Is Disgust a "Conservative" Emotion?

How our ideological out-group shapes our emotional response to our shared socio-political reality

What shapes our emotional responses to socio-political events? Following the social identity approach, we suggest that individuals adjust their emotional responses to socio-political stimuli based on their ideological out-group's responses, in a manner that preserves the comparative and normative fit of ideological in-group-out-group categories. In Study 1 and Study 2 (pre-registered), Jewish-Israeli leftists and rightists were exposed to their ideological out-group's alleged emotional response to a stimulus associated with Israeli-Palestinian relations, which was either stereotypical (leftists expressing low anger and rightists expressing high anger) or non-stereotypical (leftists expressing high anger and rightists expressing low anger). Across studies, participants reported more positive affect towards their ideological out-group when its response to the stimulus was non-stereotypical versus stereotypical, yet their own response to the stimulus became more "extreme" (towards the low end of the anger scale for leftists, and towards the high end of the anger scale for rightists), shifting farther away from their ideological out-group norm. Our findings suggest that in highly polarized contexts, where "leftist" and "rightist" identities are largely defined in comparison to one another, the "positioning" of ideological groups relative to one another plays a role in shaping their responses to their shared socio-political reality.

Status politics is the origin of morality policy

After drawing a distinction between "class" and "status," an early but short-lived sociological literature on status politics is reviewed. That approach has lost favor, but moral foundations theory (MFT) offers a new opportunity to link morality policy to status politics. While any of the five moral foundations (care, fairness, loyalty, authority, sanctity) can provoke conflict over status, most often sanctity is the cause of status politics because it engages the emotion of disgust. Disgust drives the behavioral immune system, which prevents us from being infected by contaminants in tainted food or by "outsiders" who are perceived to follow unconventional practices. This research note concludes by referencing 20 empirical studies in which feelings of disgust targeted certain groups or practices in society (i.e., immigrants, criminals, abortion). Thus, status politics is the origin of morality policy.

Political orientation, trust and discriminatory beliefs during the COVID-19 pandemic: Longitudinal evidence from the United Kingdom

The COVID-19 pandemic has impacted the world in many ways; for example, evidence from the United Kingdom indicates that higher rates of discriminatory behaviours against immigrants have been recorded during this period. Prior research suggests that political orientation and trust are instrumental in discriminatory beliefs against immigrants. A longitudinal study (six waves and a follow-up) was conducted in the United Kingdom during the COVID-19 pandemic (September 2020-August 2021) using convenience sampling (N = 383). The hypotheses enquired about whether political orientation predicts trust in government, trust in science and discriminatory beliefs. Multilevel regression and mediation analyses were conducted, using repeated measures nested within individuals. It was found that conservative views are associated with higher discriminatory beliefs, lower trust in science and higher trust in government. Furthermore, trust in science promotes reduction of discrimination, whereas trust in government, increases discriminatory beliefs. However, a nuance revealed by an interaction effect, shows that a positive alignment between political and scientific authorities may be required to reduce prejudice against immigrants. Exploratory multilevel mediation showed that trust is a mediator between political orientation and discriminatory beliefs.

Political Attitudes and Disease Threat: Regional Pathogen Stress Is Associated With Conservative Ideology Only for Older Individuals

What environmental factors are associated with individual differences in political ideology, and do such associations change over time? We examine whether reductions in pathogen prevalence in U.S. states over the past 60 years are associated with reduced associations between parasite stress and conservatism. We report a positive association between infection levels and conservative ideology in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. However, this correlation reduces from the 1980s onwards. These results suggest that the ecological influence of infectious diseases may be larger for older people who grew up (or whose parents grew up) during earlier time periods. We test this hypothesis by analyzing the political affiliation of 45,000 Facebook users, and find a positive association between self-reported political affiliation and regional pathogen stress for older (>40 years) but not younger individuals. It is concluded that the influence of environmental pathogen stress on ideology may have reduced over time.

Ideological responses to the breaking of COVID-19 social distancing recommendations

COVID-19 has plagued the globe since January 2020, infecting millions and claiming the lives of several hundreds of thousands (at the time of writing). Despite this, many individuals have ignored public health guidance and continued to socialize in groups. Emergent work has highlighted the potential role that ideology plays in such behavior, and judgements of it. In response to this contemporary cultural phenomenon, we tested whether judgements of those allegedly flouting the guidance on social distancing were influenced by an interaction between the ideologies of those providing judgements and those allegedly breaking the rules. Our data suggest that judgements of those flouting social distancing guidance are influenced by ideology in a symmetrical way. That is, both liberals and conservatives condemn outgroup flouting more than ingroup flouting. We discuss this finding in the context of theoretical work into ideological symmetries, and the implications of growing ideological polarization in contemporary Western democracies.

Do liberals value emotion more than conservatives? Political partisanship and Lay beliefs about the functionality of emotion

Relying on feelings to guide thoughts and plans may be functional from the perspective of the individual but threaten the cohesion of social groups. Thus, liberals, who prioritize caring and fairness for individuals, may view emotion as more functional than do conservatives, who prioritize preserving social groups, hierarchies, and institutions. To test this, participants in three studies (total N = 1,355) rated political partisanship, beliefs about the functionality of emotion, and well-being. Study 3 also assessed how much participants prioritized “individualizing” versus “socially binding” values (Graham et al., 2011). Across all studies, the more liberal participants were, the more they viewed emotion as functional, despite reporting less emotional well-being. In Study 3, the link between liberalism and valuing emotion was mediated by more liberal participants’ greater endorsement of individualizing than socially binding values. These results suggest that emotion is viewed as more functional by those who prioritize the needs of individuals, but as less functional by those who prioritize the cohesion of social groups.

Polarization and trust in the evolution of vaccine discourse on Twitter during COVID-19

Trust in vaccination is eroding, and attitudes about vaccination have become more polarized. This is an observational study of Twitter analyzing the impact that COVID-19 had on vaccine discourse. We identify the actors, the language they use, how their language changed, and what can explain this change. First, we find that authors cluster into several large, interpretable groups, and that the discourse was greatly affected by American partisan politics. Over the course of our study, both Republicans and Democrats entered the vaccine conversation in large numbers, forming coalitions with Antivaxxers and public health organizations, respectively. After the pandemic was officially declared, the interactions between these groups increased. Second, we show that the moral and non-moral language used by the various communities converged in interesting and informative ways. Finally, vector autoregression analysis indicates that differential responses to public health measures are likely part of what drove this convergence. Taken together, our results suggest that polarization around vaccination discourse in the context of COVID-19 was ultimately driven by a trust-first dynamic of political engagement.

Investigating the conservatism-disgust paradox in reactions to the COVID-19 pandemic: A reexamination of the interrelations among political ideology, disgust sensitivity, and pandemic response

Research has documented robust associations between greater disgust sensitivity and (1) concerns about disease, and (2) political conservatism. However, the COVID-19 disease pandemic raised challenging questions about these associations. In particular, why have conservatives-despite their greater disgust sensitivity-exhibited less concern about the pandemic? Here, we investigate this "conservatism-disgust paradox" and address several outstanding theoretical questions regarding the interrelations among disgust sensitivity, ideology, and pandemic response. In four studies (N = 1,764), we identify several methodological and conceptual factors-in particular, an overreliance on self-report measures-that may have inflated the apparent associations among these constructs. Using non-self-report measures, we find evidence that disgust sensitivity may be a less potent predictor of disease avoidance than is typically assumed, and that ideological differences in disgust sensitivity may be amplified by self-report measures. These findings suggest that the true pattern of interrelations among these factors may be less "paradoxical" than is typically believed.

Do Concepts Creep to the Left and the Right? Evidence for Ideologically Salient Concept Breadth Judgments Across the Political Spectrum

Concept creep explains how established social concepts expand to incorporate new phenomena, with such expansions fundamentally changing conceptual definitions and contributing to a loss of a shared social understanding. However, the existing work has focused on concept creep within a small number of categories that are typically more salient for those on the political left. In this work, we examined whether concept creep is a predominantly leftist phenomenon, or whether the same conceptual expansion is present for typically conservative-salient categories, by exploring judgments of concept breadth for a range of social topics. We found evidence for such symmetry when considering concept breadth for categories such as sexual deviance, terrorism, and personal responsibility—with some nuanced exceptions. We discuss our findings in relation to growing political polarization, intergroup relations, and the study of partisan differences using a variety of politically salient stimuli.

From toilet to table: value-tailored messages influence emotional responses to wastewater products

BACKGROUND

Products made from recycled organic materials are an important part of a circular economy, but the question is whether they will be adopted by the public. Such products can elicit strong emotional responses and public resistance. As a case in point, we studied products made from sewage waste, such as recycled toilet paper, which can serve as material alternative to wood and plastic when making household items (e.g., tables). In an experimental study, we investigated the role of values in emotional responses to such wastewater products, and whether emotional responses were influenced by value-tailored messages. We expected that people would experience positive emotions towards products that supported their values, especially when the messages emphasised the benefits of these products for their values (e.g., when the products were presented as good for the environment). We presented participants with one of two messages describing wastewater products as having positive implications for either biospheric values (i.e. positive consequences for the environment) or hedonic values (i.e. positive consequences for personal enjoyment). We predicted that the relationship between values and positive emotions would be stronger when the messages emphasised the positive implications of wastewater products for one's core values. Additionally, we predicted that emotions would be associated with acceptability and intentions to purchase the products.

RESULTS

The more strongly people endorsed biospheric values, the more positive emotions they reported towards wastewater products. As expected, this relationship was stronger when the environmental benefits of products were emphasised. Hedonic values were significantly but weakly associated with more negative and more positive emotions, and this did not depend on the message framing. However, we found that emphasising pleasurable benefits of wastewater products reduced positive emotions in people with weaker hedonic values. Positive and negative emotions were significantly associated with higher and lower acceptability of the products and intentions to purchase the products, respectively.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings have implications for the effective marketing of wastewater products. For people with strong biospheric values, emphasising the positive environmental consequences may promote wastewater products. Such biospheric messages do not seem to make the products less (or more) appealing for people with strong hedonic values, who do not generally have strong emotional responses to these products. We discuss the theoretical implications of our findings and avenues for future research.

Infection threat shapes our social instincts

We social animals must balance the need to avoid infections with the need to interact with conspecifics. To that end we have evolved, alongside our physiological immune system, a suite of behaviors devised to deal with potentially contagious individuals. Focusing mostly on humans, the current review describes the design and biological innards of this behavioral immune system, laying out how infection threat shapes sociality and sociality shapes infection threat. The paper shows how the danger of contagion is detected and posted to the brain; how it affects individuals’ mate choice and sex life; why it strengthens ties within groups but severs those between them, leading to hostility toward anyone who looks, smells, or behaves unusually; and how it permeates the foundation of our moral and political views. This system was already in place when agriculture and animal domestication set off a massive increase in our population density, personal connections, and interaction with other species, amplifying enormously the spread of disease. Alas, pandemics such as COVID-19 not only are a disaster for public health, but, by rousing millions of behavioral immune systems, could prove a threat to harmonious cohabitation too.

Testing the effects of pathogen threat and sexual strategies on political ideology

Disgust has been consistently associated with greater political conservatism. Two explanations have been proposed for this link. According to a pathogen threat model, disgust serves a pathogen-avoidance function, encouraging more conservative ideology, whereas a sexual strategies model suggests that this link is explained by variability in short-term versus long-term mating goals. In two preregistered studies using a college student and community sample (total N = 1,950), we examined whether experimentally manipulating pathogen threat and mate availability produced differences in political ideology and whether these differences were explained by disgust and sociosexual attitudes. Across both studies, we did not find evidence that manipulating pathogen threat or mate availability resulted in change in political ideology. In Study 1, manipulating mate availability was indirectly associated with greater political conservativism through stronger sociosexual attitudes that favor monogamy. These findings failed to replicate in Study 2. Implications for theory and future research are discussed.

Stimulus sampling and other recommendations for assessing domain-general processes of attitude formation through exploration: Reply to Ruisch, Shook, and Fazio (2020)

In response to Ruisch et al., 2020, British Journal of Psychology, we propose that the assessment of domain-general ideological differences requires systematic stimulus sampling. We argue that there is currently no evidence that the 'neutral' BeanFest assesses domain-general ideological differences and that Ruisch et al., 2020, British Journal of Psychology findings do not address the mechanism(s) underlying our findings.

Of deadly beans and risky stocks: Political ideology and attitude formation via exploration depend on the nature of the attitude stimuli

An attitude formation task examined how conservatives and liberals explore information about novel stimuli and form attitudes towards them. When framed as the BeanFest game, conservatives sampled fewer beans and exhibited a stronger learning asymmetry (i.e., better learning for negative than positive beans) than liberals. This has been taken as strong evidence that conservatives are more sensitive to negative stimuli than liberals. We argue that the learning asymmetry and sampling bias by conservatives is due to framing of the game. In addition to the BeanFest, we framed the game as StockFest (i.e., a stock market game) where participants learned about novel stocks. We replicated the pronounced learning asymmetry for conservatives in the BeanFest game, but found a pronounced learning asymmetry for liberals in the StockFest game. We suggest that conservatives and liberals are equally sensitive to negative stimuli but in different domains.