A conceptual lemon: theta burst stimulation to the left anterior temporal lobe untangles object representation and its canonical color

Disruption of Anterior Temporal Lobe Reduces Distortions in Memory From Category Knowledge

Memory retrieval does not provide a perfect recapitulation of past events, but instead an imperfect reconstruction of event-specific details and general knowledge. However, it remains unclear whether this reconstruction relies on mixtures of signals from different memory systems, including one supporting general knowledge. Here, we investigate whether the anterior temporal lobe (ATL) distorts new memories because of prior category knowledge. In this preregistered experiment (n = 36), participants encoded and retrieved image-location associations. Most images' locations were clustered according to their category, but some were in random locations. With this protocol, we previously demonstrated that randomly located images were retrieved closer to their category cluster relative to their encoded locations, suggesting an influence of category knowledge. We combined this procedure with TMS delivered to the left ATL before retrieval. We separately examined event-specific details (error) and category knowledge (bias) to identify distinct signals attributable to different memory systems. We found that TMS to ATL attenuated bias in location memory, but this effect was limited to exploratory analyses of atypical category members of animal categories. The magnitude of error was not impacted, suggesting that a memory's fidelity can be decoupled from its distortion by category knowledge. This raises the intriguing possibility that retrieval is jointly supported by separable memory systems.

Whole-Language and Item-Specific Inhibition in Bilingual Language Switching: The Role of Domain-General Inhibitory Control

A prominent theory of bilingual speech production holds that appropriate language selection is achieved via inhibitory control. Such inhibition may operate on the whole-language and/or item-specific level. In this study, we examined these two levels of control in parallel, by introducing a novel element into the traditional cued language switching paradigm: half of the stimuli were univalent (each required naming in the same language every time it appeared), and the other half were bivalent (each required naming in different languages on different trials). Contrasting switch and stay trials provided an index for whole-language inhibition, while contrasting bivalent and univalent stimuli provided an index for item-specific inhibition. We then investigated the involvement of domain-general brain mechanisms in these two levels of language control. Neuroimaging studies report activation of the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), a key region in the executive control brain network, during language switching tasks. However, it is unclear whether or not the pre-SMA plays a causal role in language control, and at which level it exerts control. Using repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to transiently disrupt the pre-SMA, we observed an essential role of this brain region in general speech execution, while evidence for its specific involvement in each level of inhibition remains inconclusive.

The Influence of Object-Color Knowledge on Emerging Object Representations in the Brain

The ability to rapidly and accurately recognize complex objects is a crucial function of the human visual system. To recognize an object, we need to bind incoming visual features, such as color and form, together into cohesive neural representations and integrate these with our preexisting knowledge about the world. For some objects, typical color is a central feature for recognition; for example, a banana is typically yellow. Here, we applied multivariate pattern analysis on time-resolved neuroimaging (MEG) data to examine how object-color knowledge affects emerging object representations over time. Our results from 20 participants (11 female) show that the typicality of object-color combinations influences object representations, although not at the initial stages of object and color processing. We find evidence that color decoding peaks later for atypical object-color combinations compared with typical object-color combinations, illustrating the interplay between processing incoming object features and stored object knowledge. Together, these results provide new insights into the integration of incoming visual information with existing conceptual object knowledge.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT To recognize objects, we have to be able to bind object features, such as color and shape, into one coherent representation and compare it with stored object knowledge. The MEG data presented here provide novel insights about the integration of incoming visual information with our knowledge about the world. Using color as a model to understand the interaction between seeing and knowing, we show that there is a unique pattern of brain activity for congruently colored objects (e.g., a yellow banana) relative to incongruently colored objects (e.g., a red banana). This effect of object-color knowledge only occurs after single object features are processed, demonstrating that conceptual knowledge is accessed relatively late in the visual processing hierarchy.

Group membership dictates the neural correlates of social optimism biases

Optimism bias, i.e. expecting the future to hold more desirable than undesirable outcomes, also extends to people that we like or admire. However, it remains unknown how the brain generates this social optimism bias. In this study, respondents estimated the likelihood of future desirable and undesirable outcomes for an in-group and three out-groups: warm-incompetent, cold-competent, and cold-incompetent. We found a strong social optimism bias for the in-group and the warm out-group and an inverted pattern for the cold-incompetent out-group. For all groups, scores of social optimism bias correlated with the brain activity in structures that respondents differentially engaged depending on the target social group. In line with our hypotheses, evaluating the in-group recruited the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex, whereas evaluating the warm out-group engaged the posterior insula, mid cingulate cortex, and somatosensory cortices. These findings suggest different underlying cognitive mechanisms of social optimism bias for these groups, despite similar behavioural patterns. Thinking about the cold out-groups recruited the right anterior temporal lobe, and temporoparietal junction. Evaluating the cold-incompetent out-group additionally recruited the anterior insula, inferior frontal cortex and dorsomedial frontal cortex. We discuss these neuroimaging findings with respect to their putative cognitive functions.

Does TMS Disruption of the Left Primary Motor Cortex Affect Verb Retrieval Following Exposure to Pantomimed Gestures?

Previous research suggests that meaning-laden gestures, even when produced in the absence of language (i.e., pantomimed gestures), influence lexical retrieval. Yet, little is known about the neural mechanisms that underlie this process. Based on embodied cognition theories, many studies have demonstrated motor cortex involvement in the representation of action verbs and in the understanding of actions. The present study aimed to investigate whether the motor system plays a critical role in the behavioral influence of pantomimed gestures on action naming. Continuous theta burst stimulation (cTBS) was applied over the hand area of the left primary motor cortex and to a control site (occipital cortex). An action-picture naming task followed cTBS. In the naming task, participants named action pictures that were preceded by videos of congruent pantomimed gestures, unrelated pantomimed gestures or a control video with no movement (as a neutral, non-gestural condition). In addition to behavioral measures of performance, cTBS-induced changes in corticospinal activity were assessed. We replicated previous finding that exposure to congruent pantomimed gestures facilitates word production, compared to unrelated or neutral primes. However, we found no evidence that the left primary motor area is crucially involved in the mechanism underlying behavioral facilitation effects of gesture on verb production. Although, at the group level, cTBS induced motor cortex suppression, at the individual level we found remarkable variability of cTBS effects on the motor cortex. We found cTBS induction of both inhibition of corticospinal activity (with slower behavioral of responses) and enhancement (with faster behavioral responses). Our findings cast doubt on assumptions that the motor cortex is causally involved in the impact of gestures on action-word processing. Our results also highlight the importance of careful consideration of interindividual variability for the interpretation of cTBS effects.

Exploring the functional nature of synaesthetic colour: Dissociations from colour perception and imagery

Individuals with grapheme-colour synaesthesia experience anomalous colours when reading achromatic text. These unusual experiences have been said to resemble 'normal' colour perception or colour imagery, but studying the nature of synaesthesia remains difficult. In the present study, we report novel evidence that synaesthetic colour impacts conscious vision in a way that is different from both colour perception and imagery. Presenting 'normal' colour prior to binocular rivalry induces a location-dependent suppressive bias reflecting local habituation. By contrast, a grapheme that evokes synaesthetic colour induces a facilitatory bias reflecting priming that is not constrained to the inducing grapheme's location. This priming does not occur in non-synaesthetes and does not result from response bias. It is sensitive to diversion of visual attention away from the grapheme, but resistant to sensory perturbation, reflecting a reliance on cognitive rather than sensory mechanisms. Whereas colour imagery in non-synaesthetes causes local priming that relies on the locus of imagined colour, imagery in synaesthetes caused global priming not dependent on the locus of imagery. These data suggest a unique psychophysical profile of high-level colour processing in synaesthetes. Our novel findings and method will be critical to testing theories of synaesthesia and visual awareness.

Gray Bananas and a Red Letter A - From Synesthetic Sensation to Memory Colors

Grapheme-color synesthesia is a condition in which objectively achromatic graphemes induce concurrent color experiences. While it was long thought that the colors emerge during perception, there is growing support for the view that colors are integral to synesthetes' cognitive representations of graphemes. In this work, we review evidence for two opposing theories positing either a perceptual or cognitive origin of concurrent colors: the cross-activation theory and the conceptual-mediation model. The review covers results on inducer and concurrent color processing as well as findings concerning the brain structure and grapheme-color mappings in synesthetes and trained mappings in nonsynesthetes. The results support different aspects of both theories. Finally, we discuss how research on memory colors could provide a new perspective in the debate about the level of processing at which the synesthetic colors occur.

Controlled semantic cognition relies upon dynamic and flexible interactions between the executive 'semantic control' and hub-and-spoke 'semantic representation' systems

Built upon a wealth of neuroimaging, neurostimulation, and neuropsychology data, a recent proposal set forth a framework termed controlled semantic cognition (CSC) to account for how the brain underpins the ability to flexibly use semantic knowledge (Lambon Ralph et al., 2017; Nature Reviews Neuroscience). In CSC, the ‘semantic control’ system, underpinned predominantly by the prefrontal cortex, dynamically monitors and modulates the ‘semantic representation’ system that consists of a ‘hub’ (anterior temporal lobe, ATL) and multiple ‘spokes’ (modality-specific areas). CSC predicts that unfamiliar and exacting semantic tasks should intensify communication between the ‘control’ and ‘representation’ systems, relative to familiar and less taxing tasks. In the present study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to test this hypothesis. Participants paired unrelated concepts by canonical colours (a less accustomed task – e.g., pairing ketchup with fire-extinguishers due to both being red) or paired well-related concepts by semantic relationship (a typical task – e.g., ketchup is related to mustard). We found the ‘control’ system was more engaged by atypical than typical pairing. While both tasks activated the ATL ‘hub’, colour pairing additionally involved occipitotemporal ‘spoke’ regions abutting areas of hue perception. Furthermore, we uncovered a gradient along the ventral temporal cortex, transitioning from the caudal ‘spoke’ zones preferring canonical colour processing to the rostral ‘hub’ zones preferring semantic relationship. Functional connectivity also differed between the tasks: Compared with semantic pairing, colour pairing relied more upon the inferior frontal gyrus, a key node of the control system, driving enhanced connectivity with occipitotemporal ‘spoke’. Together, our findings characterise the interaction within the neural architecture of semantic cognition – the control system dynamically heightens its connectivity with relevant components of the representation system, in response to different semantic contents and difficulty levels.

Task-Related Dynamic Division of Labor Between Anterior Temporal and Lateral Occipital Cortices in Representing Object Size

Object size is represented by functionally distinct sectors along the ventral visual pathway. The early visual cortex encodes objects' sensory-retinal size. Subsequently, the occipitotemporal cortex computes objects' canonical size based on statistical regularities of visual features. Although the neurocomputation of size has been studied in a "bottom-up" sensory-driven framework, little is known about how perceptual size information is transformed into conceptual knowledge and how this computation is modulated by "top-down" goal-driven signals. Using continuous theta burst stimulation, we demonstrated that behavioral goal shapes the neurocognitive network underpinning object size. We manipulated the congruency of perceptual versus conceptual object size, which provides a robust behavioral probe reflecting implicit size knowledge. Neurostimulation was targeted at the lateral occipital cortex (LOC), a key region for object perception, or the anterior temporal lobe (ATL), a "hub" of supramodal conceptual processing. We observed striking contextual modulation of the neurocognitive architecture: when human participants judged perceptual size, the congruency effect was significantly attenuated by LOC stimulation but stayed resilient to ATL stimulation. By contrast, when they judged conceptual size, both LOC and ATL stimulation eradicated the otherwise robust effect. Our findings demonstrate disparate functional profiles of the LOC and ATL, providing the first evidence of a malleable network adaptively altering its division of labor with top-down states. The LOC, regardless of task demand, automatically represents "bottom-up" statistical regularities of visual conformation (reflecting typical object size), whereas the ATL contributes to this computation when the context requires semantically based linkage of visual attributes to object recognition.

SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT

In the present study, we provide compelling evidence that the "top-down" cognitive state of an observer changes the dynamic interaction between different subregions of the ventral temporal cortex. Using inhibitory neurostimulation combined with a novel paradigm, we demonstrate a flexible division of labor in the neurocognitive architecture that underpins size knowledge: the lateral occipital cortex codes perceptually based aspects (statistical visual configuration of small/large objects), whereas the anterior temporal lobe represents semantically based aspects (object identity), with their involvement interactively weighted by task demand. The interactive nature of the ventral temporal cortex highlights how top-down modulation constrains and shapes neural representations in the visual system.

The anterior temporal cortex is a primary semantic source of top-down influences on object recognition

Perception emerges from a dynamic interplay between feed-forward sensory input and feedback modulation along the cascade of neural processing. Prior knowledge, a major form of top-down modulatory signal, benefits perception by enabling efficacious inference and resolving ambiguity, particularly under circumstances of degraded visual input. Despite semantic information being a potentially critical source of this top-down influence, to date, the core neural substrate of semantic knowledge (the anterolateral temporal lobe – ATL) has not been considered as a key component of the feedback system. Here we provide direct evidence of its significance for visual cognition – the ATL underpins the semantic aspect of object recognition, amalgamating sensory-based (amount of accumulated sensory input) and semantic-based (representational proximity between exemplars and typicality of appearance) influences. Using transcranial theta-burst stimulation combined with a novel visual identification paradigm, we demonstrate that the left ATL contributes to discrimination between visual objects. Crucially, its contribution is especially vital under situations where semantic knowledge is most needed for supplementing deficiency of input (brief visual exposure), discerning analogously-coded exemplars (close representational distance), and resolving discordance (target appearance violating the statistical typicality of its category). Our findings characterise functional properties of the ATL in object recognition: this neural structure is summoned to augment the visual system when the latter is overtaxed by challenging conditions (insufficient input, overlapped neural coding, and conflict between incoming signal and expected configuration). This suggests a need to revisit current theories of object recognition, incorporating the ATL that interfaces high-level vision with semantic knowledge.

Multisensory integration and cross-modal learning in synaesthesia: A unifying model

Recent research into synaesthesia has highlighted the role of learning, yet synaesthesia is clearly a genetic condition. Here we ask how can the idea that synaesthesia reflects innate, genetic differences be reconciled with models that suggest it is driven by learning. A number of lines of evidence suggest that synaesthesia relies on, or at least interacts with, processes of multisensory integration that are common across all people. These include multisensory activations that arise in early regions of the brain as well as feedback from longer-term cross-modal associations generated in memory. These cognitive processes may interact independently to influence the phenomenology of the synaesthetic experience, as well as the individual differences within particular types of synaesthesia. The theoretical framework presented here is consistent with both an innate difference as the fundamental driver of the condition of synaesthesia, and with experiential and semantic influences on the eventual phenotype that emerges. In particular, it proposes that the internally generated synaesthetic percepts are treated similarly to other sensory information as the brain is learning the multisensory attributes of objects and developing cross-modal associations that merge in the concept of the object.

The Timing of Anterior Temporal Lobe Involvement in Semantic Processing

Despite indications that regions within the anterior temporal lobe (ATL) might make a crucial contribution to pan-modal semantic representation, to date there have been no investigations of when during semantic processing the ATL plays a critical role. To test the timing of the ATL involvement in semantic processing, we studied the effect of double-pulse TMS on behavioral responses in semantic and difficulty-matched control tasks. Chronometric TMS was delivered over the left ATL (10 mm from the tip of the temporal pole along the middle temporal gyrus). During each trial, two pulses of TMS (40 msec apart) were delivered either at baseline (before stimulus presentation) or at one of the experimental time points 100, 250, 400, and 800 msec poststimulus onset. A significant disruption to performance was identified from 400 msec on the semantic task but not on the control assessment. Our results not only reinforce the key role of the left ATL in semantic representation but also indicate that its contribution is especially important around 400 msec poststimulus onset. Together, these facts suggest that the ATL may be one of the neural sources of the N400 ERP component.

Neurobiological roots of language in primate audition: common computational properties

Here, we present a new perspective on an old question: how does the neurobiology of human language relate to brain systems in nonhuman primates? We argue that higher-order language combinatorics, including sentence and discourse processing, can be situated in a unified, cross-species dorsal-ventral streams architecture for higher auditory processing, and that the functions of the dorsal and ventral streams in higher-order language processing can be grounded in their respective computational properties in primate audition. This view challenges an assumption, common in the cognitive sciences, that a nonhuman primate model forms an inherently inadequate basis for modeling higher-level language functions.

The role of conceptual knowledge in understanding synaesthesia: Evaluating contemporary findings from a "hub-and-spokes" perspective

Synesthesia is a phenomenon in which stimulation in one sensory modality triggers involuntary experiences typically not associated with that stimulation. Inducing stimuli (inducers) and synesthetic experiences (concurrents) may occur within the same modality (e.g., seeing colors while reading achromatic text) or span across different modalities (e.g., tasting flavors while listening to music). Although there has been considerable progress over the last decade in understanding the cognitive and neural mechanisms of synesthesia, the focus of current neurocognitive models of synesthesia does not encompass many crucial psychophysical characteristics documented in behavioral research. Prominent theories of the neurophysiological basis of synesthesia construe it as a perceptual phenomenon and hence focus primarily on the modality-specific brain regions for perception. Many behavioral studies, however, suggest an essential role for conceptual-level information in synesthesia. For example, there is evidence that synesthetic experience arises subsequent to identification of an inducing stimulus, differs substantially from real perceptual events, can be akin to perceptual memory, and is susceptible to lexical/semantic contexts. These data suggest that neural mechanisms lying beyond the realm of the perceptual cortex (especially the visual system), such as regions subserving conceptual knowledge, may play pivotal roles in the neural architecture of synesthesia. Here we discuss the significance of non-perceptual mechanisms that call for a re-evaluation of the emphasis on synesthesia as a perceptual phenomenon. We also review recent studies which hint that some aspects of synesthesia resemble our general conceptual knowledge for object attributes, at both psychophysical and neural levels. We then present a conceptual-mediation model of synesthesia in which the inducer and concurrent are linked within a conceptual-level representation. This “inducer-to-concurrent” nexus is maintained within a supramodal “hub,” while the subjective (bodily) experience of its resultant concurrent (e.g., a color) may then require activation of “spokes” in the perception-related cortices. This hypothesized “hub-and-spoke” structure would engage a distributed network of cortical regions and may account for the full breadth of this intriguing phenomenon.