White lie-telling in children for politeness purposes

What motivates early lies? Deception in 2½- to 5-year-olds

What motivates young children to produce early lies? A total of 217 2½- to 5-year-old children (Mage = 44.5 months, SD = 8.45; 54% girls; 61.7% White) from the southeastern United States were tested using a modified third-party transgression paradigm to examine the motivation behind their deception. Children were assigned to one of three conditions-baseline, self-motivated, or other-motivated condition-and their propensity to lie was captured through both verbal and nonverbal measures. Results show that children's early lies are primarily driven by a self-serving motivation. However, the motivation to lie diversifies by 4 years of age, when children begin to lie for both self-serving and other-serving motivations.

Influence of false beliefs and empathy on white lies among children with mild intellectual disabilities: focusing on trait and state perspectives

Children with mild intellectual disabilities often exhibit poor social skills owing to intellectual impairments. This makes it essential to enhance their communication abilities. This study provides a novel contribution by systematically investigating the effects of false beliefs and empathy on white lie behavior among children with mild intellectual disabilities, considering both state and trait dimensions. Experiment 1 examined the impact of trait-level false beliefs and trait-level empathy on trait-level white lies. The results demonstrated that trait-level false beliefs and trait-level empathy both significantly promoted white lie behavior. Experiment 2 explored the influence of state-level false beliefs and state-level empathy on state-level white lies and found similar positive effects. By integrating both trait and state perspectives, this research fills a gap in the literature on white lie behavior in children with mild intellectual disabilities and uncovers the mechanisms through which false beliefs and empathy operate in different contexts. These findings offer comprehensive educational and intervention strategies to improve social adaptation in children with mild intellectual disabilities.

Advanced theory of mind and children's prosocial lie-telling in middle childhood: A training study

Children's advanced theory of mind (AToM) is concurrently associated with their prosocial lie-telling. However, the causal link between AToM and prosocial lie-telling has not yet been demonstrated. To address this gap, the current study adopted a training paradigm and investigated the role of AToM in children's prosocial lie-telling in middle childhood. A total of 66 9- and 10-year-old children who did not demonstrate any prosocial lie-telling in a disappointment gift paradigm at the baseline were recruited and randomly assigned to either the experimental group (n = 32) or an active control group (n = 34). The experimental group underwent a conversation-based training program of four sessions. The results showed significantly greater gains in AToM at the posttest for the experimental group children compared with the control group children, controlling for family socioeconomic status, children's literacy score, working memory, and inhibition. More important, the experimental group children were more likely to tell prosocial lies than the control group, even after controlling for the pretest AToM and other covariates. However, the training effects faded at the 6-month follow-up test after the training's completion. These findings provide the first evidence for the causal role of AToM in the development of prosocial lie-telling in middle childhood. The fade-out effect is discussed in the context of educational interventions.

Elementary school-aged children's perceptions of academic dishonesty: Definitions and moral evaluations of cheating behaviors in school

A total of 76 children (Mage = 9 years 5 months, SD = 2.22 years) participated in a structured interview about their experiences with and knowledge of academic dishonesty. Overall, 27% of the sample reported having cheated in school. Most of these children were 10 to 13 years old, and the most prevalent form of cheating behavior reported was using forbidden materials during a test. Children's age group was a significant positive predictor of their reported cheating history; however, no significant difference was found between children's gender and engagement with cheating. Children's moral evaluations of cheating did not predict their reported cheating history, nor did children's parents' cheating history. Vignette type (cheating vs. non-cheating), age group, and the interaction between vignette type and age group were significant predictors of children's ability to accurately identify behaviors that constitute cheating. Children rated cheating behaviors as significantly less moral than non-cheating behaviors. Overall, the current results provide insight into what forms of cheating behavior children engage in at the elementary school-age level.

Lying to recommend unqualified friends: Diverging implications for interpersonal and epistemic trust inferences

When people are asked to recommend individuals they care about, they often grapple with conflicts regarding the level of honesty they should maintain when being truthful could potentially hinder those individuals' chances of receiving beneficial opportunities. In the current study, we examined how adolescents evaluate people based on how they respond to such dilemmas, with a focus on how it affects judgments of interpersonal and epistemic trustworthiness. We tested a sample of high school students in the southwestern United States (N = 78; Mage = 16.45 years), who were asked about a moral dilemma in which a story character needed to decide whether to recommend an unqualified friend. We experimentally manipulated whether the friend was very close to the standard (requiring a small exaggeration) or was far from the standard (requiring a large exaggeration) between participants. Across both exaggeration conditions, we observed a dissociation in judgments of epistemic and interpersonal trustworthiness: Lie-tellers were judged to be more interpersonally trustworthy than epistemically trustworthy, whereas truth-tellers were judged to be more epistemically trustworthy than interpersonally trustworthy. These results show that adolescents are capable of using information about an individual's lie-telling versus truth-telling decisions to make highly nuanced social inferences.

Parenting by lying and children's lying to parents: The moderating role of children's beliefs

How are children socialized about lying? One way is parental modeling of lying given that parents tell various lies to their children for parenting purposes, which is a practice known as parenting by lying. Importantly, how children perceive and interpret the lying behavior around them may be crucial to how they then learn to lie. Yet, we do not know how children's perceptions of different types of parental lies drive this socialization. In a comprehensive birth cohort of parent-child dyads (N = 564; children aged 11 and 12 years) in Singapore, we collected multi-informant reports of instrumental lies (parental lies told for child compliance) and white lies (parental lies told to instill positive emotions), children's belief in parental lies, and children's lying to parents. We found greater consistency in parent and child reports of instrumental lies than of white lies and that children reported greater belief in instrumental lies than in white lies. Children's reported exposure to instrumental lies was associated with greater lying to parents. However, for white lies this relationship was evident only when children had moderate to low beliefs in parental lies. Examining the interplay between parental lies and children's beliefs in those lies, the current study illuminates the potential pathways to children's lying behaviors.

Subverting parental overreach: Children endorse defiance and deception as legitimate modes of moral resistance and social opposition

This research examined how children evaluate the legitimacy of various sorts of rules as well as children's reasoning about the legitimacy of covertly defying and lying to parents to resist those rules. We asked U.S. 6-, 8-, and 11-year-olds (N = 118) to assess seven hypothetical situations depicting comparably aged children engaged in defiance and deception to circumvent parents' prohibitions. The nature of parents' justifications for the prohibitions varied in terms of social-cognitive domain (moral, personal, prudential, pragmatic, or conventional). Evaluations and justifications for the legitimacy of parents' prohibitions and children's defiance and deception were examined, as were general evaluations of deception and parental authority. Across situations, increased age was associated with decreased acceptance of proscriptions and, in several situations, increased acceptance of defiance and deception. Children responded significantly differently to prohibitions by domain of norm. With age, children increasingly justified defiance and deception for reasons of personal autonomy. They also increasingly endorsed defiance and deception as moral obligations required to resist immoral norms. This research shows that children value parental authority, but not at the expense of their personal autonomy, and they value honesty but sometimes subordinate it to competing moral concerns.

Testing Causal Effects of Empathy on Children's Prosociality in Politeness Dilemmas - An Intervention Study

Empathy is commonly considered a driver of prosociality in child ontogeny, but causal assumptions regarding this effect mostly rely on correlational research designs. Here, 96 urban German children (5-8 years; 48 girls; predominantly White; from mid-to-high socioeconomic backgrounds) participated in an empathy intervention or a control condition before prosocial behaviors (polite lie-telling: rating the drawing as good; prosocial encouragement: utterances interpreted as cheering up the artist) were assessed in an art-rating task. Contrasting children's empathy at baseline with their empathy after the intervention indicated promoted empathy compared to the control group. Despite the intervention's effect on children's empathy, there were no simultaneous changes in prosocial behaviors. At the same time, children's empathy at baseline was associated with their prosocial encouragement. These results indicate conceptual associations between children's empathy and prosociality. However, they do not support strict causal claims regarding this association in middle childhood. Further applications of the novel short-time intervention to address causal effects of empathy on prosociality and other developmental outcomes are discussed.

Other-Benefiting Lying Behavior in Preschool Children and Its Relation to Theory of Mind and Empathy

The present study examined children's lies to help others obtain benefits (other-benefiting lying) and its relation to theory of mind (ToM) and empathy among 3-5-year-old preschool children. One hundred nine children were recruited from preschools in China. A modified hide-and-seek paradigm was used to measure children's other-benefiting lying behavior, a ToM scale was used to measure children's ToM abilities, and an empathy scale was used to measure children's empathy abilities. Results showed that children tended to tell more lies to help other to get benefits as age increased, and further analyses showed that this other-benefiting lying was related to children's ToM component of false belief understanding and their cognitive empathy performance. These findings provide evidence that cognitive factors play important roles in children's lying to help others.

Prosocial lie-telling in preschoolers: The impacts of ethnic background, parental factors, and perceived consequence for the partner

This study explored prosocial lie-telling behavior in 4- to 5-year-old children from two ethnic groups: European Canadian (n = 49; excluding Eastern European Canadian) and Chinese Canadian (n = 45). Children completed an online experiment involving two real-life politeness situations. In the first situation, children were asked whether they thought someone with a red mark on their face looked okay for a photo or a Zoom party (Reverse Rouge Task). In the second situation, upon hearing the researcher’s misconception about two pieces of artwork, children were asked whether they agreed with the researcher (Art Rating Task). Parents completed questionnaires that measured their levels of collectivist orientation and parenting styles. Contrary to our hypotheses, the likelihood of children telling a prosocial lie did not vary as a function of their ethnic group or the presence of a perceived consequence for the partner, nor was it predicated by parental collectivist orientation. Interestingly, prosocial liars were more likely to have authoritative parents, whereas blunt-truth tellers were more likely to have permissive parents. These findings have important implications for the ways in which certain parenting styles influence the socialization of positive politeness in children. In addition, the similar rates of prosocial lying across the two ethnic groups suggest that children who are born and raised in Canada may be much more alike than different in their prosocial lie-telling behavior, despite coming from different ethnic backgrounds.

Everyone’s a Critic (Sometimes): Young Children Show High Awareness of, But Lower Adherence to, Prosocial Lying Norms

From an early age, children are taught norms about socially-acceptable behaviors; however, children's ability to recognize these norms often predates their tendency to follow them. This conflict between understanding and action has been predominantly studied in cases when enacting the norm would be costly for the child (i.e. when sharing would result in forgoing resources), but is underexplored in more low-cost scenarios. The current study examined the gap between children's knowledge and behavior in a context with a low personal cost: telling a prosocial, or white, lie. Children (N = 46) evaluated objectively poor drawings in three contexts: in one context, children were asked how a third-party character should act in a story (to assess knowledge) and in the other two contexts, children were asked to provide real-time feedback to another person and to a puppet (to assess behavior). Results indicated that children endorsed prosocial lying norms (i.e. said the story character should give the drawing a good rating) at a significantly higher rate than they demonstrated through their own lie-telling behaviors (i.e. their willingness to give social partners good ratings). These data indicate that the discrepancy between children's knowledge of social norms and their actual behaviors cannot simply be attributed to the personal costs of enacting social norms. Instead, this competence-performance gap may be due to the fact that children are often taught social rules via hypothetical situations but enacting behaviors in real-world situations may require additional skills, such as inhibition and the processing of complex, multimodal social cues.

Cheating, Trust and Social Norms: Data from Germany, Vietnam, China, Taiwan, and Japan

The data presented here contain information on cheating behavior from experiments and general self-reported attitudes related to honesty-related social norms and trust, together with individual-level demographic variables. Our sample included 493 university students in five countries, namely, Germany, Vietnam, Taiwan, China, and Japan. The experiment was monetarily incentivized based on the performance on a matrix task. The participants also answered a survey questionnaire. The dataset is valuable for academic researchers in sociology, psychology, and economics who are interested in honesty, norms, and cultural differences.

A Review of the Nature and Development of Lying and Deception and Considerations for Teaching Prosocial Lying to Autistic Persons

Compared with their neurotypical (NT) counterparts, persons with autism appear to be less inclined to tell lies and less skilled in delivering sophisticated forms of deception. At the same time, some forms of deception like white lies and prosocial lies are frequent in human interaction because they are important for social success. This article challenges the reader to evaluate the therapeutic potential for prosocial deception and teaching white-lie telling to autistic persons. The nature and development of antisocial and prosocial lying in NT development and autism are reviewed. Considerations for when to (and when not to) teach the skill of empathic lying are discussed and recommendations for how to teach the comprehension and production of prosocial lies are offered.

Liar, liar … sometimes: Understanding social-environmental influences on the development of lying

Lying is a behavior that, in theory, is discouraged and punished, except when it isn't. Perhaps as a result, many individuals lie at low levels somewhat regularly. While research has well documented the cognitive skills that support children's early lying, it does not explain how children learn when to lie versus tell a truth. The current article reviews the impact of social-environmental influences on the development of children's lie-telling knowledge, understanding and behavior, including the roles of parents, siblings, teachers and others. It is argued that holistic examinations of cognitive, social, environmental, cultural and child factors, interacting over time, is required to understand divergent trajectories of lying and truth-telling across development, particularly at the extremes.

How the Custom Suppresses the Endowment Effect: Exchange Paradigm in Kanak Country

In this paper, Knetsch's exchange paradigm is analyzed from the perspective of pragmatics and social norms. In this paradigm the participant, at the beginning of the experiment, receives an object from the experimenter and at the end, the same experimenter offers to exchange the received object for an equivalent object. The observed refusal to exchange is called the endowment effect. We argue that this effect comes from an implicature made by the participant about the experimenter's own expectations. The participant perceives the received item as a gift, or as a present, from the experimenter that cannot be exchanged as stipulated by the social norms of western politeness common to both the experimenter and the participant. This implicature, however, should not be produced by participants from Kanak culture for whom the perceived gift of a good will be interpreted as a first act of exchange based on gift and counter-gift. This exchange is a natural, frequent, balanced, and indispensable act for all Kanak social bonds whether private or public. Kanak people also know the French social norms that they apply in their interactions with French people living in New Caledonia. In our experiment, we show that when the exchange paradigm takes place in a French context, with a French experimenter and in French, the Kanak participant is subject to the endowment effect in the same way as a French participant. On the other hand, when the paradigm is carried out in a Kanak context, with a Kanak experimenter and in the vernacular language, or in a Kanak context that approaches the ceremonial of the custom, the endowment effect is no longer observed. The same number of Kanak participants accept or refuse to exchange the endowed item. These results, in addition to providing a new explanation for the endowment effect, highlight the great flexibility of decisions according to social-cultural context.

Lie for Me: Developmental Trends in Acquiescing to a Blatantly False Statement

A pair of studies demonstrates that simply asking children to make a blatantly false accusation in the guise of helping others can result in both immediate and long-term false claims. In the pilot study, the initial willingness to make a blatantly false statement was associated with some children making false statements a week later despite being told that the first interviewer had made mistakes during the initial interview. On a positive note, the majority of participants accurately stated that they did not have first-hand knowledge of their accusation's accuracy. Across both studies, the rate of false accusation rates was high. The main experiment demonstrated that children who were young, possessed the lowest verbal intelligence or who were from the lowest SES homes made the most accusations. These findings illustrate not only the dangers of encouraging children to make false statements, but the ease and durability of making such false statements.

Young Children Selectively Hide the Truth About Sensitive Topics

Starting in early childhood, children are socialized to be honest. However, they are also expected to avoid telling the truth in sensitive situations if doing so could be seen as inappropriate or impolite. Across two studies (total N = 358), the reasoning of 3- to 5-year-old children in such a scenario was investigated by manipulating whether the information in question would be helpful to the recipient. The studies used a reverse rouge paradigm, in which a confederate with a highly salient red mark on her nose asked children whether she looked okay prior to having her picture taken. In Study 1, children tended to tell the truth only if they were able to observe that the mark was temporary and the confederate did not know it was there. In Study 2, children tended to tell the truth only if they were able to observe that the mark could be concealed with makeup. These findings show that for children as young as age 3, decisions about whether to tell the truth are influenced by the likelihood that the information would be helpful to the recipient.

Identifying novel forms of reluctance in commercially sexually exploited adolescents

BACKGROUND

Research has largely overlooked expressions of reluctance in commercially sexually exploited adolescent ("CSEA") victims. This is problematic because gaining information from known victims is of the utmost importance in order to better serve the needs of current and potential future victims.

OBJECTIVE

The current study proposes a novel conceptualization of reluctance based on CSEA victims' transcripts from police interviews and courtroom examinations.

PARTICIPANTS AND SETTING

The study examined police interviews (n = 8 victims, 1558 utterances) and courtroom transcripts (n = 6 victims, 1961 utterances) conducted with female CSEA victims aged 15-17 years old (M_age = 16.29). The victims were associated with the same trafficker and were thus interviewed by the same group of police officers, and for those who testified, were questioned by the same lawyers in court.

RESULTS

Sixteen reluctance tactics were identified, including several that have been overlooked in previous literature. The current reluctance measure identified more reluctance than previous studies' reluctance measures. Reluctance was much more common in police interviews (26.4%; p < .001) than in court (5.5%), and if victims were more reluctant in the police interviews, they were less likely to appear in court (p = .001).

CONCLUSIONS

These findings have implications for future conceptualizations of reluctance, and illustrate the importance of considering the age of the victim and the circumstances under which the victim is questioned in identifying reluctance.

The coin that is most current is flattery? Stability and discontinuity of false praise-telling from 5 to 7 years of life

Preschool children engage in flattery behaviors, including expressing opinions toward other people or objects that-although favorable-are not truly held. Research shows that in the following years, the number and complexity of motives underlying such insincere behavior increase. The current study focused on children's overt behavior, examining two aspects of the development of false praise-telling: individual stability and group-level discontinuity. Using an art-rating task, a total of 164 children aged 5 to 7 years were tested at three points in time (T1/2/3): M_T1 age = 5.66 years, SD = 0.1; M_T2 age = 6.65 years, SD = 0.16; M_T3 age = 7.61 years, SD = 0.14. The results show that, having become capable of giving false praise in politeness settings at 5.5 years of age, children continue to flatter others in this way at later ages, indicating that false praise-telling is an individually stable characteristic. In addition, a statistically significant increase in the proportion of false praise-telling to non-lying behavior in children over the 2-year study period was observed. This indicates that the discontinuity, namely the growth in children's flattery behavior, occurs from 5 to 7 years of age. The findings are discussed with respect to the diverse factors that might underlie and affect children's tendency to praise others falsely in politeness settings.

Three-year-olds' spontaneous lying in a novel interaction-based paradigm and its relations to explicit skills and motivational factors

Previous research has investigated children's lying and its motivational and social-cognitive correlates mostly through explicit tasks. The current study used an anticipatory interaction-based paradigm adopted from research with preverbal infants. We investigated 3-year-olds' spontaneous lying within interaction and its motivational basis and relations to explicit skills of lying, false belief understanding, inhibitory control, and socialization. Children interacted with puppets to secure stickers that were hidden in one of two boxes. Either a friend or a competitor puppet tried to obtain the stickers. Nearly all children helpfully provided information about the sticker's location to the friend, and about half of the sample anticipatorily provided false information to the competitor. Children misinformed the competitor significantly more often than the friend, both when the reward was for themselves and when it was for someone else. Explicitly planning to lie in response to a question occurred significantly less often but predicted spontaneous lying, as did passing the explicit standard false belief task. Thus, by 3 years of age, children spontaneously invoke false beliefs in others. This communicative skill reveals an interactional use of false belief understanding in that it requires holding one's perspective to pursue one's goal while providing a different perspective to distract a competitor. Findings support the view that practical theory of mind skills emerge for social coordination and serve as a basis for developing explicit false belief reasoning.

Theory of mind, executive function, and lying in children: a meta-analysis

Scientific research on how children learn to tell lies has existed for more than a century. Earlier studies mainly focused on moral, social, and situational factors contributing to the development of lying. Researchers have only begun to explore the cognitive correlations of children's lying in the last two decades. Cognitive theories suggest that theory of mind (ToM) and executive function (EF) should be closely related to the development of lying since lying is, in essence, ToM and EF in action. Yet, findings from empirical studies are mixed. To address this issue, the current meta-analysis reviewed all prior literature that examined the relations between children's lying and ToM and/or between children's lying and EF. In total, 47 papers consisting of 5099 participants between 2 and 19 years of age were included, which yielded 74 effect sizes for ToM and 94 effect sizes for EF. Statistically significant but relatively small effects were found between children's lying and ToM (r = .17) and between lying and EF (r = .13). Furthermore, EF's correlation with children's initial lies was significantly smaller than its correlation with children's ability to maintain lies. This comprehensive meta-analysis provides a clear picture of the associations between children's ToM/EF and their lying behavior and confirms that ToM and EF indeed play a positive role in children's lying and its development.

Lying and Theory of Mind: A Meta-Analysis

This meta-analysis investigated the link between lying and theory-of-mind (ToM) by integrating findings from 81 studies involving 7,826 children between 2 and 14 years of age from 14 different collectivist and individualist cultures. Overall, there was a small, significant positive association (r = .23). Four main moderators were examined: facet of lying (understanding, instigated production, spontaneous production, maintenance); valence of lies (antisocial, prosocial); type of ToM (first-order, second-order); and culture (collectivist, individualist). Facet of lying and type of ToM were significant moderators. ToM was positively related to all facets of lying, but most strongly linked to lie maintenance and weakest for spontaneous production. Both first-order and second-order ToM were positively related to lying, but the link was stronger for the former.

Epistemic Vigilance in Early Ontogeny: Children's Use of Nonverbal Behavior to Detect Deception

This study examines the development of children's ability to modulate their trust in verbal testimony as a function of nonverbal behavior. Participants included 83 children (26 four-year-olds, 29 five-year-olds, and 28 six-year-olds) that were tasked with locating a toy hidden in one of two boxes. Before deciding the location, participants watched a video of an adult providing verbal and nonverbal cues about the location of the toy. We hypothesized that older children would display epistemic vigilance, trusting nonverbal information over verbal information when the two conflict. Consistent with our expectations, when sources were consistent, all children trusted the verbal testimony. By contrast, and as predicted, when they were inconsistent, only 6-year-olds distrusted verbal testimony and favored nonverbal cues; 4- and 5-year-olds continued to trust verbal testimony. Thus, 6-year-old children demonstrate an ability to modulate their trust in verbal testimony as a function of nonverbal information. Younger children's inability to do this is not due to their being unaware of non-verbal behavior; indeed, when nonverbal information was offered exclusively, children of all ages used it to find the object.

Prosocial lying in children between 4 and 11 years of age: The role of emotional understanding and empathy

This study examined whether emotional understanding and empathy were predictors of prosocial lying in children aged 4 to 11 years. A total of 144 children participated in the study. To assess children's prosocial lying, we used the Helping Scenario, a classical experimental paradigm that allows children to lie to help others at their own expense. Children's emotional understanding was assessed using the Test of Emotion Comprehension, a test that measures the nine components of emotional understanding. Children's empathy was assessed using the Griffith Empathy Measure, a questionnaire completed by parents that measures affective and cognitive empathy. Results indicated that emotional understanding plays a crucial role in the development of children's ability to produce prosocial lies from 4 to 11 years of age. However, we found no significant relationship between empathy and prosocial lying. Finally, our results confirm that as children grew up, they lied more and more effectively. Overall, the results allow us to better understand the factors that contribute to the emergence and development of children's ability to produce prosocial lies.

Do They Really Mean It? Children's Inference of Speaker Intentions and the Role of Age and Gender

Interpreting other people's intentions during communication represents a remarkable challenge for children. Although many studies have examined children's understanding of, for example, sarcasm, less is known about their interpretation. Using realistic audiovisual scenes, we invited 124 children between 8 and 12 years old to watch video clips of young adults using different speaker intentions. After watching each video clip, children answered questions about the characters and their beliefs, and the perceived friendliness of the speaker. Children's responses reveal age and gender differences in the ability to interpret speaker belief and social intentions, especially for scenarios conveying teasing and prosocial lies. We found that the ability to infer speaker belief of prosocial lies and to interpret social intentions increases with age. Our results suggest that children at the age of 8 years already show adult-like abilities to understand literal statements, whereas the ability to infer specific social intentions, such as teasing and prosocial lies, is still developing between the age of 8 and 12 years. Moreover, girls performed better in classifying prosocial lies and sarcasm as insincere than boys. The outcomes expand our understanding of how children observe speaker intentions and suggest further research into the development of teasing and prosocial lie interpretation.

Detecting children's true and false denials of wrongdoing: Effects of question type and base rate knowledge

One common and unfortunately overlooked obstacle to the detection of sexual abuse is non-disclosure by children. Non-disclosure in forensic interviews may be expressed via concealment in response to recall questions or via active denials in response to recognition (e.g., yes/no) questions. In two studies, we evaluated whether adults' ability to discern true and false denials of wrongdoing by children varied as a function of the types of interview question the children were asked. Results suggest that adults are not good at detecting deceptive denials of wrongdoing by children, even when the adults view children narrate their experiences in response to recall questions rather than provide one word answers to recognition questions. In Study 1, adults exhibited a consistent "truth bias," leading them toward believing children, regardless of whether the children's denials were true or false. In Study 2, adults were given base-rate information about the occurrence of true and false denials (50% of each). The information eliminated the adults' truth bias but did not improve their overall detection accuracy, which still hovered near chance. Adults did, however, perceive children's denials as slightly more credible when they emerged in response to recall rather than recognition questions, especially when children were honestly denying wrongdoing. Results suggest the need for caution when evaluating adults' judgments of children's veracity when the children fail to disclose abuse.

Trust in early childhood

Children need to build trust in their primary caregivers or significant others, as well as people who are unrelated to them, including those who belong to different social groups. The present chapter focuses on children's trust in unfamiliar individuals. How do they determine who to trust? Does putting trust in another person operate differently depending on the specific issue at hand? To address these questions, we differentiate between two forms of trust: children's trust in others' epistemic states to learn from others (epistemic trust) and trusting others for social support and reassurance (social trust), for example, when to expect that interaction partners will be truthful and keep promises. We first review the literature on epistemic trust to show that young children seem to value others' accuracy and competence when learning from them, even when these individuals are from different linguistic or racial groups than their own. We then present findings on social trust suggesting that young children trust those who are well-meaning and who keep their promises. Finally, we raise the question of whether there are environmental influences on the interaction of both epistemic and social trust with intergroup factors such as race, and we propose that research with infants will be useful to better illuminate the developmental roots of human trust.

Conceptualization and Measurement of Adolescent Prosocial Behavior: Looking Back and Moving Forward

The struggle to cast a net around the numerous ways prosocial behavior is expressed lends itself to the absence of widely accepted methods of measurement. Additionally, research intent on evaluating the psychometric properties of current approaches has been somewhat limited. Weaving together seminal as well as contemporary research, the current review focuses on how these conceptual and measurement issues pertain to adolescent studies (in an intentional effort to offset the somewhat disproportionate focus directed toward prosocial development in infants, children, and adults). Recommendations to address current limitations and attain a more nuanced understanding of the construct are presented and discussed.

Identifying Liars Through Automatic Decoding of Children's Facial Expressions

This study explored whether children's (N = 158; 4- to 9 years old) nonverbal facial expressions can be used to identify when children are being deceptive. Using a computer vision program to automatically decode children's facial expressions according to the Facial Action Coding System, this study employed machine learning to determine whether facial expressions can be used to discriminate between children who concealed breaking a toy(liars) and those who did not break a toy(nonliars). Results found that, regardless of age or history of maltreatment, children's facial expressions could accurately (73%) be distinguished between liars and nonliars. Two emotions, surprise and fear, were more strongly expressed by liars than nonliars. These findings provide evidence to support the use of automatically coded facial expressions to detect children's deception.

Temporary, inconsistent, and null effects of a moral story and instruction on honesty

Lying during childhood is a common concern for caregivers. Lee et al. (2014) showed that a moral story and instruction implying reinforcers for honesty produced statistically significant improvements in children admitting a transgression. We evaluated the influence of this moral story and instruction on the consistency of honest reports when reinforcement favored lying in the context of reporting answers to math problems. The moral story and instruction produced temporary, inconsistent, or null effects across participants. However, reinforcing accurate reports produced consistent improvements in telling the truth.

Altruistic and self-serving goals modulate behavioral and neural responses in deception

People tell lies not only for their own self-interests but sometimes also to help others. Little is known about the ways in which different types of goals modulate behaviors and neural responses in deception. The present study investigated the neural processes associated with spontaneous deception that occurs with altruistic reasons (i.e. the money would be donated to charity), self-serving reasons (i.e. the participant receives all of the money) and mixed goals (i.e. the money would be equally split between the participant and the charity). Altruistic motivation for deception reduced the intensity of moral conflict and the subsequent mental cost of resolving this conflict, reflected by a smaller N2–P3 effect in the purely altruistic condition. When making decisions about whether to lie, self-interest was a stronger motivator than others’ interests, and the participants tended to lie more for themselves than for others. When the lie could be mutually beneficial for both of the self and others, the participants tended to lie even when they knew that they could be easily caught, but they actually lied for their own self-interest rather than for altruistic reasons. These findings shed light on the neural basis of ‘good lies’ and decision-making in mutually beneficial situations.