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Goldman EJ, Poulin-Dubois D. Children's anthropomorphism of inanimate agents. WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS. COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2024; 15:e1676. [PMID: 38659105 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1676] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/08/2023] [Revised: 10/30/2023] [Accepted: 01/12/2024] [Indexed: 04/26/2024]
Abstract
This review article examines the extant literature on animism and anthropomorphism in infants and young children. A substantial body of work indicates that both infants and young children have a broad concept of what constitutes a sentient agent and react to inanimate objects as they do to people in the same context. The literature has also revealed a developmental pattern in which anthropomorphism decreases with age, but social robots appear to be an exception to this pattern. Additionally, the review shows that children attribute psychological properties to social robots less so than people but still anthropomorphize them. Importantly, some research suggests that anthropomorphism of social robots is dependent upon their morphology and human-like behaviors. The extent to which children anthropomorphize robots is dependent on their exposure to them and the presence of human-like features. Based on the existing literature, we conclude that in infancy, a large range of inanimate objects (e.g., boxes, geometric figures) that display animate motion patterns trigger the same behaviors observed in child-adult interactions, suggesting some implicit form of anthropomorphism. The review concludes that additional research is needed to understand what infants and children judge as social agents and how the perception of inanimate agents changes over the lifespan. As exposure to robots and virtual assistants increases, future research must focus on better understanding the full impact that regular interactions with such partners will have on children's anthropomorphizing. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Learning Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development Computer Science and Robotics > Robotics.
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2
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Baumann AE, Goldman EJ, Cobos MGM, Poulin-Dubois D. Do preschoolers trust a competent robot pointer? J Exp Child Psychol 2024; 238:105783. [PMID: 37804786 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105783] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/15/2023] [Revised: 08/09/2023] [Accepted: 09/07/2023] [Indexed: 10/09/2023]
Abstract
How young children learn from different informants has been widely studied. However, most studies investigate how children learn verbally conveyed information. Furthermore, most studies investigate how children learn from humans. This study sought to investigate how 3-year-old children learn from, and come to trust, a competent robot versus an incompetent human when competency is established using a pointing paradigm. During an induction phase, a robot informant pointed at a toy inside a transparent box, whereas a human pointed at an empty box. During the test phase, both agents pointed at opaque boxes. We found that young children asked the robot for help to locate a hidden toy more than the human (ask questions) and correctly identified the robot to be accurate (judgment questions). However, children equally endorsed the locations pointed at by both the robot and the human (endorse questions). This suggests that 3-year-olds are sensitive to the epistemic characteristics of the informant even when its displayed social properties are minimal.
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3
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Choi Y, Seok J, Luo Y. Young infants' expectations about a self-propelled agent's body. Cognition 2023; 241:105629. [PMID: 37806211 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105629] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/30/2023] [Revised: 08/08/2023] [Accepted: 09/26/2023] [Indexed: 10/10/2023]
Abstract
What intuitive biological understandings do infants have? Recent work reports that 8-month-olds seem to identify self-propelled agents as animals and expect them to have a closed body. The present study examined a group of 6.5-month-old infants' (N = 50, 52% female, 84% White) biological expectations. The infants seemed to grasp the causal link between a novel self-propelled box agent's functioning and its body because they expected a temporary operation (i.e., an experimenter opening the box, exposing its insides, and closing it) to impair its ability to move. Further, infants accepted what was shown inside the box during the operation; whether it had an internal cuboid did not affect the results. Together, this suggests that infants at this young age appear to recognize the importance of having an intact body to a novel self-propelled agent's mobility but have no specific knowledge about what should be inside such an entity. These findings thus shed new light on the developmental origins of biological understandings.
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Affiliation(s)
- Youjung Choi
- School of Psychological and Behavior Sciences, Southern Illinois University, 1125 Lincoln Drive, Carbondale, IL 62901, United States.
| | - Jin Seok
- Amazon.com, Inc., 410 Terry Ave N, Seattle, WA 98109, United States.
| | - Yuyan Luo
- Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Missouri, 20 McAlester Hall, Columbia, MO 65211, United States.
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4
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Erel Y, Shannon KA, Chu J, Scott K, Struhl MK, Cao P, Tan X, Hart P, Raz G, Piccolo S, Mei C, Potter C, Jaffe-Dax S, Lew-Williams C, Tenenbaum J, Fairchild K, Bermano A, Liu S. iCatcher+: Robust and Automated Annotation of Infants' and Young Children's Gaze Behavior From Videos Collected in Laboratory, Field, and Online Studies. ADVANCES IN METHODS AND PRACTICES IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2023; 6:10.1177/25152459221147250. [PMID: 37655047 PMCID: PMC10471135 DOI: 10.1177/25152459221147250] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 09/02/2023]
Abstract
Technological advances in psychological research have enabled large-scale studies of human behavior and streamlined pipelines for automatic processing of data. However, studies of infants and children have not fully reaped these benefits because the behaviors of interest, such as gaze duration and direction, still have to be extracted from video through a laborious process of manual annotation, even when these data are collected online. Recent advances in computer vision raise the possibility of automated annotation of these video data. In this article, we built on a system for automatic gaze annotation in young children, iCatcher, by engineering improvements and then training and testing the system (referred to hereafter as iCatcher+) on three data sets with substantial video and participant variability (214 videos collected in U.S. lab and field sites, 143 videos collected in Senegal field sites, and 265 videos collected via webcams in homes; participant age range = 4 months-3.5 years). When trained on each of these data sets, iCatcher+ performed with near human-level accuracy on held-out videos on distinguishing "LEFT" versus "RIGHT" and "ON" versus "OFF" looking behavior across all data sets. This high performance was achieved at the level of individual frames, experimental trials, and study videos; held across participant demographics (e.g., age, race/ethnicity), participant behavior (e.g., movement, head position), and video characteristics (e.g., luminance); and generalized to a fourth, entirely held-out online data set. We close by discussing next steps required to fully automate the life cycle of online infant and child behavioral studies, representing a key step toward enabling robust and high-throughput developmental research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yotam Erel
- The Blavatnik School of Computer Science, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel
| | | | - Junyi Chu
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts
| | - Kim Scott
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts
| | - Melissa Kline Struhl
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts
| | - Peng Cao
- Computer Science & Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts
| | - Xincheng Tan
- School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
| | - Peter Hart
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts
| | - Gal Raz
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts
| | - Sabrina Piccolo
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts
| | - Catherine Mei
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts
| | - Christine Potter
- Department of Psychology, The University of Texas at El Paso, El Paso, Texas
| | - Sagi Jaffe-Dax
- The School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel
| | | | - Joshua Tenenbaum
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts
- The MIT Quest for Intelligence, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts
| | - Katherine Fairchild
- The MIT Quest for Intelligence, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts
| | - Amit Bermano
- The Blavatnik School of Computer Science, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel
| | - Shari Liu
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland
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5
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Stojnić G, Gandhi K, Yasuda S, Lake BM, Dillon MR. Commonsense psychology in human infants and machines. Cognition 2023; 235:105406. [PMID: 36801603 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105406] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/08/2022] [Revised: 02/08/2023] [Accepted: 02/09/2023] [Indexed: 02/18/2023]
Abstract
Human infants are fascinated by other people. They bring to this fascination a constellation of rich and flexible expectations about the intentions motivating people's actions. Here we test 11-month-old infants and state-of-the-art learning-driven neural-network models on the "Baby Intuitions Benchmark (BIB)," a suite of tasks challenging both infants and machines to make high-level predictions about the underlying causes of agents' actions. Infants expected agents' actions to be directed towards objects, not locations, and infants demonstrated default expectations about agents' rationally efficient actions towards goals. The neural-network models failed to capture infants' knowledge. Our work provides a comprehensive framework in which to characterize infants' commonsense psychology and takes the first step in testing whether human knowledge and human-like artificial intelligence can be built from the foundations cognitive and developmental theories postulate.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gala Stojnić
- Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY, USA
| | - Kanishk Gandhi
- Department of Computer Science, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, USA
| | - Shannon Yasuda
- Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY, USA
| | - Brenden M Lake
- Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY, USA; Center for Data Science, New York University, New York, NY, USA
| | - Moira R Dillon
- Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY, USA.
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6
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Choi Y, Luo Y. Understanding preferences in infancy. WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS. COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2023:e1643. [PMID: 36658758 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1643] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/29/2022] [Revised: 12/22/2022] [Accepted: 01/03/2023] [Indexed: 01/21/2023]
Abstract
A preference is defined as a dispositional state that helps explain why a person chooses one option over another. Preference understanding is a significant part of interpreting and predicting others' behavior, which can also help to guide social encounters, for instance, to initiate interactions and even form relationships based on shared preferences. Cognitive developmental research in the past several decades has revealed that infants have relatively sophisticated understandings about others' preferences, as part of investigations into how young children make sense of others' behavior in terms of mental states such as intentions, dispositions including preferences, and epistemic states. In recent years, research on early psychological knowledge expands to including infant understanding of social situations. As such, infants are also found to use their preference understandings in their social life. They treat favorably others who share their own preferences, and they prefer prosocial and similar others (e.g., those who speak their language). In reviewing these results, we point out future directions for research and conclude with further suggestions and recommendations. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development Psychology > Development and Aging.
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Affiliation(s)
- Youjung Choi
- School of Psychological and Behavioral Sciences, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois, USA
| | - Yuyan Luo
- Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Missouri at Columbia, Columbia, Missouri, USA
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7
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Poulin-Dubois D, Goldman EJ, Meltzer A, Psaradellis E. Discontinuity from implicit to explicit theory of mind from infancy to preschool age. COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 2023. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2022.101273] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
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8
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Abstract
An important question in the study of canine cognition is how dogs understand humans, given that they show impressive abilities for interacting and communicating with us. In this review, we describe and discuss studies that have investigated dogs' perspective-taking abilities. There is solid evidence that dogs are not only sensitive to the gaze of others, but also their attention. We specifically address the question whether dogs have the ability to take the perspective of others and thus come to understand what others can or cannot perceive. From the latter, they may then infer what others know and use this representation to anticipate what others do next. Still, dogs might simply rely on directly observable cues and on what they themselves can perceive when they assess what others can perceive. And instead of making inferences from representations of others' mental states, they may have just learned that certain behaviours of ours lead to certain outcomes. However, recent research seems to challenge this low-level explanation. Dogs have solved several perspective-taking tasks instantly and reliably across a large number of variations, including geometrical gaze-following, stealing in the dark, concealing information from others, and Guesser/Knower differentiation. In the latter studies, dogs' choices between two human informants were strongly influenced by cues related to the humans' visual access to the food, even when the two informants behaved identically. And finally, we review a recent study that found dogs reacting differently to misleading suggestions of human informants that have either a true or false belief about the location of food. We discuss this surprising result in terms of the comprehension of reality-incongruent mental states, which is considered as a hallmark of Theory of Mind acquisition in human development. Especially on the basis of the latter findings, we conclude that pet dogs might be sensitive to what others see, know, intend, and believe. Therefore, this ability seems to have evolved not just in the corvid and primate lineages, but also in dogs.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ludwig Huber
- Comparative Cognition, Messerli Research Institute, University of Veterinary Medicine Vienna, Medical University of Vienna, University of Vienna, Veterinaerplatz 1, 1210, Vienna, Austria.
| | - Lucrezia Lonardo
- Comparative Cognition, Messerli Research Institute, University of Veterinary Medicine Vienna, Medical University of Vienna, University of Vienna, Veterinaerplatz 1, 1210, Vienna, Austria
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9
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Developmental theories: Past, present, and future. DEVELOPMENTAL REVIEW 2022. [DOI: 10.1016/j.dr.2022.101049] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
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10
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Infants' selective imitation of a transitive agent and an intransitive agent. J Exp Child Psychol 2022; 224:105517. [PMID: 35932639 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105517] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/17/2021] [Revised: 07/03/2022] [Accepted: 07/07/2022] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
This study examined how the reliability (i.e., transitivity) of an agent's object choices affects 16-month-old infants' (N = 48) imitation of her unconventional way of turning on a touch light box with her head when her hands were available. When the agent made transitive choices (i.e., she chose Object A over Object B, Object B over Object C, and then A over C), infants imitated her head touch actions. When the agent made intransitive choices (i.e., after choosing A over B and B over C, she chose C over A), infants were more likely to use only their hands to touch the light box. In addition, when it was presumably difficult for infants to judge the transitivity of the agent's choices (i.e., she chose B over C, A over B, and then A over C), they used their hands more. These results demonstrate that infants' understanding informs their decisions to selectively imitate others' specific ways to act on novel artifacts, consistent with young children's selective trust in information provided by other people based on their epistemic reliability.
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11
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Pronovost MA, Scott RM. The influence of language input on 3-year-olds' learning about novel social categories. Acta Psychol (Amst) 2022; 230:103729. [PMID: 36084438 DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2022.103729] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/14/2022] [Revised: 08/10/2022] [Accepted: 08/23/2022] [Indexed: 11/01/2022] Open
Abstract
There is considerable variability in the social categories that children essentialize and the types of expectations children form about these categories, suggesting children's essentialist beliefs are shaped by environmental input. Prior studies have shown that exposure to generic statements about a social category promotes essentialist beliefs in 4.5- to 8-year-old children. However, by this age children form essentialist beliefs quite robustly, and thus it is unclear whether generic statements impact children's expectations about social categories at younger ages when essentialist beliefs first begin to emerge. Moreover, in prior studies the generic statements were delivered by an experimenter and carefully controlled, and thus it is unclear whether these statements would have the same impact if they occurred in a somewhat less constrained setting, such as parents reading a picture book to their child. The current study addressed these open questions by investigating whether generic statements delivered during a picture-book interaction with their parents influenced 3-year-olds' expectations about members of a novel social category. Our results showed that children who heard generic statements during the picture-book interaction used social-group membership to make inferences about the likely behavior of a novel category member, whereas children who were not exposed to generic statements did not. These findings suggest that as early as 3 years of age, children's expectations about social categories are influenced by generic statements that occur during brief parent-child interactions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Megan A Pronovost
- California State University Fresno, 5300 N Campus Drive, M/S FF12, Fresno, CA 93740, United States.
| | - Rose M Scott
- University of California, Merced, 5200 Lake Rd, Merced, CA 95343, United States
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12
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Abstract
Infants use statistical information in their environment, as well as others' emotional communication, to understand the intentions of social partners. However, rarely do researchers consider these two sources of social information in tandem. This study assessed 2-year-olds' attributions of intentionality from non-random sampling events and subsequent discrete emotion reactions. Infants observed an experimenter remove five objects from either the non-random minority (18%) or random majority (82%) of a sample and express either joy, disgust, or sadness after each selection. Two-year-olds inferred the experimenter's intentionality by giving her the object that she had previously selected when she expressed joy or disgust after non-random sampling events, but not when she expressed sadness or sampled at random. These findings demonstrate that infants use both statistical regularities and discrete emotion communication to infer an agent's intentions. In particular, the present findings show that 2-year-olds infer that an agent can intentionally select a preferred or an undesired object from a sample as a function of the discrete emotion. Implications for the development of inferring intentionality from statistical sampling events and discrete emotion communication are discussed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lukas D Lopez
- Jeannine Rainbolt College of Education, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, United States
| | - Eric A Walle
- Psychological Sciences, University of California Merced, Merced, CA, United States
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13
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Carruthers P, Williams DM. Model-free metacognition. Cognition 2022; 225:105117. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105117] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/30/2021] [Revised: 03/25/2022] [Accepted: 03/31/2022] [Indexed: 01/08/2023]
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14
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Wilson VAD, Zuberbühler K, Bickel B. The evolutionary origins of syntax: Event cognition in nonhuman primates. SCIENCE ADVANCES 2022; 8:eabn8464. [PMID: 35731868 PMCID: PMC9216513 DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.abn8464] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/23/2021] [Accepted: 05/05/2022] [Indexed: 06/15/2023]
Abstract
Languages tend to encode events from the perspective of agents, placing them first and in simpler forms than patients. This agent bias is mirrored by cognition: Agents are more quickly recognized than patients and generally attract more attention. This leads to the hypothesis that key aspects of language structure are fundamentally rooted in a cognition that decomposes events into agents, actions, and patients, privileging agents. Although this type of event representation is almost certainly universal across languages, it remains unclear whether the underlying cognition is uniquely human or more widespread in animals. Here, we review a range of evidence from primates and other animals, which suggests that agent-based event decomposition is phylogenetically older than humans. We propose a research program to test this hypothesis in great apes and human infants, with the goal to resolve one of the major questions in the evolution of language, the origins of syntax.
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Affiliation(s)
- Vanessa A. D. Wilson
- Department of Comparative Cognition, Institute of Biology, University of Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel, Switzerland
- Department of Comparative Language Science, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
- Center for the Interdisciplinary Study of Language Evolution (ISLE), University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
| | - Klaus Zuberbühler
- Department of Comparative Cognition, Institute of Biology, University of Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel, Switzerland
- Center for the Interdisciplinary Study of Language Evolution (ISLE), University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
- School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St. Andrews, Scotland
| | - Balthasar Bickel
- Department of Comparative Language Science, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
- Center for the Interdisciplinary Study of Language Evolution (ISLE), University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
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15
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Geraci A. Some considerations for the developmental origin of the principle of fairness. INFANT AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 2022. [DOI: 10.1002/icd.2350] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/10/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Alessandra Geraci
- Department of Psychology and Cognitive Science University of Trento Rovereto Italy
- Department of Social and Educational Sciences of the Mediterranean Area University for Foreigners “Dante Alighieri” of Reggio Calabria Reggio Calabria Italy
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16
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Jurkat S, Iza Simba NB, Hernández Chacón L, Itakura S, Kärtner J. Cultural Similarities and Differences in Explaining Others’ Behavior in 4- to 9-Year-Old Children From Three Cultural Contexts. JOURNAL OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1177/00220221221098423] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
Previous studies suggest that people from the Western hemisphere tend to explain others’ behavior based on a person’s traits and dispositions, while participants from non-Western cultural settings more likely refer to situational factors. From a developmental perspective, it has been suggested that culture-specific modes of explaining behavior gradually emerge during late childhood and adolescence. The present study explored whether traces of a corresponding culture-specific development can be found at earlier ages when using simplified assessments. In total, 438 children between 4 and 9 years old from Münster (urban Germany), Kyoto (urban Japan), and Cotacachi (rural Ecuador), were asked to explain positive and deviant behaviors of children depicted in simple picture-based vignettes. While more internal attributions were given in Münster than in Kyoto and Cotacachi children at 4 to 5 years old, these cultural differences disappeared as internal attributions significantly increased with age in Kyoto and Cotacachi but not Münster children. Analyzing children’s explanations on a level of subcategories revealed more subtle cultural specificities. For example, when giving internal explanations, Cotacachi children focused on stable traits, while Münster children emphasized individual desires and Kyoto children highlighted more volatile aspects. Cross-cultural differences in children’s social explanations could partially be explained by mothers’ preference for autonomy-related socialization goals. Taken together, this study provides evidence for an earlier onset of internal explanations when they are culturally accentuated and further calls for a more nuanced approach to capture culture-specific meaning systems reflected in everyday social explanations.
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17
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Powell LJ. Adopted Utility Calculus: Origins of a Concept of Social Affiliation. PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2022; 17:1215-1233. [PMID: 35549492 DOI: 10.1177/17456916211048487] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
To successfully navigate their social world, humans need to understand and map enduring relationships between people: Humans need a concept of social affiliation. Here I propose that the initial concept of social affiliation, available in infancy, is based on the extent to which one individual consistently takes on the goals and needs of another. This proposal grounds affiliation in intuitive psychology, as formalized in the naive-utility-calculus model. A concept of affiliation based on interpersonal utility adoption can account for findings from studies of infants' reasoning about imitation, similarity, helpful and fair individuals, "ritual" behaviors, and social groups without the need for additional innate mechanisms such as a coalitional psychology, moral sense, or general preference for similar others. I identify further tests of this proposal and also discuss how it is likely to be relevant to social reasoning and learning across the life span.
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18
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Geraci A, Regolin L, Simion F, Surian L. Infants' preferences for approachers over repulsers shift between 4 and 8 months of age. Aggress Behav 2022; 48:487-499. [PMID: 35560230 DOI: 10.1002/ab.22033] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/25/2021] [Revised: 04/22/2022] [Accepted: 04/25/2022] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Despite its adaptive value for social life, the emergence and the development of the ability to detect agents that cause aversive interactions and distinguish them from potentially affiliative agents (approachers) has not been investigated. We presented infants with a simple interaction involving two agents: one of them (the "repulser") moved toward and pushed the other (the "approacher") which reacted by simply moving toward the repulser without contacting it. We found that 8-month-olds (N = 28) looked longer at the approacher than at the repulser (Experiment 1), whereas 4-month-olds (N = 30) exhibited no preference (Experiment 2). To control for low-level cues (such as the preference for the agent that moved after the contact), two new groups of 4- and 8-month-old infants were presented with a series of interactions in which the agents inverted their social roles. Older infants (N = 30) manifested no preference for either agent (Experiment 3), while younger infants (N = 30) looked longer at the first agent to move (Experiment 4). Our results indicated that 8-month-olds' preferences for the approacher over the repulser depended on social information and were finely tuned to agents that display prosocial rather than antisocial behavior. We discuss these findings in light of the development and adaptive value of the ability to negatively evaluate repulsers, to avoid choosing them as partners.
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Affiliation(s)
- Alessandra Geraci
- Department of Psychology and Cognitive Science University of Trento Rovereto Italy
| | - Lucia Regolin
- Department of General Psychology University of Padova Padova Italy
| | - Francesca Simion
- Department of Developmental Psychology and Socialisation University of Padova Padova Italy
| | - Luca Surian
- Department of Psychology and Cognitive Science University of Trento Rovereto Italy
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Geraci A, Simion F, Surian L. Infants' intention-based evaluations of distributive actions. J Exp Child Psychol 2022; 220:105429. [PMID: 35421629 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105429] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/05/2021] [Revised: 03/09/2022] [Accepted: 03/09/2022] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
Recent research revealed that infants attend to agents' intentions when they evaluate helping actions. The current study investigated whether infants also consider agents' intentions when they evaluate distributive actions. In Experiment 1, 9-month-old infants were first shown two failed attempts to perform a distribution. In the "failed equal distribution," the distributor first tried to reach one of the recipients to deliver an apple, failed, and then attempted to reach the other possible recipient to deliver a different apple and also failed. In the "failed unequal distribution," a different distributor always tried unsuccessfully to reach the same beneficiary. Then, in the test phase, infants were presented with the two distributors side by side, and infants' spontaneous preferential looking and reaching actions were recorded. We found a reliable preference for the equal distributor in both the visual and manual responses. Experiments 2 and 3 helped to rule out alternative explanations based on perceptual cues and affiliative biases. Overall, these findings suggest that infants' ability to evaluate distributive actions relies not only on the outcomes but also on the distributors' intentions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Alessandra Geraci
- Department of Psychology and Cognitive Science, University of Trento, 38068 Rovereto, Italy.
| | - Francesca Simion
- Department of Developmental Psychology and Socialisation, University of Padova, 35122 Padova, Italy
| | - Luca Surian
- Department of Psychology and Cognitive Science, University of Trento, 38068 Rovereto, Italy
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20
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Francesco Guala
- Department of Philosophy and PhiLab, Università Degli Studi Di Milano, Milano, Italy
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21
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Choi Y, Luo Y, Baillargeon R. Can 5-month-old infants consider the perspective of a novel eyeless agent? New evidence for early mentalistic reasoning. Child Dev 2021; 93:571-581. [PMID: 34766636 DOI: 10.1111/cdev.13707] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/13/2020] [Revised: 10/04/2021] [Accepted: 10/06/2021] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
Is early reasoning about an agent's knowledge best characterized by a mentalistic stance, a teleological stance, or both? In this research, 5-month-old infants (N = 64, 50% female, 83% White) saw a novel eyeless agent consistently approach object-A as opposed to object-B. Although infants could always see both objects, a screen separated object-B from the agent. When object-B protruded above the screen, infants interpreted the agent's actions as revealing a preference for object-A over object-B. When object-B did not protrude above the screen, however, infants refrained from attributing such a preference: Consistent with mentalistic accounts, they reasoned that the agent's representation of the scene did not include object-B, and they used the agent's incomplete representation, non-egocentrically, to interpret its actions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Youjung Choi
- School of Psychological & Behavioral Sciences, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois, USA
| | - Yuyan Luo
- Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Missouri at Columbia, Columbia, Missouri, USA
| | - Renée Baillargeon
- Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, Illinois, USA
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22
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Mermelstein S, German TC. Counterintuitive Pseudoscience Propagates by Exploiting the Mind's Communication Evaluation Mechanisms. Front Psychol 2021; 12:739070. [PMID: 34675845 PMCID: PMC8523830 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.739070] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/09/2021] [Accepted: 09/16/2021] [Indexed: 12/02/2022] Open
Abstract
Epidemiological models of culture posit that the prevalence of a belief depends in part on the fit between that belief and intuitions generated by the mind's reliably developing architecture. Application of such models to pseudoscience suggests that one route via which these beliefs gain widespread appeal stems from their compatibility with these intuitions. For example, anti-vaccination beliefs are readily adopted because they cohere with intuitions about the threat of contagion. However, other varieties of popular pseudoscience such as astrology and parapsychology contain content that violates intuitions held about objects and people. Here, we propose a pathway by which "counterintuitive pseudoscience" may spread and receive endorsement. Drawing on recent empirical evidence, we suggest that counterintuitive pseudoscience triggers the mind's communication evaluation mechanisms. These mechanisms are hypothesized to quarantine epistemically-suspect information including counterintuitive pseudoscientific concepts. As a consequence, these beliefs may not immediately update conflicting intuitions and may be largely restricted from influencing behavior. Nonetheless, counterintuitive pseudoscientific concepts, when in combination with intuitively appealing content, may differentially draw attention and memory. People may also be motivated to seek further information about these concepts, including by asking others, in an attempt to reconcile them with prior beliefs. This in turn promotes the re-transmission of these ideas. We discuss how, during this information-search, support for counterintuitive pseudoscience may come from deference to apparently authoritative sources, reasoned arguments, and the functional outcomes of these beliefs. Ultimately, these factors promote the cultural success of counterintuitive pseudoscience but explicit endorsement of these concepts may not entail tacit commitment.
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Affiliation(s)
- Spencer Mermelstein
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, United States
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23
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Toddlers draw broad negative inferences from wrongdoers' moral violations. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2021; 118:2109045118. [PMID: 34544874 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2109045118] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 08/16/2021] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
By 2 y of age, children possess expectations about several different moral principles. Building on these results, we asked whether children who observed a wrongdoer violate a principle would draw negative inferences from this violation about how the wrongdoer was likely to behave in other contexts. In four experiments, 25-mo-old toddlers (n = 152) first saw a wrongdoer harm a protagonist. When toddlers judged the wrongdoer's behavior to violate the principle of ingroup support or harm avoidance, they did not find it unexpected if the wrongdoer next violated the principle of fairness by dividing resources unfairly between two other protagonists (Exps. 2 and 3), but they did find it unexpected if the wrongdoer next acted generously by giving another protagonist most of a resource to be shared between them (Exp. 4). When toddlers did not construe the wrongdoer's harmful behavior as a moral violation, these responses reversed: They found it unexpected if the wrongdoer next acted unfairly (Exp. 1) but not if the wrongdoer next acted generously (Exp. 4). Detecting a moral violation thus lowered toddlers' assessment of the wrongdoer's moral character and brought down their expectations concerning the likelihood that the wrongdoer would perform: 1) obligatory actions required by other principles and 2) supererogatory or virtuous actions not required by the principles. Together, these findings expand our understanding of how young children evaluate others' moral characters, and they reveal how these evaluations, in turn, enable children to form sophisticated expectations about others' behavior in new contexts.
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24
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Heyman GD, Compton AM, Amemiya J, Ahn S, Shao S. Children's reputation management: Learning to identify what is socially valued and acting upon it. CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2021; 30:315-320. [PMID: 34366581 DOI: 10.1177/09637214211009516] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
Abstract
Much of what people do is motivated by a concern with social evaluation. We argue that the process of figuring out what others value and making effective use of this information presents significant cognitive challenges. These challenges include reasoning about the relevance of different forms of information and making inferences about the mental lives of others. They also include modifying one's behavior in light of whatever personal qualities appear to be valued in an effort to appeal to different audiences. We argue that the foundations of many of the important skills needed to meet these challenges are already in place early during childhood, but that the challenges themselves persist well into adulthood.
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25
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A simple definition of 'intentionally'. Cognition 2021; 214:104806. [PMID: 34146998 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104806] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/08/2020] [Revised: 06/04/2021] [Accepted: 06/05/2021] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
Cognitive scientists have been debating how the folk concept of intentional action works. We suggest a simple account: people consider that an agent did X intentionally to the extent that X was causally dependent on how much the agent wanted X to happen (or not to happen). Combined with recent models of human causal cognition, this definition provides a good account of the way people use the concept of intentional action, and offers natural explanations for puzzling phenomena such as the side-effect effect. We provide empirical support for our theory, in studies where we show that people's causation and intentionality judgments track each other closely, in everyday situations as well as in scenarios with unusual causal structures. Study 5 additionally shows that the effect of norm violations on intentionality judgments depends on the causal structure of the situation, in a way uniquely predicted by our theory. Taken together, these results suggest that the folk concept of intentional action has been difficult to define because it is made of cognitive building blocks, such as our intuitive concept of causation, whose logic cognitive scientists are just starting to understand.
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26
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Ting F, He Z, Baillargeon R. Five-month-old infants attribute inferences based on general knowledge to agents. J Exp Child Psychol 2021; 208:105126. [PMID: 33862527 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2021.105126] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/04/2020] [Revised: 02/01/2021] [Accepted: 02/05/2021] [Indexed: 10/21/2022]
Abstract
To make sense of others' actions, we generally consider what information is available to them. This information may come from different sources, including perception and inference. Like adults, young infants track what information agents can obtain through perception: If an agent directly observes an event, for example, young infants expect the agent to have information about it. However, no investigation has yet examined whether young infants also track what information agents can obtain through inference, by bringing to bear relevant general knowledge. Building on the finding that by 4 months of age most infants have acquired the physical rule that wide objects can fit into wide containers but not narrow containers, we asked whether 5-month-olds would expect an agent who was searching for a wide toy hidden in her absence to reach for a wide box as opposed to a narrow box. Infants looked significantly longer when the agent selected the narrow box, suggesting that they expected her (a) to share the physical knowledge that wide objects can fit only into wide containers and (b) to infer that the wide toy must be hidden in the wide box. Three additional conditions supported this interpretation. Together, these results cast doubt on two-system accounts of early psychological reasoning, which claim that infants' early-developing system is too inflexible and encapsulated to integrate inputs from other cognitive processes, such as physical reasoning. Instead, the results support one-system accounts and provide new evidence that young infants' burgeoning psychological-reasoning system is qualitatively similar to that of older children and adults.
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Affiliation(s)
- Fransisca Ting
- Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL 61820, USA.
| | - Zijing He
- Department of Psychology, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, Guangdong 510275, China.
| | - Renée Baillargeon
- Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL 61820, USA.
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27
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28
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Stout W, Karahuta E, Laible D, Brandone AC. A longitudinal study of the differential social-cognitive foundations of early prosocial behaviors. INFANCY 2021; 26:271-290. [PMID: 33332764 DOI: 10.1111/infa.12381] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/12/2019] [Revised: 07/28/2020] [Accepted: 11/17/2020] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Abstract
A growing body of work has documented the emergence of instrumental helping and sharing in the second year of life; however, less is known about mechanisms that underlie development and production of prosocial behavior. The current study took a longitudinal approach to explore whether the origins of prosocial behaviors can be traced back to foundational social-cognitive capacities emerging in infancy. In a sample of 90 children, longitudinal relations were examined between intention understanding and joint attention measured in infancy (8-12 months) and later instrumental helping and sharing behavior assessed in the toddler years (18-25 months). We expected social-cognitive capacities supporting infants' understanding of others to be positively related to their prosocial behaviors as toddlers. Measured variable path analyses revealed two distinct developmental pathways from infant social cognition to later prosocial behavior: 1) Instrumental helping in the toddler years was positively predicted by intention understanding in infancy; 2) sharing in the toddler years was positively predicted by infants' initiating joint attention. These results lend support to proposals on the multidimensional nature of early prosocial behavior and offer the first longitudinal evidence that the origins of toddlers' prosocial behavior can be traced to social-cognitive capacities emerging in infancy.
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Affiliation(s)
- Wyntre Stout
- Department of Psychology, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA, USA
| | - Erin Karahuta
- Department of Psychology, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA, USA
| | - Deborah Laible
- Department of Psychology, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA, USA
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29
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Pronovost MA, Scott RM. 20-month-olds Use Social Categories to Make Inductive Inferences about Agents’ Preferences. JOURNAL OF COGNITION AND DEVELOPMENT 2021. [DOI: 10.1080/15248372.2021.1893734] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/22/2022]
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30
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Burnside K, Neumann C, Poulin-Dubois D. Infants Generalize Beliefs Across Individuals. Front Psychol 2020; 11:547680. [PMID: 33071864 PMCID: PMC7536113 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.547680] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/31/2020] [Accepted: 08/18/2020] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
It has been argued that infants possess a rich, sophisticated theory of mind (ToM) that is only revealed with tasks based on spontaneous responses. A mature (ToM) implies the understanding that mental states are person specific. Previous studies on infants' understanding of motivational mental states, such as goals and preferences have revealed that, by 9 months of age, infants do not generalize these motivational mental states across agents. However, it remains to be determined if infants also perceive epistemic states as person specific. Therefore, the goal of the present study was to use a switch agent paradigm with the classic false belief violation-of-expectation task. Results revealed that 16-month-old infants attributed true and false beliefs to a naïve agent - they did not perceive beliefs as person specific. These findings indicate that the mechanisms that underlie infants' implicit attribution of beliefs differ from those assumed for explicit reasoning about beliefs.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kimberly Burnside
- Department of Psychology, Concordia University, Montréal, QC, Canada
| | - Cassandra Neumann
- Department of Psychology, Concordia University, Montréal, QC, Canada
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31
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Meristo M, Strid K. Language First: Deaf Children from Deaf Families Spontaneously Anticipate False Beliefs. JOURNAL OF COGNITION AND DEVELOPMENT 2020. [DOI: 10.1080/15248372.2020.1749057] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/24/2022]
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32
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Sodian B, Kristen‐Antonow S, Kloo D. How Does Children’s Theory of Mind Become Explicit? A Review of Longitudinal Findings. CHILD DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES 2020. [DOI: 10.1111/cdep.12381] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/08/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Beate Sodian
- Department of Psychology Ludwig‐Maximilian‐University
| | | | - Daniela Kloo
- Department of Psychology Ludwig‐Maximilian‐University
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33
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Conceptual continuity in the development of intent-based moral judgment. J Exp Child Psychol 2020; 194:104812. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104812] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/02/2019] [Revised: 01/16/2020] [Accepted: 01/17/2020] [Indexed: 11/23/2022]
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34
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Juvrud J, Gredebäck G. The teleological stance: Past, present, and future. Dev Sci 2020; 23:e12970. [PMID: 32304172 DOI: 10.1111/desc.12970] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/23/2018] [Revised: 11/05/2018] [Accepted: 11/27/2018] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Abstract
We review the support for, and criticisms of, the teleological stance theory, often described as a foundation for goal-directed action understanding early in life. A major point of contention in the literature has been how teleological processes and assumptions of rationality are represented and understood in infancy, and this debate has been largely centered on three paradigms. Visual habituation studies assess infant's abilities to retrospectively assess teleological processes; the presence of such processes is supported by the literature. Rational imitation is a phenomenon that has been questioned both theoretically and empirically, and there is currently little support for this concept in the literature. The involvement of teleological processes in action prediction is unclear. To date, the ontology of teleological processes remains unspecified. To remedy this, we present a new action-based theory of teleological processes (here referred to as the embodied account of teleological processes), based on the development of goal-directed reaching with its origin during the fetal period and continuous development over the first few months of life.
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Affiliation(s)
- Joshua Juvrud
- Department of Psychology, Uppsala Child and Baby Lab, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden
| | - Gustaf Gredebäck
- Department of Psychology, Uppsala Child and Baby Lab, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden
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35
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Setoh P, Scott R, Baillargeon R. Reply to Fenici and Garofoli: Why Would Toddlers Act on Low-Level Associations Only when Processing Demands Are Reduced? Hum Dev 2020. [DOI: 10.1159/000506805] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
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36
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Reschke PJ, Walle EA, Dukes D. Did you mean to do that? Infants use emotional communication to infer and re-enact others' intended actions. Cogn Emot 2020; 34:1473-1479. [PMID: 32216540 DOI: 10.1080/02699931.2020.1745760] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/24/2022]
Abstract
Infants readily re-enact others' intended actions during the second year of life. However, the role of emotion in appreciating others' intentions and how this understanding develops in infancy remains unstudied. In the present study, 15- and 18-month-old infants observed an experimenter repeatedly attempt but fail to produce a target action on an object and express either frustration or neutral affect after each attempt. Analyses of infants' responses revealed that 18-month-old infants, but not 15-month-olds, produced more target actions in the frustration condition than the neutral condition. These results suggest that infants use emotional communication to disambiguate and re-enact others' intended actions and that this ability develops in the second year of life.
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Affiliation(s)
- Peter J Reschke
- School of Family Life, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, USA.,Psychological Sciences, University of California, Merced, CA, USA
| | - Eric A Walle
- Psychological Sciences, University of California, Merced, CA, USA
| | - Daniel Dukes
- Swiss Centre for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
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37
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Fenici M, Garofoli D. An Associationist Bias Explains Different Processing Demands for Toddlers in Different Traditional False-Belief Tasks. Hum Dev 2020. [DOI: 10.1159/000505208] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
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38
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Jin KS, Kim Y, Song M, Kim YJ, Lee H, Lee Y, Cha M, Song HJ. Fourteen- to Eighteen-Month-Old Infants Use Explicit Linguistic Information to Update an Agent's False Belief. Front Psychol 2019; 10:2508. [PMID: 31824369 PMCID: PMC6882285 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02508] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/28/2019] [Accepted: 10/23/2019] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
The current research examined how infants exploit linguistic information to update an agent's false belief about an object's location. Fourteen- to eighteen-month-old infants first watched a series of events involving two agents, a ball, and two containers (a box and a cup). Agent1 repeatedly acted on the ball and then put it in the box in the presence of agent2. Then agent1 disappeared from the scene and agent2 switched the ball's location from the box to the cup. Upon agent1's return, agent2 told her, "The ball is in the cup!" Agent1 then reached for either the cup (cup event) or the box (box event). The infants looked reliably longer if shown the box event as opposed to the cup event. However, when agent2 simply said, "The ball and the cup!" - which does not explicitly mention the ball's new location - infants looked significantly longer if shown the cup event as opposed the box event. These findings thus provide new evidence for false-belief understanding in infancy and suggest that infants expect an agent's false belief to be updated only by explicit verbal information.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kyong-Sun Jin
- Department of Psychology, Sungshin Women's University, Seoul, South Korea
| | - Yoon Kim
- Department of Psychology, Yonsei University, Seoul, South Korea
| | - Miri Song
- Assesta Co., Ltd., Seoul, South Korea
| | - Yu-Jin Kim
- Hugmom Psychology Consultation Institution, Seoul, South Korea
| | - Hyuna Lee
- Department of Psychology, Yonsei University, Seoul, South Korea
| | - Yoonha Lee
- Department of Psychology, Yonsei University, Seoul, South Korea
| | - Minjung Cha
- Department of Psychology, Yonsei University, Seoul, South Korea
| | - Hyun-Joo Song
- Department of Psychology, Yonsei University, Seoul, South Korea
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39
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Affiliation(s)
- Lauren H. Howard
- Department of Psychology, Franklin & Marshall College, Lancaster, PA, 17603, USA
| | - Amanda L. Woodward
- Department of Psychology, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, 60637, USA
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40
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Barlev M, Mermelstein S, Cohen AS, German TC. The Embodied God: Core Intuitions About Person Physicality Coexist and Interfere With Acquired Christian Beliefs About God, the Holy Spirit, and Jesus. Cogn Sci 2019; 43:e12784. [PMID: 31529529 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12784] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/17/2018] [Revised: 07/30/2019] [Accepted: 08/01/2019] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Abstract
Why are disembodied extraordinary beings like gods and spirits prevalent in past and present theologies? Under the intuitive Cartesian dualism hypothesis, this is because it is natural to conceptualize of minds as separate from bodies; under the counterintuitiveness hypothesis, this is because beliefs in minds without bodies are unnatural-such beliefs violate core knowledge intuitions about person physicality and consequently have a social transmission advantage. We report on a critical test of these contrasting hypotheses. Prior research found that among adult Christian religious adherents, intuitions about person psychology coexist and interfere with theological conceptualizations of God (e.g., infallibility). Here, we use a sentence verification paradigm where participants are asked to evaluate as true or false statements on which core knowledge intuitions about person physicality and psychology and Christian theology about God are inconsistent (true on one and false on the other) versus consistent (both true or both false). We find, as predicted by the counterintuitiveness hypothesis but not the Cartesian dualism hypothesis, that Christian religious adherents show worse performance (lower accuracy and slower response time) on statements where Christian theological doctrines about God's physicality (e.g., incorporeality, omnipresence) conflict with intuitions about person physicality. We find these effects for other extraordinary beings in Christianity-the Holy Spirit and Jesus-but not for an ordinary being (priest). We conclude that it is unintuitive to conceptualize extraordinary beings as disembodied, and that this, rather than inherent Cartesian dualism, may explain the prevalence of beliefs in such beings.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Spencer Mermelstein
- Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences, University of California, Santa Barbara
| | - Adam S Cohen
- Department of Psychology, University of Hawai'i at Mānoa
| | - Tamsin C German
- Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences, University of California, Santa Barbara
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41
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Building blocks of social cognition: Mirror, mentalize, share? Cortex 2019; 118:4-18. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2018.05.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 29] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/15/2017] [Revised: 11/11/2017] [Accepted: 05/03/2018] [Indexed: 01/10/2023]
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42
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Burnside K, Severdija V, Poulin-Dubois D. Infants attribute false beliefs to a toy crane. Dev Sci 2019; 23:e12887. [PMID: 31309631 DOI: 10.1111/desc.12887] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/20/2018] [Revised: 07/05/2019] [Accepted: 07/06/2019] [Indexed: 12/19/2022]
Abstract
The mentalistic view of early theory of mind posits that infants possess a robust and sophisticated understanding of false belief that is masked by the demands of traditional explicit tasks. Much of the evidence supporting this mentalistic view comes from infants' looking time at events that violate their expectations about the beliefs of a human agent. We conducted a replication of the violation-of-expectation procedure, except that the human agent was replaced by an inanimate agent. Infants watched a toy crane repeatedly move toward a box containing an object. In the absence of the crane, the object changed location. When the crane returned, 16-month-old infants looked longer when it turned toward the object's new location, consistent with the attribution of a false belief to the crane. These results suggest that infants spontaneously attribute false beliefs to inanimate agents. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at https://youtu.be/qqEPPhd9FDo.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kimberly Burnside
- Centre for Research in Human Development, Concordia University, Montréal, Canada
| | - Vivianne Severdija
- Centre for Research in Human Development, Concordia University, Montréal, Canada
| | - Diane Poulin-Dubois
- Centre for Research in Human Development, Concordia University, Montréal, Canada
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43
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Botto SV, Rochat P. Evaluative Audience Perception (EAP): How Children Come to Care About Reputation. CHILD DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES 2019. [DOI: 10.1111/cdep.12335] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
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44
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Siu TSC, Cheung H. Developmental progression of mental state understandings in infancy. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL DEVELOPMENT 2019. [DOI: 10.1177/0165025419830233] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
This study establishes a sequence of developing mental state understandings in infants. We used three violation-of-expectation paradigms to assess fifty-seven 16-month-olds’ ability to (a) infer an actress’s intention from her prior repeated approaches to an object, (b) recognize her emotion by watching her facial-emotional display, and (c) deduce her false belief by noticing her lack of visual access to a change in the experimental setup. Contingencies between passing the three tasks were analyzed. Results showed that the infants made sense of intention first, followed by emotion, and then false belief. This progressive sequence parallels what has been found with preschoolers using verbal theory-of-mind tasks.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tik-Sze Carrey Siu
- Department of Early Childhood Education, The Education University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
| | - Him Cheung
- Department of Psychology, The Education University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
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45
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Krupenye C, Call J. Theory of mind in animals: Current and future directions. WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS. COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2019; 10:e1503. [DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1503] [Citation(s) in RCA: 61] [Impact Index Per Article: 12.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/14/2018] [Revised: 04/03/2019] [Accepted: 04/09/2019] [Indexed: 02/06/2023]
Affiliation(s)
| | - Josep Call
- School of Psychology & Neuroscience University of St Andrews St Andrews UK
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46
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Airenti G. The Place of Development in the History of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Front Psychol 2019; 10:895. [PMID: 31068874 PMCID: PMC6491641 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00895] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/03/2018] [Accepted: 04/03/2019] [Indexed: 11/22/2022] Open
Abstract
In this article, I analyze how the relationship of developmental psychology with general psychology and cognitive science has unfolded. This historical analysis will provide a background for a critical examination of the present state of the art. I shall argue that the study of human mind is inherently connected with the study of its development. From the beginning of psychology as a discipline, general psychology and developmental psychology have followed parallel and relatively separated paths. This separation between adult and child studies has also persisted with the emergence of cognitive science. The reason is due essentially to methodological problems that have involved not only research methods but also the very object of inquiry. At present, things have evolved in many ways. Psychology and cognitive science have enlarged their scope to include change process and the interaction between mind and environment. On the other hand, the possibility of using experimental methods to study infancy has allowed us to realize the complexity of young humans. These facts have paved the way for new possibilities of convergence, which are eliciting interesting results, despite a number of ongoing problems related to methods.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gabriella Airenti
- Department of Psychology, Center for Logic, Language, and Cognition, University of Torino, Turin, Italy
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Sheikh H, Hirschfeld LA. Collections, collectives, and individuals: Preschoolers' attributions of intentionality. Cognition 2019; 190:99-104. [PMID: 31048091 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2019.04.020] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/15/2018] [Revised: 04/19/2019] [Accepted: 04/22/2019] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
Given the complexity of our social worlds, humans must develop the ability to make nuanced interpretations of behavior, including the ability to infer an actor's intentions from perceptual properties of an actor's movements. Consistent with the common perception of a group as a single collective entity and the use of singular nouns to refer to groups, such as a clan, family, team, army, herd, hive, or a gaggle, Bloom and Veres (1999) found that adults attribute intentionality to groups to the same extent that they do to single entities. This study examines the developmental course of both these phenomena by examining the performance of adults and preschoolers on an adaptation of Bloom and Veres' task. Our results show that preschoolers, like adults, readily attribute intentions to a group and that the more they do so, the more they perceive the group as a single collective entity. This effect is largely mediated by increased attributions of goal-directed action and, to a lesser extent by attributions of mental states, consistent with the claim that purposeful, coordinated action makes a collection of individuals conceptually coalesce into an entity.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hammad Sheikh
- Department of Psychology, New School for Social Research, 80 Fifth Ave, New York, NY 10011, United States.
| | - Lawrence A Hirschfeld
- Department of Psychology, New School for Social Research, 80 Fifth Ave, New York, NY 10011, United States; Department of Anthropology, New School for Social Research, 6 East 16th Street, New York, NY 10011, United States.
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48
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McDonough KL, Hudson M, Bach P. Cues to intention bias action perception toward the most efficient trajectory. Sci Rep 2019; 9:6472. [PMID: 30996227 PMCID: PMC6470138 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-019-42204-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/02/2018] [Accepted: 03/21/2019] [Indexed: 11/15/2022] Open
Abstract
Humans interpret others' behaviour as intentional and expect them to take the most energy-efficient path to achieve their goals. Recent studies show that these expectations of efficient action take the form of a prediction of an ideal "reference" trajectory, against which observed actions are evaluated, distorting their perceptual representation towards this expected path. Here we tested whether these predictions depend upon the implied intentionality of the stimulus. Participants saw videos of an actor reaching either efficiently (straight towards an object or arched over an obstacle) or inefficiently (straight towards obstacle or arched over empty space). The hand disappeared mid-trajectory and participants reported the last seen position on a touch-screen. As in prior research, judgments of inefficient actions were biased toward efficiency expectations (straight trajectories upwards to avoid obstacles, arched trajectories downward towards goals). In two further experimental groups, intentionality cues were removed by replacing the hand with a non-agentive ball (group 2), and by removing the action's biological motion profile (group 3). Removing these cues substantially reduced perceptual biases. Our results therefore confirm that the perception of others' actions is guided by expectations of efficient actions, which are triggered by the perception of semantic and motion cues to intentionality.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Matthew Hudson
- University of Plymouth, School of Psychology, Plymouth, PL48AA, UK
- School of Business, National College of Ireland, Mayor Street, Dublin 1, Ireland
| | - Patric Bach
- University of Plymouth, School of Psychology, Plymouth, PL48AA, UK
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Perszyk DR, Lei RF, Bodenhausen GV, Richeson JA, Waxman SR. Bias at the intersection of race and gender: Evidence from preschool-aged children. Dev Sci 2019; 22:e12788. [PMID: 30675747 DOI: 10.1111/desc.12788] [Citation(s) in RCA: 28] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/18/2018] [Revised: 09/18/2018] [Accepted: 11/04/2018] [Indexed: 02/04/2023]
Abstract
There is ample evidence of racial and gender bias in young children, but thus far this evidence comes almost exclusively from children's responses to a single social category (either race or gender). Yet we are each simultaneously members of many social categories (including our race and gender). Among adults, racial and gender biases intersect: negative racial biases are expressed more strongly against males than females. Here, we consider the developmental origin of bias at the intersection of race and gender. Relying on both implicit and explicit measures, we assessed 4-year-old children's responses to target images of children who varied systematically in both race (Black and White) and gender (male and female). Children revealed a strong and consistent pro-White bias. This racial bias was expressed more strongly for males than females: children's responses to Black boys were less positive than to Black girls, White boys or White girls. This outcome, which constitutes the earliest evidence of bias at the intersection of race and gender, underscores the importance of addressing bias in the first years of life.
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Burnside K, Wright K, Poulin-Dubois D. Social orienting predicts implicit false belief understanding in preschoolers. J Exp Child Psychol 2018; 175:67-79. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2018.05.015] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/01/2017] [Revised: 05/04/2018] [Accepted: 05/30/2018] [Indexed: 10/28/2022]
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