Witnessing, Remembering, and Testifying: Why the Past Is Special for Human Beings

How to Become a Memory: The Individual and Collective Aspects of Mnemicity

Human adults distinguish their mental event simulations along various dimensions-most prominently according to their "mnemicity": we track whether these simulations are outcomes of past personal experiences or not (i.e., whether we are "remembering" or "imagining"). This distinction between memory and imagination is commonly thought to reflect a deep architectural distinction in the mind. Against this idea, I argue that mnemicity is not based on a fundamentalstructural difference between memories and imaginations but is instead the result of metacognitive attribution and social construction. On this attributional view, mnemicity is likely a uniquely human capacity that both serves collective functions and has been shaped by collective norms. First, on the individual level, mnemicity attribution is an outcome of metacognitive learning: it relies on acquired interpretations of the phenomenal features of mental event simulations. Such interpretations are in part acquired through interactive reminiscing with other community members. Further, how the distinction between memory and imagination is drawn is likely sensitive to cultural norms about what remembering is, when it is appropriate to claim to remember, what can be remembered, and what remembering entails. As a result, how individuals determine whether they remember or imagine is bound to be deeply enculturated. Second, mnemicity attribution solves an important collective challenge: who to grant epistemic authority about the past. Solving this challenge is important because-for humans-the past represents not just an opportunity to learn about the future but to coordinate present social realities. How a community determines such social realities both draws on individuals' remembering and in turn shapes when, what, and how individuals remember.

Mnemicity: A Cognitive Gadget?

Episodic representations can be entertained either as "remembered" or "imagined"-as outcomes of experience or as simulations of such experience. Here, we argue that this feature is the product of a dedicated cognitive function: the metacognitive capacity to determine the mnemicity of mental event simulations. We argue that mnemicity attribution should be distinguished from other metacognitive operations (such as reality monitoring) and propose that this attribution is a "cognitive gadget"-a distinctively human ability made possible by cultural learning. Cultural learning is a type of social learning in which traits are inherited through social interaction. In the case of mnemicity, one culturally learns to discriminate metacognitive "feelings of remembering" from other perceptual, emotional, action-related, and metacognitive feelings; to interpret feelings of remembering as indicators of memory rather than imagination; and to broadcast the interpreted feelings in culture- and context-specific ways, such as "I was there" or "I witnessed it myself." We review evidence from the literature on memory development and scaffolding, metacognitive learning and teaching, as well as cross-cultural psychology in support of this view before pointing out various open questions about the nature and development of mnemicity highlighted by our account.

Former street-working boys in Iraq highlight the importance of receiving education, training and support from families and other adults

Aim

This study investigated the perceptions of men who worked on the streets of Iraq when they were children. It looked at the risks they faced, how they developed resilience and what support they feel current working children need.

Methods

In 2021, semi‐structured interviews were held with 40 men aged 24–33 who used to work on the streets as children. They had attended the Zewa Centre, a drop‐in centre for street‐working children in 2004–2005. Thematic analysis was used to explore the transcribed interviews.

Results

Positive feedback focused on how they developed working and social skills and felt proud to support their families. Negative feedback included the consequences on their social lives and mental and physical health. Their suggestions for preventing street work in children were financial support, so that families could send their children back to school, and programmes that offer social skills training and vocational training. Social support from families, other adults and peers was very important.

Conclusion

Working on the streets had positive and negative consequences and support from family and friends influenced the men's attitudes in adulthood. They suggested that financial support, education and social and vocational training would be very important for today's street‐working children.

The effect of source claims on statement believability and speaker accountability

What is the effect of source claims (such as "I saw it" or "Somebody told me") on the believability of statements, and what mechanisms are responsible for this effect? In this study, we tested the idea that source claims impact statement believability by modulating the extent to which a speaker is perceived to be committed to (and thereby accountable for) the truth of her assertion. Across three experiments, we presented participants with statements associated with different source claims, asked them to judge how much they believed the statements, and how much the speaker was responsible if the statement turned out to be false. We found that (1) statement believability predicted speaker accountability independently of a statement's perceived prior likelihood or associated source claim; (2) being associated with a claim to first-hand ("I saw that . . .") or second-hand ("Somebody told me that . . .") evidence strengthened this association; (3) bare assertions about specific circumstances were commonly interpreted as claims to first-hand evidence; and (4) (everything else being equal) claims to first-hand evidence increased while claims to second-hand evidence decreased both statement believability and speaker accountability. These results support the idea that the believability of a statement is closely related to how committed to its truth the speaker is perceived to be and that source claims modulate the extent of this perceived commitment.

Knowledge, attitude and perceptions about Crimean Congo Haemorrhagic Fever (CCHF) among occupationally high-risk healthcare professionals of Pakistan

Background

Crimean Congo Haemorrhagic Fever (CCHF), a tropically neglected infectious disease caused by Nairovirus, is endemic in low middle-income countries like Pakistan. Emergency health care professionals (HCPs) are at risk of contracting nosocomial transmission of CCHF. We, therefore, aim to analyze the knowledge, attitudes, and perceptions (KAP) of at-risk physicians, nurses, and pharmacists in Pakistan and the factors associated with good KAP.

Method

A validated questionnaire (Cronbach’s alpha 0.71) was used to collect data from HCPs in two CCHF endemic metropolitan cities of Pakistan by employing a cross-sectional study design. For data analysis percentages, chi-square test and Spearman correlation were applied by using SPSS version 22.

Results

Of the 478 participants, 56% (n = 268) were physicians, 37.4% (n = 179) were nurses, and 6.5% (n = 31) were pharmacists. The proportion of HCPs with good knowledge, attitude, and perception scores was 54.3%, 81, and 69%, respectively. Being a physician, having more work experience, having a higher age, working in tertiary care settings, were key factors for higher knowledge (p < 0.001). The correlation coefficient showed significant positive correlation between attitude- perception (r = 0.560, p < 0.001).

Conclusion

We have observed average knowledge of HCPs. Therefore, we recommend time to time education campaigns and workshops in highly endemic CCHF regions to be launched by health ministries and HCPs, in particular nurses, encouraged to follow authentic academic sources of information to prevent nosocomial transmission.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s12879-020-05714-z.

The Phenomenology of Remembering Is an Epistemic Feeling

This article aims to provide a psychologically informed philosophical account of the phenomenology of episodic remembering. The literature on epistemic or metacognitive feelings has grown considerably in recent years, and there are persuasive reasons, both conceptual and empirical, in favor of the view that the phenomenology of remembering-autonoetic consciousness, as Tulving influentially referred to it, or the feeling of pastness, as we will refer to it here-is an epistemic feeling, but few philosophical treatments of this phenomenology as an epistemic feeling have so far been proposed. Building on insights from the psychological literature, we argue that a form of feeling-based metacognition is involved in episodic remembering and develop an integrated metacognitive feeling-based view that addresses several key aspects of the feeling of pastness, namely, its status as a feeling, its content, and its relationship to the first-order memories the phenomenology of which it provides.