The Language Network Is Recruited but Not Required for Nonverbal Event Semantics

Linguistic inputs must be syntactically parsable to fully engage the language network

Human language comprehension is remarkably robust to ill-formed inputs (e.g., word transpositions). This robustness has led some to argue that syntactic parsing is largely an illusion, and that incremental comprehension is more heuristic, shallow, and semantics-based than is often assumed. However, the available data are also consistent with the possibility that humans always perform rule-like symbolic parsing and simply deploy error correction mechanisms to reconstruct ill-formed inputs when needed. We put these hypotheses to a new stringent test by examining brain responses to a) stimuli that should pose a challenge for syntactic reconstruction but allow for complex meanings to be built within local contexts through associative/shallow processing (sentences presented in a backward word order), and b) grammatically well-formed but semantically implausible sentences that should impede semantics-based heuristic processing. Using a novel behavioral syntactic reconstruction paradigm, we demonstrate that backward-presented sentences indeed impede the recovery of grammatical structure during incremental comprehension. Critically, these backward-presented stimuli elicit a relatively low response in the language areas, as measured with fMRI. In contrast, semantically implausible but grammatically well-formed sentences elicit a response in the language areas similar in magnitude to naturalistic (plausible) sentences. In other words, the ability to build syntactic structures during incremental language processing is both necessary and sufficient to fully engage the language network. Taken together, these results provide strongest to date support for a generalized reliance of human language comprehension on syntactic parsing.

The Language Network Reliably "Tracks" Naturalistic Meaningful Nonverbal Stimuli

The language network, comprised of brain regions in the left frontal and temporal cortex, responds robustly and reliably during language comprehension but shows little or no response during many nonlinguistic cognitive tasks (e.g., Fedorenko & Blank, 2020). However, one domain whose relationship with language remains debated is semantics-our conceptual knowledge of the world. Given that the language network responds strongly to meaningful linguistic stimuli, could some of this response be driven by the presence of rich conceptual representations encoded in linguistic inputs? In this study, we used a naturalistic cognition paradigm to test whether the cognitive and neural resources that are responsible for language processing are also recruited for processing semantically rich nonverbal stimuli. To do so, we measured BOLD responses to a set of ∼5-minute-long video and audio clips that consisted of meaningful event sequences but did not contain any linguistic content. We then used the intersubject correlation (ISC) approach (Hasson et al., 2004) to examine the extent to which the language network "tracks" these stimuli, that is, exhibits stimulus-related variation. Across all the regions of the language network, meaningful nonverbal stimuli elicited reliable ISCs. These ISCs were higher than the ISCs elicited by semantically impoverished nonverbal stimuli (e.g., a music clip), but substantially lower than the ISCs elicited by linguistic stimuli. Our results complement earlier findings from controlled experiments (e.g., Ivanova et al., 2021) in providing further evidence that the language network shows some sensitivity to semantic content in nonverbal stimuli.

Tracking Components of Bilingual Language Control in Speech Production: An fMRI Study Using Functional Localizers

When bilingual speakers switch back to speaking in their native language (L1) after having used their second language (L2), they often experience difficulty in retrieving words in their L1. This phenomenon is referred to as the L2 after-effect. We used the L2 after-effect as a lens to explore the neural bases of bilingual language control mechanisms. Our goal was twofold: first, to explore whether bilingual language control draws on domain-general or language-specific mechanisms; second, to investigate the precise mechanism(s) that drive the L2 after-effect. We used a precision fMRI approach based on functional localizers to measure the extent to which the brain activity that reflects the L2 after-effect overlaps with the language network (Fedorenko et al., 2010) and the domain-general multiple demand network (Duncan, 2010), as well as three task-specific networks that tap into interference resolution, lexical retrieval, and articulation. Forty-two Polish-English bilinguals participated in the study. Our results show that the L2 after-effect reflects increased engagement of domain-general but not language-specific resources. Furthermore, contrary to previously proposed interpretations, we did not find evidence that the effect reflects increased difficulty related to lexical access, articulation, and the resolution of lexical interference. We propose that difficulty of speech production in the picture naming paradigm-manifested as the L2 after-effect-reflects interference at a nonlinguistic level of task schemas or a general increase of cognitive control engagement during speech production in L1 after L2.

Dissociating language and thought in large language models

Large language models (LLMs) have come closest among all models to date to mastering human language, yet opinions about their linguistic and cognitive capabilities remain split. Here, we evaluate LLMs using a distinction between formal linguistic competence (knowledge of linguistic rules and patterns) and functional linguistic competence (understanding and using language in the world). We ground this distinction in human neuroscience, which has shown that formal and functional competence rely on different neural mechanisms. Although LLMs are surprisingly good at formal competence, their performance on functional competence tasks remains spotty and often requires specialized fine-tuning and/or coupling with external modules. We posit that models that use language in human-like ways would need to master both of these competence types, which, in turn, could require the emergence of separate mechanisms specialized for formal versus functional linguistic competence.

Distributed Sensitivity to Syntax and Semantics throughout the Language Network

Human language is expressive because it is compositional: The meaning of a sentence (semantics) can be inferred from its structure (syntax). It is commonly believed that language syntax and semantics are processed by distinct brain regions. Here, we revisit this claim using precision fMRI methods to capture separation or overlap of function in the brains of individual participants. Contrary to prior claims, we find distributed sensitivity to both syntax and semantics throughout a broad frontotemporal brain network. Our results join a growing body of evidence for an integrated network for language in the human brain within which internal specialization is primarily a matter of degree rather than kind, in contrast with influential proposals that advocate distinct specialization of different brain areas for different types of linguistic functions.

Language is primarily a tool for communication rather than thought

Language is a defining characteristic of our species, but the function, or functions, that it serves has been debated for centuries. Here we bring recent evidence from neuroscience and allied disciplines to argue that in modern humans, language is a tool for communication, contrary to a prominent view that we use language for thinking. We begin by introducing the brain network that supports linguistic ability in humans. We then review evidence for a double dissociation between language and thought, and discuss several properties of language that suggest that it is optimized for communication. We conclude that although the emergence of language has unquestionably transformed human culture, language does not appear to be a prerequisite for complex thought, including symbolic thought. Instead, language is a powerful tool for the transmission of cultural knowledge; it plausibly co-evolved with our thinking and reasoning capacities, and only reflects, rather than gives rise to, the signature sophistication of human cognition.

The language network as a natural kind within the broader landscape of the human brain

Language behaviour is complex, but neuroscientific evidence disentangles it into distinct components supported by dedicated brain areas or networks. In this Review, we describe the 'core' language network, which includes left-hemisphere frontal and temporal areas, and show that it is strongly interconnected, independent of input and output modalities, causally important for language and language-selective. We discuss evidence that this language network plausibly stores language knowledge and supports core linguistic computations related to accessing words and constructions from memory and combining them to interpret (decode) or generate (encode) linguistic messages. We emphasize that the language network works closely with, but is distinct from, both lower-level - perceptual and motor - mechanisms and higher-level systems of knowledge and reasoning. The perceptual and motor mechanisms process linguistic signals, but, in contrast to the language network, are sensitive only to these signals' surface properties, not their meanings; the systems of knowledge and reasoning (such as the system that supports social reasoning) are sometimes engaged during language use but are not language-selective. This Review lays a foundation both for in-depth investigations of these different components of the language processing pipeline and for probing inter-component interactions.

High-level language brain regions process sublexical regularities

A network of left frontal and temporal brain regions supports language processing. This "core" language network stores our knowledge of words and constructions as well as constraints on how those combine to form sentences. However, our linguistic knowledge additionally includes information about phonemes and how they combine to form phonemic clusters, syllables, and words. Are phoneme combinatorics also represented in these language regions? Across five functional magnetic resonance imaging experiments, we investigated the sensitivity of high-level language processing brain regions to sublexical linguistic regularities by examining responses to diverse nonwords-sequences of phonemes that do not constitute real words (e.g. punes, silory, flope). We establish robust responses in the language network to visually (experiment 1a, n = 605) and auditorily (experiments 1b, n = 12, and 1c, n = 13) presented nonwords. In experiment 2 (n = 16), we find stronger responses to nonwords that are more well-formed, i.e. obey the phoneme-combinatorial constraints of English. Finally, in experiment 3 (n = 14), we provide suggestive evidence that the responses in experiments 1 and 2 are not due to the activation of real words that share some phonology with the nonwords. The results suggest that sublexical regularities are stored and processed within the same fronto-temporal network that supports lexical and syntactic processes.

Sniffing out meaning: Chemosensory and semantic neural network changes in sommeliers

Wine tasting is a very complex process that integrates a combination of sensation, language, and memory. Taste and smell provide perceptual information that, together with the semantic narrative that converts flavor into words, seem to be processed differently between sommeliers and naïve wine consumers. We investigate whether sommeliers' wine experience shapes only chemosensory processing, as has been previously demonstrated, or if it also modulates the way in which the taste and olfactory circuits interact with the semantic network. Combining diffusion-weighted images and fMRI (activation and connectivity) we investigated whether brain response to tasting wine differs between sommeliers and nonexperts (1) in the sensory neural circuits representing flavor and/or (2) in the neural circuits for language and memory. We demonstrate that training in wine tasting shapes the microstructure of the left and right superior longitudinal fasciculus. Using mediation analysis, we showed that the experience modulates the relationship between fractional anisotropy and behavior: the higher the fractional anisotropy the higher the capacity to recognize wine complexity. In addition, we found functional differences between sommeliers and naïve consumers affecting the flavor sensory circuit, but also regions involved in semantic operations. The former reflects a capacity for differential sensory processing, while the latter reflects sommeliers' ability to attend to relevant sensory inputs and translate them into complex verbal descriptions. The enhanced synchronization between these apparently independent circuits suggests that sommeliers integrated these descriptions with previous semantic knowledge to optimize their capacity to distinguish between subtle differences in the qualitative character of the wine.

Electrophysiological hallmarks for event relations and event roles in working memory

The ability to maintain events (i.e., interactions between/among objects) in working memory is crucial for our everyday cognition, yet the format of this representation is poorly understood. The current ERP study was designed to answer two questions: How is maintaining events (e.g., the tiger hit the lion) neurally different from maintaining item coordinations (e.g., the tiger and the lion)? That is, how is the event relation (present in events but not coordinations) represented? And how is the agent, or initiator of the event encoded differently from the patient, or receiver of the event during maintenance? We used a novel picture-sentence match-across-delay approach in which the working memory representation was "pinged" during the delay, replicated across two ERP experiments with Chinese and English materials. We found that maintenance of events elicited a long-lasting late sustained difference in posterior-occipital electrodes relative to non-events. This effect resembled the negative slow wave reported in previous studies of working memory, suggesting that the maintenance of events in working memory may impose a higher cost compared to coordinations. Although we did not observe significant ERP differences associated with pinging the agent vs. the patient during the delay, we did find that the ping appeared to dampen the ongoing sustained difference, suggesting a shift from sustained activity to activity silent mechanisms. These results suggest a new method by which ERPs can be used to elucidate the format of neural representation for events in working memory.

Time course of EEG complexity reflects attentional engagement during listening to speech in noise

Auditory distractions are recognized to considerably challenge the quality of information encoding during speech comprehension. This study explores electroencephalography (EEG) microstate dynamics in ecologically valid, noisy settings, aiming to uncover how these auditory distractions influence the process of information encoding during speech comprehension. We examined three listening scenarios: (1) speech perception with background noise (LA), (2) focused attention on the background noise (BA), and (3) intentional disregard of the background noise (BUA). Our findings showed that microstate complexity and unpredictability increased when attention was directed towards speech compared with tasks without speech (LA > BA & BUA). Notably, the time elapsed between the recurrence of microstates increased significantly in LA compared with both BA and BUA. This suggests that coping with background noise during speech comprehension demands more sustained cognitive effort. Additionally, a two-stage time course for both microstate complexity and alpha-to-theta power ratio was observed. Specifically, in the early epochs, a lower level was observed, which gradually increased and eventually reached a steady level in the later epochs. The findings suggest that the initial stage is primarily driven by sensory processes and information gathering, while the second stage involves higher level cognitive engagement, including mnemonic binding and memory encoding.

Event Knowledge in Large Language Models: The Gap Between the Impossible and the Unlikely

Word co-occurrence patterns in language corpora contain a surprising amount of conceptual knowledge. Large language models (LLMs), trained to predict words in context, leverage these patterns to achieve impressive performance on diverse semantic tasks requiring world knowledge. An important but understudied question about LLMs' semantic abilities is whether they acquire generalized knowledge of common events. Here, we test whether five pretrained LLMs (from 2018's BERT to 2023's MPT) assign a higher likelihood to plausible descriptions of agent-patient interactions than to minimally different implausible versions of the same event. Using three curated sets of minimal sentence pairs (total n = 1215), we found that pretrained LLMs possess substantial event knowledge, outperforming other distributional language models. In particular, they almost always assign a higher likelihood to possible versus impossible events (The teacher bought the laptop vs. The laptop bought the teacher). However, LLMs show less consistent preferences for likely versus unlikely events (The nanny tutored the boy vs. The boy tutored the nanny). In follow-up analyses, we show that (i) LLM scores are driven by both plausibility and surface-level sentence features, (ii) LLM scores generalize well across syntactic variants (active vs. passive constructions) but less well across semantic variants (synonymous sentences), (iii) some LLM errors mirror human judgment ambiguity, and (iv) sentence plausibility serves as an organizing dimension in internal LLM representations. Overall, our results show that important aspects of event knowledge naturally emerge from distributional linguistic patterns, but also highlight a gap between representations of possible/impossible and likely/unlikely events.

Driving and suppressing the human language network using large language models

Transformer models such as GPT generate human-like language and are highly predictive of human brain responses to language. Here, using fMRI-measured brain responses to 1,000 diverse sentences, we first show that a GPT-based encoding model can predict the magnitude of brain response associated with each sentence. Then, we use the model to identify new sentences that are predicted to drive or suppress responses in the human language network. We show that these model-selected novel sentences indeed strongly drive and suppress activity of human language areas in new individuals. A systematic analysis of the model-selected sentences reveals that surprisal and well-formedness of linguistic input are key determinants of response strength in the language network. These results establish the ability of neural network models to not only mimic human language but also noninvasively control neural activity in higher-level cortical areas, like the language network.

The spatiotemporal dynamics of semantic integration in the human brain

Language depends critically on the integration of lexical information across multiple words to derive semantic concepts. Limitations of spatiotemporal resolution have previously rendered it difficult to isolate processes involved in semantic integration. We utilized intracranial recordings in epilepsy patients (n = 58) who read written word definitions. Descriptions were either referential or non-referential to a common object. Semantically referential sentences enabled high frequency broadband gamma activation (70-150 Hz) of the inferior frontal sulcus (IFS), medial parietal cortex, orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and medial temporal lobe in the left, language-dominant hemisphere. IFS, OFC and posterior middle temporal gyrus activity was modulated by the semantic coherence of non-referential sentences, exposing semantic effects that were independent of task-based referential status. Components of this network, alongside posterior superior temporal sulcus, were engaged for referential sentences that did not clearly reduce the lexical search space by the final word. These results indicate the existence of complementary cortical mosaics for semantic integration in posterior temporal and inferior frontal cortex.

The language network is not engaged in object categorization

The relationship between language and thought is the subject of long-standing debate. One claim states that language facilitates categorization of objects based on a certain feature (e.g. color) through the use of category labels that reduce interference from other, irrelevant features. Therefore, language impairment is expected to affect categorization of items grouped by a single feature (low-dimensional categories, e.g. "Yellow Things") more than categorization of items that share many features (high-dimensional categories, e.g. "Animals"). To test this account, we conducted two behavioral studies with individuals with aphasia and an fMRI experiment with healthy adults. The aphasia studies showed that selective low-dimensional categorization impairment was present in some, but not all, individuals with severe anomia and was not characteristic of aphasia in general. fMRI results revealed little activity in language-responsive brain regions during both low- and high-dimensional categorization; instead, categorization recruited the domain-general multiple-demand network (involved in wide-ranging cognitive tasks). Combined, results demonstrate that the language system is not implicated in object categorization. Instead, selective low-dimensional categorization impairment might be caused by damage to brain regions responsible for cognitive control. Our work adds to the growing evidence of the dissociation between the language system and many cognitive tasks in adults.

Electrophysiological connectivity of logical deduction: Early cortical MEG study

Complex human reasoning involves minimal abilities to extract conclusions implied in the available information. These abilities are considered "deductive" because they exemplify certain abstract relations among propositions or probabilities called deductive arguments. However, the electrophysiological dynamics which supports such complex cognitive processes has not been addressed yet. In this work we consider typically deductive logico-probabilistically valid inferences and aim to verify or refute their electrophysiological functional connectivity differences from invalid inferences with the same content (same relational variables, same stimuli, same relevant and salient features). We recorded the brain electrophysiological activity of 20 participants (age = 20.35 ± 3.23) by means of an MEG system during two consecutive reasoning tasks: a search task (invalid condition) without any specific deductive rules to follow, and a logically valid deductive task (valid condition) with explicit deductive rules as instructions. We calculated the functional connectivity (FC) for each condition and conducted a seed-based analysis in a set of cortical regions of interest. Finally, we used a cluster-based permutation test to compare the differences between logically valid and invalid conditions in terms of FC. As a first novel result we found higher FC for valid condition in beta band between regions of interest and left prefrontal, temporal, parietal, and cingulate structures. FC analysis allows a second novel result which is the definition of a propositional network with operculo-cingular, parietal and medial nodes, specifically including disputed medial deductive "core" areas. The experiment discloses measurable cortical processes which do not depend on content but on truth-functional propositional operators. These experimental novelties may contribute to understand the cortical bases of deductive processes.

Constructed languages are processed by the same brain mechanisms as natural languages

What constitutes a language? Natural languages share some features with other domains: from math, to music, to gesture. However, the brain mechanisms that process linguistic input are highly specialized, showing little or no response to diverse non-linguistic tasks. Here, we examine constructed languages (conlangs) to ask whether they draw on the same neural mechanisms as natural languages, or whether they instead pattern with domains like math and logic. Using individual-subject fMRI analyses, we show that understanding conlangs recruits the same brain areas as natural language comprehension. This result holds for Esperanto (n=19 speakers)- created to resemble natural languages-and fictional conlangs (Klingon (n=10), Na'vi (n=9), High Valyrian (n=3), and Dothraki (n=3)), created to differ from natural languages, and suggests that conlangs and natural languages share critical features and that the notable differences between conlangs and natural language are not consequential for the cognitive and neural mechanisms that they engage.

The Agent Preference in Visual Event Apprehension

A central aspect of human experience and communication is understanding events in terms of agent ("doer") and patient ("undergoer" of action) roles. These event roles are rooted in general cognition and prominently encoded in language, with agents appearing as more salient and preferred over patients. An unresolved question is whether this preference for agents already operates during apprehension, that is, the earliest stage of event processing, and if so, whether the effect persists across different animacy configurations and task demands. Here we contrast event apprehension in two tasks and two languages that encode agents differently; Basque, a language that explicitly case-marks agents ('ergative'), and Spanish, which does not mark agents. In two brief exposure experiments, native Basque and Spanish speakers saw pictures for only 300 ms, and subsequently described them or answered probe questions about them. We compared eye fixations and behavioral correlates of event role extraction with Bayesian regression. Agents received more attention and were recognized better across languages and tasks. At the same time, language and task demands affected the attention to agents. Our findings show that a general preference for agents exists in event apprehension, but it can be modulated by task and language demands.

Activating words without language: beta and theta oscillations reflect lexical access and control processes during verbal and non-verbal object recognition tasks

The intention to name an object modulates neural responses during object recognition tasks. However, the nature of this modulation is still unclear. We established whether a core operation in language, i.e. lexical access, can be observed even when the task does not require language (size-judgment task), and whether response selection in verbal versus non-verbal semantic tasks relies on similar neuronal processes. We measured and compared neuronal oscillatory activities and behavioral responses to the same set of pictures of meaningful objects, while the type of task participants had to perform (picture-naming versus size-judgment) and the type of stimuli to measure lexical access (cognate versus non-cognate) were manipulated. Despite activation of words was facilitated when the task required explicit word-retrieval (picture-naming task), lexical access occurred even without the intention to name the object (non-verbal size-judgment task). Activation of words and response selection were accompanied by beta (25-35 Hz) desynchronization and theta (3-7 Hz) synchronization, respectively. These effects were observed in both picture-naming and size-judgment tasks, suggesting that words became activated via similar mechanisms, irrespective of whether the task involves language explicitly. This finding has important implications to understand the link between core linguistic operations and performance in verbal and non-verbal semantic tasks.

Precision fMRI reveals that the language-selective network supports both phrase-structure building and lexical access during language production

A fronto-temporal brain network has long been implicated in language comprehension. However, this network's role in language production remains debated. In particular, it remains unclear whether all or only some language regions contribute to production, and which aspects of production these regions support. Across 3 functional magnetic resonance imaging experiments that rely on robust individual-subject analyses, we characterize the language network's response to high-level production demands. We report 3 novel results. First, sentence production, spoken or typed, elicits a strong response throughout the language network. Second, the language network responds to both phrase-structure building and lexical access demands, although the response to phrase-structure building is stronger and more spatially extensive, present in every language region. Finally, contra some proposals, we find no evidence of brain regions-within or outside the language network-that selectively support phrase-structure building in production relative to comprehension. Instead, all language regions respond more strongly during production than comprehension, suggesting that production incurs a greater cost for the language network. Together, these results align with the idea that language comprehension and production draw on the same knowledge representations, which are stored in a distributed manner within the language-selective network and are used to both interpret and generate linguistic utterances.

Causal Contributions of the Domain-General (Multiple Demand) and the Language-Selective Brain Networks to Perceptual and Semantic Challenges in Speech Comprehension

Listening to spoken language engages domain-general multiple demand (MD; frontoparietal) regions of the human brain, in addition to domain-selective (frontotemporal) language regions, particularly when comprehension is challenging. However, there is limited evidence that the MD network makes a functional contribution to core aspects of understanding language. In a behavioural study of volunteers (n = 19) with chronic brain lesions, but without aphasia, we assessed the causal role of these networks in perceiving, comprehending, and adapting to spoken sentences made more challenging by acoustic-degradation or lexico-semantic ambiguity. We measured perception of and adaptation to acoustically degraded (noise-vocoded) sentences with a word report task before and after training. Participants with greater damage to MD but not language regions required more vocoder channels to achieve 50% word report, indicating impaired perception. Perception improved following training, reflecting adaptation to acoustic degradation, but adaptation was unrelated to lesion location or extent. Comprehension of spoken sentences with semantically ambiguous words was measured with a sentence coherence judgement task. Accuracy was high and unaffected by lesion location or extent. Adaptation to semantic ambiguity was measured in a subsequent word association task, which showed that availability of lower-frequency meanings of ambiguous words increased following their comprehension (word-meaning priming). Word-meaning priming was reduced for participants with greater damage to language but not MD regions. Language and MD networks make dissociable contributions to challenging speech comprehension: Using recent experience to update word meaning preferences depends on language-selective regions, whereas the domain-general MD network plays a causal role in reporting words from degraded speech.

A general theory of consciousness II: The language problem

It is generally assumed that what we hear in our head is what we think and that, when we tell a thought to somebody else, the other person understands what our thought has been. This paper analyzes how we think and what happens when we communicate our thoughts verbally to others and to ourselves. The assumption that we become conscious in language is erroneous: verbal communication is only an intermediary. The conscious experience of verbal communication is a sensory phenomenon. We think through sensory images (see Part I). This natural way of thinking, is a very refined and accurate method of translating thought into consciousness. It expresses our essentially unconscious neural cognitive activity in conscious sensory images: visual thinkers 'see' what they have thought. Why humans use verbal communication to express their thoughts to themselves is difficult to understand as the verbal way is extremely limited. The complex parallel cognitive activity has to be encoded into language tokens which are positioned sequentially as a string of symbols which somehow must express something comparable. Talking to oneself is directed to an imaginary person who is assumed to be the talking person himself. This imaginary person develops with the inner voice in infants and when the child grows up, that imaginary person remains there, somebody he talks to when he thinks and to which he attributes his feelings and his actions. The imaginary person is experienced as the human Self, but actually verbalizes the thoughts of the natural - animal - Self.

Differential Tracking of Linguistic vs. Mental State Content in Naturalistic Stimuli by Language and Theory of Mind (ToM) Brain Networks

Language and social cognition, especially the ability to reason about mental states, known as theory of mind (ToM), are deeply related in development and everyday use. However, whether these cognitive faculties rely on distinct, overlapping, or the same mechanisms remains debated. Some evidence suggests that, by adulthood, language and ToM draw on largely distinct-though plausibly interacting-cortical networks. However, the broad topography of these networks is similar, and some have emphasized the importance of social content / communicative intent in the linguistic signal for eliciting responses in the language areas. Here, we combine the power of individual-subject functional localization with the naturalistic-cognition inter-subject correlation approach to illuminate the language-ToM relationship. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we recorded neural activity as participants (n = 43) listened to stories and dialogues with mental state content (+linguistic, +ToM), viewed silent animations and live action films with mental state content but no language (-linguistic, +ToM), or listened to an expository text (+linguistic, -ToM). The ToM network robustly tracked stimuli rich in mental state information regardless of whether mental states were conveyed linguistically or non-linguistically, while tracking a +linguistic / -ToM stimulus only weakly. In contrast, the language network tracked linguistic stimuli more strongly than (a) non-linguistic stimuli, and than (b) the ToM network, and showed reliable tracking even for the linguistic condition devoid of mental state content. These findings suggest that in spite of their indisputably close links, language and ToM dissociate robustly in their neural substrates-and thus plausibly cognitive mechanisms-including during the processing of rich naturalistic materials.

The evolutionary origins of syntax: Event cognition in nonhuman primates

Languages tend to encode events from the perspective of agents, placing them first and in simpler forms than patients. This agent bias is mirrored by cognition: Agents are more quickly recognized than patients and generally attract more attention. This leads to the hypothesis that key aspects of language structure are fundamentally rooted in a cognition that decomposes events into agents, actions, and patients, privileging agents. Although this type of event representation is almost certainly universal across languages, it remains unclear whether the underlying cognition is uniquely human or more widespread in animals. Here, we review a range of evidence from primates and other animals, which suggests that agent-based event decomposition is phylogenetically older than humans. We propose a research program to test this hypothesis in great apes and human infants, with the goal to resolve one of the major questions in the evolution of language, the origins of syntax.