delimitate the pandemic phase of the Spanish flu from 1918 to 1920. The identification and sequencing of the Spanish flu agent allowed following the H1N1 influenza virus after the acute pandemic phase. During the 1920s H1N1 influenza virus epidemics with substantial mortality were still observed. As late as 1951, H1N1 strains of high virulence evolved but remained geographically limited. Until 1957, the H1N1 virus evolved by accumulation of mutations (‘antigenic drift’) and some intratypic reassortment. H1N1 viruses were then replaced by the pandemic H2N2 influenza virus from 1957, which was in 1968 replaced by the pandemic H3N2 influenza virus; both viruses were descendants from the Spanish flu agent but showed the exchange of entire gene segments (‘antigenic shift’). In 1977, H1N1 reappeared from an unknown source but caused only mild disease. However, H1N1 achieved again circulation in the human population and is now together with the H3N2 influenza virus an agent of seasonal influenza winter epidemics.

Trends in Excess Winter Mortality (EWM) from 1900/01 to 2019/20-Evidence for a Complex System of Multiple Long-Term Trends

Trends in excess winter mortality (EWM) were investigated from the winter of 1900/01 to 2019/20. During the 1918–1919 Spanish flu epidemic a maximum EWM of 100% was observed in both Denmark and the USA, and 131% in Sweden. During the Spanish flu epidemic in the USA 70% of excess winter deaths were coded to influenza. EWM steadily declined from the Spanish flu peak to a minimum around the 1960s to 1980s. This decline was accompanied by a shift in deaths away from the winter and spring, and the EWM calculation shifted from a maximum around April to June in the early 1900s to around March since the late 1960s. EWM has a good correlation with the number of estimated influenza deaths, but in this context influenza pandemics after the Spanish flu only had an EWM equivalent to that for seasonal influenza. This was confirmed for a large sample of world countries for the three pandemics occurring after 1960. Using data from 1980 onward the effect of influenza vaccination on EWM were examined using a large international dataset. No effect of increasing influenza vaccination could be discerned; however, there are multiple competing forces influencing EWM which will obscure any underlying trend, e.g., increasing age at death, multimorbidity, dementia, polypharmacy, diabetes, and obesity—all of which either interfere with vaccine effectiveness or are risk factors for influenza death. After adjusting the trend in EWM in the USA influenza vaccination can be seen to be masking higher winter deaths among a high morbidity US population. Adjusting for the effect of increasing obesity counteracted some of the observed increase in EWM seen in the USA. Winter deaths are clearly the outcome of a complex system of competing long-term trends.

There is still no evidence of SARS-CoV-2 laboratory origin: Response to Segreto and Deigin (10.1002/bies.202100137)

The causative agent of COVID-19 SARS-CoV-2 has led to over 4 million deaths worldwide. Understanding the origin of this coronavirus is important for the prevention of future outbreaks. The dominant point of view that the virus transferred to humans either directly from bats or through an intermediate mammalian host has been challenged by Segreto and Deigin, who claim that the genome of SARS-CoV-2 has certain features suggestive of its artificial creation. Following their response to our commentary, here we continue the discussion of the proposed arguments for this hypothesis. We show that neither the existence of a furin cleavage site in SARS-CoV-2, nor the presence of specific sequences within the nucleotide insertion encoding that site are evidence for intelligent design. We also explain why existing genetic data, viral diversity and past human history suggest that a natural origin of the virus is the most likely scenario. Genetic evidence suggesting otherwise is yet to be presented.

Genomic population structure associated with repeated escape of Salmonella enterica ATCC14028s from the laboratory into nature

Salmonella enterica serovar Typhimurium strain ATCC14028s is commercially available from multiple national type culture collections, and has been widely used since 1960 for quality control of growth media and experiments on fitness (“laboratory evolution”). ATCC14028s has been implicated in multiple cross-contaminations in the laboratory, and has also caused multiple laboratory infections and one known attempt at bioterrorism. According to hierarchical clustering of 3002 core gene sequences, ATCC14028s belongs to HierCC cluster HC20_373 in which most internal branch lengths are only one to three SNPs long. Many natural Typhimurium isolates from humans, domesticated animals and the environment also belong to HC20_373, and their core genomes are almost indistinguishable from those of laboratory strains. These natural isolates have infected humans in Ireland and Taiwan for decades, and are common in the British Isles as well as the Americas. The isolation history of some of the natural isolates confirms the conclusion that they do not represent recent contamination by the laboratory strain, and 10% carry plasmids or bacteriophages which have been acquired in nature by HGT from unrelated bacteria. We propose that ATCC14028s has repeatedly escaped from the laboratory environment into nature via laboratory accidents or infections, but the escaped micro-lineages have only a limited life span. As a result, there is a genetic gap separating HC20_373 from its closest natural relatives due to a divergence between them in the late 19^th century followed by repeated extinction events of escaped HC20_373.

Clades of closely related bacteria exist in nature. Individual isolates from such clades are often distinguishable by genomic sequencing because genomic sequence differences can be acquired over a few years due to neutral drift and natural selection. The evolution of laboratory strains is often largely frozen, physically due to storage conditions and genetically due to long periods of storage. Thus, laboratory strains can normally be readily distinguished from natural isolates because they show much less diversity. However, laboratory strain ATCC14028s shows modest levels of sequence diversity because it has been shipped around the world to multiple laboratories and is routinely used for analyses of laboratory evolution. Closely related natural isolates also exist, but their genetic diversity is not dramatically greater at the core genome level. Indeed, many scientists doubt that such isolates are natural, and interpret them as undetected contamination by the laboratory strain. We present data indicating that ATCC14028s has repeatedly escaped from the laboratory through inadvertent contamination of the environment, infection of technical staff and deliberate bioterrorism. The escapees survive in nature long enough that some acquire mobile genomic elements by horizontal gene transfer, but eventually they go extinct. As a result, even extensive global databases of natural isolates lack closely related isolates whose ancestors diverged from ATCC14028s within the last 100 years.

The origins of SARS-CoV-2: A critical review

Since the first reports of a novel severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)-like coronavirus in December 2019 in Wuhan, China, there has been intense interest in understanding how severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) emerged in the human population. Recent debate has coalesced around two competing ideas: a "laboratory escape" scenario and zoonotic emergence. Here, we critically review the current scientific evidence that may help clarify the origin of SARS-CoV-2.

Pandemics: past, present, future: That is like choosing between cholera and plague

The major epidemic and pandemic diseases that have bothered humans since the Neolithic Age and Bronze Age are surveyed. Many of these pandemics are zoonotic infections, and the mathematical modeling of such infections is illustrated. Plague, cholera, syphilis, influenza, SARS, MERS, COVID‐19, and new potential epidemic and pandemic infections and their consequences are described and the background for the spread of acute and chronic infections and the transition to endemic infections is discussed. The way we can prevent and fight pandemics is illustrated from the old and new well‐known pandemics. Surprisingly, the political reactions through different periods have not changed much during the centuries.

Computationally Optimized Broadly Reactive H2 HA Influenza Vaccines Elicited Broadly Cross-Reactive Antibodies and Protected Mice from Viral Challenges

Influenza viruses have caused numerous pandemics throughout human history. The 1957 influenza pandemic was initiated by an H2N2 influenza virus. This H2N2 influenza virus was the result of a reassortment event between a circulating H2N2 avian virus and the seasonal H1N1 viruses in humans. Previously, our group has demonstrated the effectiveness of hemagglutinin (HA) antigens derived using computationally optimized broadly reactive antigen (COBRA) methodology against H1N1, H3N2, and H5N1 viruses. Using the COBRA methodology, H2 HA COBRA antigens were designed using sequences from H2N2 viruses isolated from humans in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as H2Nx viruses isolated from avian and mammalian species between the 1950s and 2016. In this study, the effectiveness of H2 COBRA HA antigens (Z1, Z3, Z5, and Z7) was evaluated in DBA/2J mice and compared to that of wild-type H2 HA antigens. The COBRA HA vaccines elicited neutralizing antibodies to the majority of viruses in our H2 HA panel and across all three clades as measured by hemagglutination inhibition (HAI) and neutralization assays. Comparatively, several wild-type HA vaccines elicited antibodies against a majority of the viruses in the H2 HA panel. DBA/2J mice vaccinated with COBRA vaccines showed increase survival for all three viral challenges compared to the wild-type H2 vaccines. In particular, the Z1 COBRA is a promising candidate for future work toward a pandemic H2 influenza vaccine.IMPORTANCE H2N2 influenza has caused at least one pandemic in the past. Given that individuals born after 1968 have not been exposed to H2N2 influenza viruses, a future pandemic caused by H2 influenza is likely. An effective H2 influenza vaccine would need to elicit broadly cross-reactive antibodies to multiple H2 influenza viruses. Choosing a wild-type virus to create a vaccine may elicit a narrow immune response and not protect against multiple H2 influenza viruses. COBRA H2 HA vaccines were developed and evaluated in mice along with wild-type H2 HA vaccines. Multiple COBRA H2 HA vaccines protected mice from all three viral challenges and produced broadly cross-reactive neutralizing antibodies to H2 influenza viruses.

The biosecurity benefits of genetic engineering attribution

Biology can be misused, and the risk of this causing widespread harm increases in step with the rapid march of technological progress. A key security challenge involves attribution: determining, in the wake of a human-caused biological event, who was responsible. Recent scientific developments have demonstrated a capability for detecting whether an organism involved in such an event has been genetically modified and, if modified, to infer from its genetic sequence its likely lab of origin. We believe this technique could be developed into powerful forensic tools to aid the attribution of outbreaks caused by genetically engineered pathogens, and thus protect against the potential misuse of synthetic biology.

Might SARS-CoV-2 Have Arisen via Serial Passage through an Animal Host or Cell Culture?: A potential explanation for much of the novel coronavirus' distinctive genome

Despite claims from prominent scientists that SARS-CoV-2 indubitably emerged naturally, the etiology of this novel coronavirus remains a pressing and open question: Without knowing the true nature of a disease, it is impossible for clinicians to appropriately shape their care, for policy-makers to correctly gauge the nature and extent of the threat, and for the public to appropriately modify their behavior. Unless the intermediate host necessary for completing a natural zoonotic jump is identified, the dual-use gain-of-function research practice of viral serial passage should be considered a viable route by which the novel coronavirus arose. The practice of serial passage mimics a natural zoonotic jump, and offers explanations for SARS-CoV-2's distinctive spike-protein region and its unexpectedly high affinity for angiotensin converting enzyme (ACE2), as well as the notable polybasic furin cleavage site within it. Additional molecular clues raise further questions, all of which warrant full investigation into the novel coronavirus's origins and a re-examination of the risks and rewards of dual-use gain-of-function research.

Birth Cohort Effects in Influenza Surveillance Data: Evidence That First Influenza Infection Affects Later Influenza-Associated Illness

BACKGROUND

The evolution of influenza A viruses results in birth cohorts that have different initial influenza virus exposures. Historically, A/H3 predominant seasons have been associated with more severe influenza-associated disease; however, since the 2009 pandemic, there are suggestions that some birth cohorts experience more severe illness in A/H1 predominant seasons.

METHODS

United States influenza virologic, hospitalization, and mortality surveillance data during 2000-2017 were analyzed for cohorts born between 1918 and 1989 that likely had different initial influenza virus exposures based on viruses circulating during early childhood. Relative risk/rate during H3 compared with H1 predominant seasons during prepandemic versus pandemic and later periods were calculated for each cohort.

RESULTS

During the prepandemic period, all cohorts had more influenza-associated disease during H3 predominant seasons than H1 predominant seasons. During the pandemic and later period, 4 cohorts had higher hospitalization and mortality rates during H1 predominant seasons than H3 predominant seasons.

CONCLUSIONS

Birth cohort differences in risk of influenza-associated disease by influenza A virus subtype can be seen in US influenza surveillance data and differ between prepandemic and pandemic and later periods. As the population ages, the amount of influenza-associated disease may be greater in future H1 predominant seasons than H3 predominant seasons.

"Frozen evolution" of an RNA virus suggests accidental release as a potential cause of arbovirus re-emergence

The mechanisms underlying virus emergence are rarely well understood, making the appearance of outbreaks largely unpredictable. Bluetongue virus serotype 8 (BTV-8), an arthropod-borne virus of ruminants, emerged in livestock in northern Europe in 2006, spreading to most European countries by 2009 and causing losses of billions of euros. Although the outbreak was successfully controlled through vaccination by early 2010, puzzlingly, a closely related BTV-8 strain re-emerged in France in 2015, triggering a second outbreak that is still ongoing. The origin of this virus and the mechanisms underlying its re-emergence are unknown. Here, we performed phylogenetic analyses of 164 whole BTV-8 genomes sampled throughout the two outbreaks. We demonstrate consistent clock-like virus evolution during both epizootics but found negligible evolutionary change between them. We estimate that the ancestor of the second outbreak dates from the height of the first outbreak in 2008. This implies that the virus had not been replicating for multiple years prior to its re-emergence in 2015. Given the absence of any known natural mechanism that could explain BTV-8 persistence over this long period without replication, we hypothesise that the second outbreak could have been initiated by accidental exposure of livestock to frozen material contaminated with virus from approximately 2008. Our work highlights new targets for pathogen surveillance programmes in livestock and illustrates the power of genomic epidemiology to identify pathways of infectious disease emergence.

Childhood immune imprinting to influenza A shapes birth year-specific risk during seasonal H1N1 and H3N2 epidemics

Across decades of co-circulation in humans, influenza A subtypes H1N1 and H3N2 have caused seasonal epidemics characterized by different age distributions of cases and mortality. H3N2 causes the majority of severe, clinically attended cases in high-risk elderly cohorts, and the majority of overall deaths, whereas H1N1 causes fewer deaths overall, and cases shifted towards young and middle-aged adults. These contrasting age profiles may result from differences in childhood imprinting to H1N1 and H3N2 or from differences in evolutionary rate between subtypes. Here we analyze a large epidemiological surveillance dataset to test whether childhood immune imprinting shapes seasonal influenza epidemiology, and if so, whether it acts primarily via homosubtypic immune memory or via broader, heterosubtypic memory. We also test the impact of evolutionary differences between influenza subtypes on age distributions of cases. Likelihood-based model comparison shows that narrow, within-subtype imprinting shapes seasonal influenza risk alongside age-specific risk factors. The data do not support a strong effect of evolutionary rate, or of broadly protective imprinting that acts across subtypes. Our findings emphasize that childhood exposures can imprint a lifelong immunological bias toward particular influenza subtypes, and that these cohort-specific biases shape epidemic age distributions. As a consequence, newer and less "senior" antibody responses acquired later in life do not provide the same strength of protection as responses imprinted in childhood. Finally, we project that the relatively low mortality burden of H1N1 may increase in the coming decades, as cohorts that lack H1N1-specific imprinting eventually reach old age.

Investigating the Legacy of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic in Age-Related Seroepidemiology and Immune Responses to Subsequent Influenza A(H1N1) Viruses Through a Structural Equation Model

A(H1N1) strains of Influenzavirus were responsible for 2 pandemics in the last 100 years. Because infections experienced early in life may have a long-lasting influence on future immune response against other influenza strains, we drew on previously collected seroincidence data from Singapore (n = 2,554; June-October 2009) to investigate whether the 1918 pandemic influenza virus and its early descendants produced an age-related signature in immune responses against the A/California/7/2009(H1N1)pdm09 virus of 2009. Hemagglutination inhibition assays revealed a J-shaped relationship; the oldest birth cohort (born in 1911-1926) had the highest titers, followed by the youngest (born in 1987-1992). Differential response by vaccination history was also observed, with seasonal influenza vaccine being associated with higher titers mainly in the oldest birth cohort. On the assumption that antibody titers are a correlate of protection, structural equation modeling predicted that a titer-mediated effect by the vaccine could, on its own, account for a negative association with seroconversion equivalent to a risk reduction of 23% (relative risk = 0.77, 95% confidence interval: 0.60, 0.99) in the oldest birth cohort. A subset of 503 samples tested against the A/Brisbane/59/2007(H1N1) and A/Puerto Rico/8/1934(H1N1) strains also revealed different age-related antibody profiles. The effectiveness of seasonal influenza vaccines against future pandemic strains could thus be age-dependent and related to early-life exposures.

The Silver Lining in Gain-of-Function Experiments with Pathogens of Pandemic Potential

Half a decade after the contentious "gain-of-function" (GOF) debate of 2012 that followed experimentation showing that highly pathogenic avian influenza virus could become mammalian transmissible, it is possible to reflect on the arguments for and against this type of research. In this essay we argue that GOF-type experiments have already produced important information not available from any other source while also providing information on pathogenesis and the requirements for optimizing strains for vaccine production. We analyze the moral arguments against GOF and find them less compelling for a variety of reasons ranging from the uncertainty of risk-benefit analysis to the reduced likelihood of accidents given the enhanced biosafety and biosecurity protocols currently in place. In our view the most important consequence of the GOF debate is that it brought renewed attention to biosafety protocols and ushered innovation in answering the relevant biological questions with greater safety. We conclude that GOF experiments should go forward provided that necessary biosafety and biosecurity conditions are in place.

The Pandemic Threat of Emerging H5 and H7 Avian Influenza Viruses

The 1918 H1N1 Spanish Influenza pandemic was the most severe pandemic in modern history. Unlike more recent pandemics, most of the 1918 H1N1 virus' genome was derived directly from an avian influenza virus. Recent avian-origin H5 A/goose/Guangdong/1/1996 (GsGd) and Asian H7N9 viruses have caused several hundred human infections with high mortality rates. While these viruses have not spread beyond infected individuals, if they evolve the ability to transmit efficiently from person-to-person, specifically via the airborne route, they will initiate a pandemic. Therefore, this review examines H5 GsGd and Asian H7N9 viruses that have caused recent zoonotic infections with a focus on viral properties that support airborne transmission. Several GsGd H5 and Asian H7N9 viruses display molecular changes that potentiate transmission and/or exhibit ability for limited transmission between ferrets. However, the hemagglutinin of these viruses is unstable; this likely represents the most significant obstacle to the emergence of a virus capable of efficient airborne transmission. Given the global disease burden of an influenza pandemic, continued surveillance and pandemic preparedness efforts against H5 GsGd and Asian lineage H7N9 viruses are warranted.

Centennial review of influenza in Taiwan

The history of influenza in Taiwan can be traced up to the 1918 H1N1 Spanish flu pandemic, followed by several others including the 1957 H2N2, 1968 H3N2, and the 2009 new H1N1. A couple of avian influenza viruses of H5N1 and H7N9 also posed threats to the general public in Taiwan in the two recent decades. Nevertheless, two seasonal influenza A viruses and two lineages of influenza B viruses continue causing annual endemics one after the other, or appearing simultaneously. Their interplay provided interesting evolutionary trajectories for these viruses, allowing us to computationally model their global migrations together with the data collected elsewhere from different geographical locations. An island-wide laboratory-based surveillance network was also established since 2000 for systematically collecting and managing the disease and molecular epidemiology. Experiences learned from this network helped in encountering and managing newly emerging infectious diseases, including the 2003 SARS and 2009 H1N1 outbreaks.

A Highly Potent and Broadly Neutralizing H1 Influenza-Specific Human Monoclonal Antibody

Influenza’s propensity for antigenic drift and shift, and to elicit predominantly strain specific antibodies (Abs) leaves humanity susceptible to waves of new strains with pandemic potential for which limited or no immunity may exist. Subsequently new clinical interventions are needed. To identify hemagglutinin (HA) epitopes that if targeted may confer universally protective humoral immunity, we examined plasmablasts from a subject that was immunized with the seasonal influenza inactivated vaccine, and isolated a human monoclonal Ab (mAb), KPF1. KPF1 has broad and potent neutralizing activity against H1 influenza viruses, and recognized 83% of all H1 isolates tested, including the pandemic 1918 H1. Prophylactically, KPF1 treatment resulted in 100% survival of mice from lethal challenge with multiple H1 influenza strains and when given as late as 72 h after challenge with A/California/04/2009 H1N1, resulted in 80% survival. KPF1 recognizes a novel epitope in the HA globular head, which includes a highly conserved amino acid, between the Ca and Cb antigenic sites. Although recent HA stalk-specific mAbs have broader reactivity, their potency is substantially limited, suggesting that cocktails of broadly reactive and highly potent HA globular head-specific mAbs, like KPF1, may have greater clinical feasibility for the treatment of influenza infections.

Seasonality in risk of pandemic influenza emergence

Influenza pandemics can emerge unexpectedly and wreak global devastation. However, each of the six pandemics since 1889 emerged in the Northern Hemisphere just after the flu season, suggesting that pandemic timing may be predictable. Using a stochastic model fit to seasonal flu surveillance data from the United States, we find that seasonal flu leaves a transient wake of heterosubtypic immunity that impedes the emergence of novel flu viruses. This refractory period provides a simple explanation for not only the spring-summer timing of historical pandemics, but also early increases in pandemic severity and multiple waves of transmission. Thus, pandemic risk may be seasonal and predictable, with the accuracy of pre-pandemic and real-time risk assessments hinging on reliable seasonal influenza surveillance and precise estimates of the breadth and duration of heterosubtypic immunity.

Newcastle Disease Viruses Causing Recent Outbreaks Worldwide Show Unexpectedly High Genetic Similarity to Historical Virulent Isolates from the 1940s

Virulent strains of Newcastle disease virus (NDV) cause Newcastle disease (ND), a devastating disease of poultry and wild birds. Phylogenetic analyses clearly distinguish historical isolates (obtained prior to 1960) from currently circulating viruses of class II genotypes V, VI, VII, and XII through XVIII. Here, partial and complete genomic sequences of recent virulent isolates of genotypes II and IX from China, Egypt, and India were found to be nearly identical to those of historical viruses isolated in the 1940s. Phylogenetic analysis, nucleotide distances, and rates of change demonstrate that these recent isolates have not evolved significantly from the most closely related ancestors from the 1940s. The low rates of change for these virulent viruses (7.05 × 10(-5) and 2.05 × 10(-5) per year, respectively) and the minimal genetic distances existing between these and historical viruses (0.3 to 1.2%) of the same genotypes indicate an unnatural origin. As with any other RNA virus, Newcastle disease virus is expected to evolve naturally; thus, these findings suggest that some recent field isolates should be excluded from evolutionary studies. Furthermore, phylogenetic analyses show that these recent virulent isolates are more closely related to virulent strains isolated during the 1940s, which have been and continue to be used in laboratory and experimental challenge studies. Since the preservation of viable viruses in the environment for over 6 decades is highly unlikely, it is possible that the source of some of the recent virulent viruses isolated from poultry and wild birds might be laboratory viruses.