Fear in the Theater of the Mind: Differential Fear Conditioning With Imagined Stimuli

Attention control mediates the relationship between mental imagery vividness and emotion regulation

Contradictory findings suggest mental imagery may both exacerbate and protect against negative affect. We aimed to reconcile these contradictory findings by considering individual differences (N=989) in imagery vividness, attention control, resilience, emotion regulation strategy, and negative affect (depressive, anxious, and posttraumatic stress symptomology). We hypothesized that attention control would mediate relationships between imagery vividness and emotion regulation strategy use, and psychopathology symptomology. Results revealed that imagery vividness, as mediated by attention control, predicted greater levels of healthy reappraisal and deleterious rumination. Attention control also mediated negative relationships between imagery vividness and catastrophizing, self-blame, and psychopathology symptomology. An exploratory latent structural equation model revealed that imagery vividness and attention control aggregated positively with reappraisal and resilience scores. The present investigation suggests an adaptive function of imagery vividness via the indirect effects of attention control, facilitating adaptive emotion regulation and limiting maladaptive strategy use, thereby protecting against negative affect.

Suffering more in imagination than in reality? Mental imagery and fear generalization

Mental imagery may represent a weaker form of perception and, thus, mental images may be more ambiguous than visual percepts. If correct, the acquisition of fear would be less specific for imagined fears in comparison to perceptual fears, perhaps facilitating broader fear generalization. To test this idea, a two-day differential fear conditioning experiment (N = 98) was conducted. On day one, two groups of participants underwent differential fear conditioning such that a specific Gabor patch orientation (CS+) was paired with mild shocks (US) while a second Gabor patch of orthogonal orientation (CS-) was never paired with shock. Critically, one group imagined the Gabor patches and the other group was visually presented the Gabor patches. Next, both groups were presented visual Gabor patches of similar orientations (GCS) to the CS+. On day two, to assess the persistence of imagined fear, participants returned to the lab and were tested on the GCS devoid of shock. For day one, in contrast to our primary hypothesis, both self-report and skin conductance response measures did not show a significant interaction between the GCS and groups. On day two, both measures demonstrated a persistence of imagined fear, without US delivery. Taken together, rather than demonstrating an overgeneralization effect, the results from this study suggest that imagery-based fear conditioning generalizes to a similar extent as perceptually acquired fear conditioning. Further, the persistence of imagery-based fear may have unique extinction qualities in comparison to perceptual-based fear.

Attenuating conditioned fear using imagery-based interventions: An overview

A growing literature has sought to include mental imagery in fear conditioning studies. Imaginal extinction and imagery rescripting are mental imagery-based interventions that reduce conditioned fear. In the current study, we reviewed the recent findings on the efficacy of imaginal extinction and imagery rescripting as interventions to attenuate conditioned fear responses among healthy individuals. In accordance with the PRISMA guidelines, we conducted a literature search in four databases, PubMed, Scopus, Science Direct, and Web of Science to find published original empirical articles involving imagery-based interventions using a fear conditioning paradigm. The inclusion criteria were (i) use of an imagery-based intervention (either imaginal extinction or imagery rescripting), and (ii) use of a differential fear conditioning paradigm. 13 original articles reporting 15 experimental studies were included in the review. The review revealed that imagery-based interventions are effective in reducing conditioned fear. Although studies have shown that imaginal extinction and standard extinction have comparable effects in fear extinction, many studies have not been conducted to confirm the findings, or explore the underlying mechanisms. We also found the need for a standardized intervention protocol to enhance experimental control in intervention-based fear conditioning studies.

Neurocognitive mechanisms of mental imagery-based disgust learning

Disgust imagery represents a potential pathological mechanism for disgust-related disorders. However, it remains controversial as to whether disgust can be conditioned with disgust-evoking mental imagery serving as the unconditioned stimulus (US). Therefore, we examined this using a conditioned learning paradigm in combination with event-related potential (ERP) analysis in 35 healthy college students. The results indicated that the initial neutral face (conditioned stimulus, CS+) became more disgust-evoking, unpleasant, and arousing after pairing with disgust-evoking imagery (disgust CS+), compared to pairing with neutral (neutral CS+) and no (CS-) imagery. Moreover, we observed that mental imagery-based disgust conditioning was resistant to extinction. While the disgust CS + evoked larger P3 and late positive potential amplitudes than CS- during acquisition, no significant differences were found between disgust CS+ and neutral CS+, indicating a dissociation between self-reported and neurophysiological responses. Future studies may additionally acquire facial EMG as an implicit index of conditioned disgust. This study provides the first neurobiological evidence that associative disgust learning can occur without aversive physical stimuli, with implications for understanding how disgust-related disorders may manifest or deteriorate without external perceptual aversive experiences, such as in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD).

Emotion in the mind's eye: Imagination for adaptive cognition

In a complex world, we are constantly faced with environmental stimuli that shape our moment-to-moment experiences. But just as rich and complex as the external world is the internal milieu-our imagination. Imagination offers a powerful vehicle for playing out hypothetical experiences in the mind's eye. It allows us to mentally time travel to behold what the future might bring, including our greatest desires or fears. Indeed, imagined experiences tend to be emotion-laden. How and why are humans capable of this remarkable feat? Based on psychological findings, we highlight the importance of imagination for emotional aspects of cognition and behavior, namely in the generation and regulation of emotions. Based on recent cognitive neuroscience work, we identify putative neural networks that are most critical for emotional imagination, with a major focus on the default mode network. Finally, we briefly highlight the possible functional implications of individual differences in imagination. Overall, we hope to address why humans have the capacity to simulate hypothetical emotional experiences and how this ability can be harnessed in adaptive (and sometimes maladaptive) ways. We end by discussing open questions.

Fear in the mind's eye: the neural correlates of differential fear acquisition to imagined conditioned stimuli

Mental imagery is involved in both the expression and treatment of fear-related disorders such as anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder. However, the neural correlates associated with the acquisition and generalization of differential fear conditioning to imagined conditioned stimuli are relatively unknown. In this study, healthy human participants (n = 27) acquired differential fear conditioning to imagined conditioned stimuli paired with a physical unconditioned stimulus (i.e. mild shock), as measured via self-reported fear, the skin conductance response and significant right anterior insula (aIn) activation. Multivoxel pattern analysis cross-classification also demonstrated that the pattern of activity in the right aIn during imagery acquisition was quantifiably similar to the pattern produced by standard visual acquisition. Additionally, mental imagery was associated with significant differential fear generalization. Fear conditioning acquired to imagined stimuli generalized to viewing those same stimuli as measured with self-reported fear and right aIn activity, and likewise fear conditioning to visual stimuli was associated with significant generalized differential self-reported fear and right aIn activity when imagining those stimuli. Together, the study provides a novel understanding of the neural mechanisms associated with the acquisition of differential fear conditioning to imagined stimuli and that of the relationship between imagery and emotion more generally.

Ewww-Investigating the neural basis of disgust in response to naturalistic and pictorial nauseating stimuli

Emotion induction in psychological and neuroscientific research has been mostly done by presenting participants with picture or film material. However, it is debatable whether this passive approach to emotion induction results in an affective state comparable to real-life emotions, and if the neural correlates of emotion processing are ecologically valid. To investigate the appropriateness of pictures for the induction of emotions, we presented 56 participants in a within-subjects design with naturalistic disgusting and neutral stimuli as well as with pictures of said stimulus material while recording continuous EEG data. We calculated asymmetry indices (AIs) for alpha power as an index of emotion processing and emotion regulation at the F3/4, F5/6, F7/8, and O1/2 electrode pairs. Participants reported higher disgust ratings for disgusting naturalistic compared to disgusting pictorial stimuli. Investigating changes in the EEG signal in participants with a pronounced disgust response (n = 38), we found smaller AIs for naturalistic stimuli compared to pictures. Moreover, in this disgusted sub-sample, there were smaller AIs in response to naturalistic disgusting stimuli compared to pictorial disgusting and neutral stimuli at the O1/2 electrode pair indicating stronger activation of the right relative to the left hemisphere by naturalistic stimuli. As the right hemisphere has been shown to display dominance in processing negative and withdrawal-associated emotions, this might indicate that naturalistic stimuli are more appropriate for the induction of emotions than picture stimuli. To improve the validity of results from emotion induction, future research should incorporate stimulus material that is as naturalistic as possible.

A generative adversarial model of intrusive imagery in the human brain

The mechanisms underlying the subjective experiences of mental disorders remain poorly understood. This is partly due to long-standing over-emphasis on behavioral and physiological symptoms and a de-emphasis of the patient's subjective experiences when searching for treatments. Here, we provide a new perspective on the subjective experience of mental disorders based on findings in neuroscience and artificial intelligence (AI). Specifically, we propose the subjective experience that occurs in visual imagination depends on mechanisms similar to generative adversarial networks that have recently been developed in AI. The basic idea is that a generator network fabricates a prediction of the world, and a discriminator network determines whether it is likely real or not. Given that similar adversarial interactions occur in the two major visual pathways of perception in people, we explored whether we could leverage this AI-inspired approach to better understand the intrusive imagery experiences of patients suffering from mental illnesses such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and acute stress disorder. In our model, a nonconscious visual pathway generates predictions of the environment that influence the parallel but interacting conscious pathway. We propose that in some patients, an imbalance in these adversarial interactions leads to an overrepresentation of disturbing content relative to current reality, and results in debilitating flashbacks. By situating the subjective experience of intrusive visual imagery in the adversarial interaction of these visual pathways, we propose testable hypotheses on novel mechanisms and clinical applications for controlling and possibly preventing symptoms resulting from intrusive imagery.