"A deep fragrance of academia": the Australian Tobacco Research Foundation

Type A behavior pattern and coronary heart disease: Philip Morris's "crown jewel"

The type A behavior pattern (TABP) was described in the 1950s by cardiologists Meyer Friedman and Ray Rosenman, who argued that TABP was an important risk factor for coronary heart disease. This theory was supported by positive findings from the Western Collaborative Group Study and the Framingham Study. We analyzed tobacco industry documents to show that the tobacco industry was a major funder of TABP research, with selected results used to counter concerns regarding tobacco and health. Our findings also help explain inconsistencies in the findings of epidemiological studies of TABP, in particular the phenomenon of initially promising results followed by negative findings. Our analysis suggests that these "decline effects" are partly explained by tobacco industry involvement in TABP research.

Through tobacco industry eyes: civil society and the FCTC process from Philip Morris and British American Tobacco's perspectives

OBJECTIVE

To analyse the models Philip Morris (PM) and British American Tobacco (BAT) used internally to understand tobacco control non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and their relationship to the global tobacco control policy-making process that resulted in the Framework Convention for Tobacco Control (FCTC).

METHODS

Analysis of internal tobacco industry documents in the Legacy Tobacco Document Library.

RESULTS

PM contracted with Mongoven, Biscoe, and Duchin, Inc. (MBD, a consulting firm specialising in NGO surveillance) as advisors. MBD argued that because NGOs are increasingly linked to epistemic communities, NGOs could insert themselves into the global policy-making process and influence the discourse surrounding the treaty-making process. MBD advised PM to insert itself into the policy-making process, mimicking NGO behaviour. BAT's Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (CORA) department argued that global regulation emerged from the perception (by NGOs and governments) that the industry could not regulate itself, leading to BAT advocating social alignment and self-regulation to minimise the impact of the FCTC. Most efforts to block or redirect the FCTC failed.

CONCLUSIONS

PM and BAT articulated a global policy-making environment in which NGOs are key, non-state stakeholders, and as a result, internationalised some of their previous national-level strategies. After both companies failed to prevent the FCTC, their strategies began to align. Multinational corporations have continued to successfully employ some of the strategies outlined in this paper at the local and national level while being formally excluded from ongoing FCTC negotiations at the global level.

"We are anxious to remain anonymous": the use of third party scientific and medical consultants by the Australian tobacco industry, 1969 to 1979

OBJECTIVE

To document the history of visits to Australia by tobacco industry sponsored scientists and news media reports about smoking and health matters generated by their visits.

DESIGN

Systematic keyword and opportunistic website searches of tobacco industry internal documents made available through the Master Settlement Agreement.

RESULTS

At least nine sponsored scientists visited Australia from 1969 until 1979. The industry sought to promote the scientists as independent from the industry and on occasion, scientists publicly lied about their industry connections. The industry was sometimes delighted with the extensive and favourable media coverage given to the visits.

CONCLUSIONS

These media reports are likely to have influenced many who were exposed to them to believe that the evidence against smoking remained equivocal.

Smoking, disease, and obdurate denial: the Australian tobacco industry in the 1980s

OBJECTIVE

To contrast the Australian tobacco industry's awareness of the diseases caused by smoking with their aggressive public denial on the relation between smoking and disease in the 1980s.

DESIGN

Analysis of 325 industry documents from the world wide web.

RESULTS

In the 1980s Australian cigarette manufacturers were informed constantly by the international industry of the medical consensus that smoking caused disease. In addition Philip Morris (Australia) Limited received reports of Philip Morris' international biological research programme and visited its Richmond research facility; and WD&HO Wills part funded, co-managed, and contributed research to the British American Tobacco groups' biological research programme. Despite this knowledge, the Australian manufacturers had a policy of arguing to their employees, decision makers, and the general public that questions of smoking and disease were unresolved. The industry catalogued the literature, developed arguments against the main claims made by health groups, and attacked public health advocates who made statements linking smoking to death and disease. Industry studies suggested that a 20-30% minority of the Australian public agreed with the industry on smoking and disease, diminishing across the decade.

CONCLUSION

Australian manufacturers were clearly negligent in the 1980s, deliberately working to undermine Australians' understandings of the diseases caused by smoking despite their own private knowledge. Continuing scepticism about smoking and disease, corresponding with the industry's deceptions, exists in Australian smokers today, suggesting that their actions may have slowed the rate of decline in smoking prevalence. These revelations provide important evidence for Australian litigation and advocacy.