When rules are over-ruled: Virtual bargaining as a contractualist method of moral judgment

Rules help guide our behavior-particularly in complex social contexts. But rules sometimes give us the "wrong" answer. How do we know when it is okay to break the rules? In this paper, we argue that we sometimes use contractualist (agreement-based) mechanisms to determine when a rule can be broken. Our model draws on a theory of social interactions - "virtual bargaining" - that assumes that actors engage in a simulated bargaining process when navigating the social world. We present experimental data which suggests that rule-breaking decisions are sometimes driven by virtual bargaining and show that these data cannot be explained by more traditional rule-based or outcome-based approaches.

Unveiling Unexpected Selfless Collectivism: Exploring Variances in Moral Beliefs Across Cultural Values

Purpose

The impact of moral beliefs on individuals' moral judgments, particularly within the framework of contrasting cultural values such as collectivism and individualism, continues to be a subject of interest. This research delves into whether individuals with distinct values display differences in moral beliefs, with a specific focus on selflessness.

Methods

Through experiment 1 and 2, we scrutinize the moral judgments of individuals with diverse values concerning pro-social behaviors driven by selflessness and in-group favoritism. Experiment 3 investigates the underlying mechanisms by examining reward expectations.

Results

The findings from experiments 1 and 2 indicate that collectivists exhibit significantly higher moral judgment levels for selfless pro-social behaviors compared to individualists, highlighting a disparity in moral beliefs between the two value systems. Experimental 2 also found that collectivists' moral judgments rose and fell as rescuers' selflessness increased or decreased. However, individualist moral judgment did not change significantly with behavioral selflessness. The results reveal that collectivists hold higher reward expectations for selfless behavior, which contributes to their heightened moral judgment of selfless behavior.

Conclusion

While it may be assumed that collectivists' moral beliefs would be dominated by in-group preferences, aligning with the conceptual in-group preference of collectivism, this study unexpectedly found evidence of collectivists' pursuit of selflessness in their moral beliefs. These findings offer initial evidence of distinct patterns of moral beliefs associated with collectivism and individualism, shedding light on potential reasons that lead collectivists to possess stronger moral beliefs about selflessness.

Responsibility to future generations: A strategy for combatting climate change across political divides

Individuals and governments often fail to take action to address climate change owing largely to widespread politicization of the issue and related discourse. In response to recent appeals for non-partisan approaches to pro-environmentalism, we propose that highlighting one's responsibility to future generations (RFG) could offer promise across the political spectrum. We argue that RFG may be effective because it is widely endorsed, uncorrelated with demographic indicators and less tied to political ideology compared to other forms of responsibility, such as personal responsibility for climate change mitigation. Across six main and seven supplementary studies (N = 161,633), we provide evidence for these claims. RFG is not only widely endorsed across countries and demographic groups but it also significantly predicts various measures of pro-environmental behaviour, both in correlational and pre-registered experimental contexts. These findings confirm established effects, reconcile inconsistencies and suggest prioritizing intergenerational responsibility may effectively reshape climate change narratives for the most resistant parties.

Teachers' Punishment Intensity and Student Observer Trust: A Moderated Mediation Model

During social interactions, people decide whether to trust an actor based on their punitive behaviour. Several empirical studies have indicated that punishment intensity impacts observer trust, yet the underlying mechanism remains to be elucidated. This study included 242 junior high school students and was conducted to investigate the relationship between teachers' punishment intensity and levels of student bystander trust. Additionally, the mediating role of trustworthiness and the moderating role of group relationships were explored. The results showed that the relationship between punishment intensity and observer trust follows an inverted U-shaped pattern. In addition, mild punishment boosts observer trust by improving perceived trustworthiness (ability and integrity) compared to no punishment, while harsh punishment reduces observer trust more than mild punishment by diminishing perceived trustworthiness (ability, benevolence, and integrity). More importantly, group relationships positively moderate the relationship between punishment intensity and observer trust. Specifically, compared to mild or no punishment, harsh punishment decreases trustworthiness (ability, benevolence, and integrity) in close teacher-student relationships but has less impact on neutral relationships. The above findings demonstrate that guiding educators in developing appropriate disciplinary concepts contributes to enhancing student observer trust.

Unveiling the Paradox of Selflessness: Exploring Perceptions of Hypocrisy and Priority Outgroup in Intergroup Moral Dilemmas

Purpose

This study examines the impact of prioritizing the out-group in intergroup moral dilemmas. The research aims to achieve three primary objectives: 1) investigating the relationship between out-group prioritization and perceptions of hypocrisy, 2) exploring the influence of perceived hypocrisy and negative emotions on moral judgments, and 3) uncovering the underlying reasons for perceiving outgroup prioritization as hypocritical.

Methods

Experiments 1, 2 and 3 involved presenting Chinese participants with out-group rescuers and in-group rescuers and asking them to rate the two on three dimensions: level of hypocrisy, level of morality, and negative emotions toward the rescuers. In Experiment 3, the degree of similarity between participants and rescuers was manipulated to control for the level at which participants projected their own intrinsic motivations (ie, self-interest) onto the rescuers.

Results

Experiments 1 and 2 jointly showed that participants perceived the out-group rescuer as more hypocritical and immoral compared to the in-group rescuer, and that participants had stronger negative emotions toward the out-group rescuer. Mediation analysis also demonstrated that the perception of hypocrisy and negative emotions largely mediated the relationship between the different rescuers and participants' evaluation of the rescuers' morality. In Experiment 3, participants gave higher hypocrisy ratings to high projection out-group rescuers compared to low projection out-group rescuers.

Conclusion

In intergroup dilemmas, choosing to sacrifice the in-group to rescue the outgroup is perceived as more hypocritical, immoral, and objectionable. Perceived hypocrisy arises from an incongruity between individuals' subjective judgments of the rescuers' self-interest motives and the altruistic choice made by the rescuers to rescue the out-group.

Family favouring effects across intent and outcome-based moral judgements and decisions

Doing harm is a moral violation, but helping a family member is morally obligatory. In this study, participants encountered this ethical dilemma through stories featuring their sibling (i.e., brother) as either the perpetrator or victim in various moral scenarios. Subsequently, they provided their moral judgements (i.e., moral acceptability and perceived transgression) and made decisions (i.e., willingness and difficulty to disclose what the agent did to the police) regarding the perpetrator. The manipulation of family membership was integrated into the moral scenarios, which were crafted based on whether the perpetrator had malicious intent and whether those intentions resulted in a harmful outcome (i.e., intentional harm, failed attempts to harm, accidental harm, and a harmless/baseline). While we initially expected that individuals would exhibit favouritism towards their brother when harmful intent or outcomes were absent, our findings revealed that both agent/victim identities (brother/stranger) and intent-outcome-based moral scenarios had an additive effect on both measures of moral judgement. This suggests that the family favouring effect was observed across all intent-outcome scenarios, with a slightly more pronounced effect when the brother accidentally harmed a stranger compared to a stranger accidentally harming the brother. Regarding moral decisions, participants demonstrated a willingness to disclose what they witnessed regardless of their familial relationship with the agent or victim, but it was universally perceived as a difficult decision to make. Together, our results underscore the context-specific nature of moral judgements and decisions, emphasising the significant impact of family members when they are involved as moral characters.

How unexpected events are processed in theory of mind regions: A conceptual replication

Recent research in social neuroscience has postulated that Theory of Mind (ToM) regions play a role in processing social prediction error (PE: the difference between what was expected and what was observed). Here, we tested whether PE signal depends on the type of prior information people use to make predictions - an agent's prior mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires, preferences) or an agent's prior behavior - as well as the type of information that confirms or violates such predictions. That is, does prior information about mental states (versus behavior) afford stronger predictions about an agent's subsequent mental states or behaviors? Additionally, when information about an agent's prior mental states or behavior is available, is PE signal strongest when information about an agent's subsequent mental state (vs behavior) is revealed? In line with prior research, results suggest that DMPFC, LTPJ, and RTPJ are recruited more for unexpected than expected outcomes. However, PE signal does not seem to discriminate on the basis of prior or outcome information type. These findings suggest that ToM regions may flexibly incorporate any available information to make predictions about, monitor, and perhaps explain, inconsistencies in social agents.

Virtue Discounting: Observability Reduces Moral Actors' Perceived Virtue

Performing prosociality in public presents a paradox: only by doing so can people demonstrate their virtue and also influence others through their example, yet observers may derogate actors' behavior as mere "virtue signaling." Here we investigate the role of observability of actors' behavior as one reason that people engage in such "virtue discounting." Further, we investigate observers' motivational inferences as a mechanism of this effect, using the comparison of generosity and fairness as a case study among virtues. Across 14 studies (7 preregistered, total N = 9,360), we show that public actors are perceived as less virtuous than private actors, and that this effect is stronger for generosity compared to fairness (i.e., differential virtue discounting). Exploratory factor analysis suggests that three types of motives-principled, reputation-signaling, and norm-signaling-affect virtue discounting. Using structural equation modeling, we show that observability's effect on actors' trait virtue ratings is largely explained by inferences that actors have less principled motivations. Further, we leverage experimental evidence to provide stronger causal evidence of these effects. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of our findings, as well as future directions for research on the social perception of virtue.

Going above and beyond? Early reasoning about which moral acts are best

Philosophers and theologians have long distinguished between acts a good person is obliged to do, and those that are supererogatory-going above and beyond what is required. Across three studies (N = 796), we discovered a striking developmental difference in intuitions about such acts: while adults view supererogatory actions as morally better than obligatory actions, children view fulfilling obligations as morally better. This difference did not stem from differing views of what is obligatory-children agreed that supererogatory acts were not required. And this difference remained even when the very same actions were framed as either supererogatory or obligatory. These findings suggest that the intuition that supererogatory acts are especially morally good might be late-emerging and culturally specific.

Interpersonal relationships modulate subjective ratings and electrophysiological responses of moral evaluations

This study explored how interpersonal relationships modulate moral evaluations in moral dilemmas. Participants rated moral acceptability in response to altruistic (prescriptive) and selfish (proscriptive) behavior conducted by allocators (i.e., a friend or stranger), toward the participants themselves or another stranger in a modified Dictator Game (Experiments 1 and 2). Event-related potential (ERP) data were recorded as participants observed the allocators' behavior (Experiment 2). Moral acceptability ratings showed that when the allocator was a friend, participants evaluated the friend's altruistic and selfish behavior toward another stranger as being less morally acceptable than when their friend showed the respective behavior toward the participants themselves. The ERP results showed that participants exhibited more negative medial frontal negativity (MFN) amplitude whether observing a friend's altruistic or selfish behavior toward a stranger (vs. participant oneself), indicating that friends' altruistic and selfish behaviors toward strangers (vs. participants) were processed as being less acceptable at the earlier and semi-automatic processing stage in brains. However, this effect did not emerge when the allocator was a stranger in subjective ratings and MFN results. In the later-occurring P3 component, no interpersonal relationship modulation occurred in moral evaluations. These findings suggest that interpersonal relationships affect moral evaluations from the second-party perspective.

Social value at a distance: Higher identification with all of humanity is associated with reduced social discounting

How much we value the welfare of others has critical implications for the collective good. Yet, it is unclear what leads people to make more or less equal decisions about the welfare of those from whom they are socially distant. The current research sought to explore the psychological mechanisms that might underlie welfare judgements across social distance. Here, a social discounting paradigm was used to measure the tendency for the value of a reward to be discounted as the social distance of its recipient increased. Across two cohorts (one discovery, one replication), we found that a more expansive identity with all of humanity was associated with reduced social discounting. Additionally, we investigated the specificity of this association by examining whether this relationship extended to delay discounting, the tendency for the value of a reward to be discounted as the temporal distance to its receipt increases. Our findings suggest that the observed association with identity was unique to social discounting, thus underscoring a distinction in value-based decision-making processes across distances in time and across social networks. As data were collected during the COVID-19 pandemic, we also considered how stress associated with this global threat might influence welfare judgements across social distances. We found that, even after controlling for COVID-19 related stress, correlations between identity and social discounting held. Together, these findings elucidate the psychological processes that are associated with a more equal distribution of generosity.

The boundary conditions of the liking bias in moral character judgments

Recent research has shown that moral character judgments are prone to the liking bias-well-liked people are seen as morally superior to disliked or neutral ones. However, whether moral information about their past behavior would moderate the liking bias is still an open empirical question addressed in present studies. In Study 1 (N = 653), participants updated their biased moral character impressions when moral information about the target was introduced after the liking induction. In preregistered Study 2 (N = 601), when moral information about the target was presented before the liking induction, moral information had a stronger impact on moral character judgments than liking. Study 3 (N = 398) showed that moral character impression updating was three times greater when moral information was presented after (vs. before) the attitude induction. Further analyses of changes in participants' moral judgments certainty revealed that moral information reduced their uncertainty stronger than attitudes. In effect, the latter were more amenable to updating than information-based judgments. Thus, we present evidence that moral information updates moral character impressions biased by liking. Nevertheless, liking also, but to a lesser extent, updates moral character impressions initially grounded on moral information. We propose that certainty about others' moral character explains when and how moral information limits the impact of attitudinal influences on moral character judgments.

Surprisingly Happy to Have Helped: Underestimating Prosociality Creates a Misplaced Barrier to Asking for Help

Performing acts of kindness increases well-being, yet people can be reluctant to ask for help that would enable others' kindness. We suggest that people may be overly reluctant because of miscalibrated expectations about others' prosocial motivation, underestimating how positively others will feel when asked for help. A pretest identified that interest in asking for help was correlated with expectations of how helpers would think and feel, but a series of scenarios, recalled experiences, and live interactions among adult participants in the United States (total N = 2,118) indicated that those needing help consistently underestimated others' willingness to help, underestimated how positively helpers would feel, and overestimated how inconvenienced helpers would feel. These miscalibrated expectations stemmed from underestimating helpers' prosocial motivation while overestimating compliance motivation. This research highlights a limitation of construing help-seeking through a lens of compliance by scholars and laypeople alike. Undervaluing prosociality could create a misplaced barrier to asking for help when needed.

Moral Dilemmas in Hospitals: Which Shooting Victim Should Be Saved?

Moral judgments can occur either in settings that call for impartiality or in settings that allow for partiality. How effective are impartiality settings such as hospitals in suppressing personal biases? Portrayed as decision-makers in an emergency department, 431 college students made judgments on which of two victims of a mass shooting should receive immediate, life-saving care. Patients differed in ways that could reveal biases, e.g., age (8 vs. 80 years), kinship (stranger vs. cousin), gender (female vs. male), and villain/hero (shooter vs. policeman who stopped him). Participants rated each patient’s moral deservingness to receive immediate care and the likelihood they would choose the patient. Both scales showed young favored over old, cousin (or daughter) over stranger, and policeman over shooter (largest difference). In a hospital-room scenario with high risk of injury from falling, age bias disappeared. With moderate fall risk, age bias reversed and kinship deservingness bias disappeared. Bias decreases when there is a decrease in severity of potential harm to the preferred stakeholder. Settings that call for impartiality are not reliable “boundary conditions” against expressions of bias. In the absence of explicit guidelines for allocating scarce resources, a systematic, objective method of random selection offers a potentially useful strategy.

Empathic choices for animals versus humans: the role of choice context and perceived cost

People appear to empathize with cases of animal suffering yet to disregard such suffering when it conflicts with human needs. In three studies, we used an empathy regulation measure - the empathy selection task - to test whether people choose or avoid sharing in experiences of animals versus humans. In Study 1, when choosing between sharing experiences of animals or humans, participants preferred humans and rated sharing animal (versus human) experiences as more cognitively costly. In Studies 2a-2b, the choice to share experiences or be objective was done without a forced choice between animals and humans. When empathy opportunities for humans and animals were not contrasted against each other, participants avoided experience sharing for humans but not for animals. Manipulations of prosocial cost in these studies did not consistently moderate choice differences. Freeing people from contexts that pit empathy for animals against empathy for humans may diminish motivated disregard of animals' experiences.

Moral Judgment as Categorization (MJAC)

Observed variability and complexity of judgments of "right" and "wrong" cannot be readily accounted for within extant approaches to understanding moral judgment. In response to this challenge, we present a novel perspective on categorization in moral judgment. Moral judgment as categorization (MJAC) incorporates principles of category formation research while addressing key challenges of existing approaches to moral judgment. People develop skills in making context-relevant categorizations. They learn that various objects (events, behaviors, people, etc.) can be categorized as morally right or wrong. Repetition and rehearsal result in reliable, habitualized categorizations. According to this skill-formation account of moral categorization, the learning and the habitualization of the forming of moral categories occur within goal-directed activity that is sensitive to various contextual influences. By allowing for the complexity of moral judgments, MJAC offers greater explanatory power than existing approaches while also providing opportunities for a diverse range of new research questions.

Direct punishment and indirect reputation-based tactics to intervene against offences

Punishment and reputation-based mechanisms play a major role in supporting the evolution of human cooperation. Theoretical accounts and field observations suggest that humans use multiple tactics to intervene against offences-including confrontation, gossip and ostracism-which have unique benefits and costs. Here, we draw a distinction between direct punishment tactics (i.e. physical and verbal confrontation) and indirect reputation-based tactics (i.e. gossip and ostracism). Based on this distinction, we sketch the common and unique social functions that different tactics are tailored to serve and describe information-processing mechanisms that potentially underlie decisions concerning how to intervene against offences. We propose that decision rules guiding direct and indirect tactics should weigh information about the benefits of changing others' behaviour versus the costs of potential retaliation. Based on a synthesis of existing evidence, we highlight the role of situational, relational and emotional factors in motivating distinct punishment tactics. We suggest that delineating between direct and indirect tactics can inform debates about the prevalence and functions of punishment and the reputational consequences of third-party intervention against offences. We emphasize the need to study how people use reputation-based tactics for partner recalibration and partner choice, within interdependent relationships and social networks, and in daily life situations. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

How social relationships shape moral wrongness judgments

Judgments of whether an action is morally wrong depend on who is involved and the nature of their relationship. But how, when, and why social relationships shape moral judgments is not well understood. We provide evidence to address these questions, measuring cooperative expectations and moral wrongness judgments in the context of common social relationships such as romantic partners, housemates, and siblings. In a pre-registered study of 423 U.S. participants nationally representative for age, race, and gender, we show that people normatively expect different relationships to serve cooperative functions of care, hierarchy, reciprocity, and mating to varying degrees. In a second pre-registered study of 1,320 U.S. participants, these relationship-specific cooperative expectations (i.e., relational norms) enable highly precise out-of-sample predictions about the perceived moral wrongness of actions in the context of particular relationships. In this work, we show that this 'relational norms' model better predicts patterns of moral wrongness judgments across relationships than alternative models based on genetic relatedness, social closeness, or interdependence, demonstrating how the perceived morality of actions depends not only on the actions themselves, but also on the relational context in which those actions occur.

Psychological barriers to effective altruism: An evolutionary perspective

People usually engage in (or at least profess to engage in) altruistic acts to benefit others. Yet, they routinely fail to maximize how much good is achieved with their donated money and time. An accumulating body of research has uncovered various psychological factors that can explain why people's altruism tends to be ineffective. These prior studies have mostly focused on proximate explanations (e.g. emotions, preferences, lay beliefs). Here, we adopt an evolutionary perspective and highlight how three fundamental motives - parochialism, status, and conformity - can explain many seemingly disparate failures to do good effectively. Our approach outlines ultimate explanations for ineffective altruism, and we illustrate how fundamental motives can be leveraged to promote more effective giving.

No good deed goes unpunished: the social costs of prosocial behaviour

Performing costly helpful behaviours can allow individuals to improve their reputation. Those who gain a good reputation are often preferred as interaction partners and are consequently better able to access support through cooperative relationships with others. However, investing in prosocial displays can sometimes yield social costs: excessively generous individuals risk losing their good reputation, and even being vilified, ostracised or antisocially punished. As a consequence, people frequently try to downplay their prosocial actions or hide them from others. In this review, we explore when and why investments in prosocial behaviour are likely to yield social costs. We propose two key features of interactions that make it more likely that generous individuals will incur social costs when: (a) observers infer that helpful behaviour is motivated by strategic or selfish motives; and (b) observers infer that helpful behaviour is detrimental to them. We describe how the cognition required to consider ulterior motives emerges over development and how these tendencies vary across cultures - and discuss how the potential for helpful actions to result in social costs might place boundaries on prosocial behaviour as well as limiting the contexts in which it might occur. We end by outlining the key avenues and priorities for future research.

Prosocial behavior and reputation: When does doing good lead to looking good?

One reason people engage in prosocial behavior is to reap the reputational benefits associated with being seen as generous. Yet, there isn't a direct connection between doing good deeds and being seen as a good person. Prosocial actors are often met with suspicion and sometimes castigated as disingenuous braggarts, empty virtue-signalers, or holier-than-thou hypocrites. In this article, we review recent research on how people evaluate those who engage in prosocial behavior and identify key factors that influence whether observers will praise or denigrate a prosocial actor for doing a good deed.

When do caregivers ignore the veil of ignorance? An empirical study on medical triage decision-making

In principle, all patients deserve to receive optimal medical treatment equally. However, in situations in which there is scarcity of time or resources, medical treatment must be prioritized based on a triage. The conventional guidelines of medical triage mandate that treatment should be provided based solely on medical necessity regardless of any non-medical value-oriented considerations ("worst-first"). This study empirically examined the influence of value-oriented considerations on medical triage decision-making. Participants were asked to prioritize medical treatment relating to four case scenarios of an emergency situation resulting from a car collision. The cases differ by situational characteristics pertaining to the at-fault driver, which were related to culpability attribution.In three case scenarios most participants gave priority to the most severely injured individual, unless the less severely injured individual was their brother. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of a vehicle-ramming terror attack most participants prioritized the less severely injured individual ("victim-first").Our findings indicate that when caregivers are presented with concrete highly conflictual triage situations their choices may be based on value-oriented considerations related to contextual characteristics of the emergency situation. Philosophical and practical ramifications of our findings are discussed.

Binding moral values gain importance in the presence of close others

A key function of morality is to regulate social behavior. Research suggests moral values may be divided into two types: binding values, which govern behavior in groups, and individualizing values, which promote personal rights and freedoms. Because people tend to mentally activate concepts in situations in which they may prove useful, the importance they afford moral values may vary according to whom they are with in the moment. In particular, because binding values help regulate communal behavior, people may afford these values more importance when in the presence of close (versus distant) others. Five studies test and support this hypothesis. First, we use a custom smartphone application to repeatedly record participants' (n = 1166) current social context and the importance they afforded moral values. Results show people rate moral values as more important when in the presence of close others, and this effect is stronger for binding than individualizing values-an effect that replicates in a large preregistered online sample (n = 2016). A lab study (n = 390) and two preregistered online experiments (n = 580 and n = 752) provide convergent evidence that people afford binding, but not individualizing, values more importance when in the real or imagined presence of close others. Our results suggest people selectively activate different moral values according to the demands of the situation, and show how the mere presence of others can affect moral thinking.

Against Empathy Bias: The Moral Value of Equitable Empathy

Empathy has long been considered central to living a moral life. However, mounting evidence has shown that people's empathy is often biased toward (i.e., felt more strongly for) others that they are close or similar to, igniting a debate over whether empathy is inherently morally flawed and should be abandoned in efforts to strive toward greater equity. This debate has focused on whether empathy limits the scope of our morality, but little consideration has been given to whether our moral beliefs may be limiting our empathy. Across two studies conducted on Amazon's Mechanical Turk (N = 604), we investigated moral judgments of biased and equitable feelings of empathy. We observed a moral preference for empathy toward socially close over distant others. However, feeling equal empathy for all people is seen as the most morally and socially valuable approach. These findings provide new theoretical insight into the relationship between empathy and morality, and they have implications for navigating toward a more egalitarian future.

Biased Benevolence: The Perceived Morality of Effective Altruism Across Social Distance

Is altruism always morally good, or is the morality of altruism fundamentally shaped by the social opportunity costs that often accompany helping decisions? Across four studies, we reveal that in cases of realistic tradeoffs in social distance for gains in welfare where helping socially distant others necessitates not helping socially closer others with the same resources, helping is deemed as less morally acceptable. Making helping decisions at a cost to socially closer others also negatively affects judgments of relationship quality (Study 2) and in turn, decreases cooperative behavior with the helper (Study 3). Ruling out an alternative explanation of physical distance accounting for the effects in Studies 1 to 3, social distance continued to impact moral acceptability when physical distance across social targets was matched (Study 4). These findings reveal that attempts to decrease biases in helping may have previously unconsidered consequences for moral judgments, relationships, and cooperation.

Partner in crime: Beneficial cooperation overcomes children's aversion to antisocial others

Young children display strong aversion toward antisocial individuals, but also feel responsible for joint activities and express a strong sense of group loyalty. This paper aims to understand how beneficial cooperation with an antisocial partner shapes preschoolers' attitudes, preferences, and moral judgments concerning antisocial individuals. We argue that although young children display a strong aversion to antisocial characters, children may overcome this aversion when they stand to personally benefit. In Study 1a (N = 62), beneficial cooperation with an antisocial partner resulted in the children's later preference for the antisocial partner over the neutral partner. Study 1b (N = 91) replicated this effect with discrete measurement of liking (resource distribution) and showed that children rewarded more and punished less the antisocial partner in the beneficial cooperation setting. In Study 2, (N = 58), children's aversion to an antisocial in-group member decreased when the cooperation benefited other in-group members. Finally, in Study 3 (N = 62), when children passively observed the antisocial individual, personal benefits from the antisocial behavior did not change their negative attitude toward the antisocial individual. Overall, beneficial cooperation with the antisocial partner increased the children's liking and preference for the antisocial partner, but did not affect the children's moral judgments. Presented evidence suggests that by the age of 4, children develop a strong obligation to collaborate with partners who help them to acquire resources-even when these partners harm third parties, which children recognize as immoral.