Jaspers' critique of essentialist theories of schizophrenia and the phenomenological response

The Strasbourg Visual Scale: A Novel Method to Assess Visual Hallucinations

The experience of oneself in the world is based on sensory afferences, enabling us to reach a first-perspective perception of our environment and to differentiate oneself from the world. Visual hallucinations may arise from a difficulty in differentiating one's own mental imagery from externally-induced perceptions. To specify the relationship between hallucinations and the disorders of the self, we need to understand the mechanisms of hallucinations. However, visual hallucinations are often under reported in individuals with psychosis, who sometimes appear to experience difficulties describing them. We developed the "Strasbourg Visual Scale (SVS)," a novel computerized tool that allows us to explore and capture the subjective experience of visual hallucinations by circumventing the difficulties associated with verbal descriptions. This scale reconstructs the hallucinated image of the participants by presenting distinct physical properties of visual information, step-by-step to help them communicate their internal experience. The strategy that underlies the SVS is to present a sequence of images to the participants whose choice at each step provides a feedback toward re-creating the internal image held by them. The SVS displays simple images on a computer screen that provide choices for the participants. Each step focuses on one physical property of an image, and the successive choices made by the participants help them to progressively build an image close to his/her hallucination, similar to the tools commonly used to generate facial composites. The SVS was constructed based on our knowledge of the visual pathways leading to an integrated perception of our environment. We discuss the rationale for the successive steps of the scale, and to which extent it could complement existing scales.

Behind the opaque curtain: A 20-year longitudinal study of dissociative and first-rank symptoms in schizophrenia-spectrum psychoses, other psychoses and non-psychotic disorders

BACKGROUND

Depersonalization and derealization are currently considered diagnostically distinct from first-rank symptoms (FRS) seen in schizophrenia-spectrum psychoses. Nevertheless, the lived experiences of these symptoms can be very similar phenomenologically.

AIMS

To investigate the interrelationships between depersonalization, derealization and FRS in individuals with different types of psychotic and non-psychotic diagnoses.

METHODS

The Chicago Follow-up Study was a prospective longitudinal research program designed to study psychopathology and recovery in psychiatric disorders consisting of 555 participants, who were recruited at index hospitalization and studied over six follow-up timepoints at approximately 2, 4.5, 7.5, 10, 15, and 20 years later. The primary clinical indices were depersonalization, derealization and Schneiderian FRS that were measured at index hospitalization and at each subsequent follow-up.

RESULTS

62.8% of participants had at least four follow-ups. There were significant differences in the course and chronicity of depersonalization, derealization and first-rank symptoms across the three diagnostic groups. For the whole sample, derealization was significantly associated with FRS at 2-, 4.5- and 7.5-year follow-up timepoints whereas depersonalization was related to FRS from 10-year follow-up to 20-year follow-up. In participants with schizophrenia, overall depersonalization was more often associated with passivity phenomena whereas derealization was more often associated with overall delusions. There was also a significant effect of time on the associations between depersonalization, derealization and FRS across follow-ups.

CONCLUSIONS

Depersonalization and derealization should be viewed as transdiagnostic phenomena that are associated with FRS psychopathology along a continuum, although they are more closely associated with schizophrenia-spectrum psychoses.

The Prehistory of Schneider's First-Rank Symptoms: Texts From 1810 to 1932

IMPORTANCE

First-rank symptoms (FRS), proposed by Kurt Schneider in 1939, subsequently became influential in schizophrenia diagnosis. We know little of their prehistory. How often were FRS described before 1939 and in which countries and time periods? Which FRS was most frequently noted?

OBSERVATIONS

Forty psychiatric texts from 37 authors, published 1810-1932, were identified that described FRS. In a systematic subsample, half of the textbooks examined contained such descriptions with little differences between countries or over time. Somatic passivity was most commonly noted, followed by thought insertion, thought withdrawal, and made actions. This pattern resembled that reported in recent studies of schizophrenia. A novel term-delusions of unseen agency-was seen in psychiatric texts and then found, from 1842 to 1905, in a range of official reports, and psychiatric, medical, and general audience publications. The Early Heidelberg School (Gruhle, Mayer-Gross, Beringer) first systematically described "self-disturbances" (Ichstörungen), many of which Schneider incorporated into FRS.

CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE

From the beginning of Western descriptive psychopathology in the early 19th century, symptoms have been observed later described as first-rank by Schneider. A term "delusion of unseen agency"-closely related to Schneider's first-rank concept-was popular in the second half of the 19th century and described in publications as prominent as the Encyclopedia Britannica and New England Journal of Medicine. The descriptions of these specific symptoms, with substantial continuity, over more than 2 centuries and many countries, suggest that an understanding of their etiology would teach us something foundational about the psychotic illness.

De-othering “schizophrenia”

Do psychiatry and clinical psychology have an “other”? This article critically addresses the clinical-scientific fascination with diagnostic challenges and other psychiatric mysteries, focusing on the example of “schizophrenia,” often seen as the most severe and enigmatic of all mental disorders. Over a century of clinical and scientific discourse on schizophrenia has painted a portrait of something indecipherable at the very foundation of psychiatric inquiry. Despite entrenched beliefs, mounting evidence from both qualitative-phenomenological and quantitative research suggests that the experience of psychosis can be meaningfully understood. Further, there is a wealth of data indicating that persons with lived experience of psychosis can lead self-actualized lives, and new studies have revealed that psychotic experiences are common in non-clinical populations. Yet traditional views of psychosis persist in the face of this mounting evidence. I suggest that the key to de-othering schizophrenia may lie in an emerging body of research on “social defeat,” marginalization, and alienation. More specifically, the experiences and behaviors commonly designated as psychosis arise in social and interpersonal contexts that are distinctly alienating, including the psychiatric encounter. It follows that schizophrenia may not be the elusive empirical object of debates about unintelligibility or “ununderstandability,” but rather a social configuration that is manifest within the deadlock of this debate itself.

Eugen Bleuler's schizophrenia--a modern perspective

The introduction of the term and concept schizophrenia earned its inventor, Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler, worldwide fame. Prompted by the rejection of the main principle of Kraepelinian nosology, namely prognosis, Bleuler's belief in the clinical unity of what Kraepelin had described as dementia praecox required him to search for alternative characterizing features that would allow scientific description and classification. This led him to consider psychological, and to a lesser degree, social factors alongside an assumed underlying neurobiological disease process as constitutive of what he then termed schizophrenia, thus making him an early proponent of a bio-psycho-social understanding of mental illness. Reviewing Bleuler's conception of schizophrenia against the background of his overall clinical and theoretical work, this paper provides a critical overview of Bleuler's key nosological principles and links his work with present-day debates about naturalism, essentialism, and stigma.

Self-disturbances in schizophrenia: history, phenomenology, and relevant findings from research on metacognition

With a tradition of examining self-disturbances (Ichstörungen) in schizophrenia, phenomenological psychiatry studies the person's subjective experience without imposing theoretical agenda on what is reported. Although this tradition offers promising interface with current neurobiological models of schizophrenia, both the concept of Ichstörung and its history are not well understood. In this article, we discuss the meaning of Ichstörung, the role it played in the development of the concept of schizophrenia, and recent research on metacognition that allows for the quantitative study of the link between self-disturbance and outcome in schizophrenia. Phenomenological psychiatrists such as Blankenburg, Binswanger, and Conrad interpreted the Ichstörung as disturbed relationship to self and others, thus challenging recent efforts to interpret self-disturbance as diminished pure passive self-affection, which putatively "explains" schizophrenia and its various symptoms. Narrative is a reflective, embodied process, which requires a dynamic shifting of perspectives which, when compromised, may reflect disrupted binding of the components of self-experience. The Metacognition Assessment Scale-abbreviated as MAS-A-suggests that persons with schizophrenia tend to produce narratives with reductions in the binding processes required to produce an integrated, embodied self within narrated life stories, and in interactive relationships with others.