Why moral psychology needs personality psychology

People vary in how they perceive, think about, and respond to moral issues. Clearly, we cannot fully understand the psychology of morality without accounting for individual differences in moral functioning. But decades of neglect of and explicit skepticism toward such individual differences has resulted in a lack of integration between moral psychology and personality psychology-the study of psychological differences between people. In recent years, these barriers to progress have started to break down. This special issue aims to celebrate and further increase the visibility of the personality psychology of morality. Here, we introduce the articles in this special issue by highlighting some important contributions a personality-based perspective has to offer moral psychology-particularly in comparison to the currently prominent social psychological approach. We show that personality psychology is well-placed to (a) contribute toward a rigorous empirical foundation for moral psychology, (b) tackle the conceptualization and assessment of stable moral tendencies, (c) assess the predictive validity of moral traits in relation to consequential outcomes, (d) uncover the mechanisms underlying individual differences in moral judgments and behavior, and (e) provide insights into moral development. For these reasons, we believe that moral psychology needs personality psychology to reach its full scholarly potential.

Social context during moral decision-making impacts males more than females

Moral judgments are often viewed as the outcome of affective and deliberative processes that could be impacted by social factors and individual characteristics. The purpose of this study was to examine the interaction between gender and social context on moral judgment. Participants included 315 undergraduate students (67.3% female). The participants completed the Moral Decision-Making Task while seated at row tables facing the front of the room or round tables facing other participants. The results indicated that males responded in a more utilitarian manner (harm one to save five) than females for moral impersonal (MI) and moral personal (MP) dilemmas regardless of seating arrangements. When seated at round tables, all participants were more likely to respond deontologically (cause no harm) to the moral impersonal dilemmas. In addition, we calculated a moral reasoning difference score for each participant as the difference between the MI and MP scores to represent additional reactivity due to the idea of taking direct action. The moral reasoning difference score was consistent for females but indicated a more deontological response from males at round tables and a more utilitarian response from males at row tables. These results suggest that males are more utilitarian than females and are more likely to be influenced by social context when responding to moral dilemmas. More broadly, the current results indicate that moral judgments are affected by social context particularly in males in ways that have not been incorporated in many models of moral decision making.

How Much Is Enough? The Relationship Between Prosocial Effort and Moral Character Judgments

The amount of effort required to bring about a prosocial outcome can vary from low-handing a stranger the wallet she just dropped-to high-spending days tracking down the owner of a lost wallet. The goal of the current research is to characterize the relationship between prosocial effort and moral character judgments. Does more prosocial effort always lead to rosier moral character judgments? Across four studies (N = 1,658), we find that moral character judgments increase with prosocial effort to a point and then plateau. We find evidence that this pattern is produced, in part, by descriptive and prescriptive norms: exceeding descriptive norms increases moral character judgments, but exceeding prescriptive norms has the opposite effect, which leads to a tapering off of moral character judgments at higher levels of effort.

Vicarious punishment of moral violations in naturalistic drama narratives predicts cortical synchronization

Punishment of moral norm violators is instrumental for human cooperation. Yet, social and affective neuroscience research has primarily focused on second- and third-party norm enforcement, neglecting the neural architecture underlying observed (vicarious) punishment of moral wrongdoers. We used naturalistic television drama as a sampling space for observing outcomes of morally-relevant behaviors to assess how individuals cognitively process dynamically evolving moral actions and their consequences. Drawing on Affective Disposition Theory, we derived hypotheses linking character morality with viewers' neural processing of characters' rewards and punishments. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine neural responses of 28 female participants while free-viewing 15 short story summary video clips of episodes from a popular US television soap opera. Each summary included a complete narrative structure, fully crossing main character behaviors (moral/immoral) and the consequences (reward/punishment) characters faced for their actions. Narrative engagement was examined via intersubject correlation and representational similarity analysis. Highest cortical synchronization in 9 specifically selected regions previously implicated in processing moral information was observed when characters who act immorally are punished for their actions with participants' empathy as an important moderator. The results advance our understanding of the moral brain and the role of normative considerations and character outcomes in viewers' engagement with popular narratives.

Uncertain Facts or Uncertain Values? Testing the Distinction Between Empirical and Normative Uncertainty in Moral Judgments

People can be uncertain in their moral judgments. Philosophers have argued that such uncertainty can either refer to the underlying empirical facts (empirical uncertainty) or to the normative evaluation of these facts itself (normative uncertainty). Psychological investigations of this distinction, however, are rare. In this paper, we combined factor-analytical and experimental approaches to show that empirical and normative uncertainty describe two related but different psychological states. In Study 1, we asked N = 265 participants to describe a case of moral uncertainty and to rate different aspects of their uncertainty about this case. Across this wide range of moral scenarios, our items loaded onto three reliable factors: lack of information, unclear consequences, and normative uncertainty. In Study 2, we confirmed this factor structure using predefined stimulus material. N = 402 participants each rated eight scenarios that systematically varied in their degree of uncertainty regarding the consequences of the described actions and in the value conflict that was inherent to them. The empirical uncertainty factors were mainly affected by the introduction of uncertainty regarding consequences, and the normative uncertainty factor was mainly affected by the introduction of value conflict. Our studies provide evidence that the distinction between empirical and normative uncertainty accurately describes a psychological reality. We discuss the relevance of our findings for research on moral judgments and decision-making, and folk metaethics.

Blame framing and prior knowledge influence moral judgments for people involved in the Tulsa Race Massacre among a combined Oklahoma and UK sample

Introduction

How an event is framed impacts how people judge the morality of those involved, but prior knowledge can influence information processing about an event, which also can impact moral judgments. The current study explored how blame framing and self-reported prior knowledge of a historical act of racial violence, labeled as Riot, Massacre, or Event, impacted individual's cumulative moral judgments regarding the groups involved in the Tulsa Race Massacre (Black Tulsans, the Tulsa Police, and White Tulsans).

Methods and results

This study was collected in two cohorts including undergraduates attending the University of Oklahoma and individuals living in the United Kingdom. Participants were randomly assigned to a blame framing condition, read a factual summary of what happened in Tulsa in 1921, and then responded to various moral judgment items about each group. Individuals without prior knowledge had higher average Likert ratings (more blame) toward Black Tulsans and lower average Likert ratings (less blame) toward White Tulsans and the Tulsa Police compared to participants with prior knowledge. This finding was largest when what participants read was framed as a Massacre rather than a Riot or Event. We also found participants with prior knowledge significantly differed in how they made moral judgments across target groups; those with prior knowledge had lower average Likert ratings (less blame) for Black Tulsans and higher average Likert ratings (more blame) for White Tulsans on items pertaining to causal responsibility, intentionality, and punishment compared to participants without prior knowledge.

Discussion

Findings suggest that the effect of blame framing on moral judgments is dependent on prior knowledge. Implications for how people interpret both historical and new events involving harmful consequences are discussed.

Moral reasoning behind the veil of ignorance: An investigation into perspective-taking accessibility in the context of autonomous vehicles

Perspective-taking (PT) accessibility has been recognized as an important factor in affecting moral reasoning, also playing a non-trivial role in moral investigation towards autonomous vehicles (AVs). A new proposal to deepen this effect leverages the principles of the veil of ignorance (VOI), as a moral reasoning device aimed to control self-interested decisions by limiting the access to specific perspectives and to potentially biased information. Throughout two studies, we deepen the role of VOI reasoning in the moral perception of AVs, disclosing personal and contingent information progressively throughout the experiment. With the use of the moral trilemma paradigm, two different VOI conditions were operationalized, inspired by the Original Position theory by John Rawls and the Equiprobability Model by John Harsanyi. Evidence suggests a significant role of VOI reasoning in affecting moral reasoning, which seems not independent from the order in which information is revealed. Coherently, a detrimental effect of self-involvement on utilitarian behaviours was detected. These results highlight the importance of considering PT accessibility and self-involvement when investigating moral attitudes towards AVs, since it can help the intelligibility of general concerns and hesitations towards this new technology.

Children Value Animals More Than Adults Do: A Conceptual Replication and Extension

Recent psychological research finds that U.S. American children have a weaker tendency than U.S. American adults to value humans more than animals. We aimed to conceptually replicate and extend this finding in a preregistered study (N = 412). We investigated whether 6- to 9-year-old Polish children (Study 1a) are less likely to prioritize humans over animals than Polish adults are (Studies 1b and 1c). We presented participants with moral dilemmas where they had to prioritize either humans or animals (dogs or chimpanzees) in situations that involved harming (i.e., a trolley problem) or benefiting (i.e., giving a snack). We found that Polish children prioritized humans over animals less than Polish adults did. This was the case both in dilemmas that involved preventing harm and in dilemmas that involved providing snacks. Both children and adults prioritized humans over chimpanzees more than humans over dogs.

Moral foundations elicit shared and dissociable cortical activation modulated by political ideology

Moral foundations theory (MFT) holds that moral judgements are driven by modular and ideologically variable moral foundations but where and how these foundations are represented in the brain and shaped by political beliefs remains an open question. Using a moral vignette judgement task (n = 64), we probed the neural (dis)unity of moral foundations. Univariate analyses revealed that moral judgement of moral foundations, versus conventional norms, reliably recruits core areas implicated in theory of mind. Yet, multivariate pattern analysis demonstrated that each moral foundation elicits dissociable neural representations distributed throughout the cortex. As predicted by MFT, individuals' liberal or conservative orientation modulated neural responses to moral foundations. Our results confirm that each moral foundation recruits domain-general mechanisms of social cognition but also has a dissociable neural signature malleable by sociomoral experience. We discuss these findings in view of unified versus dissociable accounts of morality and their neurological support for MFT.

An Asymmetric Effect: Physical and Simulated Confederate's Mere Presence Induce a Preference for Deontological Over Utilitarian Judgment

People may behave differently in a shared physical context due to the mere presence of others. The study examined whether individual moral judgments were subject to the confederate's presence. Experiment 1 supported the hypothesis that the confederate's presence, relative to the control group, increased deontological judgment, disapproving of sacrificing a person's lifetime or interest for preserving the greater good of others. Experiment 2 investigated whether the results extend to mental space. The result revealed that simulating a positive interaction with the confederate significantly increased the preference for deontological judgments relative to the control group. However, the effect disappeared if the participants were required to simulate only the person from the scenario that did not include any additional background contexts. These results demonstrated that the confederate's physical presence and simulated confederate's presence always preferred deontological judgments over utilitarian judgments. The findings suggested that the asymmetric moral effect occurred in the physical realm and mental space.

Morality in middle childhood: the role of callous-unemotional traits and emotion regulation skills

BACKGROUND

The development of morality is vital for fostering prosocial behavior and enhancing both individual and societal well-being. Clarifying what contextual and individual factors play a role in moral processes during childhood can contribute to our understanding of the development of morality. Given the previous acknowledgment of importance, yet lack of existing empirical findings, the study focused on the significance of callous-unemotional traits (i.e., an affective-interpersonal personality trait, related to psychopathy in adulthood) and emotion regulation (i.e., an essential part of socio-emotional competence, and a transdiagnostic factor in the development of psychopathology) for moral emotions and cognitions during middle childhood. The concrete aim was to examine direct and indirect effects of callous-unemotional trait dimensions (callousness, uncaring, unemotionality) onto immoral emotional attribution (i.e., feeling good after immoral decisions) and admissibility of immoral actions (i.e., evaluating immoral actions as being okay) via emotion regulation skills.

METHODS

A cross-sectional study was conducted with 194 children attending Grades 1 to 4, and their primary caregivers. The children completed the Inventory of Callous-Unemotional Traits and caregivers completed the Emotion Regulation Checklist. The children were also presented with a set of moral dilemma vignettes, and asked about the emotions of protagonists who acted immoral, and the admissibility of their actions.

RESULTS

Path-model analysis revealed (1) negative direct effects of emotion regulation skills onto immoral emotional attribution and admissibility of immoral actions, (2) positive direct effects of the dimensions callousness and uncaring onto immoral emotional attribution and admissibility of immoral actions, and (3) negative direct effects of dimensions callousness and uncaring onto emotion regulation skills. Indirect effects, indicating that emotion regulation skills mediate the association between the callous-unemotional trait dimensions and morality, were also found.

CONCLUSION

The findings address a knowledge gap and indicate that emotion regulation skills, callousness, and uncaring play an important role in morality in middle childhood and should be included in frameworks of moral decision-making and development.

Moral foundations theory and the narrative self: towards an improved concept of moral selfhood for the empirical study of morality

Within the empirical study of moral decision making, people's morality is often identified by measuring general moral values through a questionnaire, such as the Moral Foundations Questionnaire provided by Moral Foundations Theory (MFT). However, the success of these moral values in predicting people's behaviour has been disappointing. The general and context-free manner in which such approaches measure moral values and people's moral identity seems crucial in this respect. Yet, little research has been done into the underlying notion of self. This article aims to fill this gap. Taking a phenomenological approach and focusing on MFT, we examine the concept of moral self that MFT assumes and present an improved concept of moral self for the empirical study of morality. First, we show that MFT adopts an essentialist concept of moral self, consisting of stable moral traits. Then, we argue that such a notion is unable to grasp the dynamical and context sensitive aspects of the moral self. We submit that Ricoeur's narrative notion of identity, a self that reinterprets itself in every decision situation through self-narrative, is a viable alternative since it is able to incorporate context sensitivity and change, while maintaining a persisting moral identity. Finally, we argue that this narrative concept of moral self implies measuring people's morality in a more exploratory fashion within a delineated context.

Moral foundations of pro-choice and pro-life women

Opinions on abortion are more polarized than opinions on most other moral issues. Why are some people pro-choice and some pro-life? Religious and political preferences play a role here, but pro-choice and pro-life people may also differ in other aspects. In the current preregistered study (N = 479), we investigated how pro-choice women differ in their moral foundations from pro-life women. When the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) was applied (i.e., when declared moral principles were measured), pro-life women scored higher than pro-choice women in loyalty, authority, and purity. However, when women were asked about moral judgments indirectly via more real-life problems from the Moral Foundations Vignettes (MFV), pro-choice women scored higher than pro-life women in emotional and physical care and liberty but lower in loyalty. When we additionally controlled for religious practice and political views, we found no differences between groups in declaring moral foundations (MFQ). However, in the case of real-life moral judgments (MFV), we observed higher care, fairness, and liberty among pro-choice and higher authority and purity among pro-life. Our results show intriguing nuances between women pro-choice and pro-life as we found a different pattern of moral foundations in those groups depending on whether we measured their declared abstract moral principles or moral judgment about real-life situations. We also showed how religious practice and political views might play a role in such differences. We conclude that attitudes to abortion "go beyond" abstract moral principles, and the real-life context matters in moral judgments.

Graphical abstract

Supplementary information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12144-023-04800-0.

Ordinary citizens are more severe towards verbal than nonverbal hate-motivated incidents with identical consequences

Do we judge hate incidents similarly when they are performed using words or bodily actions? Hate speech incidents are rarely reported by bystanders, and whether or how much they should be punished remains a matter of legal, theoretical and social disagreement. In a pre-registered study (N = 1309), participants read about verbal and nonverbal attacks stemming from identical hateful intent, which created the same consequences for the victims. We asked them how much punishment the perpetrator should receive, how likely they would be to denounce such an incident and how much harm they judged the victim suffered. The results contradicted our pre-registered hypotheses and the predictions of dual moral theories, which hold that intention and harmful consequences are the sole psychological determinants of punishment. Instead, participants consistently rated verbal hate attacks as more deserving of punishment, denunciation and being more harmful to the victim than nonverbal attacks. This difference is explained by the concept of action aversion, suggesting that lay observers have different intrinsic associations with interactions involving words compared to bodily actions, regardless of consequences. This explanation has implications for social psychology, moral theories, and legislative efforts to sanction hate speech, which are considered. PROTOCOL REGISTRATION: The Stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on 29/06/2022. The protocol, as accepted by the journal, can be found at: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/Z86TV .

Who attributes what to whom? Moral values and relational context shape causal attribution to the person or the situation

Eight preregistered studies (total N = 3,758) investigate the role of values and relational context in attributions for moral violations, focusing on the following questions: (1) Do people's values influence their attributions? (2) Do people's relationships with the violator (self, close other, distant other) influence their attributions? (3) Do the principles intrinsic to the violated values (e.g., loyalty to close others) further influence their attributions? We found that participants were more likely to attribute violations by distant others to the person committing the violation, rather than the situation in which the violation occurred, when participants endorsed the violated values themselves. The tendency to make dispositional attributions did not obtain for violations of participants' less highly endorsed moral values or non-moral values. Relationship with the violator also influenced participants' attributions-participants were more likely to attribute their own and close others' moral violations to situational factors, relative to distant others' violations. This relational pattern was pronounced for violations of "binding" moral values, in which protection of personal relationships and groups is primary. Collectively, these results support a relational-values account of causal attribution for moral violations, whereby attributions systematically vary based on (1) the relevance of the violated values to the attributor's moral values, (2) the attributor's personal relationship to the violator, and (3) an interaction between (1) and (2) such that the principles intrinsic to the violated values influence the effects of one's relationship to the violator.

Permitting immoral behaviour: A generalized compensation belief hypothesis

When are we more likely to permit immoral behaviours? The current research examined a generalized compensation belief hypothesis that individuals, as observers, would morally tolerate and accept someone paying forward unfair treatment to an innocent person as a means to compensate for the perpetrator's previously experienced mistreatment. Across five experiments (N = 1107) based on economic games (Studies 1-4) and diverse real-life scenarios (Study 5), we showed that participants, as observing third parties, were more likely to morally permit and engage in the same negative act once they knew about previous maltreatment of the perpetrator. This belief occurred even when the content of received and paid-forward maltreatment was non-identical (Study 2), when the negative treatment was received from a non-human target (Study 3) and when the maltreatment was intangible (e.g. material loss) or relational (e.g. social exclusion; Study 5). Perceived required compensation mediated the effect of previous maltreatment on moral permission (Studies 4 and 5). The results consistently suggest that people's moral permission of immoral behaviours is influenced by perpetrator's previous mistreatment, contributing to a better understanding of the nature and nuances of our sense of fairness and contextualized moral judgement.

Emotional descriptions increase accidental harm punishment and its cortico-limbic signatures during moral judgment in autism

Individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) present difficulties in integrating mental state information in complex moral tasks. Yet, ASD research has not examined whether this process is influenced by emotions, let alone while capturing its neural bases. We investigated how language-induced emotions modulate intent-based moral judgment in ASD. In a fMRI task, 30 adults with ASD and 27 neurotypical controls read vignettes whose protagonists commit harm either accidentally or intentionally, and then decided how much punishment the protagonist deserved. Emotional content was manipulated across scenarios through the use of graphic language (designed to trigger arousing negative responses) vs. plain (just-the-facts, emotionless) language. Off-line functional connectivity correlates of task performance were also analyzed. In ASD, emotional (graphic) descriptions amplified punishment ratings of accidental harms, associated with increased activity in fronto-temporo-limbic, precentral, and postcentral/supramarginal regions (critical for emotional and empathic processes), and reduced connectivity among the orbitofrontal cortex and the angular gyrus (involved in mentalizing). Language manipulation did not influence intentional harm processing in ASD. In conclusion, in arousing and ambiguous social situations that lack intentionality clues (i.e. graphic accidental harm scenarios), individuals with ASD would misuse their emotional responses as the main source of information to guide their moral decisions. Conversely, in face of explicit harmful intentions, they would be able to compensate their socioemotional alterations and assign punishment through non-emotional pathways. Despite limitations, such as the small sample size and low ecological validity of the task, results of the present study proved reliable and have relevant theoretical and translational implications.

Contextualizing sacrificial dilemmas within Covid-19 for the study of moral judgment

"Sacrificial dilemmas" are the scenarios typically used to study moral judgment and human morality. However, these dilemmas have been criticized regarding their lack of ecological validity. The COVID-19 pandemic offers a relevant context to further examine individuals’ moral judgment and choice of action with more realistic sacrificial dilemmas. Using this context, the purpose of the present study is to investigate how moral responses are influenced by the contextualization of the dilemma (i.e., contextualized or not within the Covid-19 pandemic). By comparing two versions of one dilemma, Experiment 1 revealed that the more realistic version (the one contextualized within the Covid-19 pandemic) did not elicit more utilitarian responses than the less realistic version (the one not contextualized within the Covid-19 pandemic). In Experiment 2, we examined more specifically whether both the perceived realism of the dilemma and the plausibility of a utilitarian action influence moral responses. Results confirmed that the contextualization of the dilemma does not make any difference in moral responses. However, the plausibility of an action appears to exert an influence on the choice of action. Indeed, participants were more inclined to choose the utilitarian action in the plausible action versions than in the implausible action versions of the dilemma. Overall, these results shed light on the importance for future research of using mundane and dramatic realistic dilemmas displaying full information regarding a sacrificial action and its consequences.

Moral psychology from the lab to the wild: Relief registries as a paradigm for studying real-world altruism

Experimental psychology’s recent shift toward low-effort, high-volume methods (e.g., self-reports, online studies) and away from the more effortful study of naturalistic behavior raises concerns about the ecological validity of findings from these fields, concerns that have become particularly apparent in the field of moral psychology. To help address these concerns, we introduce a method allowing researchers to investigate an important, widespread form of altruistic behavior–charitable donations–in a manner balancing competing concerns about internal validity, ecological validity, and ease of implementation: relief registries, which leverage existing online gift registry platforms to allow research subjects to choose among highly needed donation items to ship directly to charitable organizations. Here, we demonstrate the use of relief registries in two experiments exploring the ecological validity of the finding from our own research that people are more willing to help others after having imagined themselves doing so. In this way, we sought to provide a blueprint for researchers seeking to enhance the ecological validity of their own research in a narrow sense (i.e., by using the relief registry method we introduce) and in broader terms by adapting methods that take advantage of modern technology to directly impact others’ lives outside the lab.

More utilitarian judgment in Internet addiction? An exploration using process dissociation and the CNI model

BACKGROUND

Internet addiction (IA), which is disadvantageous for decision making, such as moral judgment, is a pernicious threat to contemporary societies. However, few studies consider social cognition abilities as an important variable in IA.

OBJECTIVES

This study explores the psychological mechanism of IA facing the moral dilemma.

METHODS

Forty participants with IA and 89 healthy participants were recruited. They finished the Internet Addiction Test and completed the moral judgment task. The process dissociation (PD) method and the consequences, norms, and generalized inaction (CNI) model were used to analyze moral judgment data.

RESULTS

Compared with the healthy control (HC) group, the traditional analysis showed that the IA group made more utilitarian judgment regarding moral dilemmas. PD analysis showed that the IA group had decreased deontological inclination, without utilitarian inclination. The CNI model further showed that the sensitivity of the IA group to moral rules was significantly lower than that of the HC group, while there was no significant difference between groups in the sensitivity to the consequences and the general preference for action.

CONCLUSIONS

Individuals with IA make more utilitarian judgment when faced with a moral dilemma, which is related to their weak sensitivity to moral norms.

Moral judgment, decision times and emotional salience of a new developed set of sacrificial manual driving dilemmas

The growing interest in the subject of moral judgment in driver and autonomous vehicle behavior highlights the importance of investigating the suitability of sacrificial dilemmas as experimental tools in the context of traffic psychology. To this aim a set of validated sacrificial trolley problems and a new set of trolley-like driving dilemmas were compared through an online survey experiment, providing normative values for rates of participants' choices; decision times; evaluation of emotional valence and arousal experienced during the decision process; and ratings of the moral acceptability. Results showed that while both sets of dilemmas led to a more frequent selection of utilitarian outcomes, the driving-type dilemmas seemed to enhance faster decisions mainly based on the utilitarian moral code. No further differences were observed between the two sets, confirming the reliability of the moral dilemma tool in the investigation of moral driving behaviors. We suggest that as moral judgments and behaviors become more lifelike, the individual's moral inclination emerge more automatically and effectively. This new driving-type dilemma set may help researchers who work in traffic psychology and moral decision-making to approach the complex task of developing realistic moral scenarios more easily in the context of autonomous and nonautonomous transportation.

The puzzle of wrongless harms: Some potential concerns for dyadic morality and related accounts

There is wide-ranging consensus that harm or perceptions of harm play a significant role in judgments of moral wrongdoing. On one prominent view, the pattern that makes up the "essence" (Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012) of acts of moral wrongdoing is "harm caused by an agent" (Schein, Goranson, & Gray, 2015, p. 983). According to Gray, Schein, and colleagues, events matching this pattern-a thinking/intentional agent inflicting some manner of harm (i.e., emotional/physical pain) upon a suffering patient-will be perceived as immoral. With this proposal in mind, we argue two basic points: (1) the current specification of the dyadic template would need to be further refined or "fortified" to withstand some obvious counter-examples; (2) this "fortified" formulation is still unfit to address the underlying concern: for any general pattern that is supposed to link perceptions of harm and wrongdoing, there are a number of cases (the "wrongless harms" of the title) that match the pattern quite well but are not viewed as immoral. We show this in four studies and one supplementary study. In our original study, we find, across six vignettes, that people may judge a behavior to be intended, self-serving, as well as foreseeably harmful and yet not judge it immoral. In our subsequent studies, we replicate these results with further checks and controls. With these findings in mind, we argue that moral cognition is far too complex and capricious to be reduced to a template.

Moral Judgment as Categorization (MJAC)

Observed variability and complexity of judgments of "right" and "wrong" cannot be readily accounted for within extant approaches to understanding moral judgment. In response to this challenge, we present a novel perspective on categorization in moral judgment. Moral judgment as categorization (MJAC) incorporates principles of category formation research while addressing key challenges of existing approaches to moral judgment. People develop skills in making context-relevant categorizations. They learn that various objects (events, behaviors, people, etc.) can be categorized as morally right or wrong. Repetition and rehearsal result in reliable, habitualized categorizations. According to this skill-formation account of moral categorization, the learning and the habitualization of the forming of moral categories occur within goal-directed activity that is sensitive to various contextual influences. By allowing for the complexity of moral judgments, MJAC offers greater explanatory power than existing approaches while also providing opportunities for a diverse range of new research questions.

Many heads are more utilitarian than one

Moral judgments have a very prominent social nature, and in everyday life, they are continually shaped by discussions with others. Psychological investigations of these judgments, however, have rarely addressed the impact of social interactions. To examine the role of social interaction on moral judgments within small groups, we had groups of 4 to 5 participants judge moral dilemmas first individually and privately, then collectively and interactively, and finally individually a second time. We employed both real-life and sacrificial moral dilemmas in which the character's action or inaction violated a moral principle to benefit the greatest number of people. Participants decided if these utilitarian decisions were morally acceptable or not. In Experiment 1, we found that collective judgments in face-to-face interactions were more utilitarian than the statistical aggregate of their members compared to both first and second individual judgments. This observation supported the hypothesis that deliberation and consensus within a group transiently reduce the emotional burden of norm violation. In Experiment 2, we tested this hypothesis more directly: measuring participants' state anxiety in addition to their moral judgments before, during, and after online interactions, we found again that collectives were more utilitarian than those of individuals and that state anxiety level was reduced during and after social interaction. The utilitarian boost in collective moral judgments is probably due to the reduction of stress in the social setting.

Are some cultures more mind-minded in their moral judgements than others?

Cross-cultural research on moral reasoning has brought to the fore the question of whether moral judgements always turn on inferences about the mental states of others. Formal legal systems for assigning blame and punishment typically make fine-grained distinctions about mental states, as illustrated by the concept of mens rea, and experimental studies in the USA and elsewhere suggest everyday moral judgements also make use of such distinctions. On the other hand, anthropologists have suggested that some societies have a morality that is disregarding of mental states, and have marshalled ethnographic and experimental evidence in support of this claim. Here, we argue against the claim that some societies are simply less ‘mind-minded’ than others about morality. In place of this cultural main effects hypothesis about the role of mindreading in morality, we propose a contextual variability view in which the role of mental states in moral judgement depends on the context and the reasons for judgement. On this view, which mental states are or are not relevant for a judgement is context-specific, and what appear to be cultural main effects are better explained by culture-by-context interactions.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

How to weigh lives. A computational model of moral judgment in multiple-outcome structures

When is it allowed to carry out an action that saves lives, but leads to the loss of others? While a minority of people may deny the permissibility of such actions categorically, most will probably say that the answer depends, among other factors, on the number of lives saved versus lives lost. Theories of moral reasoning acknowledge the importance of outcome trade-offs for moral judgments, but remain silent on the precise functional form of the psychological mechanism that determines their moral permissibility. An exception is Cohen and Ahn's (2016) subjective-utilitarian theory of moral judgment, but their model is currently limited to decisions in two-option life-and-death dilemmas. Our goal is to study other types of moral judgments in a larger set of cases. We propose a computational model based on sampling and integrating subjective utilities. Our model captures moral permissibility judgments about actions with multiple effects across a range of scenarios involving humans, animals, and plants, and is able to account for some response patterns that might otherwise be associated with deontological ethics. While our model can be embedded in a number of competing contemporary theories of moral reasoning, we argue that it would most fruitfully be combined with a causal model theory.

Attitude Moralization Within Polarized Contexts: An Emotional Value-Protective Response to Dyadic Harm Cues

Polarization about societal issues involves attitudinal conflict, but we know little about how such conflict transforms into moral conflict. Integrating insights on polarization and psychological value protection, we propose a model that predicts when and how attitude moralization (i.e., when attitudes become grounded in core values) may be triggered and develops within polarized contexts. We tested this model in three experiments (total N = 823) in the context of the polarized Zwarte Piet (blackface) debate in the Netherlands. Specifically, we tested the hypotheses that (a) situational cues to dyadic harm in this context (i.e., an outgroup that is perceived as intentionally inflicting harm onto innocent victims) trigger individuals to moralize their relevant attitude, because of (b) emotional value-protective responses. Findings supported both hypotheses across different regional contexts, suggesting that attitude moralization can emerge within polarized contexts when people are exposed to actions by attitudinal opponents perceived as causing dyadic harm.

How social relationships shape moral wrongness judgments

Judgments of whether an action is morally wrong depend on who is involved and the nature of their relationship. But how, when, and why social relationships shape moral judgments is not well understood. We provide evidence to address these questions, measuring cooperative expectations and moral wrongness judgments in the context of common social relationships such as romantic partners, housemates, and siblings. In a pre-registered study of 423 U.S. participants nationally representative for age, race, and gender, we show that people normatively expect different relationships to serve cooperative functions of care, hierarchy, reciprocity, and mating to varying degrees. In a second pre-registered study of 1,320 U.S. participants, these relationship-specific cooperative expectations (i.e., relational norms) enable highly precise out-of-sample predictions about the perceived moral wrongness of actions in the context of particular relationships. In this work, we show that this 'relational norms' model better predicts patterns of moral wrongness judgments across relationships than alternative models based on genetic relatedness, social closeness, or interdependence, demonstrating how the perceived morality of actions depends not only on the actions themselves, but also on the relational context in which those actions occur.

How prosocial is moral courage?

Moral courage, that is, defending moral beliefs despite personal risks, is often seen as a hallmark of prosocial behavior. We argue that prosociality in moral courage is, however, complex. While its prosociality is often evident at a higher societal level, it can be contested in some aspects of morally courageous acts. We review the literature on two such aspects and highlight that differences and conflicts in moral beliefs, as well as the confrontational nature of many morally courageous acts, call into question prosociality. We recommend that future research takes the complexity of prosociality in moral courage into account to obtain a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the psychological underpinnings of moral courage and its contributions to the functioning of societies.

What we would (but shouldn't) do for those we love: Universalism versus partiality in responding to others' moral transgressions

Recent work indicates that people are more likely to protect a close (vs. distant) other who commits a crime. But do people think it is morally right to treat close others differently? On the one hand, universalist moral principles dictate that people should be treated equally. On the other hand, close relationships are the source of special moral obligations, which may lead people to believe they ought to preferentially protect close others. Here we attempt to adjudicate between these competing considerations by examining what people think they would and should do when a close (vs. distant) other behaves immorally. Across four experiments (N = 2002), we show that people believe they morally should protect close others more than distant others. However, we also document a striking discrepancy: participants reported that they would protect close others far more than they should protect them. These findings demonstrate that people believe close relationships influence what they morally ought to do-but also that moral decisions about close others may be a context in which people are particularly likely to fail to do what they think is morally right.

The cherry effect or the issue behind well-being

Humans define well-being on predefined assumptions, based on inner and outer criteria as references. As illustrated, these criteria are subject to constant change, even in a situation when one is acting freely and is in control of all possible external influences. Even in scenarios that seemingly allow autonomy with one variable to analyse, underlying "irrationality" affects our ability to define and operationalize any desirable trait or state, such as well-being, euthymia or health. Before eating a bowl full of cherries, one creates an idea of how much cherries he/she will eat. However, as one starts eating, perception and following assumptions change. As cherries labeled as most desirable disappear, other cherries start to appear more alluring. The cherry effect could be of relevance in defining the terms such as well-being, euthymia and basically any other term encompassing a complex category of the human condition dependent on our perceived reality.

Cognition in moral space: A minimal model

We describe moral cognition as a process occurring in a distinctive cognitive space, wherein moral relationships are defined along several morally relevant dimensions. After identifying candidate dimensions, we show how moral judgments can emerge in this space directly from object perception, without any appeal to moral rules or abstract values. Our reductive "minimal model" (Batterman & Rice, 2014) elaborates Beal's (2020) claim that moral cognition is determined, at the most basic level, by "ontological frames" defining subjects, objects, and the proper relation between them. We expand this claim into a set of formal hypotheses that predict moral judgments based on how objects are "framed" in the relevant dimensions of "moral space."

Binding moral values gain importance in the presence of close others

A key function of morality is to regulate social behavior. Research suggests moral values may be divided into two types: binding values, which govern behavior in groups, and individualizing values, which promote personal rights and freedoms. Because people tend to mentally activate concepts in situations in which they may prove useful, the importance they afford moral values may vary according to whom they are with in the moment. In particular, because binding values help regulate communal behavior, people may afford these values more importance when in the presence of close (versus distant) others. Five studies test and support this hypothesis. First, we use a custom smartphone application to repeatedly record participants' (n = 1166) current social context and the importance they afforded moral values. Results show people rate moral values as more important when in the presence of close others, and this effect is stronger for binding than individualizing values-an effect that replicates in a large preregistered online sample (n = 2016). A lab study (n = 390) and two preregistered online experiments (n = 580 and n = 752) provide convergent evidence that people afford binding, but not individualizing, values more importance when in the real or imagined presence of close others. Our results suggest people selectively activate different moral values according to the demands of the situation, and show how the mere presence of others can affect moral thinking.

The extended Moral Foundations Dictionary (eMFD): Development and applications of a crowd-sourced approach to extracting moral intuitions from text

Moral intuitions are a central motivator in human behavior. Recent work highlights the importance of moral intuitions for understanding a wide range of issues ranging from online radicalization to vaccine hesitancy. Extracting and analyzing moral content in messages, narratives, and other forms of public discourse is a critical step toward understanding how the psychological influence of moral judgments unfolds at a global scale. Extant approaches for extracting moral content are limited in their ability to capture the intuitive nature of moral sensibilities, constraining their usefulness for understanding and predicting human moral behavior. Here we introduce the extended Moral Foundations Dictionary (eMFD), a dictionary-based tool for extracting moral content from textual corpora. The eMFD, unlike previous methods, is constructed from text annotations generated by a large sample of human coders. We demonstrate that the eMFD outperforms existing approaches in a variety of domains. We anticipate that the eMFD will contribute to advance the study of moral intuitions and their influence on social, psychological, and communicative processes.

Trolley dilemma in the sky: Context matters when civilians and cadets make remotely piloted aircraft decisions

Crews operating remotely piloted aircrafts (RPAs) in military operations may be among the few that truly experience tragic dilemmas similar to the famous Trolley Problem. In order to analyze decision-making and emotional conflict of RPA operators within Trolley-Problem-like dilemma situations, we created an RPA simulation that varied mission contexts (firefighter, military and surveillance as a control condition) and the social “value” of a potential victim. We found that participants (Air Force cadets and civilian students) were less likely to make the common utilitarian choice (sacrificing one to save five), when the value of the one increased, especially in the military context. However, in the firefighter context, this decision pattern was much less pronounced. The results demonstrate behavioral and justification differences when people are more invested in a particular context despite ostensibly similar dilemmas.

Children Prioritize Humans Over Animals Less Than Adults Do

Is the tendency to morally prioritize humans over animals weaker in children than adults? In two preregistered studies (total N = 622), 5- to 9-year-old children and adults were presented with moral dilemmas pitting varying numbers of humans against varying numbers of either dogs or pigs and were asked who should be saved. In both studies, children had a weaker tendency than adults to prioritize humans over animals. They often chose to save multiple dogs over one human, and many valued the life of a dog as much as the life of a human. Although they valued pigs less, the majority still prioritized 10 pigs over one human. By contrast, almost all adults chose to save one human over even 100 dogs or pigs. Our findings suggest that the common view that humans are far more morally important than animals appears late in development and is likely socially acquired.

The Morality of War: A Review and Research Agenda

What is judged as morally right and wrong in war? I argue that despite many decades of research on moral psychology and the psychology of intergroup conflict, social psychology does not yet have a good answer to this question. However, it is a question of great importance because its answer has implications for decision-making in war, public policy, and international law. I therefore suggest a new way for psychology researchers to study the morality of war that combines the strengths of philosophical just-war theory with experimental techniques and theories developed for the psychological study of morality more generally. This novel approach has already begun to elucidate the moral judgments third-party observers make in war, and I demonstrate that these early findings have important implications for moral psychology, just-war theory, and the understanding of the morality of war.