Conceptual penetration of visual processing

Processing of visual hapaxes in picture naming task: An event-related potential study

Object recognition and visual categorization are typically swift and seemingly effortless tasks that involve numerous underlying processes. In our investigation, we utilized a picture naming task to explore the processing of rarely encountered objects (visual hapaxes) in comparison to common objects. Our aim was to determine the stage at which these rare objects are classified as unnamable. Contrary to our expectations and in contrast to some prior research on event-related potentials (ERPs) with novel and atypical objects, no differences between conditions were observed in the late time windows corresponding to the P300 or N400 components. However, distinctive patterns between hapaxes and common objects surfaced in three early time windows, corresponding to the posterior N1 and P2 waves, as well as a widespread N2 wave. According to the ERP data, the differentiation between hapaxes and common objects occurs within the first 380 ms of the processing line, involving only limited and indirect top-down influence.

The Critical Trigger for Cognitive Penetration: Cognitive Processing Priority over Perceptual Processing

The visual perception system of humans is susceptible to cognitive influence, which implies the existence of cognitive perception. However, the specifical trigger for cognitive penetration is still a matter of controversy. The current study proposed that the cognitive processing priority over perceptual processing might be critical for inducing cognitive penetration. We tested this hypothesis by manipulating the processing priority between cognition and perception across three experiments where participants were asked to complete a size-judging task under different competing conditions between cognition and perception. To sum up, we proved that the cognitive processing priority over perceptual processing is critical for cognitive penetration. This study provided empirical evidence for the critical trigger for cognitive penetration.

Not Everybody Has an Inner Voice: Behavioral Consequences of Anendophasia

It is commonly assumed that inner speech-the experience of thought as occurring in a natural language-is a human universal. Recent evidence, however, suggests that the experience of inner speech in adults varies from near constant to nonexistent. We propose a name for a lack of the experience of inner speech-anendophasia-and report four studies examining some of its behavioral consequences. We found that adults who reported low levels of inner speech (N = 46) had lower performance on a verbal working memory task and more difficulty performing rhyme judgments compared with adults who reported high levels of inner speech (N = 47). Task-switching performance-previously linked to endogenous verbal cueing-and categorical effects on perceptual judgments were unrelated to differences in inner speech.

Amodal completion and relationalism

Amodal completion is usually characterized as the representation of those parts of the perceived object that we get no sensory stimulation from. In the case of the visual sense modality, for example, amodal completion is the representation of occluded parts of objects we see. I argue that relationalism about perception, the view that perceptual experience is constituted by the relation to the perceived object, cannot give a coherent account of amodal completion. The relationalist has two options: construe the perceptual relation as the relation to the entire perceived object or as the relation to the unoccluded parts of the perceived object. I argue that neither of these options are viable.

Letter visual similarity of Japanese hiragana and katakana based on reaction times

Letter similarity (i.e., perceptual distance) is a critical measure to better understand letter perception and literacy development. Despite its importance, however, measurements of letter similarity for non-alphabetic scripts are limited, and the shortage of letter similarity for non-alphabetic script interferes with the identification of the universality and the uniqueness of letter perception systems across different scripts. In the present study, we provide a comprehensive matrix of letter similarity for Japanese kana letters (hiragana and katakana). We obtained the discrimination reaction times for simultaneously presented letter pairs and calculated the perceptual distance of 4,278 letter pairs by inversing the time. The matrix showed significant correlations with previously obtained letter similarity for hiragana and katakana. An additional experiment showed that letter pairs for the same sounds (え–エ) produced significantly slower responses compared with those for different sounds (え–コ). However, the differences in reaction times between the same and different sound conditions were smaller than the sequentially presented conditions, suggesting that the matrix was partially attributable to knowledge-based factors (e.g., letter-sound knowledge). This first comprehensive matrix of letter similarity (i.e., perceptual distance) for Japanese kana letters (hiragana and katakana) will be useful for researchers interested in letter perception and literacy development.

From Hand to Eye With the Devil In-Between: Which Cognitive Mechanisms Underpin the Benefit From Handwriting Training When Learning Visual Graphs?

Cognitive science has recently shown a renewed interest on the benefit from training in handwriting (HW) when learning visual graphs, given that this learning experience improves more subsequent visual graph recognition than other forms of training. However, the underlying cognitive mechanism of this HW benefit has been elusive. Building on the 50 years of research on this topic, the present work outlines a theoretical approach to study this mechanism, specifying testable hypotheses that will allow distinguishing between confronting perspectives, i.e., symbolic accounts that hold that perceptual learning and visual analysis underpin the benefit from HW training vs. embodied sensorimotor accounts that argue for motoric representations as inner part of orthographic representations acquired via HW training. From the evidence critically revisited, we concluded that symbolic accounts are parsimonious and could better explain the benefit from HW training when learning visual graphs. The future challenge will be to put at test the detailed predictions presented here, so that the devil has no longer room in this equation.

Task-Irrelevant Semantic Properties of Objects Impinge on Sensory Representations within the Early Visual Cortex

Objects can be described in terms of low-level (e.g., boundaries) and high-level properties (e.g., object semantics). While recent behavioral findings suggest that the influence of semantic relatedness between objects on attentional allocation can be independent of task-relevance, the underlying neural substrate of semantic influences on attention remains ill-defined. Here, we employ behavioral and functional magnetic resonance imaging measures to uncover the mechanism by which semantic information increases visual processing efficiency. We demonstrate that the strength of the semantic relatedness signal decoded from the left inferior frontal gyrus: 1) influences attention, producing behavioral semantic benefits; 2) biases spatial attention maps in the intraparietal sulcus, subsequently modulating early visual cortex activity; and 3) directly predicts the magnitude of behavioral semantic benefit. Altogether, these results identify a specific mechanism driving task-independent semantic influences on attention.

Nonverbal category knowledge limits the amount of information encoded in object representations: EEG evidence from 12-month-old infants

To what extent does language shape how we think about the world? Studies suggest that linguistic symbols expressing conceptual categories ('apple', 'squirrel') make us focus on categorical information (e.g. that you saw a squirrel) and disregard individual information (e.g. whether that squirrel had a long or short tail). Across two experiments with preverbal infants, we demonstrated that it is not language but nonverbal category knowledge that determines what information is packed into object representations. Twelve-month-olds (N = 48) participated in an electroencephalography (EEG) change-detection task involving objects undergoing a brief occlusion. When viewing objects from unfamiliar categories, infants detected both across- and within-category changes, as evidenced by their negative central wave (Nc) event-related potential. Conversely, when viewing objects from familiar categories, they did not respond to within-category changes, which indicates that nonverbal category knowledge interfered with the representation of individual surface features necessary to detect such changes. Furthermore, distinct patterns of γ and α oscillations between familiar and unfamiliar categories were evident before and during occlusion, suggesting that categorization had an influence on the format of recruited object representations. Thus, we show that nonverbal category knowledge has rapid and enduring effects on object representation and discuss their functional significance for generic knowledge acquisition in the absence of language.

Set size and ensemble perception of numerical value

There is a growing body of research on ensemble perception, or our ability to form ensemble representations based on perceptual features for stimuli of varying levels of complexity, and more recently, on ensemble cognition, which refers to our ability to perceive higher-level properties of stimuli such as facial attractiveness or gaze direction. Less is known about our ability to form ensemble representations based on more abstract properties such as the semantic meaning associated with items in a scene. Previous work examining whether the meaning associated with digits can be incorporated into summary statistical representations suggests that numerical information from digit ensembles can be extracted rapidly, and likely using a parallel processing mechanism. Here, we further investigate whether participants can accurately generate summary representations of numerical value from digit sets and explore the effect of set size on their ability to do so, by comparing psychometric functions based on a numerical averaging task in which set size varied. Steeper slopes for ten- and seven-item compared to five-item digit sets provide evidence that displays with more digits yield more reliable discrimination between larger and smaller numerical averages. Additionally, consistent with previous reports, we observed a response bias such that participants were more likely to report that the numerical average was "greater than 5" for larger compared to smaller sets. Overall, our results contribute to evidence that ensemble representations for semantic attributes may be carried out via similar mechanisms as those reported for perceptual features.

The cognitive penetrability of perception: A blocked debate and a tentative solution

Despite the extensive body of psychological findings suggesting that cognition influences perception, the debate between defenders and detractors of the cognitive penetrability of perception persists. While detractors demand more strictness in psychological experiments, proponents consider that empirical studies show that cognitive penetrability occurs. These considerations have led some theorists to propose that the debate has reached a dead end. The issue about where perception ends and cognition begins is, I argue, one of the reasons why the debate is cornered. Another reason is the inability of psychological studies to present uncontroversial interpretations of the results obtained. To dive into other kinds of empirical sources is, therefore, required to clarify the debate. In this paper, I explain where the debate is blocked, and suggest that neuroscientific evidence together with the predictive coding account, might decant the discussion on the side of the penetrability thesis.

Categorization Goals Modulate the Use of Natural Scene Statistics

Understanding natural scenes involves the contribution of bottom–up analysis and top–down modulatory processes. However, the interaction of these processes during the categorization of natural scenes is not well understood. In the current study, we approached this issue using ERPs and behavioral and computational data. We presented pictures of natural scenes and asked participants to categorize them in response to different questions (Is it an animal/vehicle? Is it indoors/outdoors? Are there one/two foreground elements?). ERPs for target scenes requiring a “yes” response began to differ from those of nontarget scenes, beginning at 250 msec from picture onset, and this ERP difference was unmodulated by the categorization questions. Earlier ERPs showed category-specific differences (e.g., between animals and vehicles), which were associated with the processing of scene statistics. From 180 msec after scene onset, these category-specific ERP differences were modulated by the categorization question that was asked. Categorization goals do not modulate only later stages associated with target/nontarget decision but also earlier perceptual stages, which are involved in the processing of scene statistics.

Cognitive penetration of early vision in face perception

Cognitive and affective penetration of perception refers to the influence that higher mental states such as beliefs and emotions have on perceptual systems. Psychological and neuroscientific studies appear to show that these states modulate the visual system at the visuomotor, attentional, and late levels of processing. However, empirical evidence showing that similar consequences occur in early stages of visual processing seems to be scarce. In this paper, I argue that psychological evidence does not seem to be either sufficient or necessary to argue in favour of or against the cognitive penetration of perception in either late or early vision. In order to do that we need to have recourse to brain imaging techniques. Thus, I introduce a neuroscientific study and argue that it seems to provide well-grounded evidence for the cognitive penetration of early vision in face perception. I also examine and reject alternative explanations to my conclusion.

Effects of meaningfulness on perception: Alpha-band oscillations carry perceptual expectations and influence early visual responses

Perceptual experience results from a complex interplay of bottom-up input and prior knowledge about the world, yet the extent to which knowledge affects perception, the neural mechanisms underlying these effects, and the stages of processing at which these two sources of information converge, are still unclear. In several experiments we show that language, in the form of verbal labels, both aids recognition of ambiguous “Mooney” images and improves objective visual discrimination performance in a match/non-match task. We then used electroencephalography (EEG) to better understand the mechanisms of this effect. The improved discrimination of images previously labeled was accompanied by a larger occipital-parietal P1 evoked response to the meaningful versus meaningless target stimuli. Time-frequency analysis of the interval between the cue and the target stimulus revealed increases in the power of posterior alpha-band (8–14 Hz) oscillations when the meaning of the stimuli to be compared was trained. The magnitude of the pre-target alpha difference and the P1 amplitude difference were positively correlated across individuals. These results suggest that prior knowledge prepares the brain for upcoming perception via the modulation of alpha-band oscillations, and that this preparatory state influences early (~120 ms) stages of visual processing.

The role of allograph representations in font-invariant letter identification

The literate brain must contend with countless font variants for any given letter. How does the visual system handle such variability? One proposed solution posits stored structural descriptions of basic letter shapes that are abstract enough to deal with the many possible font variations of each letter. These font-invariant representations, referred to as allographs in this paper, while frequently posited, have seldom been empirically evaluated. The research reported here helps to address this gap with 2 experiments that examine the possible influence of allograph representations on visual letter processing. In these experiments, participants respond to pairs of letters presented in an atypical font in 2 tasks-visual similarity judgments (Experiment 1) and same/different decisions (Experiment 2). By using representational similarity analysis (RSA) in conjunction with linear mixed effect models (LMEM; RSA-LMEM) we show that the similarity structure of the responses to the atypical font is influenced by the predicted similarity structure of allograph representations even after accounting for font-specific visual shape similarity. Similarity due to symbolic (abstract) identity, name, and motor representations of letters are also taken into account providing compelling evidence for the unique influence of allograph representations in these tasks. These results provide support for the role of allograph representations in achieving font-invariant letter identification. (PsycINFO Database Record

Implied motion language can influence visual spatial memory

How do language and vision interact? Specifically, what impact can language have on visual processing, especially related to spatial memory? What are typically considered errors in visual processing, such as remembering the location of an object to be farther along its motion trajectory than it actually is, can be explained as perceptual achievements that are driven by our ability to anticipate future events. In two experiments, we tested whether the prior presentation of motion language influences visual spatial memory in ways that afford greater perceptual prediction. Experiment 1 showed that motion language influenced judgments for the spatial memory of an object beyond the known effects of implied motion present in the image itself. Experiment 2 replicated this finding. Our findings support a theory of perception as prediction.

Not even wrong: The “it's just X” fallacy

I applaud Firestone & Scholl (F&S) in calling for more rigor. But, although F&S are correct that some published work on top-down effects suffers from confounds, their sweeping claim that there are no top-down effects on perception is premised on incorrect assumptions. F&S's thesis is wrong. Perception is richly and interestingly influenced by cognition.

Sizing Up Objects: The Effect of Diminutive Forms on Positive Mood, Value, and Size Judgments

Language (e.g., structure, morphology, and wording) can direct our attention toward the specific properties of an object, in turn influencing the mental representation of that same object. In this paper, we examined this idea by focusing on a particular linguistic form of diminution used in many languages (e.g., in Polish, Spanish, and Portuguese) to refer to an object as being “smaller.” Interestingly, although objects are usually considered “better” when they are bigger in size, objects described with linguistic diminution can also refer to those that are emotionally positive. Across three experiments conducted in Polish, we examined this lexical ambiguity in terms of mood (Experiment 1), subjective quality and monetary value (Experiment 2), and choice selection (Experiment 3). Overall, we found that people evaluate objects differently depending on the linguistic form (i.e., with or without diminution) with which they are described, and that it was related to the perceptual representation of these objects, and not their affective status. Objects described with diminution are evaluated as less satisfying and of lesser value and this effect is attributed to the way participants represent the objects (i.e., encoded and memorized). The generalizability of these effects is discussed.

How to (and how not to) think about top-down influences on visual perception

The question of whether cognition can influence perception has a long history in neuroscience and philosophy. Here, we outline a novel approach to this issue, arguing that it should be viewed within the framework of top-down information-processing. This approach leads to a reversal of the standard explanatory order of the cognitive penetration debate: we suggest studying top-down processing at various levels without preconceptions of perception or cognition. Once a clear picture has emerged about which processes have influences on those at lower levels, we can re-address the extent to which they should be considered perceptual or cognitive. Using top-down processing within the visual system as a model for higher-level influences, we argue that the current evidence indicates clear constraints on top-down influences at all stages of information processing; it does, however, not support the notion of a boundary between specific types of information-processing as proposed by the cognitive impenetrability hypothesis.

Bottom-up and top-down attentional contributions to the size congruity effect

The size congruity effect refers to the interaction between the numerical and physical (i.e., font) sizes of digits in a numerical (or physical) magnitude selection task. Although various accounts of the size congruity effect have attributed this interaction to either an early representational stage or a late decision stage, only Risko, Maloney, and Fugelsang (Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 75, 1137-1147, 2013) have asserted a central role for attention. In the present study, we used a visual search paradigm to further study the role of attention in the size congruity effect. In Experiments 1 and 2, we showed that manipulating top-down attention (via the task instructions) had a significant impact on the size congruity effect. The interaction between numerical and physical size was larger for numerical size comparison (Exp. 1) than for physical size comparison (Exp. 2). In the remaining experiments, we boosted the feature salience by using a unique target color (Exp. 3) or by increasing the display density by using three-digit numerals (Exps. 4 and 5). As expected, a color singleton target abolished the size congruity effect. Searching for three-digit targets based on numerical size (Exp. 4) resulted in a large size congruity effect, but search based on physical size (Exp. 5) abolished the effect. Our results reveal a substantial role for top-down attention in the size congruity effect, which we interpreted as support for a shared-decision account.

Top-Down Processes Override Bottom-Up Interference in the Flanker Task

Distractor interference in the flanker task is commonly viewed as an outcome of unintentional, involuntary processing, a by-product of attention-controlled processing of the target. An important implication of this notion is that the distractors are not subjected to top-down processing of their own. We tested this idea in a modified version of the flanker task, in which letter targets (S or O) were sometimes flanked by ambiguous distractors (a character that could be S or 5 or one that could be O or 0). Distractor interference was dependent on participants' expectations regarding the category of the distractors (i.e., letters or digits). For example, the O-0 distractor interfered with responding to S when it was perceived as a letter, but not when it was perceived as a digit. Hence, participants applied top-down processing to the peripheral distractors independently of the top-down processing applied to the targets. The fact that to-be-ignored peripheral distractors were processed to such a high level raises questions regarding the fundamental differences between target and distractor processing, and the quality of attentional filtering.

The effects of alphabet and expertise on letter perception

Long-standing questions in human perception concern the nature of the visual features that underlie letter recognition and the extent to which the visual processing of letters is affected by differences in alphabets and levels of viewer expertise. We examined these issues in a novel approach using a same-different judgment task on pairs of letters from the Arabic alphabet with 2 participant groups: 1 with no prior exposure to Arabic and 1 with reading proficiency. Hierarchical clustering and linear mixed-effects modeling of reaction times and accuracy provide evidence that both the specific characteristics of the alphabet and observers' previous experience with it affect how letters are perceived and visually processed. The findings of this research further our understanding of the multiple factors that affect letter perception and support the view of a visual system that dynamically adjusts its weighting of visual features as expert readers come to more efficiently and effectively discriminate the letters of the specific alphabet they are viewing. (PsycINFO Database Record

Seeing and thinking: Foundational issues and empirical horizons

The spectacularly varied responses to our target article raised big-picture questions about the nature of seeing and thinking, nitty-gritty experimental design details, and everything in between. We grapple with these issues, including the ready falsifiability of our view, neuroscientific theories that allow everything but demand nothing, cases where seeing and thinking conflict, mental imagery, the free press, an El Greco fallacy fallacy, hallucinogenic drugs, blue bananas, subatomic particles, Boeing 787s, and the racial identities of geometric shapes.

Revisiting the empirical case against perceptual modularity

Some theorists hold that the human perceptual system has a component that receives input only from units lower in the perceptual hierarchy. This thesis, that we shall here refer to as the encapsulation thesis, has been at the center of a continuing debate for the past few decades. Those who deny the encapsulation thesis often rely on the large body of psychological findings that allegedly suggest that perception is influenced by factors such as the beliefs, desires, goals, and the expectations of the perceiver. Proponents of the encapsulation thesis, however, often argue that, when correctly interpreted, these psychological findings are compatible with the thesis. In our view, the debate over the significance and the correct interpretation of these psychological findings has reached an impasse. We hold that this impasse is due to the methodological limitations over psychophysical experiments, and it is very unlikely that such experiments, on their own, could yield results that would settle the debate. After defending this claim, we argue that integrating data from cognitive neuroscience resolves the debate in favor of those who deny the encapsulation thesis.

Time-varying effective connectivity during visual object naming as a function of semantic demands

Accumulating evidence suggests that visual object understanding involves a rapid feedforward sweep, after which subsequent recurrent interactions are necessary. The extent to which recurrence plays a critical role in object processing remains to be determined. Recent studies have demonstrated that recurrent processing is modulated by increasing semantic demands. Differentially from previous studies, we used dynamic causal modeling to model neural activity recorded with magnetoencephalography while 14 healthy humans named two sets of visual objects that differed in the degree of semantic accessing demands, operationalized in terms of the values of basic psycholinguistic variables associated with the presented objects (age of acquisition, frequency, and familiarity). This approach allowed us to estimate the directionality of the causal interactions among brain regions and their associated connectivity strengths. Furthermore, to understand the dynamic nature of connectivity (i.e., the chronnectome; Calhoun et al., 2014) we explored the time-dependent changes of effective connectivity during a period (200-400 ms) where adding semantic-feature information improves modeling and classifying visual objects, at 50 ms increments. First, we observed a graded involvement of backward connections, that became active beyond 200 ms. Second, we found that semantic demands caused a suppressive effect in the backward connection from inferior frontal cortex (IFC) to occipitotemporal cortex over time. These results complement those from previous studies underscoring the role of IFC as a common source of top-down modulation, which drives recurrent interactions with more posterior regions during visual object recognition. Crucially, our study revealed the inhibitory modulation of this interaction in situations that place greater demands on the conceptual system.

Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for “top-down” effects

What determines what we see? In contrast to the traditional “modular” understanding of perception, according to which visual processing is encapsulated from higher-level cognition, a tidal wave of recent research alleges that states such as beliefs, desires, emotions, motivations, intentions, and linguistic representations exert direct, top-down influences on what we see. There is a growing consensus that such effects are ubiquitous, and that the distinction between perception and cognition may itself be unsustainable. We argue otherwise: None of these hundreds of studies – either individually or collectively – provides compelling evidence for true top-down effects on perception, or “cognitive penetrability.” In particular, and despite their variety, we suggest that these studies all fall prey to only a handful of pitfalls. And whereas abstract theoretical challenges have failed to resolve this debate in the past, our presentation of these pitfalls is empirically anchored: In each case, we show not only how certain studies could be susceptible to the pitfall (in principle), but also how several alleged top-down effects actually are explained by the pitfall (in practice). Moreover, these pitfalls are perfectly general, with each applying to dozens of other top-down effects. We conclude by extracting the lessons provided by these pitfalls into a checklist that future work could use to convincingly demonstrate top-down effects on visual perception. The discovery of substantive top-down effects of cognition on perception would revolutionize our understanding of how the mind is organized; but without addressing these pitfalls, no such empirical report will license such exciting conclusions.

Basic level category structure emerges gradually across human ventral visual cortex

Objects can be simultaneously categorized at multiple levels of specificity ranging from very broad ("natural object") to very distinct ("Mr. Woof"), with a mid-level of generality (basic level: "dog") often providing the most cognitively useful distinction between categories. It is unknown, however, how this hierarchical representation is achieved in the brain. Using multivoxel pattern analyses, we examined how well each taxonomic level (superordinate, basic, and subordinate) of real-world object categories is represented across occipitotemporal cortex. We found that, although in early visual cortex objects are best represented at the subordinate level (an effect mostly driven by low-level feature overlap between objects in the same category), this advantage diminishes compared to the basic level as we move up the visual hierarchy, disappearing in object-selective regions of occipitotemporal cortex. This pattern stems from a combined increase in within-category similarity (category cohesion) and between-category dissimilarity (category distinctiveness) of neural activity patterns at the basic level, relative to both subordinate and superordinate levels, suggesting that successive visual areas may be optimizing basic level representations.

Instructed illiteracy reveals expertise-effects on unconscious processing

We used a new methodological approach to investigate whether top-down influences like expertise determine the extent of unconscious processing. This approach does not rely on preexisting differences between experts and novices, but instructs essentially the same task in a way that either addresses a domain of expertise or not. Participants either were instructed to perform a lexical decision task (expert task) or to respond to a combination of single features of word and non-word stimuli (novel task). The stimuli and importantly also the mapping of responses to those stimuli, however, were exactly the same in both groups. We analyzed congruency effects of masked primes depending on the instructed task. Participants performing the expert task responded faster and less error prone when the prime was response congruent rather than incongruent. This effect was significantly reduced in the novel task, and even reversed when excluding identical prime-target pairs. This indicates that the primes in the novel task had an effect on a perceptual level, but were not able to impact on response activation. Overall, these results demonstrate an expertise-based top-down modulation of unconscious processing that cannot be explained by confounds that are otherwise inherent in comparisons between novices and experts.

Knowledge is power: how conceptual knowledge transforms visual cognition

In this review, we synthesize the existing literature demonstrating the dynamic interplay between conceptual knowledge and visual perceptual processing. We consider two theoretical frameworks that demonstrate interactions between processes and brain areas traditionally considered perceptual or conceptual. Specifically, we discuss categorical perception, in which visual objects are represented according to category membership, and highlight studies showing that category knowledge can penetrate early stages of visual analysis. We next discuss the embodied account of conceptual knowledge, which holds that concepts are instantiated in the same neural regions required for specific types of perception and action, and discuss the limitations of this framework. We additionally consider studies showing that gaining abstract semantic knowledge about objects and faces leads to behavioral and electrophysiological changes that are indicative of more efficient stimulus processing. Finally, we consider the role that perceiver goals and motivation may play in shaping the interaction between conceptual and perceptual processing. We hope to demonstrate how pervasive such interactions between motivation, conceptual knowledge, and perceptual processing are in our understanding of the visual environment, and to demonstrate the need for future research aimed at understanding how such interactions arise in the brain.

Categorical biases in perceiving spatial relations

We investigate the effect of spatial categories on visual perception. In three experiments, participants made same/different judgments on pairs of simultaneously presented dot-cross configurations. For different trials, the position of the dot within each cross could differ with respect to either categorical spatial relations (the dots occupied different quadrants) or coordinate spatial relations (the dots occupied different positions within the same quadrant). The dot-cross configurations also varied in how readily the dot position could be lexicalized. In harder-to-name trials, crosses formed a “+” shape such that each quadrant was associated with two discrete lexicalized spatial categories (e.g., “above” and “left”). In easier-to-name trials, both crosses were rotated 45° to form an “×” shape such that quadrants were unambiguously associated with a single lexicalized spatial category (e.g., “above” or “left”). In Experiment 1, participants were more accurate when discriminating categorical information between easier-to-name categories and more accurate at discriminating coordinate spatial information within harder-to-name categories. Subsequent experiments attempted to down-regulate or up-regulate the involvement of language in task performance. Results from Experiment 2 (verbal interference) and Experiment 3 (verbal training) suggest that the observed spatial relation type-by-nameability interaction is resistant to online language manipulations previously shown to affect color and object-based perceptual processing. The results across all three experiments suggest that robust biases in the visual perception of spatial relations correlate with patterns of lexicalization, but do not appear to be modulated by language online.

Task context impacts visual object processing differentially across the cortex

Perception reflects an integration of "bottom-up" (sensory-driven) and "top-down" (internally generated) signals. Although models of visual processing often emphasize the central role of feed-forward hierarchical processing, less is known about the impact of top-down signals on complex visual representations. Here, we investigated whether and how the observer's goals modulate object processing across the cortex. We examined responses elicited by a diverse set of objects under six distinct tasks, focusing on either physical (e.g., color) or conceptual properties (e.g., man-made). Critically, the same stimuli were presented in all tasks, allowing us to investigate how task impacts the neural representations of identical visual input. We found that task has an extensive and differential impact on object processing across the cortex. First, we found task-dependent representations in the ventral temporal and prefrontal cortex. In particular, although object identity could be decoded from the multivoxel response within task, there was a significant reduction in decoding across tasks. In contrast, the early visual cortex evidenced equivalent decoding within and across tasks, indicating task-independent representations. Second, task information was pervasive and present from the earliest stages of object processing. However, although the responses of the ventral temporal, prefrontal, and parietal cortex enabled decoding of both the type of task (physical/conceptual) and the specific task (e.g., color), the early visual cortex was not sensitive to type of task and could only be used to decode individual physical tasks. Thus, object processing is highly influenced by the behavioral goal of the observer, highlighting how top-down signals constrain and inform the formation of visual representations.

Beyond perceptual expertise: revisiting the neural substrates of expert object recognition

Real-world expertise provides a valuable opportunity to understand how experience shapes human behavior and neural function. In the visual domain, the study of expert object recognition, such as in car enthusiasts or bird watchers, has produced a large, growing, and often-controversial literature. Here, we synthesize this literature, focusing primarily on results from functional brain imaging, and propose an interactive framework that incorporates the impact of high-level factors, such as attention and conceptual knowledge, in supporting expertise. This framework contrasts with the perceptual view of object expertise that has concentrated largely on stimulus-driven processing in visual cortex. One prominent version of this perceptual account has almost exclusively focused on the relation of expertise to face processing and, in terms of the neural substrates, has centered on face-selective cortical regions such as the Fusiform Face Area (FFA). We discuss the limitations of this face-centric approach as well as the more general perceptual view, and highlight that expert related activity is: (i) found throughout visual cortex, not just FFA, with a strong relationship between neural response and behavioral expertise even in the earliest stages of visual processing, (ii) found outside visual cortex in areas such as parietal and prefrontal cortices, and (iii) modulated by the attentional engagement of the observer suggesting that it is neither automatic nor driven solely by stimulus properties. These findings strongly support a framework in which object expertise emerges from extensive interactions within and between the visual system and other cognitive systems, resulting in widespread, distributed patterns of expertise-related activity across the entire cortex.

Language can boost otherwise unseen objects into visual awareness

Linguistic labels (e.g., "chair") seem to activate visual properties of the objects to which they refer. Here we investigated whether language-based activation of visual representations can affect the ability to simply detect the presence of an object. We used continuous flash suppression to suppress visual awareness of familiar objects while they were continuously presented to one eye. Participants made simple detection decisions, indicating whether they saw any image. Hearing a verbal label before the simple detection task changed performance relative to an uninformative cue baseline. Valid labels improved performance relative to no-label baseline trials. Invalid labels decreased performance. Labels affected both sensitivity (d') and response times. In addition, we found that the effectiveness of labels varied predictably as a function of the match between the shape of the stimulus and the shape denoted by the label. Together, the findings suggest that facilitated detection of invisible objects due to language occurs at a perceptual rather than semantic locus. We hypothesize that when information associated with verbal labels matches stimulus-driven activity, language can provide a boost to perception, propelling an otherwise invisible image into awareness.

Recurrent Processing during Object Recognition

How does the brain learn to recognize objects visually, and perform this difficult feat robustly in the face of many sources of ambiguity and variability? We present a computational model based on the biology of the relevant visual pathways that learns to reliably recognize 100 different object categories in the face of naturally occurring variability in location, rotation, size, and lighting. The model exhibits robustness to highly ambiguous, partially occluded inputs. Both the unified, biologically plausible learning mechanism and the robustness to occlusion derive from the role that recurrent connectivity and recurrent processing mechanisms play in the model. Furthermore, this interaction of recurrent connectivity and learning predicts that high-level visual representations should be shaped by error signals from nearby, associated brain areas over the course of visual learning. Consistent with this prediction, we show how semantic knowledge about object categories changes the nature of their learned visual representations, as well as how this representational shift supports the mapping between perceptual and conceptual knowledge. Altogether, these findings support the potential importance of ongoing recurrent processing throughout the brain's visual system and suggest ways in which object recognition can be understood in terms of interactions within and between processes over time.

Visual attention is not enough: Individual differences in statistical word-referent learning in infants

Recent evidence shows that infants can learn words and referents by aggregating ambiguous information across situations to discern the underlying word-referent mappings. Here, we use an individual difference approach to understand the role of different kinds of attentional processes in this learning: 12-and 14-month-old infants participated in a cross-situational word-referent learning task in which the learning trials were ordered to create local novelty effects, effects that should not alter the statistical evidence for the underlying correspondences. The main dependent measures were derived from frame-by-frame analyses of eye gaze direction. The fine- grained dynamics of looking behavior implicates different attentional processes that may compete with or support statistical learning. The discussion considers the role of attention in binding heard words to seen objects, individual differences in attention and vocabulary development, and the relation between macro-level theories of word learning and the micro-level dynamic processes that underlie learning.

Aberrant somatosensory perception in Anorexia Nervosa

Anorexia Nervosa (AN) patients have a disturbed experience of body size and shape. Previously it has been shown that these body representation disturbances extend to enlarged perception of tactile distances. Here we investigated whether misperception of tactile size could be related to inaccurate elementary somatosensory perception. Tactile size perception was measured with the Tactile Estimation Task (TET) (see Keizer et al., 2011). Elementary somatosensory perception was assessed with a pressure detection task and two point discrimination (TPD). Compared to controls (n=28), AN patients (n=25) overestimated tactile size, this effect was strongest for the abdomen. Elementary tactile perception deviated in AN as well: Patients had a lower threshold for detecting pressure on their abdomen, and a higher threshold for TPD on both the arm and abdomen. Regression results implied that group membership predicted tactile size estimation on the arm. Both group membership and TPD predicted tactile size estimation on the abdomen. Our results show that AN patients have a disturbance in the metric properties of the mental representation of their body as they overestimate the size of tactile stimuli compared to controls. Interestingly, AN patients and controls differ in elementary somatosensory perception as well. However, this could not solely explain misperception of tactile distances, suggesting that both bottom-up and top-down processes are involved.

Automatic frame-centered object representation and integration revealed by iconic memory, visual priming, and backward masking

Object identities ("what") and their spatial locations ("where") are processed in distinct pathways in the visual system, raising the question of how the what and where information is integrated. Because of object motions and eye movements, the retina-based representations are unstable, necessitating nonretinotopic representation and integration. A potential mechanism is to code and update objects according to their reference frames (i.e., frame-centered representation and integration). To isolate frame-centered processes, in a frame-to-frame apparent motion configuration, we (a) presented two preceding or trailing objects on the same frame, equidistant from the target on the other frame, to control for object-based (frame-based) effect and space-based effect, and (b) manipulated the target's relative location within its frame to probe frame-centered effect. We show that iconic memory, visual priming, and backward masking depend on objects' relative frame locations, orthogonal of the retinotopic coordinate. These findings not only reveal that iconic memory, visual priming, and backward masking can be nonretinotopic but also demonstrate that these processes are automatically constrained by contextual frames through a frame-centered mechanism. Thus, object representation is robustly and automatically coupled to its reference frame and continuously being updated through a frame-centered, location-specific mechanism. These findings lead to an object cabinet framework, in which objects ("files") within the reference frame ("cabinet") are orderly coded relative to the frame.

A satisficing and bricoleur approach to sensorimotor cognition

In this manuscript I present a set of neural processing principles and evolutionary constraints that should be taken into account in the characterization of sensorimotor cognition. I review evidence supporting the choice of the set of principles, and then I assess how such principles apply to two cases, object perception-action and peripersonal space. The aim is to emphasize the importance of focusing cognitive models on how evolution shapes functional paths to adaptations, as well as to adopt fitness maximization analyses of cognitive functions. Such an approach contrasts with the widespread reverse-engineering assumption that the neural system comprises a set of specialized circuits designed to comply with its assumed functions. The evidence presented in the manuscript points to the fact that neural systems should not be seen as a seat of optimal processes and circuits addressing particular problems in sensorimotor cognition, but as a set of satisficing and tinkered components, mostly not addressing the problems that are supposed to solve, but solving them as secondary effects of the engaged processes. I conclude with a corollary of the challenges lying ahead of the proposed approach.

Influence of category identity on letter matching: conceptual penetration of visual processing or response competition?

Participants performed same-different matching tasks, with physical-identity instructions, on letter pairs composed from the letters B, b, and p. The letters in a pair were presented simultaneously or sequentially, with the experiments differing in whether (1) the letters could appear in two or four positions, (2) two or five SOAs were used, (3) the font was Arial or one in which the two loops of the letter B were of the same size, and (4) p did or did not occur in same pairs. With sequential presentation, different RTs were longer when the letters had the same name (Bb; within-category pair) than when they did not (Bp; between-category pair), replicating a finding by Lupyan et al. (2010). However, unlike in their study, this category effect was also significant with simultaneous presentation, tending to be nonsignificantly smaller for RTs but larger for accuracy than that obtained with sequential presentation. A similar pattern was observed when we removed a bias to respond different whenever the letter p was detected in the experiments in which p did not appear in same pairs. The presence of a category effect with simultaneous presentation is predicted by a response competition account, but not by Lupyan et al.'s conceptual-penetration-of-visual-processing account.