The Tipping Point of Animacy

Significance Quest: A Meta-Analysis on the Association Between the Variables of the 3N Model and Violent Extremism

Given the pervasiveness of violent extremism all over the globe, understanding its psychological underpinnings is key in the fight against it. According to the Significance Quest Theory and its 3N model, violent extremism (i.e., violent and deviant behavior) is a function of three elements: need, narrative, and network. In the present meta-analysis, to put into test the theory and its model, we aimed to establish the strength of the association between these three elements, as well as the quest for significance itself, and violent extremism; and investigate if these associations are influenced by methodological decisions (i.e., sampling and measurements/manipulations). A literature search was performed through electronic platforms, a call for unpublished or in-press data, and backward snowballing. Seventeen reports, comprising 42 studies, met full inclusion criteria: quantitative studies based on primary data assessing for the association of at least one of the 3Ns, or quest for significance, and violent extremism, and providing sufficient data for effect size extraction. Findings are reported according to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses(PRISMA) guidelines. Random-effect meta-analyses rendered statistically significant pooled effect sizes in all the investigated associations. The association is strong for quest for significance, moderate for narrative and network, and low for need for significance. Subgroup analyses demonstrate that the detection of these associations is influenced by methodological decisions concerning the measurements and manipulations, but not by those concerning the sampling. We discuss these findings and suggest future research directions aiming to improve the predictive power of the theory and its model.

Self-discrepancies in mind perception for actual, ideal, and ought selves and partners

Defining and measuring self-discrepancies in mind perception between how an individual sees their actual self in comparison to their ideal or ought self has a long but challenging history in psychology. Here we present a new approach for measuring and operationalizing discrepancies of mind by employing the mind perception framework that has been applied successfully to a variety of other psychological constructs. Across two studies (N = 265, N = 205), participants were recruited online to fill in a modified version of the mind perception survey with questions pertaining to three domains (actual, ideal, ought) and two agents (self versus partner). The results revealed that participants idealized and thought they ought to have greater agency (the ability to do) and diminished experience (the ability to feel) for both themselves and their partner. Sex differences were also examined across both studies, and while minor differences emerged, the effects were not robust across the collective evidence from both studies. The overall findings suggest that the mind perception approach can be used to distill a large number of qualities of mind into meaningful facets for interpretation in relation to self-discrepancy theory. This method can breathe new life into the field with future investigations directed at understanding self-discrepancies in relation to prosocial behaviour and psychological well-being.

Perceptual discrimination in the face perception of robots is attenuated compared to humans

When interacting with groups of robots, we tend to perceive them as a homogenous group where all group members have similar capabilities. This overgeneralization of capabilities is potentially due to a lack of perceptual experience with robots or a lack of motivation to see them as individuals (i.e., individuation). This can undermine trust and performance in human-robot teams. One way to overcome this issue is by designing robots that can be individuated such that each team member can be provided tasks based on its actual skills. In two experiments, we examine if humans can effectively individuate robots: Experiment 1 (n = 225) investigates how individuation performance of robot stimuli compares to that of human stimuli that either belong to a social ingroup or outgroup. Experiment 2 (n = 177) examines to what extent robots' physical human-likeness (high versus low) affects individuation performance. Results show that although humans are able to individuate robots, they seem to individuate them to a lesser extent than both ingroup and outgroup human stimuli (Experiment 1). Furthermore, robots that are physically more humanlike are initially individuated better compared to robots that are physically less humanlike; this effect, however, diminishes over the course of the experiment, suggesting that the individuation of robots can be learned quite quickly (Experiment 2). Whether differences in individuation performance with robot versus human stimuli is primarily due to a reduced perceptual experience with robot stimuli or due to motivational aspects (i.e., robots as potential social outgroup) should be examined in future studies.

When Time Shifts the Boundaries: Isolating the Role of Forgetting in Children's Changing Category Representations

In studies of children's categorization, researchers have typically studied how encoding characteristics of exemplars contribute to children's generalization. However, it is unclear whether children's internal cognitive processes alone, independent of new information, may also influence their generalization. Thus, we examined the role that one cognitive process, forgetting, plays in shaping children's category representations by conducting three experiments. In the first two experiments, participants (NExp1=37, Mage=4.02 years; NExp2=32, Mage=4.48 years) saw a novel object labeled by the experimenter and then saw five new objects with between one and five features changed from the learned exemplar. The experimenter asked whether each object was a member of the same category as the exemplar; children saw the five new objects either immediately or after a five-minute delay. Children endorsed category membership at higher rates at immediate test than at delayed test, suggesting that children's category representations became narrower over time. In Experiment 3, we investigated forgetting as a key mechanism underlying the narrowing found in Experiments 1 and 2. We showed participants (NExp3=34, Mage=4.20 years) the same exemplars used in Experiments 1 and 2; then, either immediately or after a five-minute delay, we showed children seven individual object features and asked if each one had been part of the exemplar. Children's accuracy was lower after the delay, showing that they did indeed forget individual features. Taken together, these results show that forgetting plays an important role in changing children's newly-learned categories over time.

The inversion effect on the cubic humanness-uncanniness relation in humanlike agents

The uncanny valley describes the typically nonlinear relation between the esthetic appeal of artificial entities and their human likeness. The effect has been attributed to specialized (configural) processing that increases sensitivity to deviations from human norms. We investigate this effect in computer-generated, humanlike android and human faces using dynamic facial expressions. Angry and happy expressions with varying degrees of synchrony were presented upright and inverted and rated on their eeriness, strangeness, and human likeness. A sigmoidal function of human likeness and uncanniness ("uncanny slope") was found for upright expressions and a linear relation for inverted faces. While the function is not indicative of an uncanny valley, the results support the view that configural processing moderates the effect of human likeness on uncanniness and extend its role to dynamic facial expressions.

Perceived reward attainability may underlie dogs' responses in inequity paradigms

Dogs have repeatedly been shown to give their paw to an experimenter more times for no reward when a rewarded conspecific partner is absent than when a rewarded conspecific is present, thereby showing inequity aversion. However, rather than being inequity averse, dogs might give their paw more when a partner is absent due to the experimenter's procedure in which they move food in front of the subject to mimic feeding a partner. This action could increase subjects' perception of reward attainability. We tested this hypothesis by introducing an improved type of control condition in which subjects were unrewarded for giving the paw in the presence of a rewarded box, a condition that more closely resembles the inequity condition. Inequity averse subjects' performance did not differ based on whether the partner was another dog or a box. Moreover, these subjects gave the paw more times when no partner was present and the experimenter mimicked the feeding of a partner than when rewards were placed in the box. These results suggest that responses in the previous studies were inflated by subjects' increased perception of reward attainability when no partner was present and, therefore, over-exaggerated dogs' propensity to give up due to inequity aversion.

Pareidolic faces receive prioritized attention in the dot-probe task

Face pareidolia occurs when random or ambiguous inanimate objects are perceived as faces. While real faces automatically receive prioritized attention compared with nonface objects, it is unclear whether pareidolic faces similarly receive special attention. We hypothesized that, given the evolutionary importance of broadly detecting animacy, pareidolic faces may have enough faceness to activate a broad face template, triggering prioritized attention. To test this hypothesis, and to explore where along the faceness continuum pareidolic faces fall, we conducted a series of dot-probe experiments in which we paired pareidolic faces with other images directly competing for attention: objects, animal faces, and human faces. We found that pareidolic faces elicited more prioritized attention than objects, a process that was disrupted by inversion, suggesting this prioritized attention was unlikely to be driven by low-level features. However, unexpectedly, pareidolic faces received more privileged attention compared with animal faces and showed similar prioritized attention to human faces. This attentional efficiency may be due to pareidolic faces being perceived as not only face-like, but also as human-like, and having larger facial features-eyes and mouths-compared with real faces. Together, our findings suggest that pareidolic faces appear automatically attentionally privileged, similar to human faces. Our findings are consistent with the proposal of a highly sensitive broad face detection system that is activated by pareidolic faces, triggering false alarms (i.e., illusory faces), which, evolutionarily, are less detrimental relative to missing potentially relevant signals (e.g., conspecific or heterospecific threats). In sum, pareidolic faces appear "special" in attracting attention.

Facilitating animacy perception by manipulating stimuli exposure time

Animacy perception-discriminating between animate and inanimate visual stimuli-is the basis for engaging in social cognition and for our survival (e.g., avoiding potential danger). Previous studies indicate that factors in a target, such as the features or motion of a target, enhance animacy perception. However, factors in a perceiver, such as the visual attention of a perceiver to a target, have received little attention from researchers. Research on judgment, decision-making, and neuroeconomics indicates the active role of visual attention in constructing decisions. This study examined the role of visual attention in the perception of animacy by manipulating the exposure time of targets. Among Studies 1a to 1c conducted in this study, participants saw two face illustrations alternately; one of the faces was shown to be longer than the other. The participants chose the face that they considered more animated and rounder. Consequently, longer exposure time toward targets facilitated animacy perception and preference rather than the perception of roundness. Furthermore, preregistered Study 2 examined the underlying mechanisms. The results suggest that mere exposure, rather than orienting behavior, might play a vital role in the perception of animacy. Thus, in the reverse relationship between visual attention and animacy perception, animate objects capture attention-attention results in the perception of animacy.

On the realness of people who do not exist: The social processing of artificial faces

Today more than ever, we are asked to evaluate the realness, truthfulness and trustworthiness of our social world. Here, we focus on how people evaluate realistic-looking faces of non-existing people generated by generative adversarial networks (GANs). GANs are increasingly used in marketing, journalism, social media, and political propaganda. In three studies, we investigated if and how participants can distinguish between GAN and REAL faces and the social consequences of their exposure to artificial faces. GAN faces were more likely to be perceived as real than REAL faces, a pattern partly explained by intrinsic stimulus characteristics. Moreover, participants' realness judgments influenced their behavior because they displayed increased social conformity toward faces perceived as real, independently of their actual realness. Lastly, knowledge about the presence of GAN faces eroded social trust. Our findings point to potentially far-reaching consequences for the pervasive use of GAN faces in a culture powered by images at unprecedented levels.

Evidence of the unidimensional structure of mind perception

The last decade has witnessed intense interest in how people perceive the minds of other entities (humans, non-human animals, and non-living objects and forces) and how this perception impacts behavior. Despite the attention paid to the topic, the psychological structure of mind perception-that is, the underlying properties that account for variance across judgements of entities-is not clear and extant reports conflict in terms of how to understand the structure. In the present research, we evaluated the psychological structure of mind perception by having participants evaluate a wide array of human, non-human animal, and non-animal entities. Using an entirely within-participants design, varied measurement approaches, and data-driven analyses, four studies demonstrated that mind perception is best conceptualized along a single dimension.

Robots engage face-processing less strongly than humans

Robot faces often differ from human faces in terms of their facial features (e.g., lack of eyebrows) and spatial relationships between these features (e.g., disproportionately large eyes), which can influence the degree to which social brain [i.e., Fusiform Face Area (FFA), Superior Temporal Sulcus (STS); Haxby et al., 2000] areas process them as social individuals that can be discriminated from other agents in terms of their perceptual features and person attributes. Of interest in this work is whether robot stimuli are processed in a less social manner than human stimuli. If true, this could undermine human-robot interactions (HRIs) because human partners could potentially fail to perceive robots as individual agents with unique features and capabilities-a phenomenon known as outgroup homogeneity-potentially leading to miscalibration of trust and errors in allocation of task responsibilities. In this experiment, we use the face inversion paradigm (as a proxy for neural activation in social brain areas) to examine whether face processing differs between human and robot face stimuli: if robot faces are perceived as less face-like than human-faces, the difference in recognition performance for faces presented upright compared to upside down (i.e., inversion effect) should be less pronounced for robot faces than human faces. The results demonstrate a reduced face inversion effect with robot vs. human faces, supporting the hypothesis that robot faces are processed in a less face-like manner. This suggests that roboticists should attend carefully to the design of robot faces and evaluate them based on their ability to engage face-typical processes. Specific design recommendations on how to accomplish this goal are provided in the discussion.

Corneal reflections and skin contrast yield better memory of human and virtual faces

Virtual faces have been found to be rated less human-like and remembered worse than photographic images of humans. What it is in virtual faces that yields reduced memory has so far remained unclear. The current study investigated face memory in the context of virtual agent faces and human faces, real and manipulated, considering two factors of predicted influence, i.e., corneal reflections and skin contrast. Corneal reflections referred to the bright points in each eye that occur when the ambient light reflects from the surface of the cornea. Skin contrast referred to the degree to which skin surface is rough versus smooth. We conducted two memory experiments, one with high-quality virtual agent faces (Experiment 1) and the other with the photographs of human faces that were manipulated (Experiment 2). Experiment 1 showed better memory for virtual faces with increased corneal reflections and skin contrast (rougher rather than smoother skin). Experiment 2 replicated these findings, showing that removing the corneal reflections and smoothening the skin reduced memory recognition of manipulated faces, with a stronger effect exerted by the eyes than the skin. This study highlights specific features of the eyes and skin that can help explain memory discrepancies between real and virtual faces and in turn elucidates the factors that play a role in the cognitive processing of faces.

The deviation-from-familiarity effect: Expertise increases uncanniness of deviating exemplars

Humanlike entities deviating from the norm of human appearance are perceived as strange or uncanny. Explanations for the eeriness of deviating humanlike entities include ideas specific to human or animal stimuli like mate selection, avoidance of threat or disease, or dehumanization; however, deviation from highly familiar categories may provide a better explanation. Here it is tested whether experts and novices in a novel (greeble) category show different patterns of abnormality, attractiveness, and uncanniness responses to distorted and averaged greebles. Greeble-trained participants assessed the abnormality, attractiveness, uncanniness of normal, averaged, and distorted greebles and their responses were compared to participants who had not previously seen greebles. The data show that distorted greebles were more uncanny than normal greebles only in the training condition, and distorted greebles were more uncanny in the training compared to the control condition. In addition, averaged greebles were not more attractive than normal greebles regardless of condition. The results suggest uncanniness is elicited by deviations from stimulus categories of expertise rather than being a purely biological human- or animal-specific response.

Social signalling as a framework for second-person neuroscience

Despite the recent increase in second-person neuroscience research, it is still hard to understand which neurocognitive mechanisms underlie real-time social behaviours. Here, we propose that social signalling can help us understand social interactions both at the single- and two-brain level in terms of social signal exchanges between senders and receivers. First, we show how subtle manipulations of being watched provide an important tool to dissect meaningful social signals. We then focus on how social signalling can help us build testable hypotheses for second-person neuroscience with the example of imitation and gaze behaviour. Finally, we suggest that linking neural activity to specific social signals will be key to fully understand the neurocognitive systems engaged during face-to-face interactions.

Inversion Reduces Sensitivity to Complex Emotions in Eye Regions

Inferring humans’ complex emotions is challenging but can be done with surprisingly limited emotion signals, including merely the eyes alone. Here, we test for a role of lower-level perceptual processes involved in such sensitivity using the well-validated Reading the Mind in the Eyes task. Over three experiments, we manipulated configural processing to show that it contributes to sensitivity to complex emotion from human eye regions. Specifically, inversion, a well-established manipulation affecting configural processing, undermined sensitivity to complex emotions in eye regions (Experiments 1-3). Inversion extended to undermine sensitivity to nonmentalistic information from human eye regions (gender; Experiment 2) but did not extend to affect sensitivity to attributes of nonhuman animals (Experiment 3). Taken together, the current findings provide evidence for the novel hypothesis that configural processing facilitates sensitivity to complex emotions conveyed by the eyes via the broader extraction of socially relevant information.

Accepting Human-like Avatars in Social and Professional Roles

Humans report perceptions of unease or eeriness as humanoid/android robots and digital avatars approach human-like physical resemblance, a phenomenon alluded by the Uncanny Valley theory. This study extends the discussions on interactions and acceptance of digital avatars with findings from three experiments. In the first, perceptive evaluation of actors in clips from computer-generated animation and a live-action version of the same movie was examined. In the second experiment, we considered short clips with highly realistic digital avatars to measure recognition ability, the extent of eeriness, and specific physical features identified as unreal. The fixation area and pupil size variation recorded using an eye tracker were analyzed to infer attention to the body, face, and emotional response, respectively. Building on these findings, the third experiment looked at acceptance in roles requiring human skill, empathy, and cognitive ability. The results show that based on perceptions from physical attributes, the eeriness scores diverge from the uncanny valley theory as human-likeness increases. The realistic CGI and mocap technology could have helped cross the valley. Visual attention inferred from gaze behavior was similar for live-action and CGI. At the same time, we observe pupil size changes reflecting emotions like eeriness when the avatars either talked or smiled. Proficiency and acceptance scores were lower for roles requiring complex social cognition processes, such as friends and judicial decision-making. Interestingly, real-life stereotypes of gender roles were transferred to digital avatars too. The findings suggest an ambiguity in accepting human-like avatars in social and professional interactions, emphasizing the need for a multi-dimensional approach when applying the uncanny valley theory. A detailed and contextual examination is imperative as technological advancements have placed humans closer to co-existing with digital or physical android/humanoid robots.

A Meta-analysis of the Uncanny Valley's Independent and Dependent Variables

The uncanny valley (UV) effect is a negative affective reaction to human-looking artificial entities. It hinders comfortable, trust-based interactions with android robots and virtual characters. Despite extensive research, a consensus has not formed on its theoretical basis or methodologies. We conducted a meta-analysis to assess operationalizations of human likeness (independent variable) and the UV effect (dependent variable). Of 468 studies, 72 met the inclusion criteria. These studies employed 10 different stimulus creation techniques, 39 affect measures, and 14 indirect measures. Based on 247 effect sizes, a three-level meta-analysis model revealed the UV effect had a large effect size, Hedges’ g = 1.01 [0.80, 1.22]. A mixed-effects meta-regression model with creation technique as the moderator variable revealed face distortion produced the largest effect size, g = 1.46 [0.69, 2.24], followed by distinct entities, g = 1.20 [1.02, 1.38], realism render, g = 0.99 [0.62, 1.36], and morphing, g = 0.94 [0.64, 1.24]. Affective indices producing the largest effects were threatening, likable, aesthetics, familiarity , and eeriness , and indirect measures were dislike frequency, categorization reaction time, like frequency, avoidance , and viewing duration . This meta-analysis—the first on the UV effect—provides a methodological foundation and design principles for future research.

Spontaneous perspective taking toward robots: The unique impact of humanlike appearance

As robots rapidly enter society, how does human social cognition respond to their novel presence? Focusing on one foundational social-cognitive capacity-visual perspective taking-seven studies reveal that people spontaneously adopt a robot's unique perspective and do so with patterns of variation that mirror perspective taking toward humans. As they do with humans, people take a robot's visual perspective when it displays goal-directed actions. Moreover, perspective taking is absent when the agent lacks human appearance, increases when the agent looks highly humanlike, and persists even when the humanlike agent is perceived as eerie or as obviously lacking a mind. These results suggest that visual perspective taking toward robots is consistent with a "mere appearance hypothesis"-a form of stimulus generalization based on humanlike appearance-rather than following an "uncanny valley" pattern or arising from mind perception. Robots' superficial human resemblance may trigger and modulate social-cognitive responses in human observers originally developed for human interaction.

The potential for effective reasoning guides children's preference for small group discussion over crowdsourcing

Communication between social learners can make a group collectively "wiser" than any individual, but conformist tendencies can also distort collective judgment. We asked whether intuitions about when communication is likely to improve or distort collective judgment could allow social learners to take advantage of the benefits of communication while minimizing the risks. In three experiments (n = 360), 7- to 10-year old children and adults decided whether to refer a question to a small group for discussion or "crowdsource" independent judgments from individual advisors. For problems affording the kind of 'demonstrative' reasoning that allows a group member to reliably correct errors made by even a majority, all ages preferred to consult the discussion group, even compared to a crowd ten times as large-consistent with past research suggesting that discussion groups regularly outperform even their best members for reasoning problems. In contrast, we observed a consistent developmental shift towards crowdsourcing independent judgments when reasoning by itself was insufficient to conclusively answer a question. Results suggest sophisticated intuitions about the nature of social influence and collective intelligence may guide our social learning strategies from early in development.

A Behavioral Science Framework for Understanding College Campus Sexual Assault

We propose a behavioral-science approach to sexual assault on college campuses. In this framework, people commit assault when aspects of the immediate situation trigger certain psychological states. No set of mental processes or situational configurations is a precise predictor of assault. Instead, the interaction between mental processes and situational configurations predicts when sexual assault is more or less likely to occur. We begin with an illustrative story to show how a behavioral-science approach is relevant to sexual assault. Next, we map out a framework that suggests how behavioral theories of situations and mental processes have been or could be used to describe, predict, and develop ideas for the reduction of sexual assault. Relevant situational configurations include geographical configurations, local situational and informational cues, and situation-based power. Theories of mental processes include person perception, social norms, moral reasoning, and goals. Our framework can be used to demonstrate how "good" people can commit assault and how individuals can and will refrain from assault within institutions with a "bad" record. Compared with previous theories of sexual assault, a behavioral-science framework offers unique understanding and generative methods for addressing sexual assault on college campuses.

Adaptation in face animacy perception: An event-related potential study

A real face differs from an artificial face mainly in the animacy. Nowadays, the perception boundaries between the real and artificial faces are becoming blurred in our life with the ubiquitous use of AI. Therefore, the perception of animacy causes increasing interests. Here, we used an adaptation paradigm to investigate the animacy perception in faces. We morphed a real and an artificial face to generate a continuum of face images, and asked participants to judge the animacy of those face images after they were exposed to a real face or an artificial face. We found that after adaptation to a real face, the subjects were apt to identify a subsequently ambiguous face to be inanimate, whereas after adaptation to an artificial face, the subjects were apt to identify a subsequently ambiguous face to be animate, i.e., the face animacy aftereffect (FAAE). We simultaneously recorded EEG during the task and analyzed the event-related potentials in response to the test faces, and found that adaptation to a face animacy suppressed the amplitude of LPP (late positive potential) and prolonged the latencies of N250r and LPP, in response to subsequent animacy-congruent faces. However, for subsequent animacy-incongruent faces, the amplitude was enhanced in LPP and the latencies were shortened in N250r and LPP. Those modulations of N250r and LPP activity act as a neural correlate of face animacy adaptation.

Human face and gaze perception is highly context specific and involves bottom-up and top-down neural processing

This review summarizes human perception and processing of face and gaze signals. Face and gaze signals are important means of non-verbal social communication. The review highlights that: (1) some evidence is available suggesting that the perception and processing of facial information starts in the prenatal period; (2) the perception and processing of face identity, expression and gaze direction is highly context specific, the effect of race and culture being a case in point. Culture affects by means of experiential shaping and social categorization the way in which information on face and gaze is collected and perceived; (3) face and gaze processing occurs in the so-called 'social brain'. Accumulating evidence suggests that the processing of facial identity, facial emotional expression and gaze involves two parallel and interacting pathways: a fast and crude subcortical route and a slower cortical pathway. The flow of information is bi-directional and includes bottom-up and top-down processing. The cortical networks particularly include the fusiform gyrus, superior temporal sulcus (STS), intraparietal sulcus, temporoparietal junction and medial prefrontal cortex.

Impact of perceived interpersonal similarity on attention to the eyes of same-race and other-race faces

One reason for the persistence of racial discrimination may be anticipated dissimilarity with racial outgroup members that prevent meaningful interactions. In the present research, we investigated whether perceived similarity would impact the processing of same-race and other-race faces. Specifically, in two experiments, we varied the extent to which White participants were ostensibly similar to targets via bogus feedback on a personality test. With an eye tracker, we measured the effect of this manipulation on attention to the eyes, a critical region for person perception and face memory. In Experiment 1, we monitored the impact of perceived interpersonal similarity on White participants’ attention to the eyes of same-race White targets. In Experiment 2, we replicated this procedure, but White participants were presented with either same-race White targets or other-race Black targets in a between-subjects design. The pattern of results in both experiments indicated a positive linear effect of similarity—greater perceived similarity between participants and targets predicted more attention to the eyes of White and Black faces. The implications of these findings related to top-down effects of perceived similarity for our understanding of basic processes in face perception, as well as intergroup relations, are discussed.

Robot faces elicit responses intermediate to human faces and objects at face-sensitive ERP components

Face recognition is supported by selective neural mechanisms that are sensitive to various aspects of facial appearance. These include event-related potential (ERP) components like the P100 and the N170 which exhibit different patterns of selectivity for various aspects of facial appearance. Examining the boundary between faces and non-faces using these responses is one way to develop a more robust understanding of the representation of faces in extrastriate cortex and determine what critical properties an image must possess to be considered face-like. Robot faces are a particularly interesting stimulus class to examine because they can differ markedly from human faces in terms of shape, surface properties, and the configuration of facial features, but are also interpreted as social agents in a range of settings. In the current study, we thus chose to investigate how ERP responses to robot faces may differ from the response to human faces and non-face objects. In two experiments, we examined how the P100 and N170 responded to human faces, robot faces, and non-face objects (clocks). In Experiment 1, we found that robot faces elicit intermediate responses from face-sensitive components relative to non-face objects (clocks) and both real human faces and artificial human faces (computer-generated faces and dolls). These results suggest that while human-like inanimate faces (CG faces and dolls) are processed much like real faces, robot faces are dissimilar enough to human faces to be processed differently. In Experiment 2 we found that the face inversion effect was only partly evident in robot faces. We conclude that robot faces are an intermediate stimulus class that offers insight into the perceptual and cognitive factors that affect how social agents are identified and categorized.

The timeline of mentalization: Distinguishing a two-phase process from mind detection to mind attribution

Mentalization is the ability to perceive other people's mental states. This research aimed to deepen our understanding of the underlying mechanisms while also exploring the timeline of the mentalization process. Two studies were conducted in which participants' electrophysiological activity was measured while elaborating Black and White (Study 1), or Italian (ingroup) and Romanian (outgroup), human and doll-like faces (Study 2). Moreover, in Study 2 the presented faces differed in their Facial Width-to-Height Ratio. Subsequently, an Implicit Mind Attribution Test (IMAT) measured the strength of the association of the same ingroup and outgroup human stimuli with mind and body-related words. Two different phases in the time course of the mentalization process emerged. An early ERP component (N170) indicated a first difference between doll-like, mindless and human, mindful targets, while a later ERP component (P300) represented the second stage of mentalization. In this stage, outgroup doll-like faces were elaborated more similarly to the outgroup human faces compared to the same stimuli of the ingroup. Moreover, only a positive correlation between the P300 and the IMAT emerged indicating that the differences in this later ERP component were related with an implicit behavioral measure of mind attribution. These results stipulate the timeline of the mentalization process that is defined by an initial moment of mind detection, in which mindful and mindless stimuli are differentiated for the first time, and a second phase of mind attribution, where the interplay of perceptual and contextual information determine the extraction of a mind from a face.

A Pragmatic Approach to the Intentional Stance Semantic, Empirical and Ethical Considerations for the Design of Artificial Agents

Artificial agents are progressively becoming more present in everyday-life situations and more sophisticated in their interaction affordances. In some specific cases, like Google Duplex, GPT-3 bots or Deep Mind’s AlphaGo Zero, their capabilities reach or exceed human levels. The use contexts of everyday life necessitate making such agents understandable by laypeople. At the same time, displaying human levels of social behavior has kindled the debate over the adoption of Dennett’s ‘intentional stance’. By means of a comparative analysis of the literature on robots and virtual agents, we defend the thesis that approaching these artificial agents ‘as if’ they had intentions and forms of social, goal-oriented rationality is the only way to deal with their complexity on a daily base. Specifically, we claim that this is the only viable strategy for non-expert users to understand, predict and perhaps learn from artificial agents’ behavior in everyday social contexts. Furthermore, we argue that as long as agents are transparent about their design principles and functionality, attributing intentions to their actions is not only essential, but also ethical. Additionally, we propose design guidelines inspired by the debate over the adoption of the intentional stance.

Creepy cats and strange high houses: Support for configural processing in testing predictions of nine uncanny valley theories

In 1970, Masahiro Mori proposed the uncanny valley (UV), a region in a human-likeness continuum where an entity risks eliciting a cold, eerie, repellent feeling. Recent studies have shown that this feeling can be elicited by entities modeled not only on humans but also nonhuman animals. The perceptual and cognitive mechanisms underlying the UV effect are not well understood, although many theories have been proposed to explain them. To test the predictions of nine classes of theories, a within-subjects experiment was conducted with 136 participants. The theories' predictions were compared with ratings of 10 classes of stimuli on eeriness and coldness indices. One type of theory, configural processing, predicted eight out of nine significant effects. Atypicality, in its extended form, in which the uncanny valley effect is amplified by the stimulus appearing more human, also predicted eight. Threat avoidance predicted seven; atypicality, perceptual mismatch, and mismatch+ predicted six; category+, novelty avoidance, mate selection, and psychopathy avoidance predicted five; and category uncertainty predicted three. Empathy's main prediction was not supported. Given that the number of significant effects predicted depends partly on our choice of hypotheses, a detailed consideration of each result is advised. We do, however, note the methodological value of examining many competing theories in the same experiment.

Sensitivity to face animacy and inversion in childhood: Evidence from EEG data

Adults exhibit relative behavioral difficulties in processing inanimate, artificial faces compared to real human faces, with implications for using artificial faces in research and designing artificial social agents. However, the developmental trajectory of inanimate face perception is unknown. To address this gap, we used electroencephalography to investigate inanimate faces processing in cross-sectional groups of 5-10-year-old children and adults. A face inversion manipulation was used to test whether face animacy processing relies on expert face processing strategies. Groups of 5-7-year-olds (N = 18), 8-10-year-olds (N = 18), and adults (N = 16) watched pictures of real or doll faces presented in an upright or inverted orientation. Analyses of event-related potentials revealed larger N170 amplitudes in response to doll faces, irrespective of age group or face orientation. Thus, the N170 is sensitive to face animacy by 5-7 years of age, but such sensitivity may not reflect high-level, expert face processing. Multivariate pattern analyses of the EEG signal additionally assessed whether animacy information could be reliably extracted during face processing. Face orientation, but not face animacy, could be reliably decoded from occipitotemporal channels in children and adults. Face animacy could be decoded from whole scalp channels in adults, but not children. Together, these results suggest that 5-10-year-old children exhibit some sensitivity to face animacy over occipitotemporal regions that is comparable to adults.

Pre-exposure to Ambiguous Faces Modulates Top-Down Control of Attentional Orienting to Counterpredictive Gaze Cues

Understanding and reacting to others' nonverbal social signals, such as changes in gaze direction (i.e., gaze cue), are essential for social interactions, as it is important for processes such as joint attention and mentalizing. Although attentional orienting in response to gaze cues has a strong reflexive component, accumulating evidence shows that it can be top-down controlled by context information regarding the signals' social relevance. For example, when a gazer is believed to be an entity "with a mind" (i.e., mind perception), people exert more top-down control on attention orienting. Although increasing an agent's physical human-likeness can enhance mind perception, it could have negative consequences on top-down control of social attention when a gazer's physical appearance is categorically ambiguous (i.e., difficult to categorize as human or nonhuman), as resolving this ambiguity would require using cognitive resources that otherwise could be used to top-down control attention orienting. To examine this question, we used mouse-tracking to explore if categorically ambiguous agents are associated with increased processing costs (Experiment 1), whether categorically ambiguous stimuli negatively impact top-down control of social attention (Experiment 2), and if resolving the conflict related to the agent's categorical ambiguity (using exposure) would restore top-down control to orient attention (Experiment 3). The findings suggest that categorically ambiguous stimuli are associated with cognitive conflict, which negatively impact the ability to exert top-down control on attentional orienting in a counterpredicitive gaze-cueing paradigm; this negative impact, however, is attenuated when being pre-exposed to the stimuli prior to the gaze-cueing task. Taken together, these findings suggest that manipulating physical human-likeness is a powerful way to affect mind perception in human-robot interaction (HRI) but has a diminishing returns effect on social attention when it is categorically ambiguous due to drainage of cognitive resources and impairment of top-down control.

Integrated jerk as an indicator of affinity for artificial agent kinematics: laptop and virtual reality experiments involving index finger motion during two-digit grasping

Uncanny valley research has shown that human likeness is an important consideration when designing artificial agents. It has separately been shown that artificial agents exhibiting human-like kinematics can elicit positive perceptual responses. However the kinematic characteristics underlying that perception have not been elucidated. This paper proposes kinematic jerk amplitude as a candidate metric for kinematic human likeness, and aims to determine whether a perceptual optimum exists over a range of jerk values. We created minimum-jerk two-digit grasp kinematics in a prosthetic hand model, then added different amplitudes of temporally smooth noise to yield a variety of animations involving different total jerk levels, ranging from maximally smooth to highly jerky. Subjects indicated their perceptual affinity for these animations by simultaneously viewing two different animations side-by-side, first using a laptop, then separately within a virtual reality (VR) environment. Results suggest that (a) subjects generally preferred smoother kinematics, (b) subjects exhibited a small preference for rougher-than minimum jerk kinematics in the laptop experiment, and that (c) the preference for rougher-than minimum-jerk kinematics was amplified in the VR experiment. These results suggest that non-maximally smooth kinematics may be perceptually optimal in robots and other artificial agents.

The Uncanny Valley Phenomenon and the Temporal Dynamics of Face Animacy Perception

Human replicas highly resembling people tend to elicit eerie sensations-a phenomenon known as the uncanny valley. To test whether this effect is attributable to people's ascription of mind to (i.e., mind perception hypothesis) or subtraction of mind from androids (i.e., dehumanization hypothesis), in Study 1, we examined the effect of face exposure time on the perceived animacy of human, android, and mechanical-looking robot faces. In Study 2, in addition to exposure time, we also manipulated the spatial frequency of faces, by preserving either their fine (high spatial frequency) or coarse (low spatial frequency) information, to examine its effect on faces' perceived animacy and uncanniness. We found that perceived animacy decreased as a function of exposure time only in android but not in human or mechanical-looking robot faces (Study 1). In addition, the manipulation of spatial frequency eliminated the decrease in android faces' perceived animacy and reduced their perceived uncanniness (Study 2). These findings link perceived uncanniness in androids to the temporal dynamics of face animacy perception. We discuss these findings in relation to the dehumanization hypothesis and alternative hypotheses of the uncanny valley phenomenon.

How people perceive the minds of the dead: The importance of consciousness at the moment of death

Immortality is thought to be achieved through heroic deeds, reincarnation, and the afterlife. The present studies reveal an alternative path to transcending death: dying while conscious. Seven studies demonstrate that dying while more awake, aware and/or lucid leads people to see a richer postmortem mind-an effect we call conservation of consciousness. People see more mind in the deceased when they die with their eyes open (Study 1), and while awake (vs. in a coma), while suffering from ALS (vs. from Alzheimer's), while on hallucinogens (vs. sedatives), and while dreaming (vs. in a deep sleep; Study 2). This effect is robust, holding even in a between-subjects design, and even when participants are explicitly encouraged to interpret the mind perception items literally (Study 3). Perceived conservation of consciousness after death is driven more by general perceived awareness than by fear of death (Study 4) and predicts perceptions of mind beyond having a vivid (vs. dull) life (Study 5). The last wishes of the dying are also given more moral weight if made by those who ultimately die while conscious (Study 6). Perceived conservation of consciousness also occurs in the real-world context of a historic cemetery (Study 7). These results reveal a simple way to increase your influence after death and highlight both the power of endings and the subjective nature of mind.

"Parental" responses to human infants (and puppy dogs): Evidence that the perception of eyes is especially influential, but eye contact is not

The present investigation tests: (i) whether the perception of an human infant’s eyes, relative to other facial features, especially strongly elicits “parental” responses (e.g., appraisals of cuteness and vulnerability); (ii) if, so, whether effects of the visual perception of eyes may be partially attributable to eye contact; (iii) whether the perception of non-human animals’ (puppy dogs’) eyes also especially strongly influence appraisals of their cuteness and vulnerability; and (iv) whether individual differences in caregiving motives moderate effects. Results from 5 experiments (total N = 1458 parents and non-parents) provided empirical evidence to evaluate these hypotheses: Appraisals of human infants were influenced especially strongly by the visual perception of human infants’ eyes (compared to other facial features); these effects do not appear to be attributable to eye contact; the visual perception of eyes influenced appraisals of puppy dogs, but not exactly in the same way that it influenced appraisals of human infants; and there was no consistent evidence of moderation by individual differences in caregiving motives. These results make novel contributions to several psychological literatures, including literatures on the motivational psychology of parental care and on person perception.

Brain stimulation to left prefrontal cortex modulates attentional orienting to gaze cues

In social interactions, we rely on non-verbal cues like gaze direction to understand the behaviour of others. How we react to these cues is determined by the degree to which we believe that they originate from an entity with a mind capable of having internal states and showing intentional behaviour, a process called mind perception. While prior work has established a set of neural regions linked to mind perception, research has just begun to examine how mind perception affects social-cognitive mechanisms like gaze processing on a neuronal level. In the current experiment, participants performed a social attention task (i.e. attentional orienting to gaze cues) with either a human or a robot agent (i.e. manipulation of mind perception) while transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) was applied to prefrontal and temporo-parietal brain areas. The results show that temporo-parietal stimulation did not modulate mechanisms of social attention, neither in response to the human nor in response to the robot agent, whereas prefrontal stimulation enhanced attentional orienting in response to human gaze cues and attenuated attentional orienting in response to robot gaze cues. The findings suggest that mind perception modulates low-level mechanisms of social cognition via prefrontal structures, and that a certain degree of mind perception is essential in order for prefrontal stimulation to affect mechanisms of social attention. This article is part of the theme issue 'From social brains to social robots: applying neurocognitive insights to human-robot interaction'.

Young Children's Indiscriminate Helping Behavior Toward a Humanoid Robot

Young children help others in a range of situations, relatively indiscriminate of the characteristics of those they help. Recent results have suggested that young children's helping behavior extends even to humanoid robots. However, it has been unclear how characteristics of robots would influence children's helping behavior. Considering previous findings suggesting that certain robot features influence adults' perception of and their behavior toward robots, the question arises of whether young children's behavior and perception would follow the same principles. The current study investigated whether two key characteristics of a humanoid robot (animate autonomy and friendly expressiveness) would affect children's instrumental helping behavior and their perception of the robot as an animate being. Eighty-two 3-year-old children participated in one of four experimental conditions manipulating a robot's ostensible animate autonomy (high/low) and friendly expressiveness (friendly/neutral). Helping was assessed in an out-of-reach task and animacy ratings were assessed in a post-test interview. Results suggested that both children's helping behavior, as well as their perception of the robot as animate, were unaffected by the robot's characteristics. The findings indicate that young children's helping behavior extends largely indiscriminately across two important characteristics. These results increase our understanding of the development of children's altruistic behavior and animate-inanimate distinctions. Our findings also raise important ethical questions for the field of child-robot interaction.

Intentionally distracting: Working memory is disrupted by the perception of other agents attending to you - even without eye-gaze cues

Of all the visual stimuli you can perceive, perhaps the most important are other people's eyes. And this is especially true when those eyes are looking at you: direct gaze has profound influences, even at the level of basic cognitive processes such as working memory. For example, memory for the properties of simple geometric shapes is disrupted by the presence of other eyes gazing at you. But are such effects really specific to direct gaze per se? Seeing eyes is undoubtedly important, but presumably only because of what it tells us about the "mind behind the eyes" - i.e., about others' attention and intentions. This suggests that the same effects might arise even without eyes, as long as an agent's directed attention is conveyed by other means. Here we tested the impact on working memory of simple "mouth" shapes - which in no way resemble eyes, yet can still be readily seen as intentionally facing you (or not). Just as with gaze cues, the ability to detect changes in geometric shapes was impaired by direct (compared to averted) mouths - but not in very similar control stimuli that were not perceived as intentional. We conclude that this disruption of working memory reflects a general phenomenon of "mind contact," rather than a specific effect of eye contact.

Seeing minds in others: Mind perception modulates low-level social-cognitive performance and relates to ventromedial prefrontal structures

In social interactions, we rely on nonverbal cues like gaze direction to understand the behavior of others. How we react to these cues is affected by whether they are believed to originate from an entity with a mind, capable of having internal states (i.e., mind perception). While prior work has established a set of neural regions linked to social-cognitive processes like mind perception, the degree to which activation within this network relates to performance in subsequent social-cognitive tasks remains unclear. In the current study, participants performed a mind perception task (i.e., judging the likelihood that faces, varying in physical human-likeness, have internal states) while event-related fMRI was collected. Afterwards, participants performed a social attention task outside the scanner, during which they were cued by the gaze of the same faces that they previously judged within the mind perception task. Parametric analyses of the fMRI data revealed that activity within ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) was related to both mind ratings inside the scanner and gaze-cueing performance outside the scanner. In addition, other social brain regions were related to gaze-cueing performance, including frontal areas like the left insula, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and inferior frontal gyrus, as well as temporal areas like the left temporo-parietal junction and bilateral temporal gyri. The findings suggest that functions subserved by the vmPFC are relevant to both mind perception and social attention, implicating a role of vmPFC in the top-down modulation of low-level social-cognitive processes.

Mnemonic vulnerability induced by post-activation time-dependent new-learning

Reactivation renders consolidated memory labile again, and the ensuing temporary reconsolidation process is highly susceptible to mnemonic modification. Here, we show that memories in such an unstable state could be influenced by sheer behavioral means, bypassing the need for pharmacological intervention. Across several experiments using a "face-location association" paradigm in which participants experienced a "Learning - New-learning - Final-test" procedure, we demonstrate that reactivated memory traces were hampered when the new learning was strategically administered at between 0-min and 20-min delay. Using fMRI, we further advance our theoretical understanding that this lability can be mechanistically explained by the differential activation in the hippocampal-amygdala memory system implicated by the post-activation new-learning whereas the mnemonic intrusion caused by newly learned memories is efficaciously reconciled by the left inferior frontal gyrus.

Anthropomorphizing without Social Cues Requires the Basolateral Amygdala

Anthropomorphism, the attribution of distinctively human mental characteristics to nonhuman animals and objects, illustrates the human propensity for extending social cognition beyond typical social targets. Yet, its processing components remain challenging to study because they are typically all engaged simultaneously. Across one pilot study and one focal study, we tested three rare people with basolateral amygdala lesions to dissociate two specific processing components: those triggered by attention to social cues (e.g., seeing a face) and those triggered by endogenous semantic knowledge (e.g., imbuing a machine with animacy). A pilot study demonstrated that, like neurologically intact control group participants, the three amygdala-damaged participants produced anthropomorphic descriptions for highly socially salient stimuli but not for stimuli lacking clear social cues. A focal study found that the three amygdala participants could anthropomorphize animate and living entities normally, but anthropomorphized inanimate stimuli less than control participants. Our findings suggest that the amygdala contributes to how we anthropomorphize stimuli that are not explicitly social.

Passion and moral disengagement: Different pathways to political activism

OBJECTIVE

Four studies examined the relationship between motivational imbalance-the degree to which a goal dominates other goals-and political activism.

METHOD

Based on the dualistic model of passion (Vallerand, 2015) and recent theorizing on violent extremism (Kruglanski, Jasko, Chernikova, Dugas, & Webber, 2017), we predicted that obsessive passion (OP), which facilitates alternative goal suppression, would increase support for violent political behaviors. In contrast, we predicted that harmonious passion (HP), which facilitates the integration of multiple goal pursuits, would increase support for peaceful political behaviors.

RESULTS

Study 1a demonstrated that OP for environmentalism was positively associated with moral disengagement, which in turn predicted violent behaviors. HP was positively associated with peaceful behaviors. Political activism among Democrats yielded similar findings in Study 1b. Study 2 replicated Studies 1a-1b using an implicit measure of moral disengagement. Study 3 replicated Studies 1-2 by demonstrating that experimentally inducing a harmonious (vs. obsessive) passion mindset indirectly reduced violent behaviors through the attenuation of moral disengagement while directly promoting peaceful behaviors. Study 4 conceptually replicated Studies 1-3 by experimentally manipulating moral disengagement.

CONCLUSIONS

These results offer insights into the workings of radicalization and suggest theory-driven methods of reducing political violence.

Perceiving Animacy in Own-and Other-Species Faces

Though artificial faces of various kinds are rapidly becoming more and more life-like due to advances in graphics technology (Suwajanakorn et al., 2015; Booth et al., 2017), observers can typically distinguish real faces from artificial faces. In general, face recognition is tuned to experience such that expert-level processing is most evident for faces that we encounter frequently in our visual world, but the extent to which face animacy perception is also tuned to in-group vs. out-group categories remains an open question. In the current study, we chose to examine how the perception of animacy in human faces and dog faces was affected by face inversion and the duration of face images presented to adult observers. We hypothesized that the impact of these manipulations may differ as a function of species category, indicating that face animacy perception is tuned for in-group faces. Briefly, we found evidence of such a differential impact, suggesting either that distinct mechanisms are used to evaluate the "life" in a face for in-group and out-group faces, or that the efficiency of a common mechanism varies substantially as a function of visual expertise.